Judgment :- Tarun Kumar Gupta, J.:- This Second Appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 03.01.2005 passed by learned Judge XIII City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Appeal No.34 of 2001 affirming the judgment and decree of eviction dated 20.12.2000 passed by learned Judge 3rd Bench, Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No.1442 of 2000. The case of the respective parties may be summarized as follows:- Respondent/plaintiff filed the suit alleging that she purchased the structure of the suit property which comprised in Thika Tenancy from Namita Barik and Dipu Rani Bakshi for valuable consideration on 30.07.1981. Despite issuing of letter of attornment defendant being a tenant of the suit premises defaulted in payment of rent since August, 1981. Plaintiff having no other suitable accommodation elsewhere requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation. Accordingly, the tenancy of the defendant was terminated by a notice to quit. As defendant did not vacate the suit premises, the suit was filed. Defendant contested said suit by filing written statement denying material allegations of the plaint and contending inter alia that the plaintiff was neither owner nor landlord and that defendant was a tenant under one Shyam Chand Dutta and that plaintiff obtained fictitious title deed. There was no relation of landlord and tenant between the parties. The suit was liable to be dismissed. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties several issues were framed. Learned Trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment observing that plaintiff was owner/landlord of the suit premises and that defendant was a defaulter and that tenancy was terminated as per law and that plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises having no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. Defendant/tenant preferred an appeal but the same was dismissed in the Lower Appellate Court. At the time of admission of this Second Appeal the following substantial questions of law were formulated. Defendant/tenant preferred an appeal but the same was dismissed in the Lower Appellate Court. At the time of admission of this Second Appeal the following substantial questions of law were formulated. (1) “Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in proceeding as if the order dated March 20, 1993 had attained finality for not preferring any revisional application against such order by totally overlooking the fact that against such order a revisional application was moved and by the order dated June 21, 1993 this Court modified the said order by keeping the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties open; (2) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in not arriving at any finding whether the suit premises was really owned by the vendor of the plaintiff and whether by virtue of purchase from the said vendor the plaintiff became the owner of that portion of the property.” In course of hearing of the appeal additional substantial question of law was formulated as follows:- “Whether in view of the promulgation of The West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001 the Civil Court has jurisdiction to determine the disputes between the parties”. The admitted position of the case may be summarized as follows:- (1) Plaintiff Nirmala Mazumdar claimed to purchase the suit property which comprise in Thika Tenancy, from Namita Barik and Dipu Rani Bakshi (being daughters and legal heirs of Saraswati Bala Dassi, the original Thika Teant under Sham Chand Dutta and Joydeb Dutta) on 30.07.1981. (2) In the original deed of conveyance the particulars of the suit property was described as 22/3 Suri Lane, Kolkata-14. (3) On 28.08.1986 a deed of rectification was executed and registered by the vendors of the plaintiff wherein the property sold was described as portion of premises No.21 Suri Lane, Kolkata-14, which was more particularly described as 21/C Suri Lane, Kolkata-14 upon renumbering. (4) Learned Trial Court by order No.39 dated 17.01.1990 disposed of the application under Section 17(2) and 17(2A) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 holding that defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of 21/C Suri Lane, Kolkata-14. (5) The defendant/tenant preferred a revision being C.O. No.615 of 1990 against said order before this Hon’ble Court. (5) The defendant/tenant preferred a revision being C.O. No.615 of 1990 against said order before this Hon’ble Court. (6) Hon’ble Court set aside the order dated 17.01.1990 and remanded back the matter with following observations “The tenant further contends that he does not hold any property under the plaintiff. The dispute can very well be settled by determination as to whether a portion of premises number No.21, Suri Lane purchased by the plaintiff by virtue of deed dated 30.07.1981 and subsequent deed of rectification dated 28.08.1986 has been renumbered as 21/C, Suri Lane. It has further to be determined as to whether the premises possessed by the tenant appertains to premises No.21/C Suri Lane. On such determination the petition filed by the tenant under Section 1792) and (2A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act may be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. Impugned order is set aside. The Revisional application is allowed.” (7) In terms of the order of the Hon’ble High Court Investigation Commissioner was appointed to ascertain the identity of the suit property and after local investigation he submitted a report stating that suit property was a part of 21 Suri Lane since renumbered as 21/C Suri Lane. (8) At the time of commission work plaintiff /landlady submitted title deeds and other documents including the deed of settlement made by Saraswati Bala Dassi, the original Thika Tenant, in favour of her daughters being vendors of the plaintiff. (9) Learned Trial Court by Order No.103 dated 29.07.93 held that defendant was a tenant under owner landlady plaintiff and directed defendant to clear up arrear rent. (10) Learned Trial Court held that the defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent and was not entitled to protection under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1956. (11) Learned Trial Court further held that notice to quit was legal, valid and duly served upon defendant/tenant and that plaintiff /landlady reasonably required the suit premises, having no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. (12) A decree of ejectment was passed in the learned Trial Court, which was affirmed by learned Lower Appellate Court. Mr. (11) Learned Trial Court further held that notice to quit was legal, valid and duly served upon defendant/tenant and that plaintiff /landlady reasonably required the suit premises, having no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. (12) A decree of ejectment was passed in the learned Trial Court, which was affirmed by learned Lower Appellate Court. Mr. Kashinath De, learned advocate for the appellant/defendant/tenant, has submitted that plaintiff claimed to purchase the structure at suit premises from her vendors namely Dipu Rani Das and Namita Barik who traced their title to said property through one trust deed dated 19th September, 1973 executed by their mother, Saraswati Bala Dassi, the original Thika Tenant. He further submits that said original trust deed of Saraswati Dassi from which plaintiffs’ vendors acquired title to the suit property was placed before learned Investigation Commissioner