JUDGMENT Pankaj Mithal :- Heard Piyush Agrawal, learned counsel for the revisionist and the learned standing counsel. The following questions of law have been raised in the instant revision : (i) Whether, in view of the judgment of this honourable court in the case of Anup Lal Sohan Lal v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1987] UPTC 1122 and Malik Singh Int Bhatta v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1989] 75 STC 381 (All); [1989] UPTC 442, the account books can be rejected if the same has not been shown at the time of survey ? (ii) Whether, in view of the judgment of this honourable court in the case of Tara Chand Niranjan Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax reported in [1986] UPTC 976, the Trade Tax Tribunal was justified in drawing the adverse view against the applicant that the information about the closure of the brick kiln has not been given ? (iii) Whether in view of the judgment of this honourable court in the case of Kanti Swaroop Agarwal, reported in [1985] UPTC 1066, the rate fixed by the Trade Tax Tribunal is justified ? The proceedings relate to the assessment year 1986-87. Sri Piyush Agarwal, learned counsel for the revisionist, very fairly submitted that he is not pressing question No. (i) as the same is covered against the assessee by the decision of the apex court in Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. v. Mohan Brickfield reported in [2006] 148 STC 638; [2007] UPTC 1. In view of the above, the said question needs no adjudication and stands answered against the assessee and in favour of the Department in terms of the above decision. So far question No. (ii) is concerned, admittedly a survey was conducted on April 23, 1986 and according to survey report revisionist has concealed one round of firing and the brick kiln had not remained closed up to April 11, 1986. According to the revisionist, he had given information on April 13, 1986 by registered post that the brick kiln had remained closed from March 11, 1986 to April 11, 1986. Sri Piyush Agarwal has placed reliance upon Tara Chand Niranjan Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1986] UPTC 976 and submitted that information regarding closure of brick kiln is not required to be given and there is no material for recording a finding that it was operational on April 11, 1986. Sri Piyush Agarwal has placed reliance upon Tara Chand Niranjan Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1986] UPTC 976 and submitted that information regarding closure of brick kiln is not required to be given and there is no material for recording a finding that it was operational on April 11, 1986. It may be correct that such information is not required to be given under the provisions of the Act but where a survey has been conducted and the revisionist has been found running brick kiln, it becomes incumbent upon the revisionist to rebut the survey report and bring on record material to show that the brick kiln was actually closed. No such material was brought before any authority and, as such, the Tribunal has not committed any error in accepting the survey report and making assessment accordingly. The question No. (ii) is answered accordingly. The third and last question raised is with regard to the rate of the bricks. The revisionist has shown the rate to be Rs. 235 per thousand whereas the assessing authority has determined it to be Rs. 400 per thousand. The first appellate authority reduced the rate to Rs. 300 per thousand which has again been enhanced to Rs. 380 per thousand by the Tribunal. Submission is that once the rate was reduced to Rs. 300 per thousand, in the absence of any appeal by the Department the Tribunal could not have enhanced the rate to Rs. 380 per thousand. Admittedly, the rate of brick was determined by the first appellate authority at Rs. 300 per thousand and there was no appeal by the Department. Therefore, in the appeal preferred by the assessee the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to reopen the matter with regard to the rate of the bricks so as to enhance it to Rs. 380 per thousand. Accordingly, the enhancement of rate of bricks from Rs. 300 per thousand to Rs. 380 per thousand by the Tribunal cannot be sustained in law. In view of above facts and circumstances, the revision is partly allowed and the order of the Tribunal dated December 13, 2002 stands modified to the extent indicated above.