JUDGMENT Ranjit Singh, J.:- Appellant, who was given appointment for a period of three years and was terminated, though granted extension for another year, had filed this suit to impugn the order of his termination, terming it to be wrong, illegal, against the Rules and in violation of principles of natural justice. He also prayed for grant of service benefit due to him alongwith interest @ 18% per annum as if the impugned order of termination was never passed. 2. The appellant had been appointed to the post of Director, Punjab Technical University, in response to an advertisement and was so appointed after selection on the basis of interview conducted by Board of Governors. Concededly, the appellant was appointed on 7.2.2000 for a period of three years. On expiry of this period, his appointment was extended w.e.f 7.2.2003 for another year vide order dated 30.1.2003. On 17.11.2003, the services of the appellant were terminated. This order, as per the appellant, was due to a criminal case registered against him on 12.11.2003 by the Vigilance Bureau. He had accordingly filed this suit to impugn the order on the grounds as already stated. 3. Respondent Nos.1 to 4 filed a written statement contesting the suit. Respondent Nos.2 and 3 were proceeded against exparte. The contesting respondents, however, pleaded that suit was not maintainable in the form it was filed and, thus, it was prayed that the suit was liable to be dismissed. Respondent No.1 also pleaded that it was neither the punishing nor the appointing authority. Respondent No.4 had raised a preliminary objection, pleading that the suit was wholly incompetent and the appellant had no right to seek a decree for mandatory injunction. Plea was that the appointment of the appellant was for a fixed period of three years and he could be terminated without assigning any reason during the extended tenure allowed to him, which was also for one year only. 4. The Trial Court found that appointment of the appellant was purely contractual. The plea raised on behalf of the appellant that termination was ordered without holding any enquiry and that the order was non-speaking, cryptic or stigmatic was not accepted and it was observed that the impugned order was passed not on account of any misconduct on the part of the appellant. This order was found to have been passed in terms of the conditions of appointment. This order was found to have been passed in terms of the conditions of appointment. The suit filed by the appellant was accordingly dismissed. 5. While dismissing the appeal the appellate Court also clearly found that order of termination was not on account of any misconduct or for involvement of appellant in a criminal case. Finding is that contractual employment for a fix period has simply been terminated, as per the conditions contained in the appointment. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed on record the order granting extension of his service by one year and accordingly he claims that he has a right to continue for complete year w.e.f 1.11.2003. The appointment of the appellant being purely contractual and for a fixed period, certainly would not lead to creating any such right, for which the appellant could have filed the suit for mandatory injunction. At the most, the appellant had a right to continue in service for one year, which has already expired in the year 2004. The plea that the order is stigmatic and could not have been made without holding an enquiry and it being in violation of principles of natural justice, to my mind, is totally misconceived. Neither from the order nor from any facts connected therewith shows that the order was passed by way of punishment and that it carries a stigma. The registration of a criminal case may be a motive for discontinuing the extension of service granted to the appellant for a limited duration but it certainly was not the foundation of the order. In any case, the appellant, being a contractual employee, would not be entitled to the protection available to the permanent employee. The view taken by both the Courts, thus, is fully justified and the question of law pressed by the appellant is certainly not made out. The Regular Second Appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine. ----------