Judgment :- These Second Appeals arise out of a Judgment in A.S.No.12 of 2004 on the file of Principal District Judge, Vellore reversing the Judgment of trial Court in O.S.No.163 of 1996 and decreeing Plaintiffs suit for compensation. Defendants 1 and 2 are the Appellants in S.A.No.91 of 2007 and 3rd Defendant is the Appellant in S.A.No.900 of 2005. Both the Appeals arise out of the same Judgment and the questions involved are also same, both the Appeals were taken up together and stand disposed of by this Common Judgment. 2. Plaintiffs wife Nirmala gave birth to third child on 25.03.1993 on normal delivery. 3rd Defendant Dr.Parimala Selvaraj has been working as Civil Assistant Surgeon in Government Hospital, Tirupattu. Plaintiff and his wife were already having three children and Plaintiffs wife Nirmala was taken to Government Hospital, Tirupattur for family planning operation. 3rd Defendant has performed Tubectomy operation on Plaintiffs wife Nirmala on 05.04.1993. Nirmala was discharged on 09.04.1993 from the hospital. Nirmala went to her parents village Kadirampatty. On 10.04.1993, she developed fits and became ill and she was admitted in Dr.Leela Subramaniam Nursing Home at Tirupattur and Nirmala died after few minutes of admission. Alleging that death was due to careless and negligent operation by 3rd Defendant in the course of her employment, Plaintiff filed suit claiming compensation of a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- from the Defendants. 3. Defendants filed Written Statement contending that only on consent of Plaintiff and his wife Nirmala, operation was successfully performed on 05.04.1993 at Government Hospital, Tirupattur. According to Defendants, Nirmala was kept under observation for three days as in-patient and sufficient care was taken on her health. Nirmala was hale and healthy during observation and also when she was discharged from the hospital. At the time of discharge, Nirmala was advised to come to hospital for periodical check up. According to Defendants, they are not aware of subsequent ailment of the patient and that 3rd Defendant cannot be held liable for the death of Plaintiffs wife at Dr.Leela Subramaniam Nursing home at Tirupattur and Defendants are not liable to pay Rs.1,00,000/- as damages to the Plaintiff. 4. On the above pleadings, six Issues were framed and then recast into four Issues. Plaintiff himself was examined as PW1 and mother of Nirmala was examined as PW2 and Dr.Leela Subramaniam was examined as PW3. 4. On the above pleadings, six Issues were framed and then recast into four Issues. Plaintiff himself was examined as PW1 and mother of Nirmala was examined as PW2 and Dr.Leela Subramaniam was examined as PW3. One K.Viswanathan, who was then working as Sanitary Inspector in Tirupattur Municipality was examined as PW4. Exs.A1 to A9 were marked on the side of Plaintiff. 3rd Defendant Dr.Parimala Selvaraj was examined as DW1. Exs.B1 to B5 were marked on the side of Defendants. 5. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, trial Court held that at the time of discharge Nirmala was hale and healthy and Plaintiff was careless and negligent in taking Nirmala to the residence in Kdairampatty in the Auto. Finding that death was not proved to be due to medical negligence during Tubectomy, trial Court dismissed the suit. 6. Being aggrieved by dismissal of suit, Plaintiff filed A.S.No.12 of 2004. Finding that non-filing of medical report of Nirmala is fatal. Lower Appellate Court further held that death was due to Cerebral Vein Thrombosis due to negligence of 3rd Defendant. Considering the fact that already Rs.2,00,000/- was paid under Group Insurance Scheme and also another Rs.25,000/- was paid, lower Appellate Court decreed the suit directing payment of compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-to Plaintiff. 7. Being aggrieved by reversal Judgment, Government [Defendants 1 and 2] and 3rd Defendant have filed two Second Appeals - S.A.No.91/2007 and S.A.No.900/2007 respectively. At the time of admission of Second Appeals, the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration:- S.A.No.91 of 2007: a. Whether the first Appellate Court failed to appreciate the rarest possibility as a result of medical miracle while imposing compensation to the plaintiff? .b. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the compensation when she voluntarily participated the medical camp for the purpose of Family Planning Operation? .c. Whether the chain of causation is persisting between cause and the death of the victim so as to award compensation to the plaintiff? S.A.No.900 of 2007: 1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court could have drawn adverse inference against the defendants for non-marking of the case sheets of the deceased even though no application was taken out by the plaintiff and no direction was issued by the court for causing their production? 