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2010 DIGILAW 148 (GUJ)

SHANKERBHAI MANGABHAI CHAUDHRI v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2010-03-12

Z.K.SAIYED

body2010
JUDGMENT 1. The appellant-original accused has filed this Appeal under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. challenging the Judgment and order of conviction dated 03.05.1993 passed by the learned Special Judge, Rajkot, in Special Criminal Case No. 6 of 1987, whereby the learned Special Judge has held the appellant-accused guilty for the offences under Section 161 of I.P. Code and also under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced him to under-go R.I. for one year and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo R.I. for two months. 2. Brief facts of the prosecution case is that the complainant Bharatbhai Ishwarlal Parekh was doing the business of silver ornaments at Rajkot. The complainant intended to start business of gold ornaments and, therefore, he obtained the licence to start that business. It is alleged that he was also required to get the Central Sales Tax Number and the Gujarat Sales Tax number for the purpose of doing the said business and, therefore, he made an application, along with necessary documents, for obtaining the Sales Tax number on 4.3.1986. Thereafter, on 18.3.1986 the complainant approached the Sales-tax office and contacted the appellant-accused for obtaining the Sales Tax number. It is alleged that the complainant requested the appellant-accused to arrange to give him sales tax number soon, to which the appellant-accused told him that if the complainant wants to get number early, he would have to act as per the custom and would have to place weight on the papers and demanded Rs.1000/- from the complainant. It is alleged that at that time the complainant was not having money and, therefore, he was called on the next day with money. As the complainant was not willing to pay Rs.1000/- as illegal gratification, he approached the A.C.B. office on 19.3.1986 at 12.30 in the after-noon and informed shri Sarvaiya about the illegal gratification demanded by the appellant-accused. 3. Thereafter, Panch was called and preliminary panchnama was drawn and after completing all the formalities, the raiding party accompanied by the panch witnesses, went to the place. The complainant was instructed not to touch/take out smeared notes unless and until the demand is made by the accused and on demand by the accused, to immediately give the signal to the raiding party. The complainant was instructed not to touch/take out smeared notes unless and until the demand is made by the accused and on demand by the accused, to immediately give the signal to the raiding party. It is alleged that thereafter the complainant and panch No.1 went inside the office of the accused and after some time the complainant came out in the lobby and gave signal about the acceptance of bribe and, therefore, P.I. Shri Sarvaiya, along with Panch No.2 and the raiding party went to the chamber of the appellant-accused and P.I. Shri Sarvaiya gave his introduction to the appellant-accused. Thereafter, on seeing both the hands of the appellant-accused under the light of ultraviolet lamp, on fingers and palm portion of both the hands of accused scattered dots of anthracene powder were seen. On seeing the body of the accused under the ultraviolet lamp, on the border of right side pant pocket and inside the pocket and on Safari suit bus-shirt below the right side border just near the right side pocket of pant, marks of anthracene powder were seen. The amount of currency notes of denomination of Rs.100/- each were recovered which contained the same numbers of notes which were noted in the first part of panchnama. The notes were seized in presence of panchas and thereafter remaining part of panchnama was completed. The raid was successfully carried out. 4. On completion of investigation the requisite sanction of the competent Authority was obtained to prosecute the accused and thereafter the charge-sheet against the accused came to be filed. The prosecution has examined 4 witnesses and produced and relied upon 15 documents and at the end recorded the statement of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. At the conclusion of the trial, after considering the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties and the arguments advanced, the learned Special Judge, vide impugned Judgment and order dated 3rd May, 1993, held the accused-appellant guilty for the offences charged against him. The learned Special judge convicted the appellant-accused for the offence under Section 161 of I.P. Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentenced him to undergo RI for one year and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- i/d to further undergo RI for 2 months. 5. The learned Special judge convicted the appellant-accused for the offence under Section 161 of I.P. Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentenced him to undergo RI for one year and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- i/d to further undergo RI for 2 months. 