Shri Narayan Shukla, J:- Heard Mr. S.P. Singh learned Counsel for Lucknow Nagar Nigam and Mr. Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate as well as Mr. S.N. Goswami, learned Counsel for opposite parties. 2. The above noted review applica­tions have been filed by Lucknow Nagar Nigam to review the order dated 1.7.2009 passed by me in Writ Petition No. 2451 (M/S) of 1997 and other connected writ petitions. 3. In the case of Shri Kant it is stated that he was not resident of village Para and his father was Government Servant, as such he was not falling in the category of agricultural labour. It is further stated that the petitioner and his family was jointly holding 14.75 acre of land which is more than 6.25 acres of land in the circle. Accord­ingly, it is stated that he was not eligible for allotment of land under section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Re­forms Act, 1950. In the case of Smt. Gyaneshwari Devi it is stated that she was not resident of village Para and her husband was Government Servant, as such he was not falling in the category of agricultural labour, being so she was not eligible for allotment of land under section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, moreover, she and her family was jointly holding 14.75 acre of land which is more than 6.25 acres of land in the circle. In the case of Kalindi Devi it is stated that she was not resident of village Para and her husband was Government Servant, as such she was not falling in the category of agricultural labour, being so she was not eligible for allotment of land under section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. It is further stated that no patta was existing in favour of her husband. In the case of Mr. Balram Nath it is stated that lessee Smt. Chandra Kunwari was not resident of village Para, as such she was not eligible for allotment of land under section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. It is further stated that Mr. Balram Nath son of Smt. Chandra Kunwari was Government Servant, therefore, Smt. Chandra Kunwari was not falling in the category of agricultural labour. It is further stated that no valid patta was existing in favour of the petitioner. It is further stated that Mr. Balram Nath son of Smt. Chandra Kunwari was Government Servant, therefore, Smt. Chandra Kunwari was not falling in the category of agricultural labour. It is further stated that no valid patta was existing in favour of the petitioner. 4. Mr. S.P. Singh, learned Counsel for Lucknow Nagar Nigam invited the atten­tion of this Court towards section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, which is reproduced hereinunder:- "198. Order of preference in admitting per­sons to land under sections 195 and 197.-(1) In admitting any person as sirdar or asami under section 195 or 197, Gaon Sabha shall sub­ject to the rules framed or order made by the Court under section 178 or 137 observe the following order of preference- (a) a co-operative farm established under this Act, holding land within the jurisdiction of the Gaon Sabha to enable it to possess a suitable area of agricultural or culturable land, (b) a bhumidhar to whom sub-section (2) of section 18 or section 137 ap­plies and who is holding less than six and a quarter acres in area in circle, (c) a tenure-holder other than the bhumidhars to whom clause (b) applies holding land less than six and a quarter acres in area in the circle, (d) a landless labourer residing in the circle, and (e) any other person: Provided that the land allotted to a co­operative farm under Clause (a) shall, if the registration of such farm is cancelled within two years of the allotment, revert upon such cancellation to the Gaon Samaj, and any person holding or retain­ing possession of such land shall be deemed to be occupying it without title liable to ejectment under clause (b) of section 209: Provided further that in the case to which Clauses (b) and (c) apply only such land shall be allotted to such tenure holder as shall be sufficient to bring the total area held by him to 6/1/4 acres. (2) any person aggrieved by an order of the Gaon Sabha passed under sub-section (1) may file an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer who shall hear and decide the same in such manner as may be pre­scribed." 5. In the light of the aforesaid provi­sion Mr. (2) any person aggrieved by an order of the Gaon Sabha passed under sub-section (1) may file an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer who shall hear and decide the same in such manner as may be pre­scribed." 5. In the light of the aforesaid provi­sion Mr. S.P. Singh, learned Counsel for the review petitioners submits that fraudu­lently in connivance of Circle Lekhpal the writ petitioners have managed the allot­ment of land in their favour, which do not confer any right upon them as fraud ren­ders all judicial act and a decree obtained by playing fraud void. 6. In support of his contentions he cited a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. T. Surya Chandra Rao, 2005 (33) AIC 761 (SC) = 2005 (6) SCC 149 in which it has been held as under:- "Fraud and collusion vitiates even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is concept descriptive of human conduct. Michal Levi likens fraud­ster Milton's scorcerer, comus, who exulted in his ability to, 'wining me into the easy hearted man and trap him into snarers.' It has been de­nied as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New Interna­tional dictionary "fraud" is equity has been denied as an act or omis­sion to act or concealment by which one person obtains an ad­vantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Blacks Law Diction­ary, "fraud" is defined as an inten­tional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in re­liance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right. A false rep­resentation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. In Concise Ox­ford Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to gain unjust ad­vantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to have been false and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. In Concise Ox­ford Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to gain unjust ad­vantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to