Judgment :- The Criminal Appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 6.1.2003 in S.C.No.22 of 2000 on the file of the Principal Assistant Sessions Court, Thiruvannamalai, whereby the appellants/A.1 to A.4 were convicted for the offence under Section 147 IPC and each sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-each, in default, to undergo three months simple imprisonment and they were also convicted for the offence under Section 306 IPC and each sentenced to undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default, to undergo one year simple imprisonment. The sentences imposed on the appellants/A.1 to A.4 were directed to run concurrently. During the course of trial, A-5 died and hence, the charges stood abated as far as A-5 was concerned. 2. The case of the prosecution is as follows: (a) P.Ws.1, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9, A.1 to A.4 and the deceased-A.5 belong to Irumanthangal village and Palli Village. On 5.3.1998, there was a Temple festival of Sri Angalamman Temple at Irumanthangal Villaeg, which was celebrated under the leadership of P.W.8 Vengaiyan. A.2s driver Arumugham drove the tractor during the Temple festival, which was questioned by the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar, who is none other than the son of P.W.1 Logan. The very next day, the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar was assaulted by the men of A.2 Vedapuri and immediately, he was admitted in the hospital, where the deceased gave complaint against Arumugham, the driver of A.2 and others. (b) The said factum was intimated to A.1 to A.5 and on 10.3.1998, they convened a Panchayat. In the Panchayat, the accused condemned the action of the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar for giving complaint against the assaultant and the accused. So, they have warned P.W.1 and imposed a fine of Rs.7,000/-. P.W.8 Vengaiyan was also imposed fine of Rs.1,000/- since he celebrated the festival and P.W.7 Sampath, who is none other than the brother of P.W.1, was also fined, since he questioned as to why the fine was imposed. At that time, the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar has stated that since he was assaulted by persons, he gave a complaint and therefore, as to what was wrong in it and why they were imposed fine. At that time, the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar has stated that since he was assaulted by persons, he gave a complaint and therefore, as to what was wrong in it and why they were imposed fine. So, A.1 to A.5 who are the Panchayatdars, induced and incited Sankar alias Jaisankar and gave Rs.100/- each to P.Ws.1, 8, 7 and the deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar and when they gave Rs.100/- to the deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar, A.3 said, “TAMIL” The Panchayat meeting was over by 12 noon. (c) The deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar went to Cheyyar and then he consumed poison and fell down near the Temple. This was immediately intimated to P.W.1 and others and the deceased was taken to Cheyyar Hospital and subsequently to Kancheepuram Hospital. The deceased died at 8.45 p.m. on the same day. (d) P.W.1 gave Ex.P-6 complaint, which was registered in Cr.No.167 of 1998 under Section 174 Cr.P.C., by P.W.13 Head Constable. As soon as the deceased was admitted in the hospital, P.W.11 Dr.Balaji, at Cheyyar Hospital, initially treated the deceased and issued Ex.P-4 accident register. (e) After the death of the deceased, P.W.15 Inspector of Police went to the place of occurrence and examined the witnesses. He prepared Ex.P-11 observation mahazars and drew Ex.P-10 rough sketch. He conducted inquest and Ex.P-8 is the inquest report. (f) The dead body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem. P.W.12 Dr.Sudha Lakshmi conducted post-mortem and Ex.P-5 is the post-mortem certificate. (g) P.W.7 Sampath gave complaint on 23.3.1998 under Ex.P-2. P.W.14 Sub-Inspector of Police received the same and altered the crime number into one for the offence under Section 306 IPC and prepared Ex.P-9 alteration report. P.W.14 Sub-Inspector of Police examined the witnesses. (h) P.W.15 Inspector of Police, on a perusal of the enquiry conducted by P.W.14 Sub-Inspector of Police, has concluded the investigation and filed the charge sheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 147 IPC and 306 IPC. 3. The trial Court, after framing necessary charges, posed questions on the accused and the accused pleaded not guilty. During the course of trial, A.5 died and hence, the charges stood abated as far as A.5 was concerned. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., they denied the evidence incriminating against them and they have filed their statements. 3. The trial Court, after framing necessary charges, posed questions on the accused and the accused pleaded not guilty. During the course of trial, A.5 died and hence, the charges stood abated as far as A.5 was concerned. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., they denied the evidence incriminating against them and they have filed their statements. On the basis of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, 7, 8 and 9, the trial Court came to the conclusion that there was a Panchayat and in that, A.1 to A.4 induced and incited the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar to commit suicide and so, the appellants-accused are guilty of the offences under Sections 147 and 306 IPC. After considering the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 15 and Exs.P-1 to P-11, the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellants as indicated above. 4. Challenging the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second appellant/A.2 and the learned counsel appearing for the first appellant/A.1, the third appellant/A.3 and the fourth appellant/A.4, would submit that there is no evidence of Panchayat alleged to have been held on 10.3.1998, that no independent witness was examined, that there was a delay in preferring the complaint and that ingredients of Section 306 IPC are not made out. 5. Learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the respondent-Police would contend that there is no delay in preferring the complaint. Ex.P-2 complaint given by P.W.7 is only the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and that has been properly explained by P.Ws.1 and 7 and that P.Ws.1, 2 and 7 are the relatives and P.W.8 and P.W.9 are the independent witnesses. Their evidence has proved that the Panchayat was held on 10.3.1998. Hence, the ingredients of Sections 306 and 107 IPC have been made out. Therefore, the trial Court has come to the correct conclusion. He prayed for confirmation of conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants-accused and for dismissal of the Criminal Appeal. 6. Admittedly, P.Ws.1, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9, A.1 to A.4 and the deceased-A.5 belong to Irumanthangal village and Palli Village. On 5.3.1998, P.W.8 conducted the festival of Angallamman Temple at Irumanthangal Village. On 5.3.1998,, A.2s driver Arumugham drove the tractor in the midst of the Temple festival, which was questioned by the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar. 6. Admittedly, P.Ws.1, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9, A.1 to A.4 and the deceased-A.5 belong to Irumanthangal village and Palli Village. On 5.3.1998, P.W.8 conducted the festival of Angallamman Temple at Irumanthangal Village. On 5.3.1998,, A.2s driver Arumugham drove the tractor in the midst of the Temple festival, which was questioned by the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar. On the very next day, he was beaten near the bridge. He was admitted in the hospital where the factum has been intimated to the concerned Police. The complaint has been received from the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar and the case has been registered. Against that, a Panchayat was convened on 10.3.1998. 7. The appellants-accused have vehemently opposed that there was no Panchayat on 10.3.1998. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the evidence of P.Ws.1, 7 and 8, and the other witnesses, as to whether there was a Panchayat. P.W.1 is the father of the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar. P.W.7 Sampath is the relative, i.e. junior paternal uncle of the deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar. P.W.1 is the uncle of P.W.2 Rajendran. P.W.8 Vengaiyan is a Teacher. P.W.9 Dhamu knows the accused and the prosecution witnesses. They have all deposed before Court that on 10.3.1998 there was a Panchayat. While considering their evidence, there is no reason for discarding the evidence of the independent witnesses, namely P.Ws.8 and 9 and their evidence clearly proved that there was a Panchayat on 10.3.1998 in respect of the Police complaint given by the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar with regard to the incident that has taken place in connection with the festival of Angalamman Temple on 5.3.1998. 8. P.W.8 who is a Teacher, was the person who celebrated the Temple festival. He was also imposed fine in the Panchayat. P.W.7, who questioned the activities of the Panchayatdars, the accused, was also imposed fine in the Panchayat. Since the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar has given a complaint, his father P.W.1 was fined at Rs.7,000/- in the Panchayat. Evidence of P.Ws.8 and 9 has been corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 7. Hence, even though P.Ws.1 and 7 are close relatives of the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar, the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 7 is reliable. 9. Since the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar has given a complaint, his father P.W.1 was fined at Rs.7,000/- in the Panchayat. Evidence of P.Ws.8 and 9 has been corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 7. Hence, even though P.Ws.1 and 7 are close relatives of the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar, the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 7 is reliable. 9. Considering the evidence of P.Ws.1, 7, 8 and 9, it is clearly proved that there was a Panchayat held on 10.3.1998 in respect of the complaint given by the victim-deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar in connection with the Temple festival held on 5.3.1998. 