2. S.A.No.900 of 2007: 1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court could have drawn adverse inference against the defendants for non-marking of the case sheets of the deceased even though no application was taken out by the plaintiff and no direction was issued by the court for causing their production? 2. Whether the findings against the defendants is based on no evidence, since it is incumbent on the plaintiff to establish professional negligence on this defendant in the performance of the sterilization operation and its direct and proximate nexus as to the cause of death of the deceased? 3. Whether the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court is liable to be set aside in having ignored the testimony of D.W.1 made with specific reference to the standard medical text book? 4. Whether the Lower Appellate Court had correctly appreciated the issues involved in the light of Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872? 8. Ms.Bhavani Subbarayan, learned Special Government Pleader (CS) submitted that Tubectomy is a minor operation and cannot held to be due to medical negligence and therefore, Government is not liable to pay any compensation to the Plaintiff. Learned Special Government Pleader would further submit that any woman who delivered child is susceptible to Cerebral Vein Thrombosis and while so, lower Appellate Court was not right in finding that Cerebral Vein Thrombosis was due to medical negligence. It was further argued that when deceased Nirmala died in a private hospital and in the absence of postmortem certificate and non-production of medical records cannot be the reason for decreeing the suit. 9. Mr.K.Mahendran, learned counsel for Appellant in S.A.No.900/2007 submitted that there was no negligence on the part of 3rd Defendant and 3rd Defendant cannot be held liable for death due to Cerebral Vein Thrombosis. It was further argued that 3rd Defendant has only conducted Tubectomy which is only a minor operation and cannot be held responsible for death of Plaintiffs wife. 10. Mr.Muthukrishnan, learned counsel for 1st Respondent in both the Appeals submitted that Government has not filed any medical document relating to Nirmala and lower Appellate Court rightly held that Defendants have not proved that 3rd Defendant had taken reasonable care. It was further contended that inspite of request, the Defendants refused to retain deceased Nirmala in the hospital and thus Defendants were negligent in giving treatment to Nirmala. 11. It was further contended that inspite of request, the Defendants refused to retain deceased Nirmala in the hospital and thus Defendants were negligent in giving treatment to Nirmala. 11. The main point falling for consideration is when the plaintiff and his wife have volunteered to undergo Tubectomy operation, can the Defendants be held liable for medical negligence and for payment of compensation. 12. The broad principles under which medical negligence as a tort have to be evaluated, have been laid down in the celebrated case of Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab and Another AIR 2005 SC 3180 : (2005) 6 SCC 1 . In the said decision, it has been observed that the complexity of the human body, and the uncertainty involved in medical procedures is of such great magnitude that it is impossible for a doctor to guarantee a successful result and the only assurance that he "can give or can be understood to have given by implication is that he is possessed of the requisite skill in that branch of profession which he is practising and while undertaking the performance of the task entrusted to him he would be exercising his skill with reasonable competence." The Bench also approved the opinion of MCNAIR,J in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 2 All ER 118 (QBD), in the following words: "(W)here you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence because has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill.... It is well-established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art." The Bench finally concluded its opinion as follows:- "We sum up our conclusions as under: .