Judgment Mukul Mudgal, J. 1. One of us (Mahesh Grover, J.) while dealing with the matter in hand, made a reference by the order dated 24.2.2010 for determination of the following questions by a larger Bench and this is how, it has been placed before us :- 1. Whether in the absence of any substantial question of law being stated in the memorandum of appeal, the same can be rejected or not? 2. Whether Section 100 CPC enjoins a duty upon the High Court to formula a substantial question of law even if the same has not been stated in the memorandum of appeal or whether the appeal can be dismissed solely on this ground that it has not so been stated in the memorandum of appeal? 3. Whether non-stating of a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal is a mere procedural irregularity and can result in rejection of appeal or whether in can be cured and rectified? 4. Whether an application under Rule 2 of Order 41 CPC can be moved at any time before hearing of the appeal or whether the same can be rejected merely because it has been filed after lapse of substantial period of time. 5. Whether Rule 10 of the Cheyenne 14 Part B, of Volume-1 of the Rules and Orders governs the procedure of filing of the regular second appeal in the High Court or not? 6. Whether an application similiciter for formulat in substantial question of law would suffice the needs of Section 100 CPC or whether the memorandum of appeal would necessarily have to be amended, especially in view of the fact at the time of filing of the appeal, i.e. between 1971 to 2001, there was no need to formulate such questions ? 2. Before we embark upon to determine the questions that have been posed and reproduced above, we may briefly dwell upon the contour of the controversy and the course of events leading to it. 3. Alok Singh, J. while deciding R.S.A. No. 861 of 1981 - Bikkar Singh and others v. Jalaur Singh and others, on 16.2.2010, observed as follows :- "7. 3. Alok Singh, J. while deciding R.S.A. No. 861 of 1981 - Bikkar Singh and others v. Jalaur Singh and others, on 16.2.2010, observed as follows :- "7. This Court can formulate substantial questions of law when appeal is filed containing substantial questions of law in the memorandum of appeal as required under Sub-section (3) of Section 100 C.P.C. duty of the Court to formulate substantial questions of law comes subsequent to the filing of the memorandum of appeal and not otherwise. No question remains, as to whether Court can press proviso of sub-section (5) of Section 100 C.P.C. in service while hearing the appeal, enabling the Court to formulate substantial question of law as suggested by Mrs. M.L. Sarin, Sr. Advocate. 8. In the humble opinion of this Court, word OTHER used in the proviso makes it clear that proviso can be pressed in service when some substance question of law has already been formulated at the time of admission. The word OTHER denotes in addition to. If no substantial question of law formulated either in the memo of appeal or by the Court at the time of admission of the appeal, then proviso cannot be pressed in service." 4. It was further observed by Alok Singh, J. in the aforesaid judgment that a combined reading of Section 100 and Order 41 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. makes it clear that no appeal shall be entertained until and unless memo of appeal contains substantial questions of law or which is not drawn up in the manner provided in the Code must be rejected outright. 5. In denying the right to the appellant to amend the memorandum of appeal after the same was sought to be done after a gap of 29 years when the appeal came up for final disposal, Alok Singh, J. relied upon the ratio of a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Bikram Dass v. The financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, Chandigarh and others, AIR 1975 P&H 1. In that case, the Full Bench had dismissed the appeal for non-compliance of Rule 3 of the Letters Patent Rules. In that case, the Full Bench had dismissed the appeal for non-compliance of Rule 3 of the Letters Patent Rules. He, however, carved out an exception that in genuine cases, where the Court finds that the impugned judgment is absolutely without jurisdiction or the judgment passed by the court below cannot stand legal scrutiny, then of course, this court can permit an appellant to incorporate substantial questions of law in the memo of appeal by invoking Rule 2 of Order 42 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. and, thus, acknowledged the power of the High Court to formulate substantial question of law, but only in justifiable cases. 6. A similar view as expressed in Bikkar Singhs case (supra), the essence of which has been brought out above succinctly, was reiterated in judgments of Alok Singh, J. in R.S.A. No. 888 of 1982-Kartar Singh and another v. Tulsi (died) through LRs and others, decided on 17.2.2010; 2010(2) R.C.R.(Civil) 942 : R.S.A. No. 769 of 1982 - Rajinder Singh and others v. State of Punajab and ohters, decided on 17.2.2010. 7. The aforementioned judgments were relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent when the matter in the instant appeal- R.S.A. No. 1587 of 1988 was being deliberated before Grover, J. seeking to just the claim of the appellant in the appeal. However, Grover, J. was unable to ascribe to the view expressed by Alok Singh, and referred the afore-quoted posers to be answered by a larger Bench in view of the conflict of opinion. 