Judgment :- (This Writ Petition is filed under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India praying to quash the order of respondent No. 1 vide Annexure-N dated 18.01.2010 and the order of the 2nd respondent vide Annexure-K order dated 06.08.2009.) 1. In this writ petition, petitioner is challenging the order dated 06.08.2009 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, vide Annexure-K and the order dated 18.01.2010 passed in appeal by the Director, Municipal Administration, Bangalore, vide Annexure- N. 2. Facts, stated in brief, relevant for the purpose of the case are that the petitioner herein was a member of the Town Panchayat, Molakalmuru in Chitradurga District. He was serving as Vice President of the Town Panchayat. One T. Chandranna – respondent No.3 herein, who is also a member of the Town Panchayat, Molakalmuru, filed a complaint before the Deputy Commissioner alleging that the petitioner, by using his position as a Vice President of the Town Panchayat and for his personal gain, had published an advertisement in a weekly newspaper ‘Prakash Voice’ owned by the petitioner and had thus incurred disqualification to continue as a Councilor. 3. Based on the complaint made, the Deputy Commissioner issued a show cause notice dated 06.08.2008 calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation. On 18.08.2008, petitioner submitted his explanation denying that he was the owner of the newspaper and that he had committed any such irregularity. He further contended that the ownership of the newspaper was transferred in favour of one T. Manjunath as back as on 17.02.2008. 4. The Deputy Commissioner recorded the say of the petitioner, respondent No.3 and one Maheshwaraiah, District Information Officer on 04.8.2009 and passed the impugned order on 06.08.2009 holding that the petitioner being the editor and owner of ‘Prakash voice’, a weekly newspaper had received a sum of Rs.14,000/- vide Cheque dated 23.04.2008 and thus incurred disqualification under Section 16(1)(k) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The Deputy Commissioner has also found that petitioner was not saved of the said disqualification under proviso (d)(iii) of Section 16(1)(k) of the Act as he was the editor and owner of the newspaper on the relevant date. In exercise of his powers under the Act, the Deputy Commissioner declared that the petitioner stood disqualified as a Councilor with immediate effect. In exercise of his powers under the Act, the Deputy Commissioner declared that the petitioner stood disqualified as a Councilor with immediate effect. Aggrieved by this order, petitioner preferred an appeal before the Director of Municipal Administration, Bangalore. By his order dated 18.01.2010, the Director has dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the orders passed by both the authorities, this writ petition is filed. 5. The main contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Sri Jayakumar S. Patil is that as per Section 16(1)(k) read with proviso (d)(iii), it cannot be a disqualification for the petitioner to publish an advertisement relating to the affairs of the Town Panchayat pertaining to any work to be carried out or any contract or employment with or under, or by or on behalf of the Municipal Council by order of the Municipal Council. He invites the attention of the Court to the opening words in Section 16(K) and submits that Section 16(1)(k) is subject to the other provisions enacted in the succeeding provisions of the said Section. Therefore, he submits, the provision made in proviso (d)(iii) of Section 16(1)(k) if kept in mind will make it clear that insertion of an advertisement relating to the work to be carried out pursuant to the order passed by the Municipal council, even assuming that the petitioner herein was the owner or editor of the newspaper in question at the relevant point of time, cannot be a ground for disqualifying him. He further contends that the Deputy Commissioner did not provide a reasonable or fair opportunity to the petitioner to have his say in the matter inasmuch as the entire exercise of holding the enquiry and hearing the arguments is completed on 04.08.2008 itself refusing the request made by the petitioner to grant time. 6. Sri Kantharaj, learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent – complainant before the Deputy Commissioner and the learned Additional Government Advocate Sri Devdas appearing for respondents 1 and 2, vehemently contend that this is a case where the petitioner has gained financial benefit by publishing, in a weekly newspaper owned by him, the advertisement regarding a tender notification pertaining to the purchase of the materials in connection with water supply, street light, sanitation and repairs of pump-sets. It is their contention that the petitioner being a Councilor and more particularly the Vice President of the Town Panchayat could not have evinced interest in such dealings by agreeing to publish the newspaper the advertisement collecting huge sum of Rs.14,000/-. 7. Sri Kantharaj refers to the facts of the case and contends that though the petitioner herein had taken up a defence by producing some declarations made in stamp paper and a representation given to the Assistant Commissioner that he was not the owner of the newspaper at the relevant point of time, the said declaration and representations are fabricated and not genuine. He therefore contends that the findings recorded by both the authorities on the factual aspect as to whether the petitioner was in fact the owner and editor of the newspaper as on the relevant date cannot be reexamined by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. 