10. It is also pertinent to note that A.1 to A.4 were also convicted for the offence under Section 147 IPC. It is true that the accused are Panchayatdars and they convened the Panchayat. 10. It is also pertinent to note that A.1 to A.4 were also convicted for the offence under Section 147 IPC. It is true that the accused are Panchayatdars and they convened the Panchayat. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider Sections, 147, 146 and 141 IPC, which read as follows: "Section 147 : Punishment for rioting.--whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." "Section 146.--Rioting.--Whenever force or violence is used by unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting." "Section 141.--Unlawful assembly.--An assembly of five or more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is- First.--To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or Second.--To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or Third.--To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or Fourth.--By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment or to enforce any right or supposed right; or Fifth.--By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation.--An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly." 11. Even though the trial Court has convicted the appellants-A.1 to A.4 under Section 147 IPC, there is no iota of evidence to show that they have committed the offence under Section 146 IPC, for rioting. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the trial Court has committed error in convicting the appellants-A.1 to A.4 under Section 147 IPC. Section 141 IPC defines "unlawful assembly" and Section 142 IPC deals with "being member of unlawful assembly". In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the trial Court has committed error in convicting the appellants-A.1 to A.4 under Section 147 IPC. Section 141 IPC defines "unlawful assembly" and Section 142 IPC deals with "being member of unlawful assembly". Sections 141 and 142 IPC read as follows: "Section 141 IPC.--Unlawful assembly.--An assembly of five or more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is- First.--To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State Government of Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or Second.--To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or Third.--To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or Fourth.--By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment or to enforce any right or supposed right; or Fifth.--By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally to do. Explanation.---An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly." "Section 142 IPC.--Being member of unlawful assembly.--Whoever, being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues, in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly." 12. In the present case, there is no evidence to show that the accused convened the Panchayat with the common intention to execute the unlawful act. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the appellants/A.1 to A.4 are not guilty of the offence under Section 147 IPC. So, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants/A.1 to A.4 for the offence under Section 147 IPC are liable to be set aside. 13. It is appropriate to consider the delay in preferring the complaint. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the appellants/A.1 to A.4 are not guilty of the offence under Section 147 IPC. So, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants/A.1 to A.4 for the offence under Section 147 IPC are liable to be set aside. 13. It is appropriate to consider the delay in preferring the complaint. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for A.2 and learned counsel appearing for A.1, A.3 and A.4 would contend that P.W.1, the father of the deceased, has given a complaint in Ex.P-6 and his signature alone has been marked as Ex.P-1. Ex.P-6 complaint was received by the Head Constable on 11.3.1998 at 11.30 a.m. P.W.7 has given a statement/complaint and that has been marked as Ex.P-2, in which he has narrated all the facts. In this connection, learned Senior Counsel appearing for A.2 and learned counsel appearing for A.1, A.3 and A.4 would contend that the occurrence took place on 10.3.1998 and the deceased died on the same day at 8.50 p.m. P.W.1, the father of the deceased, has given the complaint as per Ex.P-6 on 11.3.1998 at 11.30 a.m. But Ex.P-2 came into existence only on 23.3.1998, after 12 days. There is a long delay, which has not been explained. 14. It is appropriate to consider as to what is the status of Ex.P-2. As per Ex.P-6, the case has been registered in Cr.No.167 of 1998 under Section 174 Cr.P.C. After receipt of Ex.P-2, the offence has been altered into one under Section 306 IPC in the same Crime Number. In such circumstances, Ex.P-2 is only a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and it is not a complaint. So, the trial Court has erred in coming to the conclusion that Ex.P-2 is a complaint given by P.W.7. 