8. We now propose to answer the questions posed in the order of reference. 9. In our endeavour to determine these questions, we have been assisted by the learned counsel for the parties as well as the counsel who appeared as intervenors. 10. In the first instance, we propose to determine question Nos. 1 to 4, which have been mentioned above and as extracted from the referral order. The same are again reproduced below for reference purposes :- 1. Whether in the absence of any substantial question of law being stated in the memorandum of appeal, the same can be rejected or not" 2. 1 to 4, which have been mentioned above and as extracted from the referral order. The same are again reproduced below for reference purposes :- 1. Whether in the absence of any substantial question of law being stated in the memorandum of appeal, the same can be rejected or not" 2. Whether Section 100 CPC enjoins a duty upon the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law even if the same has not been stated in the memorandum of appeal or whether the appeal can be dismissed solely on this ground that it has not so been stated in the memorandum of appeal? 3. Whether non-stating of a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal is a mere procedural irregularity and can result in rejection of appeal or whether it can be cured and rectified? 4. Whether an application under Rule 2 of Order 41 CPC can be moved at any time before hearing of the appeal or whether the same can be rejected merely because it has been filed after lapse of substantial period of time ? 11. Having thoughtly deliberate upon them, we are of the opinion the view expressed by Alok Singh, J. is fallacious as it emanates marily from the observations made in Bikram Dass v. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, Chandigarh and others (supra) which were overruled by the Honble Supreme Court in the appeal against the very same judgment in Mahant Bikram Dass Chela v. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, Chandigarh andothers, (1977) 4 S.C.C. 169, but prior to this, the Honble Supreme Court observed in The State of Punjab and another v. Shamla Murari and another, AIR 1976 S.C. 1177 as under :- "The Rule requiring the enclosing of 3 copies of documents mentioned in the rule along with a Letters Patent Appeal, in form strikes a mandatory note and in design is intended to facilitate a plurality of judges hearing the appeal each equipped with a set of relevant papers. In this sense, the needs of the rule transcend the directory level and may, perhaps, be considered a mandatory need. In this sense, the needs of the rule transcend the directory level and may, perhaps, be considered a mandatory need. The use of shall - word of slippery semantics - in a rule is not decisive and the context of the statue, the purpose of the prescription, the public injury in the event of neglect of the rule and the conspectus of circumstances bearing on the importance of the condition, have all to be considered before condemning a violation as fatal. It is obvious that even taking a stern view, every minor detail in Rule 3 cannot carry a compulsory or imperative import. Where copies not three documents prescribed have been furnished but not three copies of each, the omission or default is only a breach which can be characterised as an irregularity to be corrected by condition on application by the party fulfilling the condition within a time allowed by the Court." 12. At a latter point of time, as mentioned above when the appeal in Mahant Bikram Dass case (supra) came up for consideration, another two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated the view taken in The State of Punjab and another v. Shamla Murari and another (supra). 13. In BanarsiDass v. Brig. Maharaja Sukhjit Singh and Anr. 1998(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 84: JT 1997 (8) S.C. 556, the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of Section 100 of the C.P.C. vis-a-vis those of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (for short, the 1918 Act). The relevant part of paragraph of the judgment which contains the conclusion is reproduced below :- . "14. The question which, thus, arises for consideration is, if the second appeal in the High Court was maintainable in view of restrictions contained in Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act. We find no impediment in the jurisdiction of the High Courts in entertaining the second appeal in the present case in view of clause (c) of sub- section appeal in the present case in view of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the Act..." 14. We find no impediment in the jurisdiction of the High Courts in entertaining the second appeal in the present case in view of clause (c) of sub- section appeal in the present case in view of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the Act..." 14. In State of M.P. and another v. Pradeep Kumar and another, 2000(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 730 : (2000) 7 S.C.C. 372, the facts were that the second appeal was dissmised for non-compliance of Order 41 Rule 3-A of the C.P.C. and upon the matter being brought before the Supreme Court, it was laid down that filing of the memorandum of appeal without the application for condonation of delay is not fatal as Rule 3-A(l) does not foreclose the chance to rectify a mistake. The relevant observations made in the said judgment are extracted below:- "There is no rule prescribing the rejection of memorandum