Judgment P.D. Kode, J. By present appeal, appellant/accused has thrown a challenge to judgment and order dated 12th November, 2003 convicting him for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentencing to suffer imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs.100/- (Rs. One Hundred only) and in default to undergo R.I. for one month, passed by learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur in Sessions Trial No.160/2002 of the said Court. 2. The said session case had arisen out of the charge sheet submitted by Karanja (Ghadge) Police Station on 29.07.2002 against the appellant for commission of such offence as a result of investigation of FIR No.74 of 2002 registered with the said police station upon report-cum-dying declaration Exh.39 of Lata, wife of appellant, recorded by PW4 H.C. Gopal Bhute at Rural Hospital, Karanja (Ghadge). PW4 was sent at the said place by PW3 ASI Arun Bhoyar on Station House duty at the said Police Station in view of receipt of letter dated 3.5.2002 (11.55 p.m.) Exh. 45 from PW5 Dr. Vidyanand Gaikwad on duty at said hospital that Lata Gajananrao Digrase has been brought to Hospital due to sustaining burn injuries of 56 %. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, as disclosed at a trial is as follows: The deceased Lata was legally wedded wife of the appellant with their marriage solemnized before about 7 years of the day of the incident. They were having two issues namely son Suraj, aged 6 years and daughter Ujwala, aged 3 years. The appellant suspecting fidelity of Lata was subjecting her to physical torture but she had continued to tolerate the same and was pulling with him. On 3.5.2002 after having dinner, said couple had been to bed at about 9 PM. As usual appellant had picked up quarrel with her on the count of her chastity as he was suspecting her fidelity. The appellant had started abusing her and all of sudden he had got up and brought plastic can containing kerosene from inside of the house and poured the same on her person and ignited match stick and set her ablaze. She had screamed for help and shouted "Wachwa Wachwa". Hearing her scream, neighbors had been to the said place. The appellant himself after extinguishing fire, had taken her to Primary Health Centre, Karanja (Ghadge) in a jeep of covillager one Virendra Wankhede. She had screamed for help and shouted "Wachwa Wachwa". Hearing her scream, neighbors had been to the said place. The appellant himself after extinguishing fire, had taken her to Primary Health Centre, Karanja (Ghadge) in a jeep of covillager one Virendra Wankhede. Lata was hospitalized at about 11.40 PM. PW4 H.C. Bhute deputed by PW3 Arun Bhoyar, after receipt of information about the said admission at the said hospital from PW 5 doctor on duty at the said hospital had been to the said place and had given requisition Exh. 41 to PW6 for ascertaining whether Lata was fit to make any statement. PW6 after examination had given certificate Exh. 41 P over said requisition that she was fit to make a statement and thereon PW4 had recorded her dying declaration Exh.42 of Lata in presence of PW6 implicating the appellant to the effect that during quarrel after dinner the appellant having brought a plastic can containing the kerosene and pouring same on her person, having ignited match stick and set her ablaze and thereafter neighbors having gathered after hearing her shouts and thereafter appellant himself having brought her in a jeep to the hospital. PW4 after reading the dying declaration recorded to the victim and herself admitting the same, had obtained her thumb impression upon the same and PW5 had given the certificate upon same. PW2 Radhakant Bar, Executive Magistrate also requisitioned vide requisition Exh.31 by the Police had been to the said place and had also recorded dying declaration Exh.33 in question and answer form of Lata in the prescribed format to the similar effect after PW6 had given certificate Exh.32 of herself being fit for making a statement. PW2 had also obtained her thumb impression Exh.33 upon the same. 4. PW 6 PSI Virendra Yadav had taken up the investigation of the said crime registered by PW 3 for commission of offence under section 307 of IPC. During the course of investigation he had drawn spot panchanama Exh.34. Under seizure memo Exh.35, he has seized plastic can, match-box from the spot while under seizure memo Exh.36 he had seized burnt pieces of clothes on the person of deceased and samples of earth and kerosene mixed earth under another seizure memo Exh.37. During the course of investigation he had drawn spot panchanama Exh.34. Under seizure memo Exh.35, he has seized plastic can, match-box from the spot while under seizure memo Exh.36 he had seized burnt pieces of clothes on the person of deceased and samples of earth and kerosene mixed earth under another seizure memo Exh.37. After recording the statements of witnesses and sending muddemal property to Chemical Analyser vide forwarding letter Exh.16 and arresting the accused under arrest form Exh.62 on 4.5.2002 and adding the offence u/s 302 of IPC to the crime registered after death of Lata having occurred in General Hospital Wardha on 28.5.2002 to which she was shifted for further treatment and completing the investigation, he had submitted charge sheet in the Court of JMFC, Karanja (Ghadge) as stated earlier. Upon committal of said case above stated sessions trial, was registered against the appellant. 