(1) Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The definition of negligence as given in LAW OF TORTS, RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL (edited by Justice G.P.SINGH), referred to hereinabove, holds good. The definition of negligence as given in LAW OF TORTS, RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL (edited by Justice G.P.SINGH), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or, omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence are three: "duty", "breach" and "resulting damage." (2) Negligence in the contest of the medical profession necessarily calls for a treatment with a difference. To infer rashness or negligence on the part of a professional, in particular a doctor, additional considerations apply. A case of occupational negligence is different from one of professional negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on the part of a medical professional. So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice or procedure which the accused followed. When it comes to the failure of taking precautions, what has to be seen is whether those precautions were taken which the ordinary experience of men has found to be sufficient; a failure to use special or extraordinary precautions which might have prevented the particular happening cannot be the standard for judging the alleged negligence. So also, the standard of care, while assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time of the incident, and not at the date of trial. Similarly, when the charge of negligence arises out of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that particular time (that is, the time of the incident) at which it is suggested it should have been used. .(3) A professional may be held liable for negligence on one of the two findings: either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess. The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has been negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession. The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has been negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession. It is not possible for every professional to possess the highest level of expertise or skills in that branch which he practices. A highly skilled professional may be possessed of better qualities, but that cannot be made the basis or the yardstick for judging the performance of the professional proceeded against on indictment of negligence. .(4) The test for determining medical negligence as laid down in Bolam case (1957) 2 All ER 118 (QBD) holds good in its applicability in India. 13. The observation in the aforesaid case were reiterated in State of Punjab v. Shiv Ram and others [ AIR 2005 SC 3280 : (2005) 7 SCC 1 : (2005) 4 MLJ 133]. In the said decision, a suit had been filed against State of Punjab and a lady doctor, a State Government employee, claiming damages for a failed tubectomy as the woman conceived and gave birth to a child notwithstanding the procedure. The suit was decreed against the State Government. While allowing the appeal Supreme Court held as follows:- "The plaintiffs have not alleged that the lady surgeon who performed the sterilization operation was not competent to perform the surgery and yet ventured into doing it. It is neither the case of the plaintiffs, nor has any finding been arrived at by any of the Courts below that the lady surgeon was negligent in performing the surgery. The present one is not a case where the surgeon who performed the surgery has committed breach of any duty cast on her as a surgeon. The surgery was performed by a technique known and recognized by medical science. It is a pure and simple case of sterilization operation having failed though duly performed. The learned Additional Advocate General has also very fairly not disputed the vicarious liability of the State, if only its employee doctor is found to have performed the surgery negligently and if the unwanted pregnancy thereafter is attributable to such negligent act or omission on the part of the employee doctor of the State." 14. The learned Additional Advocate General has also very fairly not disputed the vicarious liability of the State, if only its employee doctor is found to have performed the surgery negligently and if the unwanted pregnancy thereafter is attributable to such negligent act or omission on the part of the employee doctor of the State." 14. Referring to Jacob Mathews case ( AIR 2005 SC 3180 : (2005) 6 SCC 1 ) and other decisions, in (2009) 7 MLJ 596 (SC) [Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S.Dhananka and others], the Supreme Court held as follows:- "22. The Court further held forth a caution that if doctors were frequently called upon to answer charges having criminal and civil consequences, it would frustrate and render ineffective the functioning of the medical profession as a whole and if the medical profession was "hemmed by threat of action, criminal and civil, the consequence will be a loss to the patients ............. and no doctor would take a risk, a justifiable risk in the circumstances of a given case, and try to save his patient from a complicated disease or in the face of an unexpected problem that confronts him during the treatment or the surgery. 