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2010 DIGILAW 1484 (CAL)

Mitali Paul v. UNION OF INDIA

2010-12-23

AMIT TALUKDAR, MRINAL KANTI CHAUDHURI

body2010
JUDGMENT Talukdar, J. 1. JUST desert. 2. NEITHER altruism nor playing the role of a scrooge the Court sometime has to do just justice. It is in one such situation we have assembled to hear these bunch of appeals where the pain and loss has formed a bond between these unfortunate Appellants. 3. FATE bound this set of distraught Appellants in a common string where their kith and kin were lost under fortuitous circumstances as known to Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 'said Act'). 4. THIS paved their way before the Railway Claims Tribunal, which saw them being compensated by the sum of Rs. Four Lakh each on different dates. Spouse, parents and an individual, whom the tragedy struck, after having received the award; had dawned upon them that they have a scope for earning interest on the compensatory amount. 5. HENCE these batch of appeals on that limited score. Since those were heard analogously the same are being disposed of by this common Judgment. 6. ADDRESSING us on this restricted sphere, Shri Jayanta Banerjee, learned Counsel for the Appellants led by Shri Subir Banerjee has shown us that it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to have granted interest in favour of the Claimants and refusal thereto has definitely given rise to a cause of action in their favour. Shri Banerjee was of the view that the Claim Petition having been filed immediately after the accident had taken place, took some time to be disposed of and the delay in the same and ultimately when the amount was received, was a period which was required to be awarded with interest; for the Appellants have suffered and were denied the amount in question for the said period. 7. IN support of his case he has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., (2009)3 WBLR (SC) 593. 8. TO further buttress his point, Shri Banerjee further referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mainura Bibi v. Union of India reported in (2009)3 WBLR (Cal) 413. According to Shri Banerjee, notwithstanding the fact that the said Act did not contain any provision for award of interest but in view of the decision of Supreme Court in Thozhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. According to Shri Banerjee, notwithstanding the fact that the said Act did not contain any provision for award of interest but in view of the decision of Supreme Court in Thozhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra) and the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mainura Bibi v. Union of India (supra) and considering the fact that the delay in making such payment definitely entitles him to an Order of interest on the principal sum of compensation received by him. 9. FURTHERMORE Shri Banerjee contended that although the question of interest was raised before the Tribunal the same was not considered properly. PER CONTRA : 10. SHRI Saptarshee Roy, learned Railway Advocate appearing for the Railway Administration in FMAT 1175 of 2010, FMAT 1174 of 2010, FMAT 938 of 2010 and FMAT 1053 of 2010 and SHRI Subrata Dasgupta appearing for the Railway Administration in FMAT 909 of 2010 and FMAT 597 of 2010 has raised a very strong objection with regard to the prayer made by SHRI Banerjee for the Appellants. Leading the case of the Railway Administration, Shri Roy, whose submission was largely adopted by Shri Dasgupta and Shri Chatterjee for the Railway Administration, submitted that in the said Act there is no scope for payment of interest. As such, any Order passed in that direction, would be dehorse the Statute. 11. SHRI Roy further invited our attention to the fact that the award of compensation was received by the appellants long time ago without any objection. He has produced before us the document of receipt of the amount forgoing any other claim with full and final satisfaction of the amount. 12. SHRI Roy was of the view that on account of the said situation, it would be a case of promissory estoppel for the Appellants to now revive their prayer for interest, once they have received the entire amount of compensation in full and final settlement in their own volition after giving necessary declaration before the Authority. This submission of Shri Roy was also adopted by Shri Dasgupta. 13. FROM the Office documents he has placed before the Court indicating that the amount was received without any murmur. 14. This submission of Shri Roy was also adopted by Shri Dasgupta. 13. FROM the Office documents he has placed before the Court indicating that the amount was received without any murmur. 14. SHRI Roy took another point to the effect that the question of interest was not taken before the Tribunal, on the contrary, as indicated hereinabove, the principal claim amount was accepted without any dispute. According to Shri Roy this would result in constructive res judicata for the Appellants to turn back a full circle and lay a claim, which has by now not only become stale but defunct by virtue of the foreclosure arising out of their own declaration with regard to having received the same in full and final settlement. 15. SHRI Arindam Chattopadhyay, learned Advocate appearing for the Railway Administration in F.M.A.T. 1025 of 2010 (SHRI Sandip Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India), while adopting the submission of SHRI Roy, has also placed before us the documents to show the amount having been received in full and final settlement of the entire claim. 