15. At this juncture, the conduct of the appellants-accused plays very vital role. As already observed in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment, there was a Panchayat convened on 10.3.1998 and it was convened by A.1 to A.5 in respect of the complaint given by the deceased Sankar alias Jaisankar in connection with the incident that has taken place in the Temple festival. Merely because the deceased has given complaint, the Panchayat has been convened and the persons responsible for giving the complaint have been fined in the Panchayat. Merely because the deceased has given complaint, the Panchayat has been convened and the persons responsible for giving the complaint have been fined in the Panchayat. In such circumstances, the appellants have taken law into their own hands and they convened the Panchayat. 16. Ex.P-6 came into existence without the knowledge of P.W.1, after obtaining P.W.1s signature, which is acceptable one. On 10.3.1998, he was fined in the Panchayat to pay Rs.7,000/- and he paid Rs.5,000/-, since A.1, the President of the Panchahyat owes Rs.2,000/- of P.W.1 and P.W.1 adjusted the same and hence he paid Rs.5,000/-. Since P.W.8 is the person who is responsible for celebration of the festival of the Temple on 5.3.1998, he was fined to pay Rs.1,000/- and he paid that amount. Since P.W.7 questioned the attitude of the Panchayatdars, he was fined to pay Rs.500/-. In his chief examination, P.W.1 stated that his signature has been obtained in white paper and that the Sub-Inspector of Police obtained his signatures in two white papers, stating that it is necessary for post-mortem. While considering the chief examination of P.W.1, he has stated that the Head Constable has examined him and that he does not know as to what he has stated before Police. He admitted only his signature. In his cross examination, P.W.1 has stated that for the death of his son, the deceased, he has not given any complaint. After ten days, his brother P.W.7 Sampath has given complaint. In cross examination, P.W.1 has stated as follows: “TAMIL” While considering the evidence of P.W.1, it is clearly proved that he was in the midst of fear about the Panchayat of the appellants-accused. Since P.W.1 lost his only son, in the midst of bereavement, P.W.1 was not in a position to give complaint. Hence, he signed in white paper. So, I am forced to accept that Ex.P-1 signature of P.W.1, has been obtained in blank paper. 17. Even though the case has been initially registered under Section 174 Cr.P.C., after receipt of Ex.P-2, the Police altered the offence into one under Section 306 IPC, in the same Crime Number and then only the investigating officers conducted enquiry. So, I am forced to accept that Ex.P-1 signature of P.W.1, has been obtained in blank paper. 17. Even though the case has been initially registered under Section 174 Cr.P.C., after receipt of Ex.P-2, the Police altered the offence into one under Section 306 IPC, in the same Crime Number and then only the investigating officers conducted enquiry. While considering the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 7, it is clearly proved that the deceased is the only son to P.W.1 and to their family, and since they have lost their only son, they were not in a position to narrate the entire facts. After the ceremony was over, P.W.7 has given Ex.P-2 and on that basis only, the offence was altered and Ex.P-9 alteration report came into existence. So, P.W.7s evidence is cogent and convincing and he explained the delay in giving the statement under Ex.P-2. 18. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that when once P.W.1s son, the deceased has given a complaint, immediately, the accused convened the Panchayat. Even though P.W.1 wanted time to face the Panchayat, he was not given time and he was forced to appear before the Panchayatdars and fined. At this juncture, learned Senior Counsel appearing for A.2 would cull out some portion of the evidence of P.W.3, and submitted that at the instigation of the Inspector of Police, the accused convened the Panchayat and so, the Inspector of Police should be one of the accused in the case. P.W.3 Gajendran has deposed in his evidence in chief examination that, “TAMIL” But the above argument does not hold good, because, from the evidence of P.W.3, it is seen that the Inspector of Police wanted to settle the matter, but he would have given advise to impose fine on the person who gave the complaint. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants/accused submitted that no independent witnesses has been examined. As already discussed, P.Ws.8 and 9 are the independent witnesses. P.W.8 was also fined in the Panchayat. So, the above argument regarding non-examination of the independent witnesses, does not merit acceptance. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants-accused submitted that P.W.11 Dr.Balaji who has first treated the deceased, issued Ex.P-4 accident register and P.W.12 Dr.Sudha Lakshmi has conducted autopsy and issued Ex.P-5 post-mortem certificate and viscera report. P.W.8 was also fined in the Panchayat. So, the above argument regarding non-examination of the independent witnesses, does not merit acceptance. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants-accused submitted that P.W.11 Dr.Balaji who has first treated the deceased, issued Ex.P-4 accident register and P.W.12 Dr.Sudha Lakshmi has conducted autopsy and issued Ex.P-5 post-mortem certificate and viscera report. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that there is no question posed on P.W.12 Dr.Sudha Lakshmi that the death was due to poisoning. In the viscera report in Ex.P-5, it is stated that "Methyl parathion is a poisonous organ phosphorus insecticide", which alleged to have led to the death of the deceased. Even though P.W.12 Doctor has not deposed that the poisonous substance caused the instantaneous death, the evidence of P.W.12 and Ex.P-5 post-mortem certificate and viscera report clearly prove that the death was due to consumption of poisonous substance and the deceased died due to consumption of poison. 21. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider as to whether the trial Court is correct in holding that the appellants-accused are guilty of the offence under Section 306 IPC. It is pertinent to note that as per the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9, it is clearly proved that after the Panchayat was over, the victim-deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar was in a dejected mood and they said that the accused have committed the offence, they directed the victim to withdraw the case, that they have also fined them at the time of Panchayat and they forced the deceased to commit suicide and hence, the deceased left the place of occurrence and consumed poison and died. 22. Learned counsel for the appellants-accused relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in 1994 (1) SCC 73 (State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal), AIR 2002 SC 1998 = 2002 (3) SUPREME 650 = 2002 (5) SCC 371 (Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh), 2008 (11) SCC 215 = AIR 2008 SC 2108 (Sohan Raj Sharma Vs. State of Haryana), 2001 (9) SCC 618 (Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh) and 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438 (Swamy Prahaladdas Vs. State of M.P. and another). In the said decisions, it has been held as follows: 1994(1)SCC 73 (State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal): "16. ... State of Haryana), 2001 (9) SCC 618 (Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh) and 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438 (Swamy Prahaladdas Vs. State of M.P. and another). In the said decisions, it has been held as follows: 1994(1)SCC 73 (State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal): "16. ... Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurtue fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law. (emphasis supplied)" AIR 2002 SC 1998 = 2002 (3) SUPREME 650 = 2002 (5) SCC 371 (Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh): "Reverting to the facts of the case, both the courts below have erroneously accepted the prosecution story that the suicide by the deceased is the direct result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25th July, 1998 wherein it is alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and had reportedly told the deceased to go and die. For this, the Courts relied on a statement of Shashi Bhushan, brother of the deceased, made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. when reportedly the deceased, after coming back from the house of the appellant, told him that the appellant had humiliated him and abused him with filthy words. The statement of Shashi Bhushan, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is annexed as anenxure P-3 to this appeal and going through the statement, we find that he has not stated that the deceased had told him that the appellant had asked him to go and die. Even if we accept the prosecution story that the appellant did tell the deceased to go and die, that itself does not constitute the ingredient of instigation. The word instigate denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or in a spur of the moment cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea. The word instigate denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or in a spur of the moment cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea. It is in a fit of anger and emotional. Secondly, the alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the deceased were on 25th July, 1998 ensured by quarrel. The deceased was found hanging on 27th July 1998. Assuming that the deceased had taken the abusive language seriously, he had enough time in between to think over and reflect and, therefore, it cannot be said that the abusive language, which had been used by the appellant on 25th July, 1998 drived the deceased to commit suicide. Suicide by the deceased on 27th July, 1998 is not proximate to the abusive language uttered by the appellant on 25th July, 1998. The fact that the deceased committed suicide on 27th July, 1998 would itself clearly pointed out that it is not the direct result of the quarrel taken place on 25th July, 1998 when it is alleged that the appellant had used the abusive language and also told the deceased to go and die. This fact had escaped notice of the courts below." 