by the plaintiff at the time of relayment to ascertain whether the part of 21 Suri Lane alleged to be purchased by plaintiff was 21/C Suri Lane i.e., suit property. According to him, in said deed of trust dated 19th September, 1973 plaintiffs’ vendors had no saleable interest in the suit property. If that be the position, he submits, then plaintiff/landlady did not acquire any title by said purchase from her vendors Namita Barik and Dipu Rani Das and subsequent deed of rectification was also of no help. In this connection he has referred a case law reported in AIR 1929 Rangoon 211 (Ma Fatima v. Momin Bibi and others) wherein it was held that a document which was duly proved and accepted by the Commissioners appointed to take evidence, is duly endorsed, initialed and dated by the Commissioner and is received by the Court without endorsement and without any objection by a party, becomes part of the record and his evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the Trial Court did not endorse it as required under Order 13 Rule 4 C. P. C. Mr. J. R. Chatterjee, learned senior advocate for the respondent, has submitted that said deed of settlement dated 17.09.73 which was produced before learned Investigation Commissioner was marked X for identification, but was not marked as an exhibit in the suit to be considered for ascertaining the propriety of title of the plaintiff derived. J. R. Chatterjee, learned senior advocate for the respondent, has submitted that said deed of settlement dated 17.09.73 which was produced before learned Investigation Commissioner was marked X for identification, but was not marked as an exhibit in the suit to be considered for ascertaining the propriety of title of the plaintiff derived. According to him, said deed was handed over to the Advocate Commissioner only for ascertaining the identity of the suit premises and that same was not proved and exhibited in Court during evidence and as such there was no scope of giving any reliance upon said document. He has further submitted that the case law referred by learned Advocate for the respondent /tenant has no application in this case. In this connection he has also referred a case law reported in (2007) 4 SCC page 306 (Amar Nath Agarwalla v. Dhillon Transport Agency) wherein it was held the documents filed by plaintiff not exhibited during trial to prove subletting, cannot be looked into since they were not proved in evidence and the defendant had no opportunity of replying to those documents. I find that the case of Agarwalla (ibid) as referred by learned advocate for the respondent /landlord, has no application in this case. In the referred case plaintiff filed the document which was against the interest of defendant but it was not exhibited. Accordingly, Hon’ble Court held that as defendant had no opportunity of replying those documents the same cannot be looked into. But in the present case plaintiff/landlady herself produced said deed of settlement of Saraswati Dassi to the Advocate Commissioner to show the flow of title of the suit property to her vendor. However, it is also true that the case of Ma Fatima and others (ibid) as referred by learned advocate for the appellant/tenant is not also squarely applicable in this case. In said referred case the document was duly proved and accepted by the Commissioner appointed to take evidence (emphasis added) and was duly endorsed initially and dated by the Commissioner. The Court received said evidence of Commissioner duly recorded but without any endorsement and without objection by a party. In said referred case the document was duly proved and accepted by the Commissioner appointed to take evidence (emphasis added) and was duly endorsed initially and dated by the Commissioner. The Court received said evidence of Commissioner duly recorded but without any endorsement and without objection by a party. Under that circumstances said document can be treated as evidence of the case being part of the record though Court did not endorse it as required under Order 13 Rule 4 C. P. C. In the case in hand, however, said document was handed over to the Pleader Commissioner for ascertaining the identity of the suit premises and not for recording evidence. Accordingly, he put endorsement mark on said document as well as other documents and relying on those documents submitted his report. Under the facts and circumstances said Rangoon case is not also applicable in the facts of this case. However, it is an admitted fact that respondent/landlady admitted said document i.e., trust deed of Saraswati Dassi as a document through which title flowed to her vendors. Now respondent/plaintiff /landlady cannot deny said document though admittedly no party gave any importance to said document at the time of evidence and accordingly it was not exhibited during trial. However, it appears that said deed of trust of Saraswati Dassi is a vital document and is required to be looked into for ascertaining ownership of the plaintiff in the suit premises. The interpretation of said document is a mixed question of law and fact. Before giving any reliance on the recitals of said document, I am of the opinion that the parties particularly plaintiff landlady should be given an opportunity to give further evidence, if any, in support of her claim of title in the suit property in perspective of aforesaid deed of settlement of Saraswati Dassi. On that score I am of the opinion that the matter should be remanded back to the learned Lower Appellate Court for putting an exhibit mark on admission, on said deed of trust executed by Saraswati Dassi and then for giving the parties an opportunity of further evidence, if any, for or /against the title of the plaintiff/landlord in the suit property in perspective of said document of deed of trust. On the basis of said further evidence, if any, and taking note of said deed of trust, Lower Appellate Court has to ascertain afresh whether plaintiff/landlady was owner of the suit premises or not and whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. During argument it was submitted before me that the ground of default was no longer pressed by the landlord as defendant already deposited the arrear as well as current rents. In a case of eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, landlord has to establish ownership over the property. This order of remand is required to set at rest, the controversy cropped up between the parties relating to ownership of the plaintiff over the suit property in the backdrop of said deed of trust executed by Saraswati Dassi. In view of foregoing discussions the impugned judgment and decree are hereby set aside and the suit is remanded back to learned Lower Appellate Court on the grounds stated above. Learned Lower Appellate Court is hereby requested to give the parties liberty to adduce further evidence, if any, only on the point of ownership, if any, of the plaintiff over the suit property and then to rewrite the judgment touching all issues after giving opportunities to the parties to submit their arguments, if any, in support of their respective claims. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Learned Lower Appellate Court is requested to dispose of the matter preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the lower Court record. Office is directed to send down the L.C.R. along with a copy of this judgment to the Lower Court expeditiously. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment be supplied to the leaned Counsels of the party/parties, if applied for.