5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the Judgment and order dated 3rd May, 1993 passed by the learned Special Judge, Rajkot, in Special Criminal Case No. 6 of 1987, the appellant (original accused) has preferred this Appeal. 6. Heard learned Advocate Shri Bhargav Bhatt, appearing for the appellant-original accused and learned A.P.P. Shri R.C. Kodekar for the respondent-State. I have gone through the Judgment and order passed by the learned Special Judge and also gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence produced before me. I have also gone through the papers produced before me. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhargav Bhatt has contended that the Judgment and order passed by the learned Judge is punitive in nature, illegal and erroneous appreciation of law. He has contended that the evidence against the accused is divisible into two partes, viz. the evidence prior to trap and secondly the evidence after the trap. He has contended that the complainant was running business in the name of M/s. Ishwarlal Chunilal Parekh and the firm was having Sales Tax as well as Central Sales Tax Number and, as per the say of the complainant, he has obtained Gold Dealers Licence in January, 1986 and for gold ornaments he had applied to obtain GST & CST number on 4.3.1986, however, the say of the complainant is far from truth as the complainant was running the firm in the capacity of a partner since long and the said firm was also dealing in gold ornaments. He has also contended that the application for obtaining GST & CST number was submitted before Mr. Buddhadev, subordinate officer of the appellant-accused at the relevant point of time, however, said Mr. Buddhdev has not been examined by the prosecution for the reasons best known to them. He has contended that the evidence of P.W. 1-complainant is not in the nature which inspires confidence so far the varacity of evidence is concerned and his conduct is also unusual which creates doubt and raises suspicion as to the nature of his evidence. Buddhdev has not been examined by the prosecution for the reasons best known to them. He has contended that the evidence of P.W. 1-complainant is not in the nature which inspires confidence so far the varacity of evidence is concerned and his conduct is also unusual which creates doubt and raises suspicion as to the nature of his evidence. He has contended that for issuing the GST & CST Number, the appellant asked for certain details from the complainant, however, the complainant was not in a position to supply the details which he was required to supply to the accused. The ultimate anxiety of the complainant was to obtain the number by hook or crook and, therefore, the intention and motive on the part of the complainant is not legitimate intention and he approached the appellant with an ulterior motive. He also contended that even the details of bank account number supplied by the complainant was not a genuine or correct. He has contended that at no point of time the appellant has refused to give or sought to delay the issuance of fresh Sales Tax number and the conduct of the appellant is quite natural one and there is no allegation that creates doubt against bonafide of the appellant. He has contended that according to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence qua appreciation of evidence, the evidence of witness should be considered as an evidence of an accomplice, because it is he who had approached the appellant in order to see that the procedure should be initiated in a hurried manner and at the same point of time he is not prepared to furnish details as asked for by the appellant-accused. In that view of the matter the whole evidence of P.W. 1 needed to be reconsidered as it being doubtful and, therefore, the case against the appellant cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He has contended that it is an admitted fact that as it appears from the evidence of P.W.1 that he has contacted Shri Budhdev, Sales-tax Officer on his first visit on 7.3.1986 and from the evidence it is further clear that on 12.3.1986 he had advised him to contact Mr. Parmar. He has contended that it is an admitted fact that as it appears from the evidence of P.W.1 that he has contacted Shri Budhdev, Sales-tax Officer on his first visit on 7.3.1986 and from the evidence it is further clear that on 12.3.1986 he had advised him to contact Mr. Parmar. It is clear that Shri Budhdev has not asked for any other details from the complainant and has positively opined for issuance of fresh GST & CST number without any verification, which is required to be done in view of circular. He has contended that it is clear from the evidence of P.W.3 that the complainant has not furnished any of the details which has been asked by the appellant - accused. Therefore, the genuineness of the evidence is under cloud or the evidence of P.W.1 should be labelled as evidence of an accomplice and hence requires to be examined with susceptibility free from doubt which requires re-appreciation. He has contended that from the evidence it clearly appears that P.W. 1 is not an innocent and he is a tutored witness or he is a person who has designed to do something against the appellant-accused either on his own or at the instance of the person who is guiding him with some ulterior motive. He has contended that the learned Judge has failed to appreciate the conduct of P.W.2 and the nature of evidence he has deposed and hence the conviction rendered by the trial Court requires to be quashed and set aside. He has contended that the P.W. 4 is an interested witness. 