2008 (11) SCC 215 = AIR 2008 SC 2108 (Sohan Raj Sharma Vs. State of Haryana): "He submitted that the fact that deceased took lives of innocent children and then committed suicide established that she was mentally unsound and that the suicide note at the most described accused as a sexual pervert but his behaviour could not be taken to be an act of abetting suicide." "10. Section 306 IPC deals with abetment of suicide. The said provision reads as follows: "306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." 11. (As observed in Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 129 at p.134, paras 12 and 13), "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. (As observed in Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 129 at p.134, paras 12 and 13), "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 13. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal ( 1994 (1) SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107 : AIR 1994 SC 1418 ) this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." 12. (As observed in Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. (2007) 10 SCC 797 at p.799 paras 6-7) "6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided [in the Act as an offence]. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word instigate literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word instigate literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. Abetted in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence. 7. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The mere fact that the husband treated the deceased wife with cruelty is not enough. (See Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P. (1995 Supp (3) SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1157 : 1995 AIR SCW 4570) )" 2001 (9) SCC 618 (Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh): "20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 21. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal ( 1994 (1) SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107) this Court has cautioned that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438 (Swamy Prahaladdas Vs. State of M.P. and another): "3. ..... We think that just on the basis of that utterance the Court of Session was in error in summoning the appellant to face trial. In the first place it is difficult, in the facts and circumstances, to come to even a prima facie view that what was uttered by the appellant was enough to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Those words are casual in nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite mens rea on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. Besides the deceased had plenty of time to weigh the pros and cons of the act by which he ultimately ended his life. It cannot be said that the suicide by the deceased was the direct result of the words uttered by the appellant. For these reasons, the error is apparent requiring rectification. The appeal is accordingly allowed. ...." 23. Relying on the said decisions of the Supreme Court, learned counsel for the appellants-accused submitted that the ingredients of Sections 107 and 306 IPC are not made out. In this regard, it is appropriate to consider the evidence of the independent witnesses to find out as to whether there is any inducement or incitement for abetment to the victim to commit suicide. It is appropriate to consider the evidence of P.W.7. All the witnesses were examined after Ex.P-2 came into existence. The charge sheet has been presented on 11.1.2000. It is appropriate to consider the evidence of P.W.7. All the witnesses were examined after Ex.P-2 came into existence. The charge sheet has been presented on 11.1.2000. But the statement of P.W.7 in Ex.P-2, dated 23.3.1998, has been received by the Court on 24.3.1998 at 3.30 p.m. Even though the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of P.W.7 has been received by the Court at a later point of time, it will not vitiate the entire prosecution case, because, Ex.P-2 is corroborated by the statement of P.W.7 under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Moreover, the evidence of P.W.7 also corroborates as to what he has stated in Ex.P-2. As already stated, Ex.P-2 is not a complaint and it is only a further statement of P.W.7. 24. Whether the evidence before Court is sufficient to conclude that the appellants-accused induced and incited the deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar to commit suicide. In this connection, it is appropriate to consider the ingredients of Sections 306 and 107 IPC, which reads as follows: "Section 306: Abetment of suicide If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." "Section 107: Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.--A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." 