JUDGMENT : In present petition filed as writ petition under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, Petitioner Plaintiff has challenged the order dated 15/2/2010 passed below Ex. 101 by Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Warud, rejecting his application to transfer Regular Civil Suit No. 119/2000 filed by him for specific performance along with counterclaim of Defendants for his eviction, for possession and damages to the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati. The transfer is sought by pointing out claim in suit valued at Rs.70,600/-and claim in counterclaim valued at Rs.40,000/- being above Rs. One lac, exceed the pecuniary jurisdiction of court of Junior Division. Trial Court has found that immovable property involved in specific performance and in eviction or recovery of possession proceedings is same and can not be clubbed or added again to determine its jurisdiction. Notice for final disposal is already issued by this Court. Hence, heard finally by making Rule returnable forthwith. 2. Advocate Deshpande has relied upon AIR 2007 Ker.69 "Pampara Philip v. Koorithottiyil Kinhimohammed", and the decision of Hon'ble Full Bench of that Court in A. Z. Mohammed Farooq v. State Government, reported in AIR 1984 Ker. 126 . He has pointed out the observations of Hon'ble Full Bench to show that claims in suit and counterclaim need to be added together to find out the subject matter of suit and on it depends the pecuniary valuation relevant for deciding the pecuniary jurisdiction. Application at Exh.101 for transferring the suit filed before trial court and at annexure “A” before this Court effectively discloses his line of argument. Advocate Malode has relied upon Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn. (2009) 8 SCC 646 to contend that right of appeal and act of filing suit or counterclaim stand on entirely different footing. He has supported the impugned order. Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn. (supra) deals with vested right of appeal and states that a plaintiff in a suit has a vested right of appeal. The said right is determined keeping in view the date of filing of the suit. Such a right of appeal can be taken away by express provision. With respect, I find that this ruling does not lay down any law relevant for present controversy. 3. The said right is determined keeping in view the date of filing of the suit. Such a right of appeal can be taken away by express provision. With respect, I find that this ruling does not lay down any law relevant for present controversy. 3. In "Pampara Philip v. Koorithottiyil Kinhimohammed", supra, relied upon by Advoate Deshpande, O.8, R.6A(1), O.20, R.19(2), S.13 of CPC are considered. Facts disclose that there the counter claim by defendant was dismissed and plaint claim was allowed. It is held by learned Single Judge that the defendant need not file separate appeal but Single Appeal before High Court challenging both findings is maintainable. It is held that suit and counter claim in proceedings being unified proceeding, valuation of appeal would be combination of suit plus counterclaim. In para 5 of this ruling, the decision of Hon'ble Full Bench of that Court reported in A.Z. Mohammed Farooq v. State Government (supra) and also relied upon before me is looked into. Appeal filed in High Court and considered by Full Bench there was by plaintiff challenging the grant of counterclaim of the defendant. Defendant challenged the forum and raised a contention that forum for appeal was to be ascertained on the basis of plaint claim. But in that case the subject-matter of the counterclaim itself exceeded Rs. 10,000/-and therefore the Full Bench did not decide the question. The Hon'ble Full Bench considers the implication of Order VIII, Rule 6A to 6G and in paragraph 17 refers to the fact that the counterclaim should be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints. In paragraph 18 it is observed that "having regard to the aforesaid provisions, it is possible to hold that the 'subject-matter' of the suit would be the aggregate of the amounts claimed on the plaint and in the written statement by way of counterclaim". Therefore, the subject-matter of an appeal to be preferred under Section 52 of the Court Fees Act, is held to be the aggregate of the amounts claimed on the plaint and written statement to govern the appellate jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Full Bench also considers the judgment of Hon'ble Madras High Court pressed into service by Petitioner before me. Therefore, the subject-matter of an appeal to be preferred under Section 52 of the Court Fees Act, is held to be the aggregate of the amounts claimed on the plaint and written statement to govern the appellate jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Full Bench also considers the judgment of Hon'ble Madras High Court pressed into service by Petitioner before me. The question whether suit claim and counterclaim are independent proceedings or unified proceedings is considered