have been false and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 de­fines "fraud" as act committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another. From dictionary meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out of deliberate active role of representator about a fact, which he knows to be untrue yet he suc­ceeds in misleading the represen-tee by making him believe it to be true. The representation to become fraudulent must be of fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading English case i.e. Derry and others v. Peek, (1886-90) All ER1 what constitutes "fraud" was described thus: (All ER p. 22 B-C) "fraud" is proved when it is shown that a false repre­sentation has been made (I) know­ingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false". But "fraud" in public law is not the same as "fraud" in private law. Nor can the ingredients, which es­tablish "fraud" in commercial transaction, be of assistance in de­termining fraud in Administrative Law. It has been aptly observed by Lord Bridge in Khawaja v. Secretary of State for Home Deptt., (1983) 1 All ER 765 that it is dangerous to introduce maxims of common law as to effect of fraud while determining fraud in relation of statutory law. "Fraud" in relation to statute must be a colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute. "If a statute has been passed for some one particular purpose, a Court of law will not countenance any attempt which may be made to extend the opera­tion of the Act to something else which is quite foreign to its object and beyond its scope. Present day concept of fraud on statute has veered round abuse of power or mala fide exercise of power. It may arise due to overstepping the limits of power or defeating the provi­sion of statute by adopting subter­fuge or the power may be exer­cised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or administration law, as it is developing, is assum­ing different shades. It may arise due to overstepping the limits of power or defeating the provi­sion of statute by adopting subter­fuge or the power may be exer­cised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or administration law, as it is developing, is assum­ing different shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclo­sure Of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power and procure an order from an authority or Tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdic­tion which otherwise would not have been exercised. The misrepre­sentation must be in relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence or non-existence of which the.power can be exercised. But non-disclosure of a fact not re­quired by a statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud. Even in commercial transactions non­disclosure of every fact does not vi­tiate the agreement. "In a contract every person must look for himself and ensures that he acquires the in­formation necessary to avoid bad bargain. In public law the duty is not to deceive. (See Shrisht Dhaivan (Smt.) v. M/s. Shaw Brothers. ( 1992 (1) SCC 534 )" 7. He further submits that the fact that the alleged patta filed by the writ peti­tioners came to the notice of this Court during the course of hearing of the writ petitions when the officer of Nagar Palika tried to trace out the record for filing a suit for cancellation of lease, which revealed that no patta was allotted to any of the writ petitioners, thus they have fraudulently fabricated the documents in their favour. Therefore, review petitioner persuaded to file the present review applications before this Court. He further submits that some facts have been incorrectly dealt with as the village in question had come in mu­nicipal limit on 11.2.1959 whereas the al­leged patta was admittedly executed on 22.12.1959. By that time the land manage­ment committee had lost its authority to execute any such lease. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite parties pointed out that there is no reason to review the order passed by this Court. He further pointed out that there is limited scope of High Court to review the order. 9. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite parties pointed out that there is no reason to review the order passed by this Court. He further pointed out that there is limited scope of High Court to review the order. 9. In support of his contentions he cited a decision of the HonTjle Supreme Court rendered in the case of Meera Bhanja (Smt.) v. Nirmala Kwnari Choudhury (Smt.), 19951 SCC 170 in which it has been held that "the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court by fol­lowing the judgment rendered in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 has held as under:- "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable er­rors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review as may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be ex­ercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erro­neous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be con­fused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors com­mitted by the Subordinate Court." 10. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erro­neous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be con­fused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors com­mitted by the Subordinate Court." 10. Upon perusal of the order dated 1.7.2009 passed by this Court in Writ Peti­tion No. 2451 (M/S) of 1997 and other con­nected writ petitions I find that the facts which have been brought to the notice of this Court by the review petitioner were not brought to the knowledge of the Court at the time of decision of the writ petitions. Had these facts been brought to the knowl­edge of this Court at the time of decision of writ petitions, I am of the definite view that the writ petitions would have been dis­missed. 11. After considering the facts and cir­cumstances of the case when I go through the judgment which is under review I find that there is apparent error on the face of the record. Therefore, I am of the view that writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 12. The review applications are al­lowed. The writ petitions are dismissed. Review Petitions Allowed.