8. Mr. Bhatt has also contended that the evidence of witnesses required corroboration of independent source which is absent in the present case. He has contended that the sanction was not legal and valid sanction. He has contended that the learned Judge was required to give due credence to the evidence in the nature of mark of anthracene powder found on the back portion of the bush-shirt below the back portion and below the border of bush-shirt at the end, but the learned Judge has not correctly appreciated the argument and under the wrong pretext that evidence of all the three witnesses of prosecution has proved the demand and acceptance of bribe money by the appellant-accused and non presence of the stains of anthracene powder at a particular place is of no consequence. He has also contended that the learned Judge has also not appreciated the conduct of the witnesses. He has contended that the Judgment of the trial Court is against the provisions of law and the learned Judge has not considered the defence version of the accused and has wrongly convicted the appellant-accused. He has contended that P.W. 3 who is superior Authority of the Department of the appellant-accused has not sent all the papers to the Sanctioning Authority and, therefore, it cannot be said that the sanction was given in a proper way in eye of law. He has contended that the complainant is habitual in making such complaints against the public servant. He has contended that previously also the complainant had filed complaint against the public servant. Mr. Bhatt has read the provision of Section 8 of the Evidence Act and contended that though initially the date for scrutinizing the original application for licence was fixed after two days from the date of trap, but only just to teach lesson to the appellant-accused, the complainant filed the complaint against the accused before A.C.B. He has contended that at the event of trap, a public servant cannot make any demand and the second demand cannot be considered. Mr. Bhatt has contended that the accused in his further statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has already clarified his defence and he has removed the presumption regarding presence of anthracene powder. He has contended that Section 4 of the P.C. Act is not applicable in the facts of the present case because from the cross examination of all the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, section 4 cannot be made applicable in this matter. 9. Mr. Bhatt has relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE (REPRESENTED BY CBI), HYDERABAD v/s. G. PREM RAJ, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 398 (more particularly Head Note “B”), which reads as under : “B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Ss. 13(1)(d)/13(2), 7 and 20 - Presumption under S. 20 - When arises - Burden of proof to rebut - On whom - On facts, respondent - accused charged under Ss. 13(1)(d)/13(2), 7 and 20 - Presumption under S. 20 - When arises - Burden of proof to rebut - On whom - On facts, respondent - accused charged under Ss. 13(1)(d)/13(2) and 7 - Respondent contending that presumption under S.20 could not be raised where respondent charged under S. 13(1)(d) - Tenability - Held, respondent ignored that charge was also under S. 7 - Herein, there was no question of presumption not arising, once it was proved that respondent accepted illegal gratification of substantial amount - Burden is on respondent to explain as to how amount came in his possession.” 10. Mr. Bhatt has contended that from the oral evidence of the complainant, it is established beyond reasonable doubt that he is a lier, habitual and not reliable witness and he has tried to get licence without following the due procedure. The first demand is also not proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 11. Mr. Bhatt has also relied upon the following decisions : (i) TEJ BAHADUR SINGH v/s. STATE OF U.P., reported in AIR 1990 SC 431 ; (ii) D. SRINIVASAN v/s. DELHI SPECIAL POLICE, reported in AIR 1993 SC 296 Relying upon the aforesaid decisions Mr. Bhatt has contended that the alleged incident has occurred in the year 1986 and the learned Special Judge has disposed of the matter by holding the appellant - accused guilty to the charges framed against him by Judgment and order dated 3.5.1993 i.e. after six years of occurrence of incident and thereafter the present Appeal is filed in the year 1993 and now today we are in 2010 i.e. about 24 years after occurrence of incident. He has contended that the appellant - accused must have become very old and in such circumstances looking to the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions some lesser sentence/punishment may be awarded to the appellant - accused. 12. Mr. Bhatt has also relied upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 883 OF 1988, which has been disposed of on 13.6.1991. He has read Para - 9 of the said Judgment, which is as under : “The learned Special Judge has held that the complainant is not a witness in the nature of accomplice. This finding of learned Special Judge is assailed by Dr. Daftary. 