23. ...... It is clear that a mere misjudgment or error in medical treatment by itself would not be decisive of negligence towards the patient and the knowledge of medical practice and procedure available at the time of the operation and not at the date of trial, is relevant. It is also evident that a doctor rendering treatment to a patient is expected to have reasonable competence in his field. (Bolams principle). It is the case of the complainant that it is the lack of care and caution and the neglect on the part of the attending doctors, and Dr.Satyanarayanan in particular, to make the necessary pre-operative investigations that had led to the complications at the time of the operation and thereafter." 15. Evidence in the present case has to be evaluated in the background of the above principles and observations. There is no dispute that Nirmala was admitted in the hospital on 25.03.1993 and on the same day she gave birth to third child and she underwent Tubectomy operation on 05.04.1993 and that she was discharged on 09.04.1993 and that Nirmala died on 10.04.1993. 16. There is no dispute that Nirmala was admitted in the hospital on 25.03.1993 and on the same day she gave birth to third child and she underwent Tubectomy operation on 05.04.1993 and that she was discharged on 09.04.1993 and that Nirmala died on 10.04.1993. 16. Let us now consider the allegations with regard to negligence alleged against the 3rd Defendant. Plaintiff himself examined as PW1 and mother of Nirmala was examined as PW2. Dr.Leela Subramaniam in whose hospital Nirmala was admitted was examined as PW3. In their evidence, PWs.1 and 2 have stated that Nirmala was in hospital for about four days and that Nirmala was discharged on 09.04.1993. PWs.1 and 2 have further stated that inspite of their request to retain Nirmala for two days, 3rd Defendant and the hospital authorities refused to retain Nirmala in hospital for two more days and inspite of request Nirmala was discharged on 09.04.1993 and that they have taken her to Kadirampatty. In their evidence, PWs.1 and 2 have further stated that on 10.04.1993, Nirmala developed fits and was admitted in PW3s hospital where she died. In her evidence, PW3-Dr.Leela Subramaniam has deposed that flow of blood to brain was blocked and Nirmala died due to Cerebral Vein Thrombosis. PW3-Dr.Leela Subramanian issued Ex.A4 certificate certifying that death was due to consequence of periperal sterilization due to vein thrombosis. In her evidence, PW3-Dr.Leela Subramaniam has further stated that Nirmala was brought unconscious with high blood pressure and inspite of efforts Nirmala died due to "Cerebral Vein Thrombosis". .17. Incases involving medical negligence, initial burden lies upon the Plaintiff to prove that Doctor(s) who treated the deceased was negligent. There must be a direct connection between death/injuries suffered and treatment given. The term negligence (as per Blacks Law dictionary 6th Edn.) means the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do or the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. As a matter of fact, negligence is failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another, the degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Indeed, the idea of negligence and duty are correlative in the considered opinion of this Court. As a matter of fact, negligence is failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another, the degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Indeed, the idea of negligence and duty are correlative in the considered opinion of this Court. More over, negligence is a relative term but not an absolute one and in fact a comparative terms. To find out whether the act will be or will not be negligence, it is necessary to determine, if any reasonable person will foresee that the act will cause damage or not. The omission to do what the law obligates or even the failure to do anything in a manner, mode or method envisaged by law would equally and per see constitute negligence on the part of such person. If the answer is in the affirmative, it is a negligent act, as per the decision in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer [ (2003) 8 SCC 731 : 2004-2-LW 15]. .18. Coming to the aspect of medical negligence, the same is defined as lack of reasonable care and skill or willful negligence on the part of the doctor in respect of acceptance of a patient, history taking, examination, diagnosis, investigation, treatment-medical or surgical etc. resulting in injury or damage to the patient. The word damage means physical, mental or functional injury to the patient. Halsburys Laws of England 3rd Edn., Volume 26 at page 17, it is observed as follows:- ."The law requires that the practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge and must exercise a reasonable degree of care. The law does not expect the very highest nor a very low degree of care and competence judged in the light of the particular circumstances of each case." 19. In order to obtain a Judgment against a Physician, the standard of medical practice in the community must be shown and further that the doctor failed to follow the method prescribed by that standard. The doctor owes a duty to inform patient of the dangers ahead or risk involved. The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of acting with ordinary care. The doctor owes a duty to inform patient of the dangers ahead or risk involved. The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of acting with ordinary care. Generally speaking there must be a direct connection between the injuries suffered and the treatment given. .20. Noticing failure rate for sterilization operation at 0.5%, Government also introduced Group Insurance and also ex-gratia payment of Rs.25,000/-to the legal heirs. In Ex.B3, Government noticed failure rate as under:- ."...... 9) When large number of sterilization operation are performed with a limited facilities and limited time some complications failures and even deaths also can taken place. (Standards for male and female Sterilization, Department of Family Welfare, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, New Delhi-110 011). 10) Failure rate for sterilization according to foreign Authors and according to Indian Authors it is 0.5%." .21. Letter Na.Ka.2909/FW/H2/2001 dated 07.02.2001 of Directorate, Family Welfare Department stipulates payment of Insurance amount of Rs.2,00,000/- as under:- .(TAMIL) (National Insurance Company Ltd.) (TAMIL) 22. Only on consent of Nirmala and Plaintiff, Tubectomy was performed. 3rd Defendant is a Senior Civil Surgeon in Government Hospital, Tirupattur. Lower Appellate Court faulted the Defendants for non-production of medical records. It is pertinent to note that no finding was arrived that 3rd Defendant has been negligent in performing Tubectomy. In her evidence, 3rd Defendant/DW1 has stated that Tubectomy was performed by common technique as in case of any other patient. Tubectomy is a simple case of sterilization operation. 3rd Defendant could be held liable only if she is proved to be negligent and the death attributed to such negligence. Defendants 1 and 2 could be held vicariously liable only if negligence of 3rd Defendant is established and death is proved to be due to such negligent act or omission on the part of the employee Doctor of State. 23. Defence plea is that Plaintiff and his wife Nirmala were informed about the risk involved. Absolutely, there is no evidence to show that 3rd Defendant/DW1 was not competent to perform sterilization operation. 23. Defence plea is that Plaintiff and his wife Nirmala were informed about the risk involved. Absolutely, there is no evidence to show that 3rd Defendant/DW1 was not competent to perform sterilization operation. The only evidence adduced by the Plaintiff is evidence of PW2-mother of Nirmala who has stated that Nirmala was not well and the same was informed to the Doctor and requested the Doctor to continue treatment for two more days as inpatient and inspite of request, Nirmala was discharged. Excepting the above evidence of PW2, absolutely there is no evidence to prove medical negligence of 3rd Defendant that she has failed to take reasonable care as any other Doctor of ordinary skill. 24. Lower Appellate Court reversed the findings of trial Court mainly on the ground that Defendants have not produced medical records. Lower Appellate Court faulted Defendants for not producing the medical records and drew inference that death of deceased Nirmala is due to negligence on the part of 3rd Defendant. Lower Appellate Court did not keep in view the well settled principles that initial burden lies upon the Plaintiff to prove that Doctor was negligent. The approach of lower Appellate Court in drawing inference of negligence on the ground that medical records were not filed is erroneous. 25. In her evidence, DW1-Dr.Parimala has deposed that sterilization Tubectomy is a minor operation and that Nirmala was discharged in good health condition. DW1 has further stated that any woman who has delivered child is susceptible for Cerebral Vein Thrombosis. In the light of the evidence of DW1, Plaintiff did not insist upon production of medical records nor Plaintiff had taken any steps in taking summons to the Defendants to produce the medical records. When the Plaintiff has not discharged the initial burden cast upon him, lower Appellate Court was not right in faulting Defendants for not producing the medical records. 