in T. K. V. S. Vidyapoornachary Sons v. M. R. Krishnamachary, AIR 1983 Mad 291 . Hon'ble Full Bench has borrowed following portion of Madras judgment which reads as follows : "Order 8, Rule 6A speaks of a counterclaim as a plaint in one place and as a cross-claim in another place. Nevertheless, in its most operative provision, it lays down that the Court shall pronounce a single judgment in the suit, both on the original claim and on the counterclaim. The susceptibility of a counterclaim to be dealt with in a single judgment along with a suit claim, runs counter to the idea of the two being regarded as things apart. It is not merely that the Code provides for a single judgment to dispose of, at one stroke, the suit claim as well as a counterclaim, like hitting two birds with one stone. But Rule 6C specifically lays down a special procedure to separate the suit claim from the counterclaim, wherever the separation is called for. This provision emphasises by implication that as a general rule a suit claim and a counterclaim ought properly to be regarded as constituting a unified proceeding. The rule, however, makes for an exception, and it is this; should the plaintiff in a given case desire that the counterclaim filed by the defendant in answer to his suit claim be dealt with as a separate suit in itself, he ought to apply for that relief before the trial Court and it should be done before the issues are settled. On his application for amending his suit claim and the counterclaim, the Court will have to consider whether the counterclaim should be dealt with as part and parcel of the suit or whether the defendant should be referred to a separate suit. These exceptional provisions in Rule 6C only illustrate the homogeneity of the suit claim and the counterclaim as a single proceeding". 4. These exceptional provisions in Rule 6C only illustrate the homogeneity of the suit claim and the counterclaim as a single proceeding". 4. These observations also, therefore, do not show that if such counterclaim is separated, it can not be tried separately by same court which is adjudicating claim of plaintiff. On the contrary scheme in Order VIII Rule 6A clearly shows that such counterclaim has to fall within pecuniary jurisdiction of the court whose jurisdiction is invoked by plaintiff. It is nowhere even the attempt of defendant in both Kerala matters to demonstrate that because of his/its counterclaim, trial court seized to possess that pecuniary jurisdiction. Such an attempt is being made by the present Petitioner plaintiff. Both the judgments of Hon'ble Kerala High Court consider dispute about forum for filing of an appeal under S. 96 CPC and not the competency of trial court to adjudicate such unified proceedings. Before the learned Single Judge challenge by the defendant was to decree in favour of plaintiff and also dismissal of his counterclaim. Thus both challenges required an independent application of mind by the appellate court. In matter before the Hon'ble Full Bench, valuation of counterclaim itself exceeded pecuniary jurisdiction for appeal in District Court. 5. As the view of Hon'ble Kerala High Court has been pressed into service before me, I find it proper to mention that in 2007(6) Mah.L.J. 127 = 2007 (7) LJSOFT 139 Teofilo Barreto Vs. Sadashiva G. Nasnodkar and Ors., this Court through its Single Judge has found valuation of plaint by plaintiff only determinative of the appellate forum. Section 22 of the Goa Civil Courts Act, 1965, is construed there and it is parimateria with S.26 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869. That Section 22 reads: “In all suits decided by a Civil Judge of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds (one lakh) the appeal from his decision shall be direct to the High Court.” Section 26 of the Bombay Act reads : "26. In all suits decided by a Civil Judge of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds two lakhs rupees the appeal from his decision shall be directed to the High Court." Words "Subject matter" appearing in S. 22 are held to necessarily mean subject matter of the suit and not subject matter of the appeal. In all suits decided by a Civil Judge of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds two lakhs rupees the appeal from his decision shall be directed to the High Court." Words "Subject matter" appearing in S. 22 are held to necessarily mean subject matter of the suit and not subject matter of the appeal. The jurisdiction of the appellate court is found not dependent on the fluctuating valuation of the claim in appeal. The valuation of claim in appeal is held to have relevance only for the purposes of court fee. The valuation for the purposes of determining jurisdiction and for the purpose of court fee are two distinct factors. They need not be identical or common. The Original plaintiff there preferred an appeal being aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit and he was not aggrieved by the dismissal of the counterclaim. He, therefore, valued subject-matter in appeal as per