883 OF 1988, which has been disposed of on 13.6.1991. He has read Para - 9 of the said Judgment, which is as under : “The learned Special Judge has held that the complainant is not a witness in the nature of accomplice. This finding of learned Special Judge is assailed by Dr. Daftary. Relying on a Judgment in the case of Bansibhai Ashabhai Patel v/s. The State of Gujarat, in Criminal Appeal No.1150 of 1979 (1984 GLR (UJ) 89) wherein their lordships have categorized four types of bribe givers. The relevant observation reads as under : “There are different types of bribe givers. Firstly, the person offers bribe to prompt a public servant to do him an undeserved favour, secondly, the person who pays to a public servant to see that normal official act is done early and promptly and in favour of the bribe giver; thirdly, the type of person who is driven to pay a bribe on demand to do a normal work just to avoid coercion or harassment in getting the work which could normally be done in the official business. And the fourth is a type of person who pays a bribe to a public servant after his work is over and when the public servant demands it as a regard for what he has done. So, in fact, it can be said that bribe givers of the first type might certainly be the accomplices end to some extent the bribe givers of the second type also can be said to be the persons who prompt the bribes; while the persons in the categories of third and fourth types would be the persons who are unwilling to give bribe out would be required to pay bribe under certain circumstances as they are driven to that.” Mr. Shelat, the learned A.P.P. contended that the complainant cannot be said to be a witness in the nature of accomplice and to support his contention he relied on a judgement in the case of PRAFULCHANDRA SOMALAL VASANI v/s. THE STATE OF GUJARAT, reported in 1987 (1) GLR 364. In the case of Prafulchandra it is held that it all depends on the circumstances of each case is as to whether the bribe giver, that is, the complainant was willing to give bribe. In the case of Prafulchandra it is held that it all depends on the circumstances of each case is as to whether the bribe giver, that is, the complainant was willing to give bribe. If he was not willing to give bribe, but under the circumstance was compelled to agree to give bribe then it cannot be treated as evidence of an accomplice. Here, in the case, the appellant No.1 raided the premises of the complainant on 15th September, 1984. Appellant No.1 collected the sample of chilly powder under the provisions of Food Adulteration Act. If the sample was found adulterated by the public analysis, then the complainant was not to be prosecuted. At the time when the sample was taken by the appellant No.1 it was not known that the public analyst will find the sample adulterated. It is clear from the evidence of the complainant that at the time when appellant No.1 took sample, he requested the appellant No.1 to find out some way and requested him not to proceed in the matter (Exh.14 Para 2 in the chief examination and Para - 11 in the cross-examination). This fact positively suggests and shows that the complainant intended to bribe the appellant No.1, a public servant to do him undeserved favour, and therefore, the complainant is bribe giver of the first type as observed in the case of Bansibhai (supra). Even in view of the observation in the case of Prafulchandra as relied on by Mr. Shelat, the complainant was proposed to bribe he was not compelled or he was obliged by creating a situation by appellant No.1 to give him bribe. Therefore, also the complainant in view of the judgment of Prafulchandra is a witness in the nature of an accomplice.” 13. Mr. Bhatt has contended that ratio laid down in the aforesaid decision of Division Bench of this Court is applicable to the facts of the present case. He has contended that the present appellant-accused is a bribe giver and is an accomplice, so the proper and adequate corroboration is required in connection with the oral evidence of the complainant. Mr. Bhatt has contended that ratio laid down in the aforesaid decision of Division Bench of this Court is applicable to the facts of the present case. He has contended that the present appellant-accused is a bribe giver and is an accomplice, so the proper and adequate corroboration is required in connection with the oral evidence of the complainant. He has contended that from the oral evidence of the witnesses the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and there are sufficient contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses before the learned Special Judge and the learned Judge has not considered the case of the appellant in a proper perspective and in accordance with law and, therefore, the Judgment of the learned Special Judge requires to be quashed and set aside. 