Sudesha Malik Aged About 52 Years v. State of U. P. Through Its Pirncipal Secy Panchyati Raj
2010-05-11
PRADEEP KANT, SHABIHUL HASNAIN
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
Hon'ble Shabihul Hasnain, J.:- The petitioner was elected unopposed as Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat, Muzaffarnagar on 7.1.06. She was administered oath of office on 14.1.06. 2. The petitioner challenges the order dated 4.9.08, by means of which she has been issued a show cause notice by the State Government for holding a formal enquiry against her and also in the meantime ceasing her powers, both administrative and financial till she is exonerated of the charges and in her place a three-member Committee has been constituted for looking after the affairs of Zila Panchayat. 3. The petitioner challenges the aforesaid order on mala fides and the same having been passed in violation of principles of natural justice and also on the ground that the charges levelled are non-existent and from the own findings of the enquiry officer, as compared to the charge to which she was required to reply, no charge can be said to be even, prima facie, proved, though by twisting the charge, she has been indicted and for the same reason, the impugned order has been passed. 4. In support of the plea of mala fide, it has been asserted that she belongs to political party 'Lokdal' and since after the elections of the Legislative Assembly, Bahujan Samaj Party came in absolute majority, who formed government sometimes in 2007, every effort is being made since then to oust the petitioner from the elected office, which is also evident from the fact that a complaint was made by the Member of Legislative Assembly of the ruling party, who addressed the same to the Minister of Panchayati Raj, without there being any affidavit in support thereof, only with the affidavits of those members of Zila Panchayat who were said to be the source of information alleging the irregularities and illegalities committed by the petitioner. The contents of all these four affidavits of the members of Zila Panchayat are same in verbatim except that of Sudesh Pal Singh, which included the charge of auction of Pashu Peth (cattle market). 5.
The contents of all these four affidavits of the members of Zila Panchayat are same in verbatim except that of Sudesh Pal Singh, which included the charge of auction of Pashu Peth (cattle market). 5. Further case of the petitioner is, that the impugned order was signed on 4.9.08 but before the said date i.e. on 3.9.08, public statement was made by the local MLA, owing allegiance to Bahujan Samaj Party, that the administrative and financial powers of the petitioner have been ceased and the said news was published in local daily on 4.9.08, i.e. the date on which the order was actually passed, which shows that the impugned order was passed for political reasons, which is a pre-determined order, as otherwise there was no occasion for the announcement being made by the political leader belonging to Bahujan Samaj Party on 3.9.08, which was reflected in the newspapers on 4.9.08 in the morning itself, even before the order was passed. The order was passed by the time when the announcement was made nor till the news was sent to the press. 6. The local MLA Sri Balbir Singh elected on the ticket of Bahujan Samaj Party made a complaint on 25.3.08 to institute an enquiry in regard to the alleged irregularities committed by the petitioner in her capacity as Zila Panchayat Adhyaksha. Alongwith this complaint, affidavits of five members of Zila Panchayat, Muzaffarnagar were annexed. This complaint/letter was addressed by the MLA Sri Balbir Singh to the Minister for Panchayati Raj, wherein it was mentioned that he is informed by the affidavits filed that the Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat has committed gross irregularities in the matter of development works, construction of road, Pashu Peth and in the grant of contract etc. and has spent lot of money in the construction of her official residence, ignoring the requirements of public. 7. On receipt of the said complaint, the State Government directed the District Magistrate to make an enquiry in terms of Rule 4 sub-clause (1) of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayats and Zila Panchayats (Removal of Pramukhs, Up-Pramukhs, Adhyakshas and Upadhyakshas) Enquiry Rules, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1997, and to submit the enquiry report. 8.
7. On receipt of the said complaint, the State Government directed the District Magistrate to make an enquiry in terms of Rule 4 sub-clause (1) of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayats and Zila Panchayats (Removal of Pramukhs, Up-Pramukhs, Adhyakshas and Upadhyakshas) Enquiry Rules, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1997, and to submit the enquiry report. 8. The aforesaid letter dated 11.4.08 specifically says that in view of the affidavits filed by Smt. Mamta Verma, Smt. Suman Devi, Smt. Amita Singh, Sri Sudesh Pal Singh and Smt. Rani Saini, Members, Zila Panchayat, Muzaffarnagar, enquiry be conducted and report be submitted. 9. It is to be taken note of, that this letter does not show nor did indicate that any complaint was filed by these persons, who have given affidavits in accordance with Rule 3 sub-clause (2), which requires the filling of an affidavit duly verified before a notary. 10. It is also established from the record that Sri Balbir Singh, MLA, who forwarded the said affidavits and has apparently made the complaint, did not file his affidavit nor his application/letter was filed in accordance with the provision of Rule 3, as it was neither supported by any affidavit of his own nor the said letter which has been treated as complaint, was verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as required under Rule 3 sub-clauses (2) and (3). 11. The petitioner was issued a show cause notice by the District Magistrate on 17.5.08 requiring her to submit explanation to the charges, which have emerged from the complaints within one week. The notice aforesaid mentioned that affidavits of members of Zila Panchayat, Muzaffarnagar have been received, giving their names and the date of affidavits, which make out following charges, which the petitioner need to reply.