5. The said trial was taken up by learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha who framed charge Exh.6 on 9.6.2003 against the appellant for commission of offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused had pleaded not guilty to the said charge vide his plea at Exh.7. 6. The prosecution at the trial had examined above referred 5 witnesses and additionally PW 1 panch witness for spot panchanama and seizure of articles. Needless to add that except PW1 who was required to be declared hostile, the rest of 5 witnesses had given evidence inconsonance with part played by them in said episode as described hereinabove. 7. It will not be out of place to state that defence had not disputed, certain aspects of the investigation effected and admitted certain documents i.e. report of police sending body of deceased for post-mortem Exh.12, post-mortem notes Exh.27, inquest panchanama effected Exh.21, spot panchanama Exh.34, seizure of plastic can and match-box Exh.35, seizure of burnt pieces of clothes of deceased Exh.36, seizure of earth sample Exh.37, requisition to Medical Officer for examination of appellant dated 4.5.2002 Exh.16, the medico legal certificate of examination of the appellant on 4.5.2002 Exh.17, map of place of occurrence at Exh.28. 8. The defence of the appellant was of total denial and of false implication. 8. The defence of the appellant was of total denial and of false implication. During the answers in his examination effected under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. the appellant had not taken any specific defence except stating that the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence being false but had not assigned any specific reason for witnesses having deposed falsely against him. 9. Thus prosecution case had mainly rested upon the evidence of PW 2 and PW 4 and the dying declaration recorded by each of them and corroborative evidence of PW 5 and that of the investigating officer PW 3, PW 6 and the documentary evidence corroborating the oral testimonies of these witnesses regarding sending/requisitioning then for recording dying declaration, endorsement made/certificate given by them and regarding the material collected during the investigation. The trial court accepted the evidence of PW2 and 4 and amongst other came to the conclusion of Exhs.33 and 42 being dying declarations of deceased Lata recorded by them being established by prosecution. It also came to the conclusion that deceased had died due to the burn injuries sustained by her due to herself being set on fire by the appellant after pouring kerosene on her person. 10. It also came to the conclusion that deceased had died due to the burn injuries sustained by her due to herself being set on fire by the appellant after pouring kerosene on her person. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant urged to allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court on the count of: a) the trial court having manifestly erred in coming to the conclusion of guilt of the appellant for the offence of murder being established on the basis of the dying declarations relied, b) the dying declaration recorded by PW 2 suffers from serious infirmities as PW 2 in his evidence has admitted that Exh.31 requisition received by him was not containing any reference about the fitness, c) the dying declaration recorded by PW 4 bears only the endorsement 'fit for statement' and fitness and the person making a statement being conscious being altogether different things and the same indicating of PW 4 having recorded the same without bothering for the said aspect, d) thus so called dying declaration relied by the trial court cannot be regarded as trustworthy dying declaration made by the deceased while being conscious and fit to make a statement, e) both the said dying declarations do not inspire confidence and deserve to be discarded and consequently there being no other evidence to link the appellant with the offence for which he is convicted he deserves to be acquitted, f) the learned counsel in the alternative urged that even accepting the said dying declaration as it is and after taking into following circumstances which were missed/ignored by the trial court, the offence would fall under Section 304 Part (I) or 304 Part (II) of IPC, (i) FIR/dying declaration lodged/recorded by PW 4 itself reveals that the appellant had immediately brought her and admitted in Rural Hospital. (ii) the dying declaration recorded by PW 2 at Exh.33 also reveals that he had admitted the deceased to Rural Hospital at Karanja. (iii) the accused had also suffered from burn injury indicating that he had extinguished fire. (iv) the prosecution evidence itself reveals that the act committed by the accused was as a fall out of a quarrel occurred in between appellant and his wife and was not any preplanned calculated act. (iii) the accused had also suffered from burn injury indicating that he had extinguished fire. (iv) the prosecution evidence itself reveals that the act committed by the accused was as a fall out of a quarrel occurred in between appellant and his wife and was not any preplanned calculated act. (v) the reason behind the said quarrel was doubt entertained by the appellant regarding chasisty of his wife. (vi) such a doubt true or even false for any married man was sufficient for loosing balance and being prey of impulse. (vii) thus considering the reason because of which the act had occurred at the hands of accused and his reaction immediately thereafter of taking his wife to the Rural Hospital clearly indicates that the appellant was not at all entertaining any intention to kill his wife and he had immediately made effort to save her life. (viii) the deceased had sustained only 56 % burn injuries. (ix) the death of the deceased has not occurred immediately. (x) the deceased has succumbed to the death due to septicemia and that too after about 22 days of the incident. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance upon the following decisions:- i) Bhimrao Harbaji Gedam vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. 550 , ii) Deorao s/o Sonbaji Bhalerao & Anr .vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1921, iii) Maroti s/o Kashinath Jadhav and ors. .vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 3301. 12. The learned APP supported the impugned judgment and order and submitted that the evidence on record clearly makes out a case of accused having committed murder of the deceased. He urged that the evidence of PW 2 and PW 4 inspires confidence in view of the same being supported by corroborative evidence and the same clearly establishes that Exh.33 and Exh.42 are true, voluntary and reliable dying declarations made by the deceased and properly recorded by them. He urged that acceptance of the said dying declaration clearly establishes of the appellant having burnt his wife by bringing can and pouring kerosene on her person. He urged that considering matters from said dying declarations the same clearly reveals that during quarrel itself the appellant had not committed the said act and had taken the said decision after passage of some time. He urged that considering matters from said dying declarations the same clearly reveals that during quarrel itself the appellant had not committed the said act and had taken the said decision after passage of some time. He states that subsequent conduct of the appellant or other circumstances pointed by learned counsel for appellant are not sufficient to drive to the conclusion as canvassed by him. He urged that merely appellant had taken victim to the hospital will not absolve him from the liability of heinous act committed by him. He urged that that the appellant being grown up person was fully aware about the consequences likely to be ensued from the act committed by him and as such he is guilty for the offence of murder and has been rightly convicted by the trial court and hence appeal preferred by him deserves to be dismissed. 13. We have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by both the parties and carefully perused the record and the decisions pointed. 14. Apart from the learned counsel for the appellant having not disputed the deceased having died due to burn injuries sustained by her in the house at night the said facet has been otherwise established by overwhelming evidence on record in a shape of the evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4,PW5 and PW6 corroborated by documentary evidence referred hereinabove which is also again not disputed by the appellant. Thus in light of submissions canvassed the only question which arises in the present appeal is "whether the accused was responsible for the incident which had occurred in the said night in which deceased had sustained burn injuries and if so, then what offence he had committed". In order to determine the same, it will be necessary to scrutinize the prosecution evidence regarding said aspect which is mainly in the nature of dying declarations of deceased Lata recorded by PW2 and PW4. 15. Considering the evidence of PW2, the same reveals that after receipt of requisition Exh.31 from Police, he had been to the Rural Hospital at Karanja at which victim Lata was admitted and he had inquired with Medical Officer (PW5) whether she was able to make dying declaration and for offering his remarks to that effect. 15. Considering the evidence of PW2, the same reveals that after receipt of requisition Exh.31 from Police, he had been to the Rural Hospital at Karanja at which victim Lata was admitted and he had inquired with Medical Officer (PW5) whether she was able to make dying declaration and for offering his remarks to that effect. It discloses that in his presence PW5 had examined deceased and issued certificate at Exh.P-32 that she was fit for making a statement upon the letter given by PW2 to him. It also discloses that thereafter he had started recording dying declaration of deceased on 4.5.2002 at about 3.45 a.m. and had made a query with her regarding her name and she had disclosed her full name. PW2 had asked her as to where she was residing and what was her occupation and she had disclosed that she was residing at Godhani and her occupation was agricultural labourer. Thereafter PW2 had asked about the place of occurrence and she had replied that the incident had taken place at her residence. She had made a statement that her husband used to abuse her in filthy language and on 3.5.2002 at about 9 p.m. he had poured kerosene on her person and ignited her by match stick and set her on fire. PW2 has categorically deposed that he had recorded declaration of Lata as per her version and had read over the same to her and asked her whether the same was correct or otherwise and she had replied in affirmative. Since she could not sign, he had obtained her thumb impression upon the same and Exh.33 before the Court being said dying declaration. He had further deposed that he has completed recording of her dying declaration at about 4 p.m. and at that time PW5 Medical Officer Shri Gaikwad was present and he had examined her and submitted that right from beginning of recording of her statement till completion thereof, she was fit to make a statement and had accordingly issued the certificate. 