Judgment The petition in M.P.(MD)No.2 of 2008 in S.A.No.1143 of 2005 is filed to grand leave to the petitioners to implead themselves as party respondents 2 to 9 in the C.M.P.No.7434 of 2005 in S.A.No.1143 of 2005. The petition in M.P.(MD)No.3 of 2008 in S.A.No.1143 of 2005 is filed to grand leave to the petitioners to implead themselves as party respondents 2 to 9 in the second appeal in S.A.No.1143 of 2005. The petition in M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2009 in W.P.No.7615 of 2005 is filed to implead the petitioners as respondents 5 to 12 in the above W.P.No.7615 of 2005. All these applications are filed under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of C.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to implead the third party petitioners as respondents in the second appeal in S.A.No.1143 of 2005 and also in the writ petition in W.P.No.7615 of 2005. The brief facts of the case leading to the filing of the second appeal and as well as the writ petition and also the filing of these petitions are as follows: Arulmigu Mariyamman Kovil Thirukovil, Irukankudi, Sattur Taluk, Virudhunagar District is a religious institution governed by a scheme framed as early as 04.05.1935. As per the scheme, the Temple is administered and managed by the hereditary trustees. Under the scheme, a manager is provided to assist the hereditary trustee. Presently, the post of the manager is administered by the Executive Officer in the cadre of an Assistant Commissioner, H.R.&C.E Department, as per the order passed by the Government dated 210. l991. The Temple was originally founded by one Ramasamy Poosari and after him, his three sons became the hereditary trustees cum poosari. From the said three sons, three sets of branches came into existence. By an order dated 23.03.1977, all the male members in each family were considered as hereditary trustees as birth right. As there were several disputes, an application was filed before the Department in R.P.No.169 of 1975 and it was finally decided that only the first male son will become the hereditary trustee. The first respondent became the hereditary trustee after his father who was superseded. However, surcharge proceedings was initiated against the third respondent. He was finally dismissed from the trusteeship on 17.07.1992 and therefore, he filed a suit in O.S.No.102 of 1993 on the file of the Sub Court, Srivilliputhur against the administration. The first respondent became the hereditary trustee after his father who was superseded. However, surcharge proceedings was initiated against the third respondent. He was finally dismissed from the trusteeship on 17.07.1992 and therefore, he filed a suit in O.S.No.102 of 1993 on the file of the Sub Court, Srivilliputhur against the administration. The other trustees were not parties to the suit. The suit was dismissed and an appeal was preferred in A.S.No.39 of 2004 on the file of the District Court, Srivilliputhur and the same was allowed. The second respondent herein has filed a second appeal in S.A.No.1143 of 2005 and the same is pending. Pending appeal, C.M.P.No.7434 of 2008 was filed to stay the operation of the decree passed in A.S.No.39 of 2004. Meanwhile, the first respondent had filed the writ petition in W.P.No.7615 of 2005 to issue a writ of mandamus directing the department to issue an order recognising the first respondent as hereditary trustee of the Temple. While so, the petitioners who are the present trustees would contend that the stay application in C.M.P.No.7434 of 2008 was not properly prosecuted by the third respondent and it was allowed to be dismissed for the reasons best to known them. Taking advantage of dismissal of the stay application and on the strength of the judgment and decree in A.S.No.39 of 2004, the first respondent is trying to interfere with the administration of the Temple. An election was conducted as per the direction of the High Court and the petitioners are the Chairman and Board of Trustees of the suit Temple. The petitioners seriously believe that the respondents namely, the Department of H.R. and C.E., is not prosecuting the second appeal and the writ petition effectively. The present Chairman and Board of Trustees are necessary parties to safeguard the idol and its properties. Therefore, the petitioners have filed the present applications for implead themselves as parties. The above applications are resisted by the first respondent. Many of the allegations were denied and the election of the petitioners as the board of trustees was questioned in the counter affidavit. It was also contended that the dismissal of the stay application in the second appeal has nothing to do with the petitioners. The above applications are resisted by the first respondent. Many of the allegations were denied and the election of the petitioners as the board of trustees was questioned in the counter affidavit. It was also contended that the dismissal of the stay application in the second appeal has nothing to do with the petitioners. It is further contended that after considering the prima facie case and balance of convenience the court has refused to pass an order of stay while admitting the second appeal in the year 2005. The allegation that the department had recognised the first respondent as hereditary trustee is false and the petitioners are not necessary parties and therefore, the applications to implead petitioners as a parties was resisted. The point for consideration arises in all these applications is whether the petitioners are proper and necessary parties to be impleaded in these proceedings. Mrs.Hema Sampath, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would submit that the father of the first respondent who was the hereditary trustee was superseded by an order of Joint Commissioner, HR