Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—The short facts of the present case appears to be that the respondent was an employee of the petitioner - Corporation. He was served with the charge-sheet and, thereafter he was dismissed from service from 30.07.1987. The respondent preferred appeal being First Appeal which also came to be dismissed. The respondent, thereafter, raised the dispute under Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter be referred to as “the Act”) which ultimately came to be referred to the Labour Court vide order dated 24.05.1990. In the meantime, the respondent also preferred Second Appeal No. 24 of 1988 before the Second Appellate Authority against the decision of the First Appellate Authority. It appears that pending the reference before the Labour Court, Second Appeal No. 24 of 1988 vide order dated 13.09.1991, was allowed to the extent that the punishment of dismissal was substituted with the reinstatement of the respondent in service and the back wages were not granted and the respondent was placed under the lowest pay scale for the post of Conductor. It is the case of the petitioner that thereafter, based on the said order dated 13.09.1991, the respondent - workman joined duty on 29.10.1991 and he was reinstated in service. It appears that thereafter, in respect of some other Default Case No. 490 of 1991, he was dismissed from the service vide order dated 25.02.1992. In the meantime, the proceedings of the reference continued. But before the Labour Court neither otherside put forward the aforesaid development of the case. The Labour Court examined the matter on merits and vide award dated 15.12.2000, allowed the reference and directed reinstatement of the respondent - workman with the full back wages until the date of retirements. It is under these circumstances, the petitioner - Corporation has approached this Court by the present petition. 2. Heard Mr. Singhvi learned Counsel for Mr. Ashish M. Dagli, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner - Corporation and Mr. Mukesh H. Rathod, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent - employee. 3. It may be recorded that neither affidavit-in-reply has been filed to the statement made in the petition nor to meet with the documents produced in the petition. 4. Heard Mr. Singhvi learned Counsel for Mr. Ashish M. Dagli, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner - Corporation and Mr. Mukesh H. Rathod, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent - employee. 3. It may be recorded that neither affidavit-in-reply has been filed to the statement made in the petition nor to meet with the documents produced in the petition. 4. If the facts of the case are considered as stated in the petition, the position would be that the reference made before the Labour Court and was pending before would lapse on account of two subsequent circumstances; one was that the order of dismissal was set aside by the Second Appellate Authority and the respondent - workman was already reinstated in service as per the said order by observing that there shall not be any back wages and he shall also be placed in lowest pay scale for the post of Conductor. The second circumstances is that the respondent - workman accepted the order and resumed the duty on 29.10.1991, as per duty joining report whereof the copy produced at Annexure – ‘C’. If the dismissal order is set aside by the Second Appellate Authority and the order for setting aside the dismissal order is accepted by the workman and having acting upon the same, there would not be any cause before the Labour Court to examine the legality and validity of the order of termination, therefore, the reference as was pending before the Labour Court pertaining to the dismissal order dated 30.07.1987 would lapse. Under these circumstances, the award could be said as without jurisdiction on the part of the Labour Court, on the date when the award has been passed i.e. on 15.12.2000. 5. The another aspect in the present case is that after the respondent - workman was reinstated in service pursuant to the order of the Second Appellate Authority, he has been dismissed from service on 25.02.1992 whereof the copy produced at Annexure – ‘D’. 6. Mr. Mukesh H. Rathod, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent contended that the said order of dismissal is without holding any inquiry and, therefore, cannot be maintained in law. He also submitted that the respondent has already reached to his superannuation age on 30.06.1998 and hence, the retiral benefits if not paid to the respondent, may be paid by the Corporation. 7. Mr. Singhvi, learned Counsel for Mr. He also submitted that the respondent has already reached to his superannuation age on 30.06.1998 and hence, the retiral benefits if not paid to the respondent, may be paid by the Corporation. 7. Mr. Singhvi, learned Counsel for Mr. Ashish M. Dagli, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is not in a position to show as to whether any inquiry was held for dismissal of the respondent vide order dated 25.02.1992. Under these circumstances, it is observed that if the order dated 25.02.1992 has been passed without holding any departmental inquiry against the respondent, it will be for the petitioner - Corporation to treat the respondent as reinstated in service pursuant to the order of the Second Appellate Authority dated 13.09.1991 and to pay retiral benefits in accordance with law and such benefits shall be paid preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ of this order. However, if the order dated 25.02.1992 for dismissal of the respondent - workman in service is after holding departmental inquiry in accordance with law, the petitioner - Corporation shall intimate to the respondent in writing by supplying the copy of the outcome of the departmental inquiry, if any and the respondent shall be at liberty to challenge such decision in accordance with law before the appropriate forum. In case of second contegency also treating the respondent as dismissed from the service, the other dues like Provident Fund and others, if any, of the respondent if not paid shall be paid by the petitioner - Corporation preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ of the order. 8. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned award dated 15.12.2000 passed by the Labour Court is quashed and set aside, but as the petitioner has reached to the age of superannuation, keeping in view, the order dated 13.09.1991 passed by the Second Appellate Authority as well as the order dated 25.02.1992 in Default Case No. 490 of 1992, the direction as per Para-7 shall be implemented by the petitioner - Corporation. 9. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs. P P P P P