26. Contending that Cerebral Vein Thrombosis is not uncommon for woman who has delivered a child, in the trial Court, Defendants placed reliance upon the passage in "Clinical Obstrics" [Seventh Revised Edition, International Book Year Publication 1972 – Published by V.Abdulla, on ent Longman Ltd., Page 592 -A.I.Mudaliar, M.D.,L.L.D.,D.Sc.,D.C.I.(Oxan.)., F.R.C.O.G.,F.A.C.S.,F.R.C.P., ED.,Hon.) and M.K.Krishnamenon, B.A., M.D., F.R.C.O.G., F.A.M.S.,] which reads as under:- "This is not an uncommon condition. The pregnancy and labour in most cases are normal. The pregnancy and labour in most cases are normal. The time of onset various between fourth and twentieth day after delivery. Premonitory symptoms are usually absent. The first symptom may be sudden onset of Coma or fits. The fits may be frequent and with increasing fits the Coma deepens. The remaining symptoms depend on the site of the thrombosis. If the motor cortex is involved, as after it is, there is complete paralysis of one Limb and weakness of the rest of the body. The crebro spinal fluid is usually normal but may contain a little blood. The condition has often been mistaken for post-partum eclampsia. Pre-eclamptic toxaemia in the form of high blood pressure, cedema and albuminurea are invariably present in post-partum eclamptics and it is not common for post-partum eclampsia to occur after forty eight hours. The treatment is to prevent further thrombosis by anticoagulant therapy, control of convulsions by sedatives and keeping up the general strength by supportive treatment. Physiotherapy for paralysed muscles will be required." 27. When Cerebral Vein Thrombosis is not an uncommon, it cannot readily be presumed that death of Nirmala on 10.04.1993 was due to medical negligence. PW2-mother of Nirmala has stated that after discharge, they have taken Nirmala to Kadirampatty in an auto which is about 7 – 8 kms. In her evidence, PW3-Dr.Leela Subramaniam has admitted that when a woman who delivered child is taken in an auto for a distance at about 7 – 8 kms., there is possibility of a woman developing Cerebral Vein Thrombosis. When there is possibility of developing Cerebral Vein Thrombosis, it cannot be said that Plaintiff has established that death was due to medical negligence. 28. As rightly contended by the learned Special Government Pleader, Plaintiff and Nirmala volunteered to undergo family planning operation. Evidence of Dr.Parimala [DW1] who attended Nirmala is clear that Nirmala was discharged in a good condition. While so, sudden development of fits and death on 10.04.1993 cannot be said to be due to medical negligence. 29. Lower Appellate Court erred in drawing inference of medical negligence merely on the ground that no medical records were produced by the Defendants. Lower Appellate Court did not keep in view the well settled principle that initial burden lies upon the Plaintiff to prove negligence. Lower Appellate Court did not analyse the evidence in the light of well settled principles. Lower Appellate Court erred in drawing inference of medical negligence merely on the ground that no medical records were produced by the Defendants. Lower Appellate Court did not keep in view the well settled principle that initial burden lies upon the Plaintiff to prove negligence. Lower Appellate Court did not analyse the evidence in the light of well settled principles. Judgment of the lower Appellate Court reversing findings of trial Court cannot be sustained. 30. Admittedly as per G.O.(Ms) No.79 Health and Family Welfare (R1) Department dated 05. 2002, Plaintiff was paid Rs.25,000/- and insurance amount of Rs.2,00,000/- was also paid to the Plaintiff. By the order dated 25.01.2007 in M.P.No.255/2007 in S.A.No.91/2007, Appellants therein directed to deposit a sum of Rs.50,000/- to the credit of O.S.No.163 of 1996. By the order dated 011. 2008 in M.P.No.1/2008 in S.A.No.91/2007, Plaintiff was permitted to withdraw the amount of Rs.50,000/-deposited by Defendants 1 and 2. Amount of Rs.50,000/- deposited by Defendants 1 and 2 shall be treated as exgratia payment to Plaintiff and the same may not be recovered from Plaintiff if already withdrawn by Plaintiff. 31. S.A.Nos.91/2007 & 900/2005: In the result, the Judgment of the lower Appellate Court in A.S.No.12 of 2004 dated 211. 2004 on the file of Principal District Judge, Vellore is set aside and both the Second Appeals are allowed. Judgment of the trial Court in O.S.No.163 of 1996 dated 31. 2003 is confirmed. Amount of Rs.50,000/- deposited and if already withdrawn by the Plaintiff shall be treated as exgratia payment to the Plaintiff and the same may not be recovered from Plaintiff. If the Plaintiff had not already withdrawn the amount, he is permitted to withdraw the exgratia amount of Rs.50,000/- along with accrued interest. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.