The notice aforesaid mentioned that affidavits of members of Zila Panchayat, Muzaffarnagar have been received, giving their names and the date of affidavits, which make out following charges, which the petitioner need to reply. (i) The petitioner has been charging/realising 40 to 45% commission in the construction of roads and other construction activities; (ii) The petitioner gave contract of construction works to her favoured persons, who used substandard material in the said construction works and, therefore, the roads constructed became very bad within three months; (iii) The petitioner instead of looking to the convenience of the public, is spending money upon her own luxuries and has spent huge amount in her official residence; and (iv) The petitioner's husband perform all her official works through her forged signatures and also uses her office portraying himself as Adhyaksha. 12. These were the common charges which were mentioned in all the five affidavits of Smt. Mamta Verma, Smt. Suman Devi, Smt. Amita Singh, Sri Sudesh Pal Singh and Smt. Rani Saini. 13. However, one more charge was added which came out from the affidavit of Sri Sudesh Pal Singh (Lalaji) i.e. charge no. 5, which said that Pashu Peth Banat, is the main source of income of Zila Panchayat but the contract was granted by the petitioner to her favoured contractor, despite the stay order of the civil court. 14. The petitioner submitted her reply to the aforesaid charges on 5.6.08. 15. The District Magistrate thereafter submitted his report on 30.6.08. The report requires special mention at this stage, as the District Magistrate in his report with respect to charge no. 3, which was regarding spending of huge amount on the official residence of the petitioner, apparently made out a different charge that the money was spent on the construction of Government Guest House (Dak Bangalow). 16. The State Government did not feel satisfied with the aforesaid enquiry report and, therefore, required the District Magistrate to submit a pointwise report after enquiry, as is evident from the report submitted by the District Magistrate on 31.7.08, wherein he made specific mention that in view of the report submitted by him on 30.6.08, as required by the State Government, pointwise report after enquiry, is being sent. 17.
17. The State Government after receipt of the report dated 31.7.08, passed the impugned order, wherein show cause notice has been issued and administrative and financial powers of the petitioner have been ceased. 18. A perusal of the impugned order dated 4.9.08 says that out of the five charges on which it is said that enquiry was made, three have been dropped as they do not find mention in the aforesaid show cause notice/order and only two charges, namely, charges no. 3 and 5 have been found to be proved. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner assailing the aforesaid order, urged that the affidavits filed by the five members of Zila Panchayat and also that of Sudesh Pal Singh could not have been taken as complaints under Rule 3 of the Rules of 1997 and the letter written by the Local MLA, Sri Balbir Singh also could not be taken to be a complaint within the meaning of the said rules and, therefore, no cognizance could have been taken by the State Government on such complaints. 20. It has been further pleaded that the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity while submitting the first report dated 30.6.08 by the District Magistrate and no opportunity at all, while furnishing the second report dated 31.7.09. 21. Further argument is that the two charges which are said to have been found proved do not make out any case against the petitioner, rather none of the charges can be said to be either proved or made out against the petitioner, even on the face of those charges, which, in fact, are against the record, wherein, in charge no. 3, a new charge has been framed, which was not the subject matter of any complaint, on which the petitioner was required to submit her reply even in the first enquiry and charge no.
3, a new charge has been framed, which was not the subject matter of any complaint, on which the petitioner was required to submit her reply even in the first enquiry and charge no. 5, on the face of it, runs against the legal proceedings which were taken by the petitioner, where Theka of Pashu Peth was granted after due publicity in terms of the order passed by the High Court, which cannot be said to be in violation of the orders passed by the civil court and also ignores the fact that Sudesh Pal Singh himself was the contractor of the aforesaid Pashu Peth for the years 2004 to 2007 and in order to block the fresh tender for the period 2007-2010, he filed a civil suit, in which he prayed that his term be extended till 2012, though for recovery of the unpaid amount under the previous Theka awarded to him, the demand was being pressed by the Zila Panchayat. 22. Submission is that in view of such complaint of an interested person, that too in the teeth of the orders passed by the High Court, the said charge was not only non-existent but absolutely frivolous and baseless, and was framed only with a design to make out a case, for ousting the petitioner from the elected office. 23. Sri Mukund Tiwari, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State, in response, submitted that the two charges which have been found to be proved against the petitioner, point out grave financial irregularities committed by the petitioner in the matter of approving the budget and funds for construction/repair of Dak Bungalow, wherein the estimate was got revised and a larger amount was sanctioned though without following the procedure prescribed and that it also shows that the petitioner had granted the theka of Pashu Peth on lower price though it could have fetched higher price, that too in the presence of the orders passed by the civil court; Submission is that for such grave irregularities, discretionary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 cannot be invoked, on mere technicalities or on the pleas pressed by the petitioner. 24.
