JUDGMENT S.A. Bobde, J. 1. Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 2. The petitioners have approached this Court for direction to respondent no.2-Vice Chancellor, Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University, Nagpur, to exercise the emergency powers under Section 14 (7) and (8) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) and grant approval to the syllabus for the course of M. Tech (Power Electronics and Power Systems) in Electrical Engineering and further First Time Affiliation for academic year 2010-11. The petitioner is a reputed college of Engineering affiliated to the Nagpur University. There is no course of M. Tech. (Power Electronics and Power Systems) in Electrical Engineering in the Nagpur University. The petitioner, therefore, made a proposal to the Nagpur University for the introduction of the Course. However, it seems that the proposal could not go through the entire procedure contemplated by the Act for its commencement and has only gone past the Board of Studies under Section 38 of the Act and not beyond. Thus, the Board of Studies for the University has approved the syllabus in the said course. After approval by the Board of Studies, in ordinary course, the proposal along with the syllabus would have gone to the Faculty, Engineering and Technology under Section 34 of the Act and, thereafter, to the Academic Council under Section 30 of the Act. Thereafter, it would have been placed before the Management Council. However, admittedly, these last three stages could not be completed because of cessation of the term of those bodies under the provisions of the Act. The bodies are not yet constituted and we are informed that they would be constituted only by the end of December-2010. 3. Mr. Bhangde, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that in these circumstances, it was incumbent on the Vice Chancellor to exercise powers under Section 14 (7) and (8) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, there is, in fact, an emergency in the sense that the newly proposed course, ought to have commenced in July but it could not because the term of the bodies, which were to approve the syllabus for commencing of the course, came to an end. Section 14 (7) and (8) of the Act read as follows: “14. Powers and Duties of Vice-Chancellor. (1)..... (2)..... (3)..... (4)..... (6)..... Section 14 (7) and (8) of the Act read as follows: “14. Powers and Duties of Vice-Chancellor. (1)..... (2)..... (3)..... (4)..... (6)..... (7) If there are reasonable grounds for the Vice-Chancellor to believe that there is an emergency which requires immediate action to be taken, he shall take such action, as he thinks necessary, and shall at the earliest opportunity, report in writing the grounds for his belief that there was an emergency, and the action taken by him, to such authority or body as would, in the ordinary course, have dealt with the matter. In the event of a difference arising between the Vice-Chancellor and authority or body whether there was in fact an emergency, or on the action taken (where such action does not affect any person in the service of the University), or on both, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision shall be final: Provided that, where any such action taken by the Vice Chancellor affects any person in the service of the university, such person shall be entitled to prefer, within thirty days from the date on which he receives notice of such action, appeal to the management Council. (8) Where any matter is required to be regulated by the Statutes, Ordinances or Regulations, but no Statutes, Ordinances or Regulations are made in that behalf the Vice-Chancellor may, for the time being, regulate matter by issuing such directions as he thinks necessary, and shall, at the earliest opportunity thereafter, place them before the Managements Council or other authority or body concerned for approval. He may, at the same time, place before such authority or body for consideration the draft of the Statutes, Ordinances or Regulations, as the case may be, required to be made in that behalf.” The above provisions clearly confer on the Vice Chancellor, powers to take action in an emergency. Whether an emergency exists or not is a matter to be decided by Vice Chancellor alone or by the Chancellor, in case of a difference on that issue between him and a body. Whether an emergency exists or not is a matter to be decided by Vice Chancellor alone or by the Chancellor, in case of a difference on that issue between him and a body. In normal circumstances, the commencement of one course in one college may not have been considered to be an emergency but the Vice Chancellor has himself in exercise of powers conferred by Section 14 (7) and (8) granted First Time Affiliation of same course to the petitioner College itself and we are told to other colleges also. Thus, it appears that the circumstance of commencing of a course has been considered to be emergency for the Vice Chancellor. Indeed, it is not the contention on behalf of the Vice Chancellor before us that there is no emergency, therefore, he has declined to exercise powers to approve the syllabus for the course in question. 4. Mr. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the Vice Chancellor, submitted that the only reason why Vice Chancellor has not exercised powers under Section 14 (7) and (8) of the Act, to consider whether the approval should be granted for commencement of the new course in M. Tech (Power Electronics and Power Systems) in Electrical Engineering, is not that there is no emergency but grant of such approval for a new course requires amendment of Ordinance and that he has no power to amend an Ordinance. According to the learned counsel, Ordinance 9, which is styled as “An ordinance to provide for the examination leading to the degree of Master of Technology (Full Time) in the faculty of Engineering and Technology”, contains a list of courses, which a college may offer to the students for a degree in M. Tech. That list in Ordinance 9 does not have the subject in question, which is a totally new course. It will, therefore, be necessary to amend the Ordinance to introduce this Course. According to the learned counsel, a scheme of examination for this course is also not in existence and such a scheme can only be approved and finalised by same procedure referred to earlier. The learned counsel contended that since the Vice Chancellor is of the view that dealing with the matter is governed by the Act and since it involves the amendment of Ordinance, he has not exercised the said powers. The learned counsel contended that since the Vice Chancellor is of the view that dealing with the matter is governed by the Act and since it involves the amendment of Ordinance, he has not exercised the said powers. We find from a plain reading of sub sections (7) and (8) that power has been conferred on the Vice Chancellor expressly to deal with matters, which are regulated by Statutes, Ordinances or regulations vide Sub Section (8) where no Statutes, Ordinances or Regulations are made in that behalf. Here is a case where there is no absence of an Ordinance but the existing Ordinance does not include and regulate the course in question. It is not disputed that the entire subject matter of granting permission to introduce a new course and laying down the scheme for examination is a matter governed by Ordinances, for which specific power has been conferred on the bodies referred to earlier in the regular course. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the matter of introduction of new course and the scheme of its examination being a matter within the preview of the Ordinance making power of various bodies of the University is a matter, which can be dealt with by Vice Chancellor in exercise of his powers under Sub Section (8) of Section 14 of the Act. 5. In the circumstances, we hold that the Vice Chancellor has the necessary powers to act under Sub Section (8) of Section 14 of the Act in the matter of introducing a new course by approving a syllabus of new course and scheme of examination, particularly in this case since the syllabus has already been approved by the Board of Studies on 27.07.2010. We make it clear that our finding is not intended to operate as a direction to the Vice Chancellor to mandatorily exercise his powers in the present case but that the Vice Chancellor is free to exercise the powers in case, he considers it necessary as contemplated by law. 6. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to consider a contention raised by Shri Bhangde, learned counsel for the petitioner, that Section 14 (7) and (8) confer on the Vice Chancellor a power coupled with a duty to exercise it. The submission cannot be accepted. The provisions empower a Vice Chancellor to deal with an emergency. 6. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to consider a contention raised by Shri Bhangde, learned counsel for the petitioner, that Section 14 (7) and (8) confer on the Vice Chancellor a power coupled with a duty to exercise it. The submission cannot be accepted. The provisions empower a Vice Chancellor to deal with an emergency. He must decide both, whether there is an emergency and whether he should take action. In fact, the section confers the power to act where there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency which requires immediate action to be taken. The provisions confer a power to be exercised with due care and circumspection. There is a wide latitude conferred on the Vice-Chancellor. He may or may not reach the conclusion that there is an emergency or that he should take action in his best judgment. In The Official Liquidator ..vs.. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd.; AIR 1977 Supreme Court 740, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “If the conditions in which the power is to be exercised in particular cases are also specified by a statute then, on the fulfillment of those conditions, the power conferred becomes annexed with a duty to exercise it in that manner...” Section 14 (7) and (8) do not specify that when certain conditions exist in a particular case, the Vice Chancellor must treat it as an emergency and take particular action. Nor do the provisions indicate that power is invested in aid of enforcement of a right public or private of a citizen vide L. Hirday Narain ..vs.. Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 33. Section 14 (7) and (8) of the Act, therefore, do not confer on the Vice Chancellor a power coupled with a duty to exercise it. With these observations, the writ petition is dismissed. Rule accordingly. No order as to costs.