Judgment : These appeals arise out of Awards made by the learned Member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in three different claim petitions filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. As the claims subject matter of the impugned Awards arise out of the same accident, the appeals are taken up together for hearing. 2. One Arjun Dhondiba Ingale was holding the post of the District Health Officer of Zilla Parishad Solapur. He was on deputation with the Zilla Parishad. On 15th November 1989, the said Arjun was travelling along with his wife and children by an Ambassador car. While the car was proceeding by Bombay Pune National Highway, a truck came from the opposite direction and there was a collision. As a result, the car was smashed. The said Arjun succumbed to injuries sustained in the accident. A claim petition was filed by his widow, daughters and son claiming compensation on account of death of the said Arjun. Separate claim petitions were filed by his widow, two daughters and the son claiming compensation on account of injuries sustained by them in the accident. The allegation in the claim petitions was that the driver of the Ambassador car was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. In the claim petition it was stated that the Ambassador car was owned by the appellant Solapur Zilla Parishad and deceased Arjun was proceeding from Bombay towards Pune for attending an official meeting. There is no dispute that the said Arjun was allowed to use the said car by virtue of his post. Written statements were filed by the appellant opposing the claim petitions. In the written statement it was admitted that the driver of Ambassador car was driving the said car during the course of employment with the Solapur Zilla Parishad and that the deceased and his family members were travelling by the said car. It was denied that the car was owned by the Zilla Parishad and it was contended that the car is owned by the State Government. It was contended that the Zilla Parishad was the agent of the State Government in respect of the health services and the cost of the health services in the district was being fully reimbursed by the State Government including the salary of the driver of the Zilla Parishad. It was contended that the Zilla Parishad was the agent of the State Government in respect of the health services and the cost of the health services in the district was being fully reimbursed by the State Government including the salary of the driver of the Zilla Parishad. It was contended that the Zilla Parishad not being the owner of the Ambassador car was unnecessarily impleaded as a party. 3. State Government also filed a written statement contending that though the car was owned by the State Government, as per the prevailing practice, the said car was to be actually driven by the driver of the Zilla Parishad as per the order of the District Health Officer. It was contended that as the claims had arisen out of the activities of the Zilla Parishad, the State Government has no responsibility of any kind and therefore, the State Government ought not to have been impleaded as a party. 4. The learned Member of the Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Ambassador car. The learned Member of the Tribunal held that the driver of the car was an employee of the Zilla Parishad and therefore it is the Zilla Parishad which will be responsible for the payment of compensation. Accordingly, while partly allowing the claim petitions by granting compensation with interest, Awards were made against the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishad (Appellant) to pay the compensation amount. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant-Zilla Parishad submitted that admittedly the State Government was the owner of the car. He submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can direct only the owner of the offending vehicle to pay the compensation. He invited the attention of the court to subsection 1 of section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). He invited the attention of the Court to the definition of Owner in clause 30 of section 2 of the said Act and submitted that the Zilla Parishad was not the owner within the meaning of clause 30 of section 2. He invited the attention of the Court to the definition of Owner in clause 30 of section 2 of the said Act and submitted that the Zilla Parishad was not the owner within the meaning of clause 30 of section 2. He submitted that there is neither a hire purchase agreement nor an agreement for lease or agreement of hypothecation between the Zilla Parishad and State Government and therefore, the Zilla Parishad not being the owner, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass an Award against the Zilla Parishad. 5A. The learned A.G.P opposed the submission contending that the Ambassador car was placed at the disposal of the Zilla Parishad and it was under the control of the Zilla Parishad which was being driven by a driver who was admittedly an employee of the Zilla Parishad. The learned A.G.P submitted that as the driver of the Zilla Parishad was negligent, it was the Zilla Parishad which is vicariously liable to pay compensation and the Tribunal has rightly held that it is the Zilla Parishad which is responsible for payment of compensation. 6. I have given careful consideration to the submissions. As far as factual aspect is concerned, it is not in dispute that though the State Government was the legal owner of the car, the same was in the custody of the Zilla Parishad and it was allowed to be used by the deceased. It is also an admitted position that the driver who is held to be negligent was the employee of the Zilla Parishad and he was driving the car during the course of his employment with the Zilla Parishad. There is no dispute as regards master and servant relationship between the Zilla Parishad and the driver of the car. 7. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has been constituted under section 165 of the said Act. Subsection 1 of the said Act reads thus : "165. There is no dispute as regards master and servant relationship between the Zilla Parishad and the driver of the car. 7. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has been constituted under section 165 of the said Act. Subsection 1 of the said Act reads thus : "165. Claims Tribunals (1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Explanation For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles includes the claims for compensation under section 140 (and section 163A)." Section 175 of the said Act excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where any claims Tribunal has been constituted to entertain claim petitions for compensation which can be adjudicated upon by the claims Tribunal for that area. Thus, exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims for compensation in respect of the death or the bodily injury to persons on account of accidents arising out of use of motor vehicles has been conferred on the Tribunal. Liability to pay compensation on account of death or bodily injury caused to a person arising out of a motor accident is the liability under the law of torts and it is the liability to be discharged by the tort-feasor. In view of the provisions of the said Act, instead of filing a civil suit in regular Civil Court, a claim is maintainable before the claims Tribunal. The Apex Court in case of Minu B. Mehta and another vs. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and another ( AIR 1977 S.C. 1248 ) has held that liability of the owner of the vehicle to compensate the victim of accident involving the said vehicle due to negligent driving of his servant is based on law of tort. The Apex Court in case of Minu B. Mehta and another vs. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and another ( AIR 1977 S.C. 1248 ) has held that liability of the owner of the vehicle to compensate the victim of accident involving the said vehicle due to negligent driving of his servant is based on law of tort. The owner of the vehicle is liable to pay compensation on account of negligence of the driver employed by him as the liability of the owner is a vicarious liability. Sub section 1 of section 165 does not restrict the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to pass an Award for payment of compensation only against the driver or the legal owner of the offending vehicle or the insured. In case of claims for compensation against tort-feasor arising out of the motor accidents, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit/claim for compensation which can be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal, has been excluded by section 175 of the said Act and the said jurisdiction vests in the Tribunal in view of sub section 1 of section 165. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon sub-section 1 of section 168 by contending that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is confined to passing an Award against the insurer, owner or driver of the offending vehicle and against no other person. Sub-section 1 of section 168 reads thus : "168. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon sub-section 1 of section 168 by contending that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is confined to passing an Award against the insurer, owner or driver of the offending vehicle and against no other person. Sub-section 1 of section 168 reads thus : "168. Award of the Claims Tribunal - (1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an Award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the Award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be: Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X." 9. The latter part of the section cannot be narrowly construed to mean that the said sub-section restricts the jurisdiction vested in the claims Tribunal which is conferred by section 165. In law, a claim petition can be maintained against the driver of the offending vehicle without impleading the owner of the vehicle. The reason is that the driver is the tort-feasor who is liable under the law of torts. There can be a situation where the vehicle is being used by a person who is not the owner with the express consent of the owner. If the person using vehicle with the consent of the owner allows his own driver to drive the vehicle, in case of an accident due to negligence on the part of the driver, the master of the driver who may not be the owner of the vehicle will be vicariously liable along with the driver. If the person using vehicle with the consent of the owner allows his own driver to drive the vehicle, in case of an accident due to negligence on the part of the driver, the master of the driver who may not be the owner of the vehicle will be vicariously liable along with the driver. In such a case, the claim petition can be maintained before the Tribunal against the person who is using vehicle of another person and the driver. The latter part of the sub section 1 of section 168 does not restrict the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to pass Award only as against the insurer or the driver or the owner. The said part of the section merely provides that when the claim is made against the insurer, owner and/or driver of the vehicle, or against all of them, the Tribunal has to specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer, owner and/or driver or the amount which shall be paid by all of them. Therefore, the argument that the claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to pass Award only against the legal owner of the vehicle deserves to be rejected. 10. In the present case, Zilla Parishad was in actual possession of the Ambassador car. Zilla Parishad was having control over the Ambassador car and under the directions of the Zilla Parishad, an employee of the Zilla Parishad was driving the car at the time of accident. Therefore, the Zilla Parishad will have to be held as vicariously liable as there is no challenge to the finding of negligence recorded by the Tribunal against the driver of the car. 11. Hence, the contentions raised by the appellant will have to rejected. The Tribunal was right in holding that the appellant was liable to pay compensation. Before parting with the judgment, it must be noted that it is very unfortunate that the State Government and Zilla Parishad have taken conflicting stands before the Tribunal. As a result, the claim petitions remained pending for more than four years. Therefore, the claimants suffered. More importantly, the public exchequer also suffered as the appellant was required to pay interest at the rate of 12% p.a. 12. There is no merit in the appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.