14. Learned A.P.P. Shri Kodekar has supported the Judgment and order of the learned Special Judge. He has contended that the sanction is legal and valid sanction and is accorded after due application of mind after considering the material placed before the Authority and on scrutinizing the sanction from every corner, there is nothing to say that it was issued and given without application of mind. He has contended that the two demands were made by the present appellant-accused to the complainant, viz. first prior to the trap and second at the time of trap. He has also contended that the bribe giver is accomplice, but his evidence is required to be considered with other piece of evidence of Panch witness. He has contended that P.W. 2 panch witness, who is Government servant is an independent witness and he has no cause to depose against the appellant-accused. He has also contended that the learned Judge has rightly considered the evidence of the complainant, Panch witnesses and the Investigating Officer and from the evidence of prosecution witnesses, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. He has contended that from the oral as well as documentary evidence, it is established that the presence of anthrecene powder was found from the finger, tips as well as on the pocket of the clothes of the accused as well as of the complainant. He has also contended that Section 8 of the Evidence Act applies qua the conduct of the present appellant-accused. He has also contended that Section 8 of the Evidence Act applies qua the conduct of the present appellant-accused. He has gone read over the provision of Section 8 of the Evidence Act and contended that the present appellant-accused was the sales Tax Officer and he was the only authority to issue registration number and looking to the evidence at the first event, when the complainant approached him he made a demand of Rs.1000/-. He has contended that the allegation which was made by the appellant-accused before the Joint Commissioner of Sales-tax about the behaviour of the trapping officer and that he was beaten by the Trapping Office, is without any evidence. He has contended that the accused was not arrested by the Trapping Officer/Investigating Officer and he was free to file complaint before the Police or before the learned J.M.F.C., but the appellant-accused has never filed any complaint against the Trapping Officer. He has contended that the conduct of the appellant-accused is totally not befitting a public servant, who has been entrusted with such type of work. He has contended that when the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, then no leniency is required to be shown in such type of serious offence. No doubt there is some delay in trial and also in hearing the Criminal Appeal, but, that is not the cause to award him lesser punishment. 15. Mr. Kodekar has relied upon the decision in the case of RAJ RAJENDRA SINGH SETH v/s. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ANR., reported in (2008) 11 SCC 681 , more particularly, Para-15 of the said decision, which reads as under : “15. In B.Noha v State of Kerala, it was, inter alia, observed by this Court as follows : (SCC pp 280-81, Paras 10-11) “10. The evidence shows that when PW 1 told the accused that he had brought the money as directed by the accused, the accused asked PW 1 to take cut and give the same to him. When it is proved that there was voluntary and conscious acceptance of the money, there is no further burden cast on the prosecution to prove by direct evidence, the demand or motive. It has only to be deduced from the facts and circumstances obtained in the particular case. It was held by this Court in Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v/s State of Maharashtra as follows : “12. It has only to be deduced from the facts and circumstances obtained in the particular case. It was held by this Court in Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v/s State of Maharashtra as follows : “12. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted “as motive or reward” for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word “gratification” need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the Court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like “gratification or any valuable thing”. If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word “gratification” must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it.” “11. This decision was followed by this Court in M. Narsinga Rao v/s. State of A.P. There is no case of the accused that the said amount was received by him as the amount which he was legally entitled to receive or collect from PW 1. It was held in State of A.P. v. Kammaraju Gopala Krishna Murthy that when amount is found to have been passed to the public servant the burden is on public servant to establish that it was not by way of illegal gratification. That burden was not discharged by the accused.” 