Krishna Sinha Wife Of Jai Nandan Sharma v. State Of Bihar
2010-07-12
MIHIR KUMAR JHA
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGEMENT 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the State. 2. In all these writ petitions, basically only one question has been raised though the prayer therein has been clothed in different manner. Such question is with regard to entitlement and payment of House Rent Allowance. It is not in doubt that in the report of the pay revision committee as accepted by the State Government the House Rent Allowance (HRA) is one of the admissible allowance which is payable on fulfillment of certain terms and conditions. In fact to that extent, there is also a statutory rule in Bihar Rajyakarmchari Bharha and Bhatta Niyamawali, 1980. The grievance of the petitioner is that when the State Government by a specific order contained in Letter No. 5810 dated 4.8.1984 had laid down certain conditions for grant of HRA and the petitioners had also been given the same by the competent authority, its payment could not have been stopped under the order of Sub-Divisional Officer. In this context, counsel for the petitioners have specifically relied on letter of the Secretary to the Education Department No.1150 dated 26.4.1986 delegating power of sanctioning and the payment of HRA in respect of teachers of Primary School, Basic Schools and other schools in the Deputy Development Commissioner (D.D.C.) of the District. Such delegation of power according to the petitioners makes the DDC the sola repository with regard to sanction and payment of HRA to the teachers of different schools. The grievance of the petitioners therefore is that when by an individual order they were sanctioned and in fact were also paid HRA in terms of policy decision of the State Government, its sudden stoppage under the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer was not only bad but also without jurisdiction. 3. Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner to that extent has also gone to submit that as a matter of fact, after such stoppage was made and the petitioners had moved this Court, some orders were passed in justification to the impugned action with regard to stoppage of payment of HRA. 4. Counsel for the State on the other hand with reference to the facts stated in the counter affidavit would submit that as matter of fact the very grant of HRA under the various orders of DDC was bad and/or in violation of Government policy and rules.
4. Counsel for the State on the other hand with reference to the facts stated in the counter affidavit would submit that as matter of fact the very grant of HRA under the various orders of DDC was bad and/or in violation of Government policy and rules. In this context, much stress has been given by them on the distance portion between place of working and place of residence of the petitioners inasmuch as according to the counsel for the State the touchstone distance is of eight kilometers. 5. In the opinion of this court, the Sub-Divisional Officer even if he had found certain discrepancies in grant/payment of HRA to the petitioners, he had to bring this fact to the notice of DDC who was not only the person delegated such power by the Education Department, the Administrative Department referable to order of the Finance Department in Letter No. 5810 dated 4.8.1984 but also even otherwise the author of the individual grant of benefit to the petitioners by way of sanction and payment of HRA. It was thus for the DDC to find out as to whether the terms and conditions imposed by him in the individual letters sanctioning HRA to the petitioners was followed in letter and spirit by the Drawing and Disbursing Authority or not. 6. That having not been done, this Court cannot approve the action of the Sub-Divisional Officer in stoppage of the payment of HRA inasmuch as Sub-Divisional Officer is definitely a subordinate authority to the Deputy Development Commissioner and the power has been vested exclusively in the DDC by the Secretary to the Education Department. Any action detrimental to the petitioners either by way of stopping or reducing or cancelling the payment of HRA has to be necessarily passed by the authority who had been delegated such power. 7. Consequently, the order stopping payment of HRA to the petitioners by the SDO in these cases are hereby set aside and the matter is remitted to the Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Patna; who now will go into the individual cases of all these petitioners and would record his order after considering the facts of each of the petitioners in the same manner in which he had issued the individual order for grant and/or sanction of their HRA. 8.
8. In order to expedite the matter, this Court would direct each of the petitioners to file his separate individual representation alongwith supporting documents for claiming the payment of HRA and on receipt of such representation the DDC will pass the necessary order within a period of six months from the date of its receipt in his office. 9. It goes without saying that if DDC holds the petitioners or any of them or some of them to be not entitled for payment of such HRA which would also require cancelling his earlier order of sanction and payment of HRS to the petitioners, he would give his reason in support of the same. 10. Since the petitioners have stood deprived and also remained uncertain about admissibility and payment of HRA for long 8 years and their payment has been restricted only to 5 percent (though their claim is 15 percent), the DDC, Patna will ensure prompt disposal of the representation of the petitioners within the aforesaid fixed time frame strictly in accordance with law including the Government rules and circulars on the subject. 11. With the aforementioned observation and direction, these writ petitions are disposed of.