16. 16. Now carefully scrutinizing the evidence of PW2 in the light of the answers elicited in the cross-examination, the same does not reveal any of them having the effect of shaking core of his testimony i.e. he had been for recording of dying declaration and has recorded the same in a manner as disclosed from his evidence and Exh.33 being the said dying declaration. The close scrutiny of his evidence reveals that except bringing on the record regarding the query made by him to PW5 whether deceased was mentally fit to make a statement, being not found supported by such an endorsement given by PW5 and same being only to the effect of 'mentally fit', nothing significant has been brought on the record for not accepting his evidence. No much credence can be given to the said aspect brought on the record after considering circumstances in which opinion of Medical Officer was sought. Similarly Medical Officer certifying fit to make a statement will be inclusive of the fact of herself being mentally fit. It can be further added that hardly anything otherwise has been brought on record by defence. Thus having regard to the evidence of PW2 in the entirety, it can be safely said that the same deserves to be accepted as the same is found to be corroborated by the evidence of PW5 and so also endorsement made by him and so also by Exh.33 itself recorded by PW2. Apart from the aforesaid, the evidence of PW2 also does not reveal any plausible reason for falsely deposing against accused. 17. Now taking up the evidence of PW4 regarding the recording of other dying declaration, the same reveals that after receipt of letter from Rural Hospital Karanja (Ghadge), PW3 had deputed him for recording dying declaration of deceased. He had been to said hospital and inquired with Medical Officer (PW5) whether deceased was in a position to make any statement. After endorsement Exh.P-41 made by PW5 to the effect that she was in a position to make a statement, he had recorded dying declaration of deceased in presence of PW5 as per her say, read over it to her and herself having admitted same to be correct. After endorsement Exh.P-41 made by PW5 to the effect that she was in a position to make a statement, he had recorded dying declaration of deceased in presence of PW5 as per her say, read over it to her and herself having admitted same to be correct. The deceased had put her thumb impression on dying declaration and he also signed on it and PW5 Medical Officer also signed the same of having recorded the said dying declaration in his presence. PW4 stated that deceased had made a dying declaration to the effect that her husband casting aspersions on her fidelity had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire by igniting match stick. He had vouched Exh. P-42 being the said declaration of the deceased and the same was bearing her thumb impression, signature of PW4 and so also signature of PW5 Doctor. His further evidence also discloses of having issued requisition for medical examination of Lata and for her treatment and so also the requisition to Executive Magistrate, Karanja to record dying declaration of injured Lata. His further evidence relates to production of the dying declaration at the Police Station and registration of offence against the appellant and filling and signing of proforma FIR. 18. Close scrutiny of evidence of PW4 reveals that he has not mentioned in dying declaration Exh.P-42 that he had inquired with Lata whether she was knowing and able to speak Marathi language i.e. as claimed by him during the evidence, having regard to the fact that dying declaration of Lata was recorded in Marathi and nothing has surfaced on the record that she was not knowing Marathi, it is difficult to give any significance to the said aspect. Needless to add that language being a mode of communication on the backdrop of dying declaration being recorded in Marathi, it will be difficult to perceive that it was necessary for PW4 to mention such a fact in the dying declaration. Similarly hardly any foundation or support is found to the suggestion put to PW4 that dying declaration was recorded by him falsely in the cabin of PW5 Dr. Gaikwad, which was duly denied by PW4. The further cross-examination of PW4 effected also does not reveal any other material being brought on record except putting the suggestions which were also denied by PW4. 19. Gaikwad, which was duly denied by PW4. The further cross-examination of PW4 effected also does not reveal any other material being brought on record except putting the suggestions which were also denied by PW4. 