16. On the aspect of awarding minimum sentence Mr. Kodekar, has also relied upon the decision in the case of MOTA RAM v/s. STATE OF HARYANA, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 727 . In Para-14 of the said decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under : “14. So far as the issue of sentence is concerned, in view of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, the minimum sentence a Court could award is one year and it may extend to seven years and a fine can also be imposed. In Para-14 of the said decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under : “14. So far as the issue of sentence is concerned, in view of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, the minimum sentence a Court could award is one year and it may extend to seven years and a fine can also be imposed. None of the grounds submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that it was a very old case; the appellant had already served about six months in jail; the appellant had refunded the amount taken by him from the complainant; that the complainant himself had been the abettor and could have been a co-accused for an offence punishable under Section 109 IP Code, can be the mitigating circumstances for which the Court may reduce the sentence taking into consideration the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act.” Mr. Kodekar has contended that in the present case, no doubt the case is very old, however, the sentence is awarded by the learned Judge is only for the period of one year and there is no mitigating circumstances for which the Court may reduce the sentence taking into consideration the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act. He has, therefore, contended that the learned Judge has rightly held the appellant-accused guilty for the offences charged against him and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case no interference is required to be called for by this Court. 17. I have gone through the Judgment and order of the trial Court. I have also perused the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. I have also gone through the further statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. I have also gone through the decisions cited by both the sides. From the perusal of oral evidence of complainant as well as of the panch witness it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the demand which was made by the present appellant-accused from the complainant is proved. It appears that the complainant has applied for registration of Sales Tax number and it is on record that the present appellant-accused was the main authority to issue the said licence/registration number. It is also on record that in presence of Panch witness the present appellant-accused has demanded Rs.1000/- by way of illegal gratification. It appears that the complainant has applied for registration of Sales Tax number and it is on record that the present appellant-accused was the main authority to issue the said licence/registration number. It is also on record that in presence of Panch witness the present appellant-accused has demanded Rs.1000/- by way of illegal gratification. I have gone through Section 8 of the Evidence Act and looking to the conduct of the accused, when he made demand in presence of panch witness the guilty mind of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt that he has made demand of Rs.1000/- and the prosecution has proved this version beyond reasonable doubt. 18. It has been contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the complainant is in habit of filing false complaint against the public servant. No doubt it is on record that previously one complaint was filed by the complainant against another public servant, but, that is not the ground to disbelieve the present complaint filed by the complainant against the appellant-accused. Looking to the facts of the present case, the nature of the complainant cannot be considered as habitual person. In the present case the complainant has applied for Sales Tax Number for doing new business and as the complainant was in need of said number he requested the appellant-accused to give him urgently, the appellant-accused demanded Rs.1000/- for the same by way of illegal gratification. 19. Even from the perusal of oral evidence of Trapping Officer, it is brought on record that proper care and caution was taken by the Trapping Officer prior to the trap and during the preparation of preliminary panchnama. I have also perused the oral evidence of the complainant and the panch witnesses. It is on record that all the practicals regarding anthracene powder was prepared in presence of both the panch witnesses as well as in presence of member of raiding party. I have also not found anything from the cross-examination of the witnesses to consider that issue that the case of the prosecution is doubtful. I have also perused the evidence of Joint Commissioner of Sale-Tax regarding the complaint of appellant-accused about misbehaviour of the Trapping Officer against the appellant-accused. 20. Looking to the oral as well as documentary evidence and looking to the conduct of the appellant-accused, his intention to demand illegal gratification is clearly established beyond reasonable doubt. I have also perused the evidence of Joint Commissioner of Sale-Tax regarding the complaint of appellant-accused about misbehaviour of the Trapping Officer against the appellant-accused. 20. Looking to the oral as well as documentary evidence and looking to the conduct of the appellant-accused, his intention to demand illegal gratification is clearly established beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that the evidence of demanding bribe can be corroborated by some other independent witness. In the present case the panch witnesses have fully supported the case of prosecution and the panch witnesses are the public servant and independent witnesses and their evidence is totally corroborated with the evidence of the complainant-P.W.1. 