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2010 DIGILAW 1529 (PNJ)

Dhup Singh v. Phulla Ram

2010-04-28

ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA, JASBIR SINGH, MUKUL MUDGAL

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Judgment Mukul Mudgal, J. 1. This reference to the Full Bench has arisen by virtue of an order dated 16.11.1987 passed by a Division Bench. The said referral order reads as follow:- "There is a clear cleavage of judicial opinion between the decisions of the two Division Benches reported as Suresh Chand and others v. Director of Panchayats, Haryana and others, 1 1979 P.L.J. 116 and Ram Saroop v. The Director of Panchayats Haryana, Chandigarh and others, 1983 P.L.J. 350, on the point as to whether before revoking a suspension order passed against a Panch or a Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat, it is necessary to hear the complainant on whose complaint the order of suspension has been passed. Admitted. We direct that the papers of this case be placed before Honble the Chief Justice for decision by a larger Bench." 2. The referral order shows that the issue referred to the Full Bench for consideration is as to whether before revoking a suspension order passed against a Panch or a Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat, it is necessary to hear the complainant on whose complaint the order of suspension had been passed?. 3. No one is present on behalf of the petitioner. However, we have gone through the judgments referred to in order dated 16.11.1987and the records of this case with the assistance of Mr. Randhir Singh, Addl. Advocate General, Haryana. On going through the judgments referred to in the reference order, we find that the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Saroop v. The Director of Panchayats Haryana, Chandigarh and others,1983 P.L.J. 350 does not have any essential difference of opinion with the view expressed in Suresh Chand and others v. Director of Panchayats, Haryana and others, 1979 P.L.J. (Pb&Hr) 116. The view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Saronp s case (supra) is that there is no necessity of giving an opportunity of hearing to the person who makes a complaint if the authority concerned wants to revoke its own earlier order based on the complaint because the complainant is merely an informant and cannot be party to a lis or an aggrieved party. The view taken by the Division Bench reads as under:- "Where information is given to the appropriate authority for taking action against a public servant and action is taken in pursuance of that information, we do not think that it is necessary to give an opportunity to the informant, if the authority concerned later wants to revoke its earlier order. The informant is no more than a mere informant and cannot be considered to be a party to the lis or an aggrieved party, on that account alone so as to entitle him to be heard before an order against the public servant is revoked. He is not in a better position that a person who gives information to the police about the commission of an offence. Such a person has no right to be heard, if no action is taken against the person against whom he gives information or if action is, taken initially and then dropped. We disagree with the view expressed in Gram Panchayat Kamalpur v. Deputy Commissioner, District Jind. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed." 4. In Suresh Kumars case (supra), the Division Bench held as under:- "There is yet another ground justifying the quashing of this order, that is, it was on the complaint of petitioner No. 1, that respondent No.2 had come to the conclusion as recorded in Annexure P-2. When the respondent No.l was to differ with Annexure P-2 so soon after its passing, the exigency of the situation and principles of natural justice and the principle laid down in Mange Rams case (supra) required that petitioner No. 1 should have been heard against the proposed order. Order Annexure P-3 is, therefore, quashed the above reasons" emphasis supplied, but the above view was in the facts and circumstances of the case particularly when the revocation of suspension was soon after passing the suspension order and not a view laying down law in general. The Honble Division Bench in Suresh Chands case has also held as under: - "Cases may not be wanting when the information may be incomplete and the Director may feel the necessity of a further probe into the matter, for which he may require the assistance of the complainant. In that case, he will have to hear the person supplying the information." 5. In that case, he will have to hear the person supplying the information." 5. The above observation made in Suresh Chands case (supra) regarding grant of hearing was in the context that where the Director felt that information supplied is incomplete for taking action in the matter and feels necessity of a further probe into the matter, the assistance of the complainant may be required. However, this hearing could only be at the discretion of the Director and not as a matter of right for the complainant. These observations of the Division Bench in no event can be construed as a difference of opinion with the view taken in Ram Saroop s case (supra) because these observations would show that where information is complete and no further assistance is required, opportunity of hearing to the complainant is not necessary to be granted while setting aside the order of suspension passed on Sarpanch or Panch and that order could be revoked by the Director on the basis of record available before him. Even the Division Bench in Suresh Kumars case (supra) has held that the proper remedy available for a complainant who has not been afforded opportunity of hearing is the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. In our view, giving an automatic opportunity to every complainant, would multiply the scope of litigation in Local Self Government issues arising from the concept of Panchayati Raj and such multifarious litigation could not be countenanced in matters relating to panchayat. The functioning of the Panchayat is required to be simple in nature so that the rural populace can easily understand its functioning. Introduction of various layers of intervention such as the hear ing to a complainant would obviate against simple and uncomplicated functioning of Panchayats. 6. Even if Suresh Chands case (supra) was construed to mean that the complainant was required to be heard prior to revocation of suspension, we are satisfied that for the aforesaid reasons Suresh Chands case does not lay down the correct position of law. 6. Even if Suresh Chands case (supra) was construed to mean that the complainant was required to be heard prior to revocation of suspension, we are satisfied that for the aforesaid reasons Suresh Chands case does not lay down the correct position of law. Accordingly, we fully agree with the view taken by a Division Bench of diis Court in Ram Sarups case (supra) and affirm the same holding that while revoking the order of suspension passed at the behest of a complainant, the complainant is not required to be heard and in case the complainant is aggrieved by what is perceived to be an unjust order of revocation, the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is always available to him. In so far as the present writ petition is concerned, the grievance raised therein with the passage of time has indeed been rendered infructuous because the term of the office of the Sarpanch/Panch had expired long ago and even the period for which he could be debarred in case of having been held guilty had also elapsed. Therefore, the writ petition is also dismissed as having become infructuous. The reference is ordered accordingly. Sd/- Ashutosh Mohunta, J. Sd/-Jasbir Singh, J. Petition dismissed