8. As regards the lack of opportunity given to the petitioner, learned Additional Government Advocate submits that the petitioner had ample opportunity before the Director and in fact had made use of the same by producing some documents whereupon the Director after considering the materials has passed a detailed order confirming the findings recorded by the Deputy Commissioner and hence the grievance made by the petitioner in this connection cannot be entertained. 9. The principal question urged before this Court pertains to the application of the provisions contained under Section 16(1)(k) of the Act so as to attract disqualification against the petitioner to continue as a Councilor in view of the allegations made stating that he had by receiving charges, published an advertisement in his newspaper of the tender notification of the works notified by the Town Panchayat. Since the counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that even assuming, without conceding that all the allegations against the petitioner, on facts, are proved still the impugned orders cannot be sustained as the allegations made against the petitioner do not fall under Section 16 (1)(k) read with proviso (d) (iii) of the Act, it is necessary to test this contention with reference to the provisions of the Act. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the relevant provisions. Section 16 pertains to general disqualifications for becoming a Councilor. Section 16(1)(k) and proviso (d) (iii) are relevant for our purpose. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the relevant provisions. Section 16 pertains to general disqualifications for becoming a Councilor. Section 16(1)(k) and proviso (d) (iii) are relevant for our purpose. They read as under: 16(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a Councilor. (a) …… (b) …… (c) …… (d) …… (e) …… (f) …… (g) …… (h) …… (i) …… (j) …… (k) if, save as hereinafter provided, he has directly or indirectly by himself or his partner, any share or interest in any work done by order of the municipal council, or in any contract or employment with or under, by or on behalf of the municipal council: or (l) ….. (m) …… (n) …… (o) ….. Provided that (a) …… (b) …… (c) …… (d) a person shall not be deemed to have incurred disqualification under sub-clause (k) by reason of his:- (i) …… (ii) ….. (iii) having a share or interest in any newspaper in which any advertisement relating to the affairs of the municipal council may be inserted, or (iv) …… (v) …… (vi) …… 10. A careful reading of the provisions contained in Section 16(1)(k) and proviso (d) (iii) would suggest that if a councilor has any share or interest either directly or indirectly by himself or through his partner in any work done by the order of the Municipal Council or in any contract or employment with or under or on behalf of the Municipal Council, then unless he is saved from the succeeding provisions of Section 16(1)(k), he shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being, a Councilor. As Section 16(1)(k) starts with the expressions “if, save as hereinafter provided”, it is necessarily suggests that in case an exception is provided or an exemption is indicated in the succeeding provisions, then it saves him from disqualification though he has got such an interest or share in any work done or contract entered into or employment taken up. The provision that saves some of the Councilors even though they have some share or interest in any such work, contract or employment are provided in the proviso from (a) to (d). The provision that saves some of the Councilors even though they have some share or interest in any such work, contract or employment are provided in the proviso from (a) to (d). The effect of proviso (d) is that the disqualification as provided for under Section 16(1)(k) shall not be incurred or deemed to have been incurred by reason of the Councilor having a share or interest in any newspaper in which as advertisement relating to the affairs of the Municipal Council may have been inserted. 11. The allegation in this case against the petitioner is that he had carried an advertisement in his newspaper as per the order passed by the Chief Officer of the Town Panchayat pertaining to Tender Notification with regard to certain works to be undertaken for the Town Panchayat such as materials for water supply, sanitation and repairs of pump set. The findings of both the authorities are that though the petitioner had denied that as on the date the advertisement was carried out in the newspaper he was the owner and editor of the newspaper, the facts disclosed that he was, in fact, the owner and editor of the newspaper and received the amount through Sri Manjunath and that the cheque itself was presented by him. 12. Sri Kantharaj, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent and the learned Additional Government Advocate would contend that acceptance of the assignment of publishing the tender notification in the newspaper is itself an act that comes within the purview of the expression ‘any work done’ as contained in Section 16(1)(k) and the said assignment is not saved as it does not fall within the ambit of proviso (d) (iii). He submits that proviso (d) (iii) comes to the help of such Councilors who own or have interest in any newspaper from continuing to own or have such interest in them, but the moment they carry out any such work by advertising the same in the newspaper, for consideration, then he incurs disqualification under Section 16(1)(k). 13. The plain reading of Section 16(1)(k) with proviso (d) (iii) does not lend support to such a construction. There is no prohibition or disqualification under Section 16(1)(k) for a Councilor to be an editor or the owner of the newspaper. 