19. Thus scrutiny of the evidence does not reveal the claim staked by him being shattered or rendered unsustainable by bringing any material on the record. On the contrary the same has been found well corroborated by various documents referred by him during his evidence i.e. requisition given by him, endorsement made by doctors and furthermore by the dying declaration Exh.42 recorded by him. 20. In the context of the evidence of PW4, the learned counsel for the appellant has also tried to make a grievance on the basis of the decisions in the case of Deorao vs. State of Maharashtra and Maroti Kashinath Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra ( supra) to contend that on the basis of the said decisions the evidence of PW4 is liable to be rejected. After carefully considering the said decisions and true import of the same and fact that the oral testimony of PW4 in term discloses the vital part of dying declaration recorded by him of Lata having made a dying declarations that her husband casting aspersions on her fidelity had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire by igniting match stick, it is difficult to accept that ratio of the said decisions would be of any assistance to learned counsel for appellant for supporting such submission the appellant i.e. his evidence fails to establish of deceased having made a dying declaration to him and Exh.42 being the same. Thus in short as that of PW2, the evidence of PW4 also inspire a confidence and also establishes of the deceased having made a dying declaration as claimed by him. 21. Thus in short as that of PW2, the evidence of PW4 also inspire a confidence and also establishes of the deceased having made a dying declaration as claimed by him. 21. Having considered the evidence of the witnesses who had recorded the dying declarations of Lata and their claim considered in light of the dying declarations recorded by them being found sustainable inspiring confidence, now turning to the evidence of PW5 doctor who had also played a role in recording the said dying declaration and without unnecessarily reciting his evidence in entirety, it can be safely said that perusal of his evidence also reveals that the claim stated by him being in consonance with the claim staked by PW2 and PW4 i.e. both of them at time as claimed by them having approached him for recording dying declaration of Lata admitted in the hospital at which he was on duty. Needless to add that amongst other main aspect his evidence clearly establishes that on each occasion after examining Lata he had made the necessary endorsements and allowed both of them to record the dying declarations in his presence. His evidence is also found corroborated by the endorsement/certificates given by him upon the respective dying declaration and/or upon requisition letter. 22. The scrutiny of the evidence of PW5 also reveals that though he was extensively cross-examined on behalf of the appellant, hardly any significant material has been brought on record either shattering claim staked by him during the evidence and/or having any adverse effect upon the claim regarding the relevant respect staked by PW2 and PW4. Though it is true that initially PW5 after admitting that the appellant had brought Lata to the hospital had denied of having examined the appellant after being confronted with medico legal certificate Exh.17 had admitted of having examined him and also having found appellant having sustained injuries. The said aspect considered in proper perspective also adds ring of a truth to the evidence of PW5. Needless to add that considering the number of patients required to be examined by the doctors at Government Hospital, merely because of the denial earlier made PW5 of not having examined the conclusion is not warranted that he was trying to suppress the said aspect. 23. The same is the case regarding the cross-examination of PW5 effected regarding history about injuries caused to Lata given to him. 23. The same is the case regarding the cross-examination of PW5 effected regarding history about injuries caused to Lata given to him. Needless to add that even the history being given to PW5 by relatives of the appellant and not by the appellant in spite of PW5 having asked him is also a factor consistent with the matters revealed from the dying declaration. Even the answers given by PW5 regarding having made an endorsement for referring her to Government Medical Hospital, Nagpur considered alongwith with further answers given by him in the said respect amongst other of herself being not shifted to said hospital immediately as her relatives were not ready also does not lead to the conclusion of Lata after admission being not in a position to make a statement. 24. Similarly PW5 having admitted of having injected pathadrin 2 cc, to Lata but having denied further suggestion that because of the same patient will become drowsy, also does not lead to the conclusion of Lata then being not conscious or being not in a position to make a statement. Similarly the submission of learned counsel for the appellant of PW5 having endorsed/certified 'fit to make statement' or having not whispered about her consciousness and both said things being different, clearly appears to be an attempt to make mountain out of mole as the said submission is made by ignoring vital aspect of opinion of a Medical person was sought in respect of burnt lady, obviously for recording her dying declaration. 25. Thus considering the evidence of PW5 in entirety and considering the same in light of documentary evidence such as endorsement made by him upon dying declaration recorded or endorsement made upon requisition for same and dying declarations and the evidence of PW2 and PW4, it can be safely said that evidence of all the said witnesses corroborates evidence of each other upon the relevant aspects and their oral testimonies are again found corroborated by documentary evidence. Thus careful reappraisal of the entire evidence does not reveal any circumstance having surfaced on the record during evidence of any of these witnesses having any reason to falsely implicate the appellant by staking false claim of Lata having made dying declaration as established by the said evidence and/or Exhs. 33 and 42 being the dying declarations of Lata respectively recorded by PW2 and PW4. 