and CE, Sivagagai and the first respondent has become the hereditary trustee but he was also dismissed from the trusteeship following surcharge proceedings against him. The learned counsel pointed out that the subsequent events namely, the judgment decree passed in A.S.No.39 of 2004 and orders passed in W.P.No.7615 of 2005 and also the dismissal of the stay application in the second appeal would reveal that the Department is not effectively prosecuting the cases initiated by a dismissed trustee. The learned counsel pointed out that the present Chairman and Board of Trustees have been elected in an election conducted as per the direction of the High Court and if the proceedings were not effectively prosecuted, the smooth administration of the Temple would be damaged. The petitioners, who are the present Chairman and Board of trustees have all the rights to take care of the idol and its properties and also to supervise the effective prosecution of the proceedings by the Department. The learned counsel pointed out that the petitioners are the proper and necessary parties to the proceedings. To strengthen her argument, the learned counsel relied on the following judgments - i) 1992(2) SCC 524 (Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. The learned counsel pointed out that the petitioners are the proper and necessary parties to the proceedings. To strengthen her argument, the learned counsel relied on the following judgments - i) 1992(2) SCC 524 (Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others) wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: "...The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. ..." ii) AIR 1953 Madras 618 (Paramasivam Pillai Vs. Adilakshmi Ammal and others) wherein this Court has held as follows: "...In interpreting O.1,R.10(2), C. P.C., it has been held that the construction of the ....of the section should be as liberal and .... as possible and should not be restricted merely to the parties involved in the suit but at the attempt should be always to make ...all persons who may be necessary in ...that there might be a final and complete ...of the points involved in the suit. ..." iii) AIR 1995 ALLAHABAD 7 (Committee of Management, Ratan Muni Jain Inter College and another Vs. III Additional Civil Judge, Agra and others) wherein the Allahabad High Court has held as follows: "The theory of dominus litus should not be over stretched because it is the duty of the court to ensure that if for deciding the real matter in dispute, a person is necessary party, the court can order such person to be impleaded. Merely because the plaintiff does not choose to implead a person is not sufficient for rejection of an application for being impleaded. The provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 (2), C.P.C.,are very wide and the powers of the court are equally extensive. Merely because the plaintiff does not choose to implead a person is not sufficient for rejection of an application for being impleaded. The provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 (2), C.P.C.,are very wide and the powers of the court are equally extensive. Even without an application to be impleaded as a party, the court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the name of any party, who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. ..." iv) 2005(11) SCC 403 (Amit Kumar Shaw and another Vs. Farida Khatoon and another) wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: "9. The object of Order 1 Rule 10 is to discourage contests on technical pleas, and to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non suited. The power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. Under this rule, a person may be added as a party to a suit in the following two cases: (1) when he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not joined so or (2) when, without his presence, the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided. 10. The power of a court to add a party to a proceeding cannot depend solely on the question whether he has interest in the suit property. The question is whether the right of a person may be affected if he is not added as a party. Such right, however, will necessarily include an enforceable legal right." v) 2010(1) LW 343 (S.K.Lakshminarayanan and another Vs. The Commissioner, HR AND CE Department, Chennai and two others) wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: "13. Alleging acts of mis-management, 3rd respondent has also brought to the notice of 1st respondent about the sale of temple lands by Appellants. 3rd respondent has brought to the notice of 1st respondent as to certain instances of alienation of temple lands. For exercise of proper control over the temple in accordance with HR & CE Act, 1st respondent has rightly ordered impleading of 3rd Respondent in A.P.No.17/2009. 3rd respondent has brought to the notice of 1st respondent as to certain instances of alienation of temple lands. For exercise of proper control over the temple in accordance with HR & CE Act, 1st respondent has rightly ordered impleading of 3rd Respondent in A.P.No.17/2009. Observing that as a person having interest in the temple, 3rd respondent has legal right to be heard in the Appeal before the 1st respondent, learned single Judge rightly dismissed the Writ petition and we do not find any reason for interference with the order of learned single Judge." The learned counsel further submitted that the suit Temple being a religious institution the persons even can maintain a suit as held in 1993(2) MLJ 390 (S.Govindasamy Naidu and others Vs. Poorna Valli and others) wherein it has held as follows: "13. Regarding the maintainability of the suit by the plaintiffs, it is not in dispute that the deceased first plaintiff was and the other plaintiffs are members