24. It remains undisputed that the local MLA sent a letter on 25.3.08 saying that it has come from the affidavits filed by the members of Zila Panchayat that the petitioner is involved in grave irregularities in the matter of construction of roads and in various other works and matters. This letter was accompanied by the affidavits of the persons named therein, whose reference has been given in the earlier part of the judgement. 25. The letter/complaint of the MLA was not in accordance with sub-rule (2) and (3) of the Rules of 1997, as it was neither verified in the manner prescribed nor was supported by any notarized affidavit. The affidavits which have been filed by the members were not accompanied by any complaint within the meaning of the aforesaid Rule and, therefore, there was no complaint validly made to the State Government, cognizance of which could have been taken. 26. Rule 4 of the Rules of 1997, which deals with the preliminary enquiry, says that the State Government may, on the receipt of a complaint referred to in Rule 3 or otherwise appoint an officer not below the rank of an Additional District Magistrate in the case of a Pramukh or Up-Pramukh and District Magistrate in the case of an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha to conduct a preliminary enquiry with a view to finding out if there is a prima facie case for a formal enquiry in the matter. 27. The aforesaid Rule thus, prescribes the essential conditions which are required to be fulfilled before an enquiry is ordered by the State Government, for finding out, if there is a prima facie case for formal enquiry in the matter, namely, (i) there should be a complaint as referred to in Rule 3; and (ii) in the case of Adhyaksha, the enquiry is to be conducted by the District Magistrate. 28. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1997 reads as under: "3. Procedure relating to complaints.-- (1) Any person making a complaint against a Pramukh, Up-Pramukh, Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha may send his complaint to the Secretary to the State Government in the Panchayati Raj Department, Vidhan Bhawan, Lucknow.
28. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1997 reads as under: "3. Procedure relating to complaints.-- (1) Any person making a complaint against a Pramukh, Up-Pramukh, Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha may send his complaint to the Secretary to the State Government in the Panchayati Raj Department, Vidhan Bhawan, Lucknow. (2) Every complaint referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by the complainant's own affidavit in support thereof and also affidavits of all persons from whom he claims to have received information of fact relating to the accusation, verified before a notary, together with all documents in his possession or power pertaining to the accusation. (3) Every complaint and affidavit under this rule as well as any schedule or annexure thereto shall be verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings and affidavit respectively. (4) Not less than three copies of the complaint as well as each of its Annexures shall be submitted by the complainant. (5) A complaint which does not comply with any of the foregoing provisions shall not be entertained." 29. Rule 3 is the procedure relating to complaints, which says that any person making a complaint against a Pramukh, Up-Pramukh, Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha may send his complaint to the Secretary to the State Government in the Panchayati Raj Department, whereas sub-rule (2) says that every complaint referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by the complainant's own affidavit in support thereof and also affidavits of all persons from whom he claims to have received information of facts, relating to the accusation, verified before a notary, together with all documents in his possession or powers pertaining to the accusation. The complaint has to be verified in the manner prescribed in sub-rule (3). 30. Compliance of sub-rule (2) and (3) of Rule 3 is mandatory, and the absence of any condition, so prescribed would not allow the State Government to act upon such a complaint. The consequence of non-compliance of the aforesaid provisions of sub-rule (2) and (3) of Rule 3 places an embargo under sub-rule (5) from taking cognizance of such a complaint. 31. Rule 3, not only prescribes the imperative conditions and the procedure of making a complaint, but also lays down the consequences in sub-rule (5), if the complaint is not made in accordance with sub-rule (2) and (3) viz.