25. The mens-rea is an essential component of abetment and there must be an overt act on the part of the accused in course of the alleged instigation. The mens-rea is an essential component of abetment and there must be an overt act on the part of the accused in course of the alleged instigation. It must be shown that the instigation was prior to and at the point of time. It was directly or indirectly to give a suggestion to the person to do a certain act. An abettor must be shown to have intentionally aided the commissioning of the crime and mere proof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abettor, is not enough compliance with the requirement of Section 107 IPC. The word "instigation" involves two things; one is physical act or omission, while the other is mental act. The physical act or omission involved in the "instigation" is "goading or urging forward" another. Such physical act of goading can be committed either by words or deed, as the meaning of the word suggests. "Goading" can be committed also by any other wilful conduct, may be by even an adamant silence. The physical act of "urging forward" or "instigation" involves doing of an act by strongly advising, persuading to make a person to do something or by pushing or forcing a person in order to make him move more quickly in a forward direction. Thus, both the physical acts in "goading or urging forward" can be committed by doing some act either verbal or physical or even by wilful omission or conduct. 26. At this juncture, it has to be considered as to whether there is instigation or incitement. The appreciation of the oral evidence of the witnesses is necessary. P.W.1 Logan is the father of the deceased. While considering the evidence of P.W.1, in his evidence in chief examination, P.W.1 has stated that, “TAMIL” “TAMIL” P.W.3 Gajendran in his evidence, in chief examination, has stated that, “TAMIL” The evidence of P.W.7 Sampath is corroborated in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and Ex.P.2 statement. P.W.7 Sampath in his evidence in chief examination, has stated that, “TAMIL” "TAMIL” P.W.7 in his cross examination, stated that, “TAMIL” P.W.8 in his evidence, in chief examination, has stated that, “TAMIL” “TAMIL” P.W.8 in his cross examination has stated that, “TAMIL” “TAMIL” P.W.9 Dhamu, in his evidence, in cross examination, has stated that “TAMIL 27. P.W.7 Sampath in his evidence in chief examination, has stated that, “TAMIL” "TAMIL” P.W.7 in his cross examination, stated that, “TAMIL” P.W.8 in his evidence, in chief examination, has stated that, “TAMIL” “TAMIL” P.W.8 in his cross examination has stated that, “TAMIL” “TAMIL” P.W.9 Dhamu, in his evidence, in cross examination, has stated that “TAMIL 27. The above evidence of the witnesses clearly proves that A.3 instigated and incited the victim-deceased to commit suicide by throwing Rs.100/- on his face, for giving the Police complaint. It has clearly proved that A.3 has committed the offence of abetement of suicide under Section 306 IPC. 28. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) would contend that A.1 to A.5 formed an unlawful assembly to commit the offence for imposing fine in the Panchayat since the deceased gave complaint before the Police and their act is only illegal and merely because the deceased has given complaint when he was admitted in the hospital, immediately, A.1 to A.5 formed an unlawful assembly and convened the Panchayat and imposed fine on P.W.1, on behalf of his son, the deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar, on P.W.8 who celebrated Agalamman Temple festival and on P.W.7 who questioned the activities of the Panchayatdars, and this shows that the accused formed an unlawful assembly for commission of the illegal act and during the course of the illegal act, A.3 has mens-rea for abetment and there seems to be an overt act on his part by throwing Rs.100/- on the face of the deceased by uttering words, "to go and consume poison and die and to not to show his face again before him". Immediately, the incident happened on 10.3.1998 at 12 noon and at 3.30 p.m., the deceased was found near the Temple after consumption of poison. Because of the activities of the appellants-accused, the deceased was forced to commit suicide. Hence, learned Government Advocate prayed for dismissal of the Criminal Appeal. 29. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider that even uttering the words "go and die" do not mean that there is mens-rea for instigating to commit suicide. Because of the activities of the appellants-accused, the deceased was forced to commit suicide. Hence, learned Government Advocate prayed for dismissal of the Criminal Appeal. 29. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider that even uttering the words "go and die" do not mean that there is mens-rea for instigating to commit suicide. But the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants in AIR 2002 SC 1998 (cited supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case, because, in the said decision, there was a dispute between the husband and the brother-in-law and there was also a suicide note in the facts of that case. In the present case, there is no relationship between the appellants-accused and the deceased and during the Panchayat, the deceased was imposed a fine and subsequently, A.3 threw Rs.100/- on his face by uttering the words, "to go and consume poison and die and to not to show his face again before him". 