of appeal in a case where the appeal is not accompanied by an application for condoning the delay. If the memorandum of appeal is filed in such appeal without accompanying the application to condone delay the consequence cannot be fatal. The court can regard in such a case that there was no valid presentation of the appeal. In turn, it means that if the appellant subsequently files an application to condone the delay before the appeal is rejected the same should be taken up along with the already filed memorandum of appeal. Only then the court can treat the appeal as lawfully presented. There is nothing wrong if the court returns the memorandum of appeal (which was not accompanied by an application explaining the delay) as defective. Such defect can be cured by the party concerned and the appeal presented again without further delay. The use of the word "shall" in Order 41 Rule 3-A (1) does not for close a chance for the appellant to rectify the mistake, either on his own or on being pointed out by the court. The word "shall" in the context needs to be interpreted as an obligation cast on the appellant. There is no reason to put a more restrictive interpretation on the sub-rule. The Rule cannot be interpreted very harshly and make the non-compliance punitive to an appellant. It can happen that due to some mistake or lapse an appellant may omit to file the application (explaining the delay) along with the appeal. There is no reason to put a more restrictive interpretation on the sub-rule. The Rule cannot be interpreted very harshly and make the non-compliance punitive to an appellant. It can happen that due to some mistake or lapse an appellant may omit to file the application (explaining the delay) along with the appeal. Even a vigilant litigant is prone to commit mistakes. As the aphorism "to err is human" is more of a practical notion of human behaviour than an abstract philosophy, the unintentional lapse on the part of a litigant should not normally cause the doors of the judicature permanently to be closed before him. The effort of the court should not be one of finding means to pull down the shutters of adjudicatory jurisdiction before a party who seeks justice, on account of any mistake committed by him, but to see whether it is possible to entertain his grievance if it is genuine. 15. In Batakrushna Das v. Natabar Behera, (2000) 9 S. C. C. 29, it was laid down that framing of substantial question of law is mandatory for considering a second appeal. However, the Honble Supreme Court did not rule out the stage at which the substantial question of law could be formulated. Paragraph 4 of the said judgment reads as under :- "4. According to the judgments of this Court, it is mandatory for the High Court to frame a substantial question of law and then only to consider whether the appellant has a good case on the said question of law. As this has not been done, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal for framing a substantial question of law and disposing of the appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in accordance with law. We make it clear that we are not to be understood as having said anything on the merits of the case." 16. In Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganlal (dead) through L.Rs. We make it clear that we are not to be understood as having said anything on the merits of the case." 16. In Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganlal (dead) through L.Rs. v. GohilAmarsing Govindhhai (Dead) through L.Rs., 2007(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 403 : 2007(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 27 : 2007(1) R.A.J. 5 : (2006) 13 S.C.C. 113, it was observed that proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the C.P.C. is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be decided the appeal on any other substantial question of law. 17. There is, thus, no doubt that under the provisions of Section of the C.P.C, it is incumbent upon the High Court to interfere only a substantial question of law arises and such interference, if warranted, should be purely on the stated objective and requirement of Section 100 and failure to do so, would only invite a negation of the intention of the Legislature. But, that is not the purport of our quest. 18. We are confronted with the situation where Alok Singh, J. has observed that the word other as appearing in proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the C.P.C. wouldmean in addition to and if no substantial question of law is formulated either in the memorandum of appeal or by the Court at the time of admission of the appeal, then the said proviso cannot be pressed into service. In so far as the observation pertaining to the framing of substantial question of law at the time of admission of appeal, we, in unison, express affirmation of the view expressed by Alok Singh, J., but the real question in issue is that whether an absence of formulating any substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal should entail the dismissal of the appeal or not ? 19. Here, we deem it proper to quote Section 100 of the C.P.C, which reads as under :- "100. Second appeal. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question; Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other sub-stantial question of law, not formulated by it, if is satisfied that the case involves such question." 