of the Thousand Yadhavas community. It is common case that the suit temples belong to that community. The plaintiffs claim that the first plaintiff was and the other plaintiffs are worshippers in the temples. The suit has been filed by the plaintiffs representing the entire members of the community. In the written statement it is just stated that the plaintiffs are not worshippers. But the fact that the plaintiffs are the members of the community to which the temples belong and they have filed the suit on behalf of themselves and also representing the other members of the community complaining that the defendants are trying to alienate the said trust properties which would be detrimental to the interest of the temples, would unequivocally show that they are indeed worshippers in the temples. We have seen above that the trust is created endowing the properties to the temples for the purpose of doing certain services (Kattalais) in respect thereof. Therefore as worshippers of the temples the plaintiffs are certainly interested in the administration of the trust." The learned counsel also pointed out that the idol is in a position of a minor and the person interested is clothed with the power to protect the same and relied 1996(1) LW 231 where in it is sated that it should not be forgotten that an idol is in the position of a minor. It has been held in Bishwanath V. Radha ballabhji ( AIR 1967 SC 1044 ) that an idol is in the position of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with an ad ahoc power of representation to protect its interests. On the contrary, Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.S.Conscious Ilango, would submit that the petitioners are not necessary parties to the present proceedings. The learned Senior counsel pointed out that against the order of the Commissioner, a statutory suit was filed by the first respondent against the department wherein the petitioners were not parties and the plaintiff was dominus litis and is not bound to choose or implead the petitioners as necessary parties. The learned Senior counsel further pointed out that the First Appellate Court had rightly decided the matter in favour of the first respondent and there is no substantial question of law raised by the department in the second appeal. The learned counsel pointed out lis is only between the first respondent and the HR & CE department and the petitioners have no say either in the second appeal or in the writ petition. The learned counsel pointed out that the party to be impleaded must be a party directly and legally interested in the action and the learned counsel relied on JT 1992(2) SC 116 (Ramesh Hiranand Kundanmal Vs. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Others). "6. ...The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touch stone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one with out whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. A necessary party is one with out whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercise in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case." The learned counsel pointed out that the petitioners have claimed collusion between the appellant and the first respondent and on mere apprehension of collusion, the petitioners cannot be brought in as a party and relied on 2004(1) MLJ 3 (M.Ramanathan Vs. M.Vasantha and others) wherein it is held as follows: "17. ...On mere apprehension, a party cannot be impleaded. ..." The learned counsel also took this court through the governing principles of impleading a third party to the suit or proceedings. Heard both sides and perused the records. The admitted facts are that the suit temple is the religious institution coming within the purview of HR & CE Act. It is governed by a scheme and the hereditary trustees are appointed in accordance with the scheme. The father of the first respondent was a hereditary trustee. He was superseded and the first respondent became the hereditary trustee. There were surcharge proceedings against the first respondent for some irregularities and on 17.07.1992 he was removed from the said trusteeship on various charges. He filed a suit in O.S.No.102 of 1993 challenging the dismissal order. On 112. 2003 the suit was dismissed and he had preferred an appeal in A.S.No.39 of 2004 and the appeal was allowed by the District Court, Srivilliputhur, on 18.05.2005. He had approached the third respondent (herein after referred as the Department) to recognise him as a hereditary trustee and on failure of which he had preferred the writ petition in W.P.No.7615 of 2005. In meanwhile the department has preferred the second appeal and there is no stay of the operation of the decree granted to the first respondent in A.S.No.39 of 2004. Subsequently the stay application was also dismissed for non prosecution. At this stage, the petitioners who are the elected Chairman and Board of trustees of the religious institution have filed this applications to implead them as parties. Subsequently the stay application was also dismissed for non prosecution. At this stage, the petitioners who are the elected Chairman and Board of trustees of the religious institution have filed this applications to implead them as parties. Order 1 Rule 10 of C.P.C. Reads as follows:- "10.Suit in name of wrong plaintiff- (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the court thinks just. (2) Court may strike out or add parties- The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. (3) Noperson shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without is consent. (4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended- Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the court thinks fit, on the original defendant. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), Section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons." In 1968(1) MLJ 15 (Firm Mahadeva Rice and Oil Mills Vs. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), Section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons." In 1968(1) MLJ 15 (Firm Mahadeva Rice and Oil Mills Vs. Chennimalai) this Court has held that "...Under Order 1, rule 10, C.P.C.(1) If, for the adjudication of the "real controversy" between the parties on record, the presence of a third party is necessary, then he can be impleaded; (2) It is imperative to note that by such impleading of the proposed party, all controversies arising in the suit and all issues arising thereunder may be finally determined and set at rest, thereby avoiding municipality of suits over a subject matter which could still have been decided in the pending suit itself; (3)The proposed party has a defined subsisting, direct and substantive interest in the litigation, which interest is either legal or equitable and which right is congnisable in law, (4)Meticulous care should be taken to avoid the adding of a party if it is intended merely as a ruse to ventilate certain other grievances of one or the other of the parties on record which is neither necessary nor expedient to be considered by the court in the pending litigation; and (5) It should always be remembered that considerable prejudice would be caused to the opposite party when irrelevant matters are allowed to be considered by Courts by adding a new party whose interest has no nexus to the subject matter of the suit." In 2005(3) MLJ 124 SC (Katuri Vs. Uyyamperumal) the Supreme Court has held that there are two tests to be satisfied for determining the question who is the necessary parties and the test are "7. ...(1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2)no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party." and however, that was the case related to a suit for specific performance. In 2006(2) MLJ 593 this Court has held as "17. ...(1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2)no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party." and however, that was the case related to a suit for specific performance. In 2006(2) MLJ 593 this Court has held as "17. In a nut-shell, the tests to be applied for determining the right of a party to implead another, in a pending suit or other proceeding, may be crystallized into the following categories: a) If without his presence, no effective and complete adjudication could be made; b) If his presence is necessary for a complete and effectual adjudication of the dispute though no relief is claimed against him; c) If there is a cause of action against him; d) If the relief sought in the suit or other proceedings is likely to be made binding on him; e) If the ultimate outcome of the proceedings is likely to affect him adversely; f) If his role is really that of a "necessary witness" but is sought to be camouflaged as a "necessary party"." In 2010(1) LW 343 (S.K.Lakshminarayanan and another Vs. The Commissioner, HR & CE Department, Chennai and two others) a Division Bench of this Court has held as "10.Point in dispute lies in a narrow compass. Under Section 6(15)(b) of HR & CE Act "person having interest" means - "in the case of a temple, a person who is entitled to attend at or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the temple, or who is entitled to partake or is in the habit of partaking in the benefit of the distribution of gifts threat." In 2005(11) SCC 403 wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: "9.The object of Order 1 Rule 10 is to discourage contests on technical pleas, and to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non suited. The power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. The power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. Under this rule, a person may be added as a party to a suit in the following two cases: (1) when he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not joined so or (2) when, without his presence, the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided." In the present case, the petitioners have sought to be impleaded themselves as parties on the sole ground that the department is not taking effective steps in prosecuting the proceedings. In other words, the petitioner apprehend that the Department is in collusion with the first respondent. It is also noted that the petitioners who are the present Chairman and hereditary trustees and the first respondent where fighting for the administration for many years and there are proceedings pending between them in various courts. According to the petitioners, there are serious allegations against the first respondent who was dismissed from the hereditary trusteeship and the department has allowed the stay petition to be dismissed for non prosecution and the petitioners are apprehending that the first respondent, a shady character, will interfere with the administration of the temple and they urges this Court to implead them as parties in order to protect the idol, who is in a status of minor. It is well settled principle that the plaintiffs is in a position of dominus litus and he cannot be compelled to add a party against his wishes. Order 1 Rule 10 of C.P.C., gives a wide discretion to the court to bring the necessary parties on record to set right the inaction of the plaintiff and to remove the defect of non joinder of proper and necessary party. It is now well settled that the object of Order 1 Rule 10 is to discourage contest on technical pleas and to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non suited. It is also well settled that the power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. Under Order 1 Rule 2(2) of C.P.C., only a necessary or a proper party may be added and there are instances where persons having interest is also recognised as proper party. It is also well settled that the power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. Under Order 1 Rule 2(2) of C.P.C., only a necessary or a proper party may be added and there are instances where persons having interest is also recognised as proper party. A person may be added as a party to a suit, if he has a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation. The plain reading of sub clause (2) would show that the court may add a party, whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the question involved in the suit. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision of the question involved in the proceeding; and the person interested is one who has a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation. The test is that if the relief or the order which the plaintiff is asking, directly or indirectly affects the impleading party in the enjoyment of his legal rights then he/she is a necessary, proper and interested party. If a person who sought to be impleaded passes any of the test above the court can compel the plaintiff who is in a position of dominus litus to join him as a necessary party. The court has the judicial discretion but however, to be exercised having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Coming to the facts in the present case, it is already stated that the suit Temple is a public institution governed by a scheme under which, the hereditary trustees are managing and administrating the institution. The plaintiff in the suit was also a managing trustee but was subjected for surcharge proceedings by the HR & CE Department and was dismissed from the trusteeship. Challenging the order of dismissal, he has filed a suit before the Sub Court, Sivakasi, to set aside the order and to declare that the plaintiff continuing to be the hereditary trustee of the suit Temple. The Trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal the District Court has reversed the finding and the department had preferred the present second appeal. The Trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal the District Court has reversed the finding and the department had preferred the present second appeal. In the suit the department alone was the defendant. On allowing the appeal, the plaintiff has insisted to be recognised as a hereditary trustee and the writ petition was filed to that effect. A stay application in C.M.P.No.7434 of 2008 was filed in the second appeal which was dismissed for default. Meanwhile, the petitioners, who are the hereditary trustees, are managing the affairs of the Temple and there are suits between the parties in various forums and the present petition is filed only on the sole ground that the department has not effectively prosecuting the suit and their presence is necessary as the outcome of the suit will affect their administration directly. The plea of the petitioners was countenanced by the plaintiff by stating that on mere apprehension of collusion a party cannot be impleaded and the decision reported in 2004(1) MLJ 3 (cited supra) was relied on. It is also contended that the petitioners are neither necessary or proper parties to adjudicate the real issue which is a matter between the plaintiff and the department. The decision in 1968(1) MLJ 15 (cited supra) was relied on by the first respondent wherein this Court has held if the cardinal test, namely, for a final adjudication for the real controversy such addition is necessary, is not satisfied then it cannot be said with any reasonable certainty that the post party is a proper party and reliance also placed on 2005(1) MLJ 124 (SC) (cited supra). The above decisions relate to; one is for suit for partition and another suit is a suit for specific performance. In the present suit, the subject matter of the litigation is a declaration as regards to the legal character of the plaintiff. The character of a person itself was questioned when he was in the helm of affair of a public institution. In 1996(1) LW 231 this court observed as follows; "4.It should not be forgotten that an idol is in the position of a minor. The character of a person itself was questioned when he was in the helm of affair of a public institution. In 1996(1) LW 231 this court observed as follows; "4.It should not be forgotten that an idol is in the position of a minor. It has been held in Bishwanath V. Radha Ballabhji ( AIR 1967 SC 1044 ) that an idol is in the position of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with an adhoc power of representation to protect its interests. ..." In 2010(1) LW 343 (cited supra)this Court allowed an application for impleading a third party being "person having interest". The result of the suit may alter the administration of the public institution. Therefore, the real controversy is whether the plaintiff, can be allowed to continue as a hereditary trustee? The real controversy has to be adjudicated in the presence of the necessary party against whom the order is binding and without whom no order can be made effective and therefore the petitioners are also proper parties whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings and they are having interest in the subject matter. In AIR 1953 Madras 618 this Court has held that the construction of the section should be as liberal and as possible and should not be restricted merely to the parties involved in the suit but the attempt should be always to make all persons who may be necessary in the suit so that there might be a final and complete decision of the points involved in the suit. Therefore, no prejudice will be caused to the first respondent if the present board of trustees are impleaded as parties at this stage for proper adjudication. In the result, the M.Ps. are allowed.