33 and 42 being the dying declarations of Lata respectively recorded by PW2 and PW4. Needless to add that the said evidence clinchingly establishes of Lata having made such dying declarations and matters from the same clearly establishes accused/appellant being responsible for causing her burn injuries by pouring kerosene on her person. 26. Now with regard to further submission of learned counsel for the appellant that even in event of acceptance of said dying declarations; the matters from the same do not disclose commission of the offence of murder and/or the same discloses only the commission of offence under Section 304 Part I or Part II of IPC in light of other facts and circumstances of the case, we find substance in his submission that the act committed by the appellant was an out come of his suspicion about fidelity of wife. We also find substance in further submission that the said act was fall out of the quarrel on the said count ensued in between the couple in the said night. Having regard to the said aspects, merely because the said act had occurred not during the quarrel but sometime thereafter will not lead to the conclusion that while committing the same the appellant was not acting under the impulse of moment i.e. said quarrel as tried to be canvassed by learned APP. 27. Having regard to the said aspect and the subsequent conduct of the appellant of taking his wife immediately to the hospital and in the said process of extinguishing fire having sustained some injuries, are also reflective of himself not entertaining an intention to cause murder of his wife. In the said context considering the place at which the accused had committed the said act, it is difficult for us to accept the submission of learned APP that since after quarrel after some time accused had brought a can and poured kerosene reveals that he had acted in preplanned manner and thus had committed the murder. We are also unable to accept the submission that subsequent conduct of the appellant was an afterthought for wriggling out the situation occurred. 28. We are also unable to accept the submission that subsequent conduct of the appellant was an afterthought for wriggling out the situation occurred. 28. However, considering the nature of the act committed by the appellant i.e. user of kerosene, lighting the match stick, deceased having suffered 56 % burn injuries, the same is sufficient to indicate that thereby the appellant was entertaining an intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. In view of the same the act committed by the appellant would be squarely covered within Section 304(I) of IPC. Now para 11 of the judgment in the case of Bhimrao Harbaji Gedam vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) reads thus: "The question which remains to be determined is whether the act of the appellant would fall under Section 304 Part I or Part II of the Indian Penal Code. There can be no manner of doubt that the act of the appellant was otherwise imminently dangerous and would, in all probability, likely to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The knowledge that, by his act, the appellant was likely to cause the death or such bodily injury, as is likely to cause death, has to be attributed to the appellant even though he was stated to be drunk at the time of the incident. The offence in question would, therefore, fall under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold the appellant guilty for the offence under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code." (emphasis supplied) 29. It is true that in the said decision in light of the facts and circumstances, this Court had come to the conclusion of the said appellant having been guilty for commission of offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of I.P.C. The said ratio will not be applicable in the instant case because in a case pointed deceased herself had poured kerosene on her person and the appellant had thereafter lit the fire. In the present case appellant having poured kerosene and so also lit the fire, would definitely add to the gravity of the act committed by him and the offence committed by him would be under Section 304 Part I of IPC. 30. In the present case appellant having poured kerosene and so also lit the fire, would definitely add to the gravity of the act committed by him and the offence committed by him would be under Section 304 Part I of IPC. 30. In the result, therefore, conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC is quashed and set aside. The appellant is convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of IPC. Considering the facts and circumstances relevant to the offence committed, we are of the opinion that sentence of R.I. for 10 years with a fine of Rs.1,000/-(Rs. One Thousand) in default to undergo further R.I. for 3 months would be an appropriate sentence for the same and appellant/accused stands sentenced accordingly. Appellant is entitled for set off the period of imprisonment already undergone in terms of Section 428 of Cr.P.C. The order passed by the trial Court in so far as muddemal property is concerned is maintained. 31. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.