20. A bare reading of the afore-quoted provisions shows that Section 100 CPC envisages that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to it if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (1) thereof enjoins a duty upon the High Court to satisfy itself in the first instance when the appeal is set down before it as to whether a substantial question of law arises in it or not. Section 100(3) casts a duty was the appellant filing an appeal to state in the memorandum of appeal precisely the substantial question of law which is involved in the appeal, while Section 100(4) goes on to state that where the High Court is satisfied that a sub-stantial question of law is involved, then it shall formulate that question and if such a question of law is formulated, then the High Court shall proceed to permit the arguments on appeal on the said question of law. The proviso to Section 100(5) only enlarges the scope of the earlier provisions of law and contemplates a situation when no substantial question of law has been framed, but at the time of hearing if the Court, for reasons to be recorded, regarding its satisfaction that a substantial question of law is involved, may formulate such a question to dispose of the appeal. 21. Thus, the language of Section 10 of the C.P.C. is unambiguous. Sub-section (4) acknowledges the power of the High Court to frame a substantial question of law if it is satisfied that one exists. It is implicit in the language of sub-section (4) that the power of the High Court is not fettered by any constraints. The judgment of the High Court is not fettered by any constraints. The judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Batakrushna Dass case (supra), in fact, mandates the High Court to frame a Substantial question of law, if not framed already and the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Bikkar Singhs case (supra) runs counter to the mandate of the above judgment. 22. We also feel that subjugating a substantial right of appeal to technicalities and irregularities which has the effect of asphyxiating sub- stantial justice, should normally be abhorred. 22. We also feel that subjugating a substantial right of appeal to technicalities and irregularities which has the effect of asphyxiating sub- stantial justice, should normally be abhorred. We are, thus, with respect unable to ascribe to the view expressed by Alok Singh, J. and venture to say that the High Court, while determining an appeal, can formulate substantial question of law if one arises upon satisfaction so expressed by the Court even if the same are not contained in the memorandum of appeal as is unambiguously expressed by the language of sub-section (4) and (5) of Section 100 of the C.P.C. and that non-stating of substantial questions of law in the memorandum of appeal is merely a procedural irregularity which can be cured and rectified, but should not result in dismissal of appeal and that an application under Rule 2 of Order 41 of the C.P.C. for amendment of memorandum of appeal can be moved at any time and merely because of the fact that it has been moved belatedly should not result in denial of hearing of appeal on merits, more-so when prior to the coming into force of the C.P.C. Amendment act, 1976, the filing to the regular second appeal was governed by Section 41 of the 1918 Act which did not warrant the Framing of a substantial question of law and that the Full Bench decision of this Court Ganpat v. Shri Devi, AIR 1978 P&H 137, wherein it was held that non-formuation of substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal as well as at time of admitting the appeal was not required despite amendment of C.P.C. in the year 1976, which view was over-turned by the Honble Supreme Court in Kulwant Kaur and others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs. and Others, 2001(2) R.C.R.(Civil) 277: JT 2001 (4) S.C. 158. In that case, the provisions of Section 100 of the C.P.C. as amended and those of Section 41 of the 1918 Act, the language of which was pari materia with the unamended provisions of Section 100 of the C.P.C, were being considered and after a detailed discussion, it was held that mandatory requirement of Section 100 of the C.P.C. cannot be obliterated by reason of a State legislation and that Section 41 of the 1918 Act being repugnant to Section 100 of the C.P.C. cannot have its effect. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are extracted below :- Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact even if erroneous will generally not be disturbed but where it is und that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjecture and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in due view will be within its jurisdiction to beak with the issue. This is, owever, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - What is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. The requirements stands specified in Section 103 and nothing of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that section 100 of the Code stands complied with. The learned Single Judge of the High Court obviously had the Punjab Full Bench judgment in mind and having regard to Section 41 and without any reference to Section 100 dealt with the issue. The mandatory requirement of Section 100 cannot be obliterated by reason of a State Legislature where the requirement is not such. Section 41 of the Punjab Act cannot but the termed to be repugnant to section 100 and as such cannot have its effect, since parliamentary supremacy renders Section 41 of the Punjab Act devoid of any effect. The mandatory requirement of Section 100 cannot be obliterated by reason of a State Legislature where the requirement is not such. Section 41 of the Punjab Act cannot but the termed to be repugnant to section 100 and as such cannot have its effect, since parliamentary supremacy renders Section 41 of the Punjab Act devoid of any effect. Neither the saving clause in Section 100(1) or Section 4 of the Code can come to the rescue of the respondents in view of Section 97(1) of the Amending Act. More so by reason of the clarification rendered by the Legislature in Section 101 of the Code which provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in Section 100 indicating thereby the further reinforcement to the legislative intent to be obtained from Section 101 as regards the issue of substantial question of law. This refers to substantial question of law having regard to the language of Section 103 cannot however be said to even imply a contra note apart from what is stated hereinbefore. This is so reason of the provisions of Section 97 of the Amending Act. Through of 1976 amendment right to second appeal further restricted only to lie where, "the case involves a substantial question of law". This introduction definitely is in conflict with Section 41 of the Punjab Act which was pari materia with unamended Section 100 CPC. Thus, so long there was no specific provision to the contrary in this Code Section 4 CPC saved special or local law. But after it comes in conflict Section 4 CPC would not save, on the contrary, its language implied would make such special or local applicable. Any provision of the State Legislature to this Amending Act which becomes inconsistent to this Amending Act is in consonance with both sub- clause (1) an proviso to sub-clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. Thus language of Section 97(1) of the Amending Act clearly spells out that any local law in consistent goes but regarding what is not in consistence, it could be said the local law would still continue to occupy its filed. But so far the present case, Section 41 of the Punjab act, it is expressly in conflict with the amending law, viz., Section 100 amended which would be deemed which would be deemed to have been repealed. But so far the present case, Section 41 of the Punjab act, it is expressly in conflict with the amending law, viz., Section 100 amended which would be deemed which would be deemed to have been repealed. Thus we have no hesitation to hold the law declared by the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Ganpat (supra) cannot be sustained and is overruled." (Emphasis supplied) 23 In Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Parsed Singh and another, 2006(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 18:2005(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 637: (2006) 1 S.C.C. 75, which dealt with various provisions of the C.P.C. including Order 41 Rule 1, it was held as under :- "Non-compliance with any procedural requirement beating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statue or rule so mandates. Procedure defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well- recognised exceptions to this principle are :- (i) where the statue prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequences of non-complaince; (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it; (iii) where the non-complaince or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous; (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court; and (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant." 24. ln M/s. Bharat Khandsari Udyog v. Khandasari Inspector, Roorkee West Circle and another, 1992 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 473, the matter relating to interpretation of Rule 24(3) of Sugarcane (Purchase tax) Rules, 1961 came up for consideration and it was observed as under :- "Rule 24(3) is on the familiar pattern of Order 41 Rule 1 CPC. The requirement of the production of the attested copy of assessment is mandatory and in absence of an attested copy of the order the filing of appeal would be incomplete, defective and incompetent. The requirement of the production of the attested copy of assessment is mandatory and in absence of an attested copy of the order the filing of appeal would be incomplete, defective and incompetent. But the non-filing of an attested copy of the order along with the Memorandum of Appeal does not compel the appellate authority to dismiss the appeal as if it had no other option. The appropriate thing to do in such a case is to call upon the appellant to make good the defect within the time to be specified. If cause for non-complaince is not shown and the defect not made good, then alone the appeal should be dismissed." 25. From the aforementioned position of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, it is clear that non-compliance of any procedural requirement should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection of an appeal was the relevant statue or rule so mandates and a hypertechnical view could not be taken to deny the substantial right of an appeal. 26. We are now left with two questions posed in the order of reference and indicated at Sr. Nos. 5 and 6 and propose to determine them. At the cost of repetition, they are again extracted below :- "5. Whether Rule 10 of Chapter 14 Part -B of Volume-1 of the Rules and Orders governs the procedure of filing of the regular second appeal in the High Court or not ? 