the valuation done in the trial court. The view reiterated by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kazi Syed Saifuddin Vs. Kasturchand Abhayrajji Golchha reported in 2000 (12) LJSOFT 13 : 2000 (4) Bom.C.R. 582 has been followed to hold that the valuation of the suit determines the forum of the appeal and not the valuation of decree. Principle that the forum for appeal is to be ascertained upon the value as adjudicated by the court is stated to be not accepted by majority of the High Courts. Where both suit and counterclaim are dismissed, this Court has held that plaintiff cannot be made to value his appeal on the basis of the combined valuation of the plaint and counterclaim, in respect of which he makes no claim. As plaint was valued at Rs.38,500/-, appeal filed before the District Court was held proper. Counter claim filed by Petitioner-defendant claiming damages to the tune of Rs.90,00,000/-was dismissed there. He filed cross objection under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC valuing it at Rs.90,00,000/-. It is also held that since the cross-objection is preferred in the appeal which is properly filed in the District Court, the cross-objection of the petitioner will have to be decided by the same appellate court only. He filed cross objection under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC valuing it at Rs.90,00,000/-. It is also held that since the cross-objection is preferred in the appeal which is properly filed in the District Court, the cross-objection of the petitioner will have to be decided by the same appellate court only. The legislative object behind enactment of provision of Order 20 Rule 19(2) of the Code, Section 216 of the old Code of C.P.C. 1882 (Act No.14 of 1882), its substitution with that of Order 20 Rule 19(2) to give effect to the legislative view that all appeals from the decree relating to set off should lie to the court to which appeals in respect of the original claim would lie and then new unamended CPC have been looked into. Further legislative change brought about in new CPC in the year 1976 by inserting provisions with respect to counterclaim under Order 8 Rule 6A to 6G & consequent to this insertion of words "counter claim" immediately after the words "set off" in Order 20 Rule 19(1), (2) is also taken note of. As such decree passed in a suit where counterclaim is preferred is held subject to the same provisions in respect of appeal to which it would have been subject, if no counterclaim had been preferred. As an extension of the same principle, the cross objection arising from the decree of setoff and/or counterclaim has also been given similar treatment in the matter of determination of Appellate Forum by this Court. It is however important to note that above mentioned view of Hon'ble Kerala High Court has not been noticed there. 6. In present matter I am concerned with valuation of suit only in which a valid counterclaim is raised. The counterclaim is essentially correlated with plaint claim and also at times warrants adjudication as an independent suit. Legislature has found it necessary to have such separate trial of counterclaim by same court. Hence, this ceiling on and reference of pecuniary jurisdiction in proviso to O. VIII R.6A to see that by filing a counterclaim, the defendant does not oust the jurisdiction of trial court approached by the plaintiff. Said proviso does not envisage a counterclaim only for balance of pecuniary jurisdiction of concerned court left unexhausted by the plaintiff or only if it is so left unexhausted. Said proviso does not envisage a counterclaim only for balance of pecuniary jurisdiction of concerned court left unexhausted by the plaintiff or only if it is so left unexhausted. If arguments of Petitioner are to be accepted, it would be rewriting the legal provisions in O.VIII R.6A,CPC. Pecuniary jurisdiction is required to be satisfied independently by claim made in plaint and claim raised in counterclaim. Court fee is also required to be paid separately on both. There is no question of clubbing both together for said purpose. 7. Same immovable property forms subject matter of suit for specific performance instituted by Petitioner and of counterclaim lodged by Respondents for recovery of possession and damages by evicting him i.e. Petitioner. Had Respondents filed a separate Suit (instead of counterclaim) it would have been tried by Civil Judge, Junior Division at Warud only as within its pecuniary jurisdiction. Consolidation of such separately instituted suit with his suit for specific performance also would not have enabled Petitioner Plaintiff to urge that valuation of subject matter has doubled or increased. Suits whether separate or in the shape of suit and counterclaim relate to same immovable property. Trial Court has rightly appreciated the situation. There is no jurisdictional error or perversity. Petition is, therefore, without any merit and no case is made out necessitating interference by this Court. 8. Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.