Judgment K.Kannan, J. 1. The order in a challenge is a direction for reinstatement issued by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies of the 2nd respondent, who was an Accountant in the petitioner Sugar Mill. The case has gone through many a vicissitude and some facts are necessary. 2. For some large scale misappropriation that was alleged to have taken place in the petitioner Sugar Mill, the 2nd respondent had been served with the charge-sheet on 24.02.1996. An enquiry which had been constituted which resulted in a report of an Enquiry Officer finding him guilty of the charges on 15.04.1996 and the employer, acting on the Enquiry Officers report issued an order of dismissal from service on 16.05.1996. It appears that the 2nd respondent treating himself as a workman within the definition of Industrial Disputes Act applied for making a reference to the Labour Court raising an industrial dispute against the termination of service. The case had been pending before the Labour Court at Ambala in Reference No. 51 of 1998 and simultaneously, the 2nd respondent appears to have filed a representation to the Managing Director against the order of dismissal. The representation had been dismissed on 12.07.2001, stating that he had already referred to an industrial adjudication and, therefore, the representation shall not be considered. He had subsequently preferred an appeal to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies which was disposed of on 18.12.2003 directing the petitioner to have remedy before an appropriate forum. Notwithstanding such an order, the 2nd respondent appears to have approached the Registrar of Cooperative Societies challenging the order of dismissal which was dismissed for default on 14.10.2004. Independently of the order of dismissal for default before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, the Labour Court rejected on 29.10.2004 the reference on merits finding that the enquiry against the 2nd respondent had been properly conducted and the order of dismissal form service was not liable for any interference. 3. If the order of the Labour Court passed on 29.10.2004 was an affirmation of an order of dismissal by the employer, that constituted the terminus quo as regards the relationship between the 2nd respondent and the petitioner. The petitioner appears to have sought for restoration of the appeal which was dismissed for default before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and after its restoration on 30.03.2006, it was ultimately dismissed on 23.11.2006. The petitioner appears to have sought for restoration of the appeal which was dismissed for default before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and after its restoration on 30.03.2006, it was ultimately dismissed on 23.11.2006. Against this order, revision appears to have been filed before the Financial Commissioner, which was remitted to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies again on 30.4.2008 for fresh consideration. The fresh consideration yielded to an order favourable to the 2nd respondent directing reinstatement on 30.06.2009. It is this order which is in challenge before this Court. 4. The main contention of the petitioner is that when the order of termination had been a subject of industrial adjudication before a Labour Court, the 2nd respondent could not have also simultaneously prosecuted any application before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. The orders passed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and the Financial Commissioner directing a fresh consideration and the ultimate order of reinstatement, are all without jurisdiction. The decision of the Labour Court itself constituted res judicata and in the face of an award upholding dismissal, there cannot be a direction for reinstatement by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. The order, according to him, is bad in the eyes of law, as one passed without jurisdiction. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would submit that he had applied to the Labour Court for withdrawal of the petition on 04.02.2004 and he had been under the impression that there was no need to prosecute the matter before the Labour Court and consequently, the proceedings which he had initiated before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies was perfectly justified. When there was an order for reinstatement, the petitioner cannot deny to him the relief. It is contended on behalf of the 1st respondent that the writ petition itself is not maintainable and an order passed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies is assailable before the Financial Commissioner and the writ petition filed without exhausting that remedy was not tenable. 6. The case has to be dealt with from a fundamental aspect that when there was an award passed by the Labour Court and it was also published in the gazette, the award cannot be in any way modified by any other authority, except when a fresh employment is offered on fresh terms by the employer. 6. The case has to be dealt with from a fundamental aspect that when there was an award passed by the Labour Court and it was also published in the gazette, the award cannot be in any way modified by any other authority, except when a fresh employment is offered on fresh terms by the employer. It is not the case of employer that he has given to him employment on new terms but the employer is now sought to be compelled by a direction from the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to reinstate him in purported exercise of his power to set aside an order of dismissal which was made on 16.5.1996. The order dated 16.5.1996 has obtained an imprimaturs from the Labour Court and it is not assailable by any other authority unless the award had been a subject of challenge in appropriate proceedings before this Court. Even in objection by the 1st respondent that the writ petition could not have been filed and the remedy was only by way of revision, is not tenable since an interference which is sought is on the ground of complete lack of jurisdiction and it is Well marked exception to an alternative efficacious remedy that the Court will interfere under Article 226, if there is an exercise of power which he did not have or the authority was exercising a jurisdiction that did not vest in him. I have held that after the dismissal of the case by the Labour Court, there could not have been any resort to a proceeding before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and the order passed was one without jurisdiction. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would submit that he is absolutely innocent and the should have an opportunity to challenge the award. I only dealt with the case of how it cannot stand a minute of judicial scrutiny. If the Labour Courts award had become final, then the contention that he is innocent, is not possible, for the finality to the award would conclude the issue even on the merits. To the plea made by the counsel for the 2nd respondent that the award had been passed by the Labour Court is spite of an application for withdrawal of the same, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner points out that the award records the presence of the counsel for the workman. To the plea made by the counsel for the 2nd respondent that the award had been passed by the Labour Court is spite of an application for withdrawal of the same, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner points out that the award records the presence of the counsel for the workman. It is incomprehensible as to how an application for withdrawal could have been made without the knowledge of the counsel or if he had known how he had prosecuted the case before the Labour Court after an application for withdrawal. This is still not the issue before me but the 2nd respondent shall be liberty to assail the award in an manner which is permissible in law. 8. The impugned proceedings are quashed and the writ petition is allowed. There shall be however no directions as to costs. Petition allowed.