30. Learned counsel for the appellants-accused also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1994 (1) SCC 73 (cited supra) and argued that before recording a finding of guilt, the Court must satisfy itself that the deceased was not hypersensitive and also exaggerated devotion to rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby, destroy social defence. The "benefit of doubt" has to be in favour of the appellants and the said decision relates to a matrimonial dispute. In the present case, on 5.3.1998, the incident has taken place and then only, after giving complaint, the Panchayat has been convened for commission of illegal act for imposing fine on the person who gave complaint which is against law, and hence, the said decision is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. 31. Learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon 2001 (9) SCC 618 (cited supra), wherein also, the dispute was matrimonial dispute. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. In the present case, A.3 Singapooran Velu @ Velu instigated, incited and provoked the deceased by throwing Rs.100/- on his face by uttering the words that, "to go and consume poison and die and to not to show his face again before him". The ingredients of Sections 107 and 306 IPC have been clearly proved. 32. In the present case, A.3 Singapooran Velu @ Velu instigated, incited and provoked the deceased by throwing Rs.100/- on his face by uttering the words that, "to go and consume poison and die and to not to show his face again before him". The ingredients of Sections 107 and 306 IPC have been clearly proved. 32. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the words uttered are casual in nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people and nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. Thus, the act does not reflect the requisite mens-rea on the assumption that those words would be carried out in all events. Though it is true, even P.W.1 was not willing for Panchayat and he was called for and in the Panchayat, he was fined on behalf of the deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar for giving complaint before the Police and P.W.8 was also fined to pay Rs.1,000/- for celebrating Angalamman Temple festival on 5.3.1998 and since the deceased has questioned and since he has not committed any mistake, while he was directed to withdraw the complaint, even then the accused have imposed fine and at that time, they were uttering the words and immediately P.W.7 has interfered and questioned the activities of the Panchayatdars and P.W.7 was also fined to pay Rs.500/-. After that, they distributed Rs.100/- each and A.3 has thrown Rs.100/-on the face of the deceased Sankar @ Jaisankar and proclaimed that, "to go and consume poison and die and to not to show his face again before him". Immediately, the deceased went and consumed poison and he died at 8.50 p.m. on the same day. There is a proximity between the commission of the offence and the Panchayat. The said words uttered by A.3 have instigated and provoked the deceased to commit suicide. 33. So, I am of the opinion that the ingredients of Sections 306 and 107 IPC have been made out by the prosecution only against the third appellant/A.3. 34. There is a proximity between the commission of the offence and the Panchayat. The said words uttered by A.3 have instigated and provoked the deceased to commit suicide. 33. So, I am of the opinion that the ingredients of Sections 306 and 107 IPC have been made out by the prosecution only against the third appellant/A.3. 34. As discussed above, the prosecution has failed to prove that A.1, A.2 and A.4, are guilty under Section 306 IPC beyond reasonable doubt and I am of the opinion that the third appellant/A.3 alone is guilty of the offence under Section 306 IPC and hence, the conviction and sentence imposed on the third appellant/A.3 for the offence under Section 306 IPC are liable to be confirmed and the conviction and sentence imposed on A.1, A.2 and A.4 for the offence under Section 306 IPC are liable to be set aside. 35. As discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants/A.1 to A.4 for the offence under Section 147 IPC are liable to be set aside. 36. In fine, (a) The Criminal Appeal is partly allowed. (b) The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants/A.1 to A.4 for the offence under Section 147 IPC are set aside. They are acquitted of the said charge. (c) The conviction and sentence imposed on the first appellant/A.1, the second appellant/A.2 and fourth appellant/A.4, for the offence under Section 306 IPC are set aside and they are acquitted of the said charge. (d) The conviction and sentence imposed on the third appellant/A.3 for the offence under Section 306 IPC are confirmed. (e) Since the third appellant/A.3 is on bail, the trial Court is directed to take steps to secure his custody to undergo the remaining period of sentence. (f) The period of imprisonment already undergone by the third appellant/A.3, shall be set-off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. (g) The bail bonds, if any executed by A.1, A.2 and A.4 shall stand cancelled. (h) The fine amounts, if paid by A.1, A.2 and A.4, in respect of Sections 147 and 306 IPC, shall be refunded. (i) The fine amount, if paid by A.3 in respect of the offence under Section 147 IPC, shall be refunded to A.3. (j) During the course of trial, A-5 died and hence, the charges stood abated as far as A5 was concerned.