21. Learned APP has also drawn the attention regarding Section 4 of the P.C. Act, 1947. He has no doubt made an attempt to establish that presumption is required to be drawn against the present appellant-accused. Mr. Kodekar has read the statement of the accused, recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and also read the evidence of Trapping Officer just to clarify that the anthracene powder which was found from the finger, tips, palm, out-side and inside the pocket of his bus-shirt and interesting evidence of the Trapping officer that anthracene powder was found from inside the pocket of the accused and he is unable to say anything how the anthracene powder was found from inside the pocket. We can consider the natural conduct of the human being. Suppose a person is trying to thrust something from his pocket, the person can use one hand. He cannot use both the hands. He has also further stated that when the complainant was requested to furnish the information, at that time he showed his willingness to give money and on saying so he took out money from the pocket and offered him the money. He, thereupon warned the complainant and refused to accept money and asked him to go away but the complainant did not go out of his chamber and so with a view to drive him out of the chamber, while he was coming out of the chamber, the complainant tried to put money in his pocket in the chamber as well as out of the chamber and during which the accused gave a jerk and as a result of which money had fallen down in the lobby and at that time the police people came and surrounded him and started beating. However, the accused has failed to explain regarding the presence of anthracene powder which was inside the pocket. So Section 4 is straight-way applicable to the facts of the present case. 22. It is true that presumption of fact and presumption regarding law can be considered from the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. The presumption regarding the fact can be considered from the oral evidence of complainant as well as of the panch witness and also from the documentary evidence like complaint and the panchnama. 23. From the perusal of above oral as well as documentary evidence, I am of the opinion that the accused has failed to rebut the presumption under Section 4 of the Act. Even from the cross examination of the witnesses, the present appellant has failed to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt before the learned Special Judge. From the perusal of reasons assigned by the learned Special Judge, I have not found any substance to hold that the learned Special Judge has committed any error. Even from the submissions made by the learned Counsel Mr. Bhatt he has not convinced this Court that from which angle of the evidence, his defence version can be considered in favour of the appellant-accused. 24. The contention of learned Advocate that the alleged incident has occurred in the year 1986 and today we are in 2010 and the appellant-accused must have become very old aged and, therefore, some lesser punishment may be awarded to the appellant-accused. No doubt there is some delay in deciding the Appeal. But, it is not only the fault on the part of the prosecution, the appellant-accused could have also approached the Court for early hearing by way of filing appropriate application for early hearing of Appeal. However, the appellant-accused has not tried to approach this Court for early hearing of this matter. Looking to the ratio of the punishment prescribed under Section 161 of I.P. Code and under Section 5 of the P.C. Act, in my opinion, the learned Judge has awarded the lesser punishment to the appellant-accused and, therefore, in my view, no case is made out to award lesser punishment than the punishment awarded by the learned trial Judge and hence, the sentence awarded by the learned Single Judge is quite proper and no interference is required to be called for. 25. 25. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Special Judge has not committed any error in holding the appellant-accused guilty for the offences alleged against him and, therefore, I do not see any reason to interfere with the findings arrived at by the learned Special Judge. Therefore, I am in agreement with the reasons assigned by the learned Special Judge. Hence, impugned Judgment requires to be confirmed and Appeal requires to be dismissed. 26. In view of above, this Appeal is dismissed. The Judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 3.5.1993 passed by learned Special Judge, Rajkot, in Special Criminal Case No. 6 of 1987 is hereby confirmed. Appellant-accused is on bail and, therefore, his Bail Bond shall stands cancelled. The appellant-original accused is directed to surrender himself before the Jail authority within a period of six weeks from the date of this order, failing which the concerned Sessions Court shall issue non-bailable warrant to effect the arrest of the appellant-original accused. R & P to be sent back to the trial Court forthwith.