16. SHRI Chattooadhyay was of the view that the injured person i.e. the appellant himself being properly satisfied-took the amount awarded by the Tribunal but did not raise any objection with regard to the question of interest and once he has received it, now it is not open for him to revert at this stage and raise the plea of non-payment of interest. To square up, Shri Roy has placed before us two Division Bench decisions of the Andhra Pradesh and Bombay High Courts : A) Union of India v. Konduru Venkata Reddy, AIR 2008 Andhra Pradesh 211 and B) ; Sanjay Sampatrao Gaikwad v. Union of India, AIR 2005 Bombay 409 to show that question of grant of interest is purely a matter of discretion and there is no statutory obligation which binds the Court in cases of this type to award interest. 17. HE has invited our attention to Paragraph 22 of the decision of Union of India v. Konduru Venkata Reddy (supra) and illustrated his point and submitted on the strength of the decision of Union of India v. Konduru Venkata Reddy (supra) that interest cannot be claimed as a matter of right. 18. 17. HE has invited our attention to Paragraph 22 of the decision of Union of India v. Konduru Venkata Reddy (supra) and illustrated his point and submitted on the strength of the decision of Union of India v. Konduru Venkata Reddy (supra) that interest cannot be claimed as a matter of right. 18. REFERRING to the Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court in Sanjay Sampatrao Gaikwad v. Union of India (supra) Shri Roy has submitted that the liability of the Railways to pay interest, is restricted to the decision of the Tribunal and nothing beyond the same. After we have had our foray in the entire bundle of materials that have been placed before us in the light of the submissions made at the Bar on the anvil of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra), the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mainura Bibi v. Union of India, (supra), as well as Bombay High Court in Sanjay Sampatrao Gaikwad v. Union of India (supra) and Union of India v. Konduru Venkata Reddy (supra), we would be required to appreciate the prayer made in this series of appeals. 19. AS we have found these appeals relate to payment of compensation under Section 124-A of the said Act. The Appellants have failed to earn any interest amount from the Tribunal. They have now approached this Court in appeal on a common plea, which we have seen from the submission made by Shri Banerjee at the prologue of our Judgment and we need not adumbrate the same so as to avoid unnecessary verbose. 20. WHILE dealing with this question at first, we should touch a little, although in a tender fashion, the merit of the appeal-even though we are restricted to the question of grant of interest. It should be kept in mind that Section 124-A of the said Act was inserted in the statute Book by Parliament in their wisdom in 1989 for the reasons set out in the Object and Preamble of the said Act where the phrase 'untoward incident' have been found place, which was earlier not in existence. It should be kept in mind that Section 124-A of the said Act was inserted in the statute Book by Parliament in their wisdom in 1989 for the reasons set out in the Object and Preamble of the said Act where the phrase 'untoward incident' have been found place, which was earlier not in existence. Not only this is a piece of Legislation which covers situations such as those we have noticed through the various Judgments and Orders under appeal in this string of appeals but they have a larger Social purpose to serve i.e. to ameliorate the plight of those who have either been injured or have lost their near and dear ones on account of circumstances as understood within the meaning of Section 124-A of the said Act. 21. WE, in a Court of appeal, should be alive in giving the same a purposive and a broader interpretation so as to further the Legislative intent and not to defeat it. 22. TRUE, that there is no mention of grant of interest in the whole of the said Act. Will it foreclose the path of the Court to respond to such cases? Exactly, this would be the question, which, we would be required to answer in this batch of appeals. Firstly, we find that as a First Court of appeal, we are also in equity. Secondly, we are dealing with a piece of Legislation where, although the cold logic of Law should apply within the meaning of Section 123/124-A of the said Act but the purpose of enactment of these pieces of Legislation should be kept in mind and the Court should be alive to the wisdom of Parliament under which these Sections were incorporated in the Statute Book. Anything that cause to defeat a Social purpose, should not be cherished. 23. BEFORE us, Shri Banerjee has placed the decision of Supreme Court in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra) and the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mainura Bibi v. Union of India (supra). These decisions are quite appropriate on the fact and situation of the present appeals. 24. REFERENCE in this regard may be made by us to the case of Rathi Menon v. Union of India, 2001 WBLR (SC) 515, which has been referred to in the decision of Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. These decisions are quite appropriate on the fact and situation of the present appeals. 24. REFERENCE in this regard may be made by us to the case of Rathi Menon v. Union of India, 2001 WBLR (SC) 515, which has been referred to in the decision of Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra). In all these cases, question of grant of interest was considered by the Supreme Court as well as the Division Bench of our Court. More precisely in Rathi Menon v. Union of India's (supra) case, the Supreme Court was categorical in this regard which was followed in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra). 