JUDGEMENT 1. The principal question involved in this present writ application is whether an order passed by the District Primary Panchayat Teachers Appellate Authority under Rule 18 of the Bihar Primary Teachers (Appointment and Condition of Service) Rules, 2006, as now existing, can be interfered by any authority at district level may it be the District Superintendent of Education, District Education Extension Officer, District. Magistrate-cum-Collector, Sub-Divisionai Officer or Block Development. Officer. The answer to this lies in the rule as aforesaid. In the rules aforesaid, a statutory jurisdiction has been conferred on the appellate authority and that being so either the rules should permit the orders of the said quasi judicial authority where it can be challenged or it is to be assumed that the order of quasi judicial authority final and not amenable to challenge before any authority. A reference to the rules aforesaid would show that the orders of the authority, which is a tribunal can be revised or appealed against. 2. Mr. Ojha in support of the writ petition has annexed Annexure 5, the notification of the State Government in the Department of Human Resources Department being notification no. 3716, dated 23.10.2008 by which the authority (Tribunal) was constituted. This notification lays down the terms and conditions of the members of the Tribunal and the regulation of its functioning. If one refers to clause 15 thereof, it clearly stipulates that no appeal is provided against the order passed by the tribunal to any authority. This, of course, would be subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, which obviously cannot be fettered. Thus, seen the order of tribunal aforesaid under Section 18 is final and binding on all concerned may be District Magistrate or District Superintendent of Education. 3. In the present case, the validity of petitioners appointment as Primary Panchayat Teacher was subject matter of dispute before the tribunal so constituted under Section 18 of the Rules. The tribunal held that the termination of their services was wrong and directed reinstatement of the petitioners. Regrettably, the position in law being clear, still the Sub- Divisional Officer and District Superintendent of Education considering themselves to be above law, refused to get the order of the tribunal implemented. The result is that the petitioners having been found to be wrongly terminated, they are not being reinstated. What is disturbing is, as pointed out by Mr. Regrettably, the position in law being clear, still the Sub- Divisional Officer and District Superintendent of Education considering themselves to be above law, refused to get the order of the tribunal implemented. The result is that the petitioners having been found to be wrongly terminated, they are not being reinstated. What is disturbing is, as pointed out by Mr. Ojha in support of the writ petition, that pursuant to order of the tribunal, petitioners were reinstated but the respondent-Sub-Divisional Officer intervened and ensured exit petitioners once again. 4. Be that as it may, the position is that the petitioners notwithstanding reinstatement order by the tribunal are not being permitted to join. 5. Here it must be remembered that the appellate tribunal has been specially constituted and conferred jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. Once the dispute is adjudicated, as pointed out, clause 15 of the notification dated 23.10.2008 clearly barred its challenge by any authority, however, was an erroneous that order may be. Thus, a finality has been given to the order of the tribunal which no authority of the State can upset. The tribunal may be manned by personnel that may be officer junior in rank to other officer of the State but that does not make the authority of tribunal junior or subservient of other officers. Tribunal is an independent statutory authority and that independent and superiority has to be maintained. Thus, it is an appropriate case in which direction has to be issued to the authority to implement the order of the tribunal without demour. 6. Learned counsel for the State submits that the order of the tribunal may be wrong and this Court in these proceedings for implementation of the order of the tribunal can examine that aspect of the matter. 6. Learned counsel for the State submits that the order of the tribunal may be wrong and this Court in these proceedings for implementation of the order of the tribunal can examine that aspect of the matter. This question has been considered by constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. V/s. Income Tax Officer, Bhopal since reported in AIR 1961 SC 182 wherein the Apex Court has held thus: "Where the Income-tax Officer had virtually refused to carry out the clear and unambiguous directions which a superior tribunal like the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, had given to him by its final order in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him, such refusal is in effect a denial of justice, and is furthermore destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is on the hierarchy of Courts. In such a case a writ of mandamus should issue ex debito justiciae to compel the Income-tax Officer to carry out the directions given to him by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The High Court would be clearly in error if it refuses to issue a writ on the ground that no manifest injustice had resulted from the order of the Income-tax Officer in view of the error committed by the Tribunal itself in its order. Such a view is destructive of one of the basic principles of the administration of justice." 7. In that view of the matter, the writ petition is allowed and respondents including District Superintendent of Education and Sub-Divisional Officer are directed to implement the order of the tribunal forthwith and not to interfere with the right of the petitioners except under due authority of law. Consequent orders issued by them in conflict with the order of the tribunal are quashed.