Heard Ms. Deep Shikha, learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. R. K. Agarwal, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 2. As the common questions of facts and law are involved in the aforementioned cases, they are taken up together for common or­ders. 3. The respondents preferred cases before the Railway Claims Tribunal seeking com­pensation on account of damage to the ce­ment bags. The appellant-resisted the claim on the ground that the consignment was ac­cepted for carriage under Protective Risk Rate Remarks, which was accepted by the con­signor/consignee and no protest was lodged on this score either by the consignee or con­signor. It was further claimed by the appel­lant that the respondent being a regular cus­tomer was in full knowledge that there are no covered sheds for such inwards consign­ments at Mohanlalganj. The date of booking did not relate to the monsoon period. After considering all these aspects, the Tribunal passed the impugned order. Being aggrieved, the aforesaid appeals have been filed. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellants sub­mits that the Tribunal has failed to take into consideration that the consignment reached the destination without any transit delay or negligence on the part of the appellant-re­spondent or any interference en route and con­sequently, the appellant cannot be held liable for losses, if any, occurred to the respondent on account of damage to the cement bags. Moreover, The date of booking of the con­signment and its delivery did not relate to the monsoon period. The Tribunal further failed to take into consideration that the damage to the cement bags occurred on account of sud­den cloud burst, which is an act of God and on which the railway administration had no control and consequently the impugned or­der dated 2.6.2003 has been passed in viola­tion of provisions of Section 93 (a) of the Railway Act, 1989. 5. Further, she submits that it was the duty of the consignor/consignee to have arranged for proper removal of the goods after unload­ing the rake and by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 93 (f) of the Railway Act, 1989, the appellant- respondent cannot be held responsible for damages to the con­signment, if any, on account of carelessness/negligence on the part of the consignee in re­moving the goods. Next, she contends that the appellant took all reasonable care in han­dling the consignment right from its booking I and till delivery at destination. Next, she contends that the appellant took all reasonable care in han­dling the consignment right from its booking I and till delivery at destination. The consignee is a regular customer for goods like cement and was fully aware of non-availability of. covered and termination facilities available at Mohanlalganj and consequently the dam­age to the cement bags occurred on account of negligence of the consignee and consignor themselves. On arrival of the consignment at destination, the same was handed over to the I consignee/consignor, who failed to segregate the effected cement bags. Next submissioij of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that after delivery of the goods, most of the bags under consignment have also been removed by the respondents and tarpaulins were provided. 6. Thus, the Tribunal committed mani error in applying the provisions of Section 99 of the Railways Act, 1989, as they are not at all attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case, as a consequence of which, the' impugned order suffers from illegalities. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand contends that there is no error in the finding recorded by the Tribunal since the responsibility of the Railway administra­tion as bailee under Section 99 of the Rail­ways Act, 1989 is during the free time and the transit time. He, therefore, contends that even if the delivery paper was taken, the pro­visions of Contract Act relating to loss, de­struction, damage and deterioration for non­delivery of goods would also be the responsibility of the railway administration. As the damage was caused during free time and such, the railway administration is responsible as bailee upto the period 7 days and af­ter the period of termination of transit, the Tribunal's Award in granting damages to the respondents cannot be said to be illegal. 8. While supporting the impugned order, Mr. R. K. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that till the goods are un­loaded by the railway, it must be held to be in the custody of the railway and no delivery could be said to have taken place merely by signing the delivery book and surrendering the railway receipts. Thus though there was a token delivery, there was no real delivery by the railway to the consignee. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the case; .m of India v. W. P. Factories [AIR 1966 SC395]. 9. Thus though there was a token delivery, there was no real delivery by the railway to the consignee. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the case; .m of India v. W. P. Factories [AIR 1966 SC395]. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has drawn my attention towards the judgment and order dated 20.9.2007 passed in F.A.F.O. No. 542 of 2004 and another passed by a Divi­sion Bench of this Court, of which I was one of the members. 10. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and find that the Tribunal had recorded a find­ing of fact that the delivery of consignment I was taken by the consignee within free time and the goods were unloaded and placed on the siding of the railways. The said goods were not removed from the railway premises even after physical delivery of goods had been (taken and as such, the railway seized to be­come responsible as bailee in view of provi­sions of Section 160 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The finding recorded by the Tri­bunal is contrary on the ground that bailee is I responsible for a period of 7 days after ter­mination of period of transit cannot be up­held since admittedly, the physical delivery of goods had been taken. The question of damages of the goods within free time or be­yond free time would have no relevancy for fixing responsibility upon the railway admin­istration when it could not be treated as a bai­lee under Section 99 of the Railway Act. Since the goods had been delivered, the responsi­bility of Railway had seized. So far as the damages caused to the goods during the free time is concerned, I find that once the deliv­ery of goods has been made, the only respon­sibility of the railway would be that if the goods remained at its premises and have not been removed by the consignee, the railway would be responsible to provide necessary tarpaulins for prevention from damages of goods from rain on demand made by the con­signee. But such is not the dispute in the present case. The case law relied by Mr. But such is not the dispute in the present case. The case law relied by Mr. R. K. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the respon­dents is not applicable in the facts and cir­cumstances of the case, as in that case, the consignee was not authorized to remove the goods from the wagons by the Railways, whereas in the instant case, the delivery has taken place and goods have also been re­moved, though partly and as such, there would not be any other inference than that physical delivery of the cements bags has taken place. 11. In view of above, the impugned judg­ment of the Tribunal suffers from infirmities. The Tribunal lost sight of the very vital fact that the delivery of the goods had taken place by the respondent, which is proved by the documentary evidence. 12. For the reasons aforesaid, the im­pugned judgments and Awards dated 2.6.2003 contained in the aforementioned First Appeal From Orders are hereby quashed. Accord­ingly, all the F.A.F.Os. are allowed. 13. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.