25. THE Division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Union of India v. Konduru Venkata Reddy (supra) has been carefully seen by us. Their Lordship were of the view that the grant of interest is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. We would be of the view no doubt true that grant of interest is discretionary but it is how the discretion is exercised, is the sine qua non of a Judicial Order. Such discretion, in our view, has not been discreetly exercised by the Tribunal. 26. WE, sitting in appeal, which is after all, continuation of the proceeding of the first instance-can, obviously rectify the same. So far as the Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court in Sanjay Sampatrao Gaikwadv. Union of India (supra) is concerned, we find no reason to have any say on the same since it deals with the date of interest. That apart, neither the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Union of India v. Konduru Venkata Reddy (supra) nor the decision of Bombay High Court in Sanjay Sampatrao Gaikwad. v. Union of India (supra) can be binding upon us as Article 141 and the Division Bench decision of our Court in Mainura Bibi v. Union of India (supra) has binding value upon us within the Rule of stare decisis-others best a persuasive value, nothing else. 27. NOW, if we go back to square one, we find after all, what is whole hog of the entire issue where it has persuaded this group of Appellants to have beseeched the Jurisdiction of this Court in appeal in the circumstances that have been placed before us. 28. 27. NOW, if we go back to square one, we find after all, what is whole hog of the entire issue where it has persuaded this group of Appellants to have beseeched the Jurisdiction of this Court in appeal in the circumstances that have been placed before us. 28. INTEREST is, after all, an earning capacity of a person. Denial of the same for whatever reason or in the manner, entitles the recipient to lay its claim. Even though the Statute may not contain provision in this regard, the Court or a Tribunal; more so when exercising its powers under this type of Act which serves the social purpose-ought to be alive to this situation. In that way the Tribunal, in our opinion, has been oblivious of this situation which requires our interference. 29. WE have kept in mind the objection of Shri Roy that there has been a promissory estoppel since the amount has already been received by the Claimants and also as they have come back after a sufficient length of time, their claim would be hit by constructive res judicata . 30. IN our opinion, in ordinary circumstances of the Matter, we would have found much substance in the submission of Shri Roy that in any other nature of suite these two aspects would have been of a very big hurdle for Shri Banerjee to overcome. But as this is a piece of beneficial Legislation, which has been incorporated in the Statute Book along with Section 124-A for containing the situation of the victims of the circumstances as set out there under-all the trappings of a normal Civil Court should not apply and a broad view of the Matter would be required to be taken. We have noted the submissions of the learned Counsels for the Railway Administration with regard to interest not being claimed at the first instance. In our reading of the different judgments and orders under appeal we feel the situation is quite otherwise. In several cases the learned Tribunal notwithstanding the prayer made in that regard refused the same without any valid reason [ (i) FMAT 1025 of 2010 and (ii) FMAT 597 of 2010]. 31. In our reading of the different judgments and orders under appeal we feel the situation is quite otherwise. In several cases the learned Tribunal notwithstanding the prayer made in that regard refused the same without any valid reason [ (i) FMAT 1025 of 2010 and (ii) FMAT 597 of 2010]. 31. SO far as the arguments advanced by the Railway Administration that since the statute did not permit grant of interest we are of the view that the same cannot be sustained in the light of the Judgment of Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra) where this question has been discussed by their Lordship of the Supreme Court. 32. IN all in nothing in substance what remains before us is the fact that after all when the shadow of tragedy clamped on these appeal their entitlement for compensation arose from the very same day. Protracted long process before the Tribunal and thereafter by way of appeal before this Court has simply compounded their agony perhaps in the process leaving little scope to mourn for the loss. Interest on the award cannot obliterate the condition of the Appellants but we in appeal would simply reinforce a legal right available in their favour by way of necessary directions for amendment of the claimed amount along with interest. 33. ON a wholesome appreciation of the entire aspect of the Matter, we would be of the opinion that the objection raised by Shri Roy and his counterpart for the Railway Administration Shri Chattopadhyay and Shri Dasgupta cannot be sustained on the contrary we found much force in the submission made by Shri Banerjee for the appellant. 34. IT is now directed that the claim amount would carry an interest @ 8% per annum from the date of filing of the Application till the date of actual payment. Amended exercise to be completed within 3 weeks from communication of this order. 35. WITH the aforesaid direction the compensation amount stands modified. Parties to bear their own costs.