13. The plain reading of Section 16(1)(k) with proviso (d) (iii) does not lend support to such a construction. There is no prohibition or disqualification under Section 16(1)(k) for a Councilor to be an editor or the owner of the newspaper. The disqualification comes only if, being a Councilor he has any share or interest in any work done by the order of the Municipal Council. Even assuming, in this case, that by the order of the Municipal Council, the petitioner was called upon to do some work and that he has actually done the work of carrying out the advertisement relating to the tenders called for in the newspaper run by him, proviso (d) (iii) is clearly intended to save such persons having such interest in the newspaper in which an advertisement of such nature relating to the affairs of the Municipal Council is inserted. If this was not so, there was no reason for the Legislature to use the language ‘ a person shall not be deemed to have incurred disqualification under sub-clause (k) by reason of his having share or interest in any newspaper in which any advertisement relating to the affairs of the Municipal Council may be inserted’. In this case, petitioner, as found by the authorities, inserted an advertisement in his newspaper and that advertisement related to the tender notification of the Town Panchayat and he collected money for the same. An advertisement to be inserted in a newspaper will have to be naturally for the price payable for such advertisement. Therefore, when insertion of such advertisement in a newspaper in which the Councilor may have interest or share is saved by the Legislative intent, it cannot be interpreted to mean that if the concerned Councilor accepts the assignment under the order of the Council to do the said work for consideration then he shall stand disqualified under sub-clause (k) of Section 16(1). Such an understanding or interpretation of proviso (d) (iii) will negate the whole purpose for which the proviso is inserted. 14. When a provision of law is required to be constructed, full meaning has to be given to the words and expressions used in the said enactment. The object behind disqualification and the purpose behind saving some of the situations by providing exceptions have to be kept in mind. 14. When a provision of law is required to be constructed, full meaning has to be given to the words and expressions used in the said enactment. The object behind disqualification and the purpose behind saving some of the situations by providing exceptions have to be kept in mind. In fact, the provision under Section 16(1)(k) is itself made subject to the succeeding provisions as it uses the expression ‘save as hereinafter provided’. Therefore, when it is provided in the proviso that an interest or share in any newspaper held by a Councilor in which an advertisement relating to the affairs of the Municipal Council is inserted will not result in disqualification, then it is not open for this Court by a process of interpretation to bring in circumstances such as the one presented in the instant case under the mischief of the Section on the ground that in the given case a substantial amount of Rs.14,000/-is taken for the purpose of inserting an advertisement. If that were to be so, the language of the Section would have been totally different. This begin the position, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner which is confirmed by the Director of Municipal Administration holding that the matter fell within the four corners of the provisions contained under Section 16 (1)(k) and did not fall in the exception provided under proviso (d) (iii) to Section 16(1)(k) cannot be sustained. 15. It is also urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no fair and reasonable opportunity has been given to the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner. In this view of the matter, learned Additional Government Advocate was directed to secure the records. The records disclose that on all the earlier occasions prior to 04.08.2009, no enquiry was conducted as, either the Deputy Commissioner was not available or the matter was not taken up. Only on 04.08.2009, the inquiry is started. The same day it is completed and the matter is posted for orders on 06.08.2009 and on 06.08.2009 the order is passed. The records disclose that on all the earlier occasions prior to 04.08.2009, no enquiry was conducted as, either the Deputy Commissioner was not available or the matter was not taken up. Only on 04.08.2009, the inquiry is started. The same day it is completed and the matter is posted for orders on 06.08.2009 and on 06.08.2009 the order is passed. Though the Director of Municipal Administration in the order -Annexure-N has observed that in relation to the enquiry, the matter was posted on 22.10.2008, 26.11.2008, 01.07.2008, 22.07.2009 and finally on 04.08.2009 and therefore there was ample opportunity given to the petitioner, the said observations do not reflect the actual position inasmuch as the enquiry was in fact conducted only on 04.08.2009 and the petitioner had no opportunity earlier to the said date. However, this aspect pales into insignificance as it is already held that the allegations made, even if taken on their face value to be true, the matter does not fall within the ambit of Section 16(1)(k) read with proviso (d)(iii) and therefore there was no jurisdiction in the Deputy Commissioner to initiate action for disqualification of the petitioner. 16. In view of the above and in the light of the construction of the provision contained under Section 16(1)(k), I find that this writ petition deserves to succeed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned orders are set aside. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs.