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2010 DIGILAW 1527 (RAJ)

Dauji v. Natthu

2010-08-23

G.K.TIWARI

body2010
TIWARI, M.—This is a revision petition under Section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 against the impugned judgment dated 1.8.2001 of Revenue Appellate Authority Sawai Madhopur. 2. The facts, in brief, leading to the revision are that the non-petitioners had filed an application under Section 212of the Act for the grant of temporary injunction against the petitioner during pendency of a revenue suit between the rival parties in the court of Sub-Divisional Officer Hindauncity (District Karauli). This application of temporary injunction was finally decided by the Sub-Divisional Officer vide his order dated 28.9.1998 for maintaining status quo of the land. Thereafter, the non-petitioners filed an application before Sub-Divisional Officer making a complaint that the petitioner (non-petitioner before Sub-Divisional Officer) has violated the injunction order dated 28.9.1998 of Sub-Divisional Officer by laying `patol' (stone slabs) on the disputed land; as such `patol' should be removed and the non-petitioner Dauji etc. should be punished for disobedience of the court's order. Thereupon the Sub-Divisional Officer allowed the application vide his judgment dated 25.1.2001 ordering removal of the `patol' in fifteen days and also awarded imprisonment of one month to the petitioner Dauji for disobedience of the status quo order dated 28.9.1998 of Sub-Divisional Officer, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 225 of the Act before Revenue Appellate Authority Sawai Madhopur who dismissed the appeal by his judgment dated 1.8.2001, aggrieved against which the instant revision is preferred in this Court. 3. I have heard the learned counsels of both the parties. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that Sub-Divisional Officer finally decided the application of Section 212 of the Act with the order of status quo; whereas an order of status quo on an application for grant of temporary injunction under Section 212 of the Act cannot be a final order, as held in 1994 RRD 581; as such the order dated 28.9.1998 is an illegal order. It was also pleaded that the main suit between the rival parties was dismissed on 30.3.2000. With the dismissal of the suit, the alleged order of status quo dated 28.9.1998 had come to an end. The petitioner is a khatedar tenant of the disputed land, whereas the non-petitioners are claiming right on the disputed land on the basis of alleged `agreement to sale- which is not possible under the law. With the dismissal of the suit, the alleged order of status quo dated 28.9.1998 had come to an end. The petitioner is a khatedar tenant of the disputed land, whereas the non-petitioners are claiming right on the disputed land on the basis of alleged `agreement to sale- which is not possible under the law. The petitioner who is a khatedar tenant laid `patol' (stone slabs) on his own khatedari land after dismissal of the suit on 30.3.2000. The petitioner has produced independent witnesses to prove that stone slabs were put on the land on 30.3.2000 and not on 29.3.2000 as claimed by the non-petitioners. The trial Court as well as appellate court did not pay attention to the statements of any of the witnesses produced by the petitioner. Even the witnesses PW.2 and PW.3 of the petitioners (non-petitioners here) are not certain about the exact date when `patol' was laid. It was also contended that Order 39 Rule 2(A) of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) is not applicable in case of section 212 of the Act; no order was passed under Order 39 Rule 2 of the CPC. As such the petitioner cannot be punished either under Order 39 Rule 1 or in sub rule (2) of the C.P.C. Citing 1973 RRD 20 it was pleaded that even the concurrent findings of both the courts below can be set aside if they are illegal and against the evidence on record. The learned counsel prayed for quashing of both the judgments of courts below. 5. Countering the contentions of the petitioners, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners submitted that the order of status quo was passed as final order in the application under Section 212 of the Act with the mutual consent of both the parties on 28.9.1998; but on 29.3.2000 the petitioner Dauji and others defied the order of status quo and laid `patol' on the disputed land which amounts to clear disobedience and breach of the injunction order dated 28.9.1998 which is punishable under Order 39 Rule 2(A) of the C.P.C. The disobedience of the court order is proved by the witnesses of the non-petitioners (petitioners before the Sub-Divisional Officer). So there is nothing illegal in the impugned order of trial Court which is upheld by the Revenue Appellate Authority. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings which cannot be interfered with through a revision petition. So there is nothing illegal in the impugned order of trial Court which is upheld by the Revenue Appellate Authority. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings which cannot be interfered with through a revision petition. The learned counsel cited 1981 RRD 429 and 1980 RRD 637 in support of his contention. It was also pleaded that disobedience of an order under section 212 of the Act is punishable under Order 39 Rule 2(A) of the C.P.C., as held in AIR 1973 (Raj.) 201 . 6. I have given thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, perused the judgments of both the courts below and gone through the material on record. 7. It is undisputed that the petitioner is the khatedar tenant of the disputed land. The non-petitioners claimed right and interest in the disputed land on the basis of the `agreement to sale' allegedly made in their favour. Perusal of the file of the trial Court shows that Sub-Divisional Officer passed final order for maintaining status quo of the land while conclusively deciding an application filed under Section 212 of the Act. It has been held umpteen number of times by this Court that an order of status quo cannot be given as a final order by conclusively disposing of an application under Section 212 of the Act. An order under Section 212 of the Act has to be a specific order prohibiting commission or continuance of an act. Thus, the order dated 28.9.1998 for maintaining status quo of the land as final order under Section 212 of the Act is prima facie an illegal order as held in 1994 RRD 581. 8. Perusal of the record shows that the main suit was dismissed in default on 30.3.2000. However, it was restored on 1.4.2000. Neither party is aware whether this suit is still continuing or has ended. Nonetheless the suit stood dismissed on 30.3.2000 and 31.3.2000, until it was restored on 1.4.2000. Perusal of the statement of the witnesses of both the parties shows that whereas the petitioner (non-petitioner before Sub-Divisional Officer) claims laying `Patol' on 30.3.2000; the non-petitioners (petitioners before Sub-Divisional Officer) claim that `patol' was laid on 29.3.2000. In this regard, the petitioner had produced four witnesses and the non-petitioners produced three witnesses. Perusal of the statement of the witnesses of both the parties shows that whereas the petitioner (non-petitioner before Sub-Divisional Officer) claims laying `Patol' on 30.3.2000; the non-petitioners (petitioners before Sub-Divisional Officer) claim that `patol' was laid on 29.3.2000. In this regard, the petitioner had produced four witnesses and the non-petitioners produced three witnesses. It is worth-observing that PW.1 (non-petitioner No. 2) in his evidence has categorically stated that he was not present on the site when the alleged `patol' was laid on 29.3.2000. Besides it, PW.3, an independent witness Bantu Lal of the non-petitioners, stated that he was not sure of the exact date when the `patol' was laid. On the contrary, the witness DW-2 (Gopal) who himself laid the patol as labourer says that the `patol' was laid on 31.3.2000. His contention is corroborated by another witness Ram Singh (DW. 3) who himself laid `patol' as a labourer and who says in his statement that `patol was laid in 31.3.2000. Witness DW-4 Mahendra also says that `patol' was laid on 31.3.2000. Surprisingly both the courts below have utterly overlooked the statements of these witnesses DW.2 to DW 4. Evidently, it is clear that there is no conclusive and final proof that Patol was laid on 29.3.2000 as claimed by the non-petitioners. In a case like this where disobedience of an order of injunction is sought to be punished the proof of disobedience has to be established beyond an iota of doubt; whereas it is not so in this case. Apparently, both the concurrent judgments of courts below are against the evidence on record and as such can be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, the revision is allowed, the impugned judgment dated 1.8.2001 of Revenue Appellate Authority Sawai Madhopur and judgment dated 25.1.2001 of Sub-Divisional Officer Hindauncity are set aside. Pronounced.