JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner – original respondent, by way of this revision application, challenges the judgment and order dated 21st March, 2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Parbhani in Rent Appeal No.2 of 2001 whereby the appeal preferred by the tenant came to be allowed and the order of the Rent Controller dated 27.2.2001 was set aside. 2. The petitioner herein is the landlord, who filed petition u/s 15 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (for short, the Act of 1954) referred to as the said Act) bearing No.98/RC/O3 in the court of Rent Controller Hingoli against respondent – tenant, for eviction from suit shop no. 20/93, C.T.S. No.4580 of Hingoli. 3. The case of petitioner - landlord was that he is owner of shop no.20/93 C.T.S. NO.4580 of Hingoli and defendant tenant is willful defaulter in making payment of rent for 30 months. He issued notice for termination of tenancy of tenant on 19.11.1997. The landlord also claimed eviction on the ground of bonafide personal requirement. 4. The respondent – tenant resisted the application by filing written statement contending that he made payment of rent up to 3.10.1997. It is also contended that the landlord did not demand the rent and as he did not come to collect the rent, the tenant send the rent by money order but the landlord refused to accept it. It is also contended that landlord is having other two shops in Hingoli and only to harass the tenant, the landlord made an application before the rent controller, Hingoli. The tenant denied personal bonafide requirement of landlord. 5. After recording evidence, the learned Rent Controller passed an order dated 27th February, 2001 and allowed the application of the landlord holding that the respondent – tenant was willful defaulter and also passed order of eviction on the ground of personal bonafide requirement of the landlord. 6. As aforesaid, the learned District Judge set aside the judgment and order of the Rent Controller by allowing the appeal filed by the tenant – present respondent. Hence, the present petitioner – landlord filed this revision application challenging the judgment and order of the District Judge, Hingoli dated 27.2.2001. 7. 6. As aforesaid, the learned District Judge set aside the judgment and order of the Rent Controller by allowing the appeal filed by the tenant – present respondent. Hence, the present petitioner – landlord filed this revision application challenging the judgment and order of the District Judge, Hingoli dated 27.2.2001. 7. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the Rent Controller, taking into consideration the bonafide requirement of the present petitioner – landlord, held that the petitioner has proved that the premises in the occupation of the tenant are required by the landlord. The Rent Controller also held that the respondent herein is willful defaulter and on both counts i.e. bonafide requirement of the petitioner and default in payment of rent on the part of respondent – tenant, passed the decree of eviction against the tenant. However, the appellate Court reversed the findings recorded by the Rent Controller and held that though there is default in payment of rent, the said default is not willful. The appellate Court further held that the petitioner does not require the suit premises and there is no bonafide requirement of the petitioner. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the suit premises are required for the business of son of petitioner and, therefore, the Rent Controller, taking into consideration the evidence on record, rightly held that the suit premises are required by the petitioner. The learned Counsel submitted that the appellate Court recorded perverse findings that the respondent is not willful defaulter. The learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the findings recorded by the appellate Court and submitted that though the appellate Court held that respondent is defaulter, further without recording any reasons held that the respondent is not a willful defaulter. It is further submitted that the Appellate Court has not recorded any reasons for holding that the respondent is not a willful defaulter. If fact, the Rent Controller has recorded the findings on the basis of the evidence and assigned reasons to hold that the respondent is willful defaulter. He further submitted that the appellate Court has utterly failed to take into consideration that the suit premises are required for the purpose of business of the petitioner’s son. The Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the requirement of the petitioner, has rightly held that the suit premises are required for bonafide need of the petitioner. He further submitted that the appellate Court has utterly failed to take into consideration that the suit premises are required for the purpose of business of the petitioner’s son. The Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the requirement of the petitioner, has rightly held that the suit premises are required for bonafide need of the petitioner. The learned Counsel submitted that the notice was given to the respondent / tenant asking him to pay rent. The petitioner filed proceedings before the Rent Controller on 21st January, 1998. The learned Counsel invited my attention to the fact that the respondent made attempt on 24th January, 1998 to send rent for the months of October, November, December, 1997 and in February, 1998, sent rent for January and February, 1998. According to the Counsel for the petitioner, the said attempt by the respondent to make payment for the months of October, November, December, 1997 was on 24th January, 1998 i.e. after filing the proceedings before the Rent Controller. He further submitted that the suit premises are in dilapidated condition and on that ground also the petitioner herein prayed eviction of the respondent. The learned Counsel further submitted that once default is proved, it is for the tenant to prove that he is not a willful defaulter. The learned Counsel, at the cost of repetition, submitted that the appellate Court, without assigning any reason, has recorded perverse finding that the respondent is not a willful defaulter. He invited my attention to the provisions of Section 15 of the Act of 1954 and also to the terms of the agreement to pay the rent, dated 1st October, 1989 and submitted that the respondent – tenant was bound to pay rent amount before 5th of every month. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, any payment even according to the provisions of Act of 1954, any payment after 15 days from the first date of the month amounts to default. Once it amounts to default, it is for the tenant to prove that it was not a willful default. In fact, the Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the documents brought on record, has recorded the findings that the respondent is a willful defaulter. The appellate Court has reversed those findings without assigning any reasons. Once it amounts to default, it is for the tenant to prove that it was not a willful default. In fact, the Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the documents brought on record, has recorded the findings that the respondent is a willful defaulter. The appellate Court has reversed those findings without assigning any reasons. The learned Counsel further submitted that the tenant has to pay rent in every month and payment of lump sum rent is not permissible. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the reported judgment of this Court in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart vs. Suresh Shankarlal Dhoot reported in 2000(2)Bom.C.R. 784 and in case of Nandlal Govindram Gunwani vs. Ashok Balram Bedekar reported in 200(1) Mh.L.J. 23, and submitted that if there is default in payment of rent, the tenant cannot raise plea of practice of payment of accumulated rent. This Court in the aforesaid judgments has held that the practice of payment of accumulated rent cannot be accepted by way of explanation or defence to infer that the default was not willful default. The plea of practice of payment of accumulated rent to be paid by the tenant shows that basically the tenant failed to discharge his statutory duty as provided under clause (i) of section 15(2) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, but claimed the benefit of the proviso, which is against the settled principles of law. Therefore, the learned Counsel would submit that since the findings recorded by the appellate Court are perverse, this Court can set aside the perverse findings under revisional jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for petitioner also relied on the judgment in the case of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar vs Traders & Agencies and another, reported in 1997(1) Mh.L.J. 121 , wherein the Apex Court held that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. It is for him to decide how and in what manner he should live. If he desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient, it is not for the Courts to dictate to him to continue to occupy such premises. 8. It is for him to decide how and in what manner he should live. If he desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient, it is not for the Courts to dictate to him to continue to occupy such premises. 8. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellate Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order after appreciating the rival contentions. He submitted that it is for the tenant to show as to which accommodation is vacant and accessible. The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that as per agreement of 1989, the rent was fixed to be paid by 5th of every month. He invited my attention to the provisions of section 15(1) of the Act of 1954 and submitted that willful default is explained in the said section and submitted that only arrears of rent would not constitute default. There should be conscious failure on the part of the tenant then only it amounts to willful default. It is submitted that the first duty to prove default is on the landlord and once he proves the default then only the tenant has to discharge the burden to prove that it was not a willful default. He invited my attention to the application filed before the Rent Controller and submitted that there was no specific pleadings in the said application. It is further submitted that the notice which was sent to the tenant does not mention as to how much arrears the respondent is supposed to pay. It was only stated that two and half years rent is due. The evidence is also led by the plaintiff, which is general in nature. He invited my attention to the deposition of Suresh Doiphode and submitted that he has stated in cross-examination that till October, 1997 the rent is collected. It is further submitted that the rent sent by the respondent by money order was not accepted by the petitioner on the ground that the case was pending before the rent controller. It is further submitted that the consistent stand of the respondent was that since October, 1997 the landlord plaintiff did not turn up for collecting rent from the respondent. It is further submitted that the consistent stand of the respondent was that since October, 1997 the landlord plaintiff did not turn up for collecting rent from the respondent. The learned Counsel further submitted that before the suit was filed, the payment of rent was sent by money order. However, the landlord refused to accept it. He submitted that the money order was sent on 24th January, 1998. It is further submitted that the respondent had regularly deposited the rent in the Court. No document is placed on record by the plaintiff to show that the arrears of rent was not received. The learned Counsel submitted that the landlord failed to establish the default. He further submitted that it is never stated by the respondent that there is a practice of paying rent in lump sum. The respondent has paid the rent regularly in the past. The willful default has not been established. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the respondent / tenant placed reliance on the reported judgments in the cases of Wafatunnisa Begum and another (both deceased through L.Rs. vs. Fakhruddin Abdul Karim Surmawala (deceased) through L.Rs. (1992 (2) Mah.LR 660) and more particularly, Head Note (B) thereof. It is submitted that refusal to accept money order does not amount to default. He placed reliance on the reported judgment of this Court in case of Smt. Kamalabai Baburao Kabade v. Smt. Laxmibai Janardan Jagtap and others (AIR 2000 BOMBAY 490). The learned Counsel for respondent submitted that there is no bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the petitioner. He submitted that there are four shops adjoining the shop of the petitioner which belong to the petitioner. Both the Courts have held that fertilizer shop of the son of the respondent is at Khanapur. He invited my attention to para 12 of the affidavit filed before this Court and submitted that the petitioner has also taken several shops from the municipality on lease and lease is extended in case of two shops. The Appellate Court has rightly held in favour of the respondent on the issue of hardship. He further invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in case of Shivram Gajulal and another vs. Ugrasen Bhadrasen Rathod (1996 MCR 630) and submitted that the scope of revision is very limited. He also invited my attention to the averments in the affidavit-in-reply. 9. He further invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in case of Shivram Gajulal and another vs. Ugrasen Bhadrasen Rathod (1996 MCR 630) and submitted that the scope of revision is very limited. He also invited my attention to the averments in the affidavit-in-reply. 9. I have given due consideration to the rival submissions and I am of the opinion that the judgment and order passed by the appellate Court is required to be interfered with. It is true that re-appreciation of the evidence is not possible in the revisional jurisdiction. However, this Court can certainly interfere into the findings recorded by the appellate Court if the appellate Court fails to consider the evidence on record, which amounts to failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under the law and whole judgment is vitiated because of it. This court can also interfere in the judgment if perverse findings are recorded by the lower appellate Court. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner and respondent have argued the matter at length, the revision petition can be disposed of with direction to the appellate Court to re-hear the parties and after taking into consideration the documents and evidence afresh, pass order recording elaborate findings on the point of “willful default” and “bonafide requirement”. I have carefully perused the judgment of the appellate Court. In para 35 of the judgment, the appellate Court has observed that, `the rent was not paid within the stipulated time but at the same time it is required to be considered whether default was willful.’ (Emphasis supplied). This finding of the appellate Court does show that there was default in payment of rent by the tenant. 10. In para 37 of the judgment, without assigning any reason whatsoever, the appellate Court observed that, `After taking into consideration the above discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that the tenant was not a willful defaulter and the learned Rent Controller has committed an error in holding that the tenant was willful defaulter.’ In fact, in the said para, the appellate Court has not recorded separate reasons so as to reverse the findings of the Rent Controller that the respondent / tenant is a willful defaulter. The appellate Court has recorded perverse findings and on this count alone, the matter is required to be remanded back to the appellate Court. 11. The appellate Court has recorded perverse findings and on this count alone, the matter is required to be remanded back to the appellate Court. 11. On careful perusal of the findings recorded by the appellate Court on the point of bonafide requirement of the petitioner, it further appears that cryptic findings are recorded by the appellate Court. In fact, when the Rent Controller has held in favour of the landlord on both counts i.e. willful default and bonafide requirement, it was incumbent upon the appellate Court to record cogent and sufficient reasons while reversing those findings. 12. Taking overall view of the matter, I am of the view that without going into the other aspects which are agitated by the learned Counsel for respective parties, ends of justice would meet if the matter is remanded back to the appellate Court for consideration afresh and appropriate decision. 13. In the result, revision application is allowed. The judgment and order dated 21st March, 2003 passed by the District Judge, Parbhani in Rent Appeal No.2/2001 is quashed and set aside. The Rent Appeal No.2/2001 is restored to its original file. The matter is remanded back to the appellate Court for fresh hearing. The lower appellate Court shall hear and dispose of the Rent Appeal No.2/2001 afresh within a period of six months from today. In the mean time, parties are directed to maintain status quo. It will be open for the parties to agitate all points in support of their contention. Rule made absolute, accordingly with no order as to costs.