6. Whether an application simpliciter for formulating substantial question of law would suffice the needs of Section 100 CPC or whether the memorandum of appeal would necessarily have to amended, especially in view of the fact that at the time of filing of the appeal, i.e., between 1971 to 2001, there was no need to formulate such questions ?" 27. Rule 10 Part-B of Chapter 14 of Volume-1 of Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules and Orders, read as under :- "10. Amendment after admission. - When an appeal has been registered and a date has been fixed for hearing, the petition cannot be returned for amendment. The appeal must be disposed of in the regular manner by dismissal, or by a judgment affirming, varying or reversing the decree of the lower Court. Amendment after admission. - When an appeal has been registered and a date has been fixed for hearing, the petition cannot be returned for amendment. The appeal must be disposed of in the regular manner by dismissal, or by a judgment affirming, varying or reversing the decree of the lower Court. If the appellant should desire to urge any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal, he can, under the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, do so only with the permission of the Court and such permission sho \uld ordinarily be applied for in writing some time before the date fixed for the hearing, under Order XLI Rule 12, of the Code, in order that the respondent may have sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground, without the necessity of a postponement." 27. in attempt was made to say that part-B of Chapter-14 of Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules and Orders, Volume-I, does not apply to the regular second appeals. But, a perusal of the [provisions of the said Part B of Chapter-14 shows that it deals with the general procedure of the appellate Courts. Rule 1 of Part-B categorically refers to second appeals. The relevant portion of the same is extracted below :- "In second appeals, in addition to the copies specified in Order XLI, Rule 1, the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment of the Court of first instance, unless the Appellate Court dispenses therewith, vide Rule 23, Order XLII, added by the Punjab High Court..... 28. Thereafter, this Part, after dealing with more procedures which govern the filing of appeal, in Rule 10 goes on to deal with the procedure by which memorandum of appeal can be amended. 29. Thus, since this Chapter does not categorically confine itself to first appeals, we hold that it governs the filing of regular second appeals as well, but the question is as to whether an application simpliciter would suffice for formulating substantial question of law and would satisfy the requirement of the provisions aforesaid including those of Section 100 of the C.P.C. or whether the memorandum of appeal necessarily has to be amended. We would again insist on reading of the afore-quoted Rule 10 for it shows that if the appellant should desire to urge any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal, he can, under the provisions of Order XLI Rule 2 of the. C.P.C. do so only with the permission of the Court and sub permission should ordinarily be applied for in writing some time before the date fixed for the hearing. 30. The ground of objection as set out in Rule 10 above, to our minds, can be restricted to only material grounds and cannot be extended to substantial question of law because under sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 100 of the C.P.C, the Court can formulate such question of law at any point of time and thus, to say that the appellant can do so by only amending the memorandum of appeal after the filing and admission of the appeal, but before hearing of the same, would be too constrictive and incorrect. We are, therefore, if the view that in order to obviate and obliterate the complexities in the procedure, a simple application with notice to the opposite side for formulating substantial questions of law would suffice and the appellant need not go through the rigorous of amending his grounds of appeal, more-so when we have already observed that these are mere curable irregularities and that substantial rights of justice should never be subject to interpretation which has the effect of guillotining them and in any eventuality, the Court itself can and is, indeed, required to do so while hearing the appeal under Section 100(4) and (5) of the C.P.C. and even otherwise, a question of . law can be permitted to be raised at any stage of the proceedings. law can be permitted to be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Having answered the questions as above, we hold that the view expressed by Alok Singh, J. in R.S.A. No. 861 of 1981 -Bikkar Singh and others v. Jalaur Singh and others, decided on 16.2.2010; R.S.A. No. 888 of 1982 Kartar Singh and another v. Tulsi (died) through LRs and others, decided on 17.2.2010; R.S.A. No. 769 of 1982 - Rajinder Singh and other v. State of Punjab and others, decided on 17.2.2010 and R.S.A. No. 1291 of 1982 - Mohinder kaur and others v. Manmohan Singh and others, decided on 17.2.2010 does not lay down the correct position of law and the relevant position of law having been formulated by us, would hence forth govern all second appeals in this Court. The reference to this Full Bench is answered accordingly. The matter be now listed before the learned Single Judge for hearing as per roster.