31. Rule 3, not only prescribes the imperative conditions and the procedure of making a complaint, but also lays down the consequences in sub-rule (5), if the complaint is not made in accordance with sub-rule (2) and (3) viz. no cognizance of such a complaint shall be taken by the State Government, i.e. it will not be entertained. That being so, the provisions of Rule 3 sub-rule (2) and (3) are mandatory for making a legal cognizable complaint. 32. In the case of Saroj Kumari Yadav (Smt.) and others v. State of U.P. and others, [ (1999) 1 UPLBEC 630 ], a Division Bench of this Court, while considering almost the similar question about the validity of the complaint, as to when it can be entertained by the State Government, observed that non-compliance of Rule 3 sub-rules (2), (3) or (4) would not empower the State Government to take cognizance of such a complaint. The Court set aside the order of cessation of administrative and financial powers of the Adhyaksha, after making following observations: "........Clause 5 of Rule 3 of the Enquiry Rules places an unqualified embargo on the concerned authority to entertain any complaint which is not in confirmity with sub-rules (2), (3) or (4) thereof and; on facts, non-compliance of these sub-rules had not been much in dispute before us. As mentioned hereinbefore the State tried to take refuge under the contingency clause "or otherwise" as permitted by Rule 4(1) of the Enquiry Rules. In our considered opinion the effort is futile because here the State Government has not ordered an enquiry under this alternative contingency. It has rather taken cognizance of the preliminary report prepared by the authorities on the basis of complaints which as discussed hereinabove should have conformed with the specifications and parameters laid down in sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 3 of the Enquiry Rules and factually did not." 33. Sri Mukund Tiwari though did not dispute nor could dispute the factual position about the letter/complaint of Sri Balbir Singh not being supported by any affidavit of his own or the same being not verified in the prescribed manner, as given in sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 and also the fact that the affidavits which were annexed alongwith the complaint, of the persons from whom he derived the information, were also not supported by any complaint, whatsoever, in any form. 34.
34. He, however, submitted that Rule 4, which empowers the State Government to hold a preliminary enquiry for finding out if there is a prima facie case for a formal enquiry in the matter, also says that the State Government can act on the complaint or 'otherwise' also. Stressing upon the word 'otherwise', he submitted that even if the complaints were not in accordance with the aforesaid Rule 3, it having come to the knowledge of the State Government that the Adhyaksha was committing grave irregularities, in exercise of both financial and administrative powers, the State Government was fully competent to invoke its powers under 'otherwise' clause of the aforesaid rule. 35. This argument again runs contrary to the judgement in the case of Saroj Kumar Yadav (supra). 36. In case the word 'otherwise' is interpreted to mean that it will include even the complaints which have not been moved in accordance with the aforesaid provision of sub-rule (2) and (3) of Rule 3, it will mean, negating the whole requirement of Rule 3, which under sub-clause (5) prohibits the State Government from taking cognizance of any such application/complaint, which does not conform to any of the requirement of Rule 3(2) and (3). In case the intention of the Rule was that even on such defective or inadmissible complaint, the State Government can proceed to take action against the Adhyaksha, there was no necessity to incorporate sub-rule (2) and (3) and also, of course, sub-rule (5). In such a situation, the Rule could have been framed by saying that 'on a complaint being received or otherwise' the State Government may hold an enquiry and action may be taken accordingly. 37. The interpretation of the aforesaid Rules in such a manner would lead to an interpretation, which would defeat the very purpose and the object, for which it has been enacted. 38. The requirement of verifying the application as per the provision of Code of Civil Procedure and filing of notarized affidavit of the complainant has been done with the object that frivolous complaints are not made and that prima facie, the State Government may rely upon the affidavit and on the complaint which has been filed in accordance with rules. 39.
The requirement of verifying the application as per the provision of Code of Civil Procedure and filing of notarized affidavit of the complainant has been done with the object that frivolous complaints are not made and that prima facie, the State Government may rely upon the affidavit and on the complaint which has been filed in accordance with rules. 39. There may be a case, where in the absence of any complaint from any person, as required under Rule 3, the State Government acquires information about grave financial irregularities and other irregularities being committed by the Adhyaksha, for example, on the recommendations made by Lok Ayukt or from any other source, the State Government would not be precluded from holding such an enquiry, which naturally would be in the interest of Zila Panchayat itself. 40. A provision under the statutory rules has to be read and interpreted in the manner and for the purpose, for which it has been enacted. If the State Government had initiated the proceedings on some information being gathered otherwise than the complaints made by the aforesaid persons and this fact had been mentioned in the order for holding preliminary enquiry, probably this argument could have been advanced, which could have required consideration of the Court, but since the impugned order specifically says that enquiry be made in view of the affidavits filed by the members of Zila Panchayat and to submit a report on the allegations made therein, the order of the State Government cannot be protected on the ground that it had an alternative power to act otherwise also, i.e. in the absence of any complaint under Rule 3, particularly, when there is nothing on record to show that the State Government has exercised its power under the 'otherwise' clause. 41. That being the factual and legal position, we have no hesitation to hold that the State Government was not having any power to take cognizance of the complaint which did not conform to the statutory rule, namely, Rule 3 (2) and (3) of the Rules of 1997. 42. On merits also, we find that the petitioner since admittedly was not afforded any opportunity while furnishing the second report on 31.7.08 after the State Government did not proceed or so to say did not accept the first report of the District Magistrate dated 30.6.08, the entire proceedings thereafter stand vitiated only on this ground.
42. On merits also, we find that the petitioner since admittedly was not afforded any opportunity while furnishing the second report on 31.7.08 after the State Government did not proceed or so to say did not accept the first report of the District Magistrate dated 30.6.08, the entire proceedings thereafter stand vitiated only on this ground. 43. Section 29 (1) of of the U.P. Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961 gives the power to the State Government to remove an Adhyaksha, who wilfully omits or refuses to perform his duties or functions under the Act or abuses the powers vested in him or is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or because he is physically and mentally incapacitated for performing his duties, after giving the Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity for explanation. 44. The proviso annexed to the aforesaid Section reads as under: "Provided that where in an enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities such Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry, be exercised and performed by a committee consisting of three elected members of the Zila Panchayat appointed in this behalf by the State Government." 45. The effect of the proviso is that if an Adhyaksha is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities, on an enquiry being held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, then until he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry, his administrative and financial powers shall be ceased and his functions shall be performed by a three-member Committee appointed by the State Government. 46.
46. The proviso aforesaid makes it abundantly clear that the mandatory requirement is that the preliminary enquiry is to be conducted by the person so authorised under the Rules of 1997 i.e. the District Magistrate in the instant case and the enquiry is to be conducted in such manner, as may be prescribed under the Rules of 1997 and if in such an enquiry so held, it is prima facie found that the Adhyaksha has committed financial and other irregularities or so to say, the charges framed against him are found prima facie proved, only then the financial and administrative powers can be ceased and not otherwise. 47. When the proviso says that if an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities, which means prima facie guilty of the charges, only then power can be ceased, it admits no ambiguity that in such an enquiry, the Adhyaksha is to be given opportunity to participate therein only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the charges levelled, do make out any prima facie case or not. Of course, formal enquiry would be held later on, where the Adhyaksha will participate in terms of Rule 6 of the Rules of 1997. 48. Holding of preliminary enquiry aforesaid is not merely an enquiry for finding out as to whether formal enquiry is to be conducted against the Adhyaksha but on the basis of such enquiry, financial and administrative powers of the Adhyaksha can also be ceased. 49. The cessation of financial and administrative powers of the Adhyaksha means virtually denuding him of all the powers but for some facilities which are attached to the office of Adhyaksha to which he is otherwise entitled under the Rules till he is exonerated from the charges. 10.
49. The cessation of financial and administrative powers of the Adhyaksha means virtually denuding him of all the powers but for some facilities which are attached to the office of Adhyaksha to which he is otherwise entitled under the Rules till he is exonerated from the charges. 10. This means that an Adhyaksha would be deprived of his functioning as Adhyaksha on the charges being prima facie proved in the enquiry conducted by the person authorised and in the manner as prescribed under the Rules of 1997 but it does not mean that if the enquiry has not been conducted by the authorised/nominated person under the Rules or it has not been done in accordance with the provision prescribed under the Rules or that the charges are not found prima facie proved or could be said to be prima facie proved on the basis of the material considered by the District Magistrate, even then the powers can be ceased. 51. The meaning and import of proviso to Section 29 (1) was considered by a Division Bench in which one of us (Pradeep Kant, J) was a member, in the case of Smt. Chinta Yadav vs. State of U.P. and others [Writ Petition No. 1609 (MB) of 2008] decided on 1.4.08, against which two Special Leave Petitions were filed and both were dismissed. 52. In the aforesaid case, the Court made the following observations: "Reading of the proviso to Section 29 reveals that it obligates the State Government to get a preliminary enquiry held, which enquiry shall be held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed; the prescription has been made by Rules, 1997 and if in that enquiry Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities, such Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions. This means that not only a preliminary enquiry is to be held under the orders of the State Government but it has to be held by a person duly nominated for the purpose, in accordance with rules and if in that enquiry, it is prima facie found that the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha has committed financial and other irregularities, he shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative charges in the final enquiry.
This again means that liability has to be established and misconduct has to stand proved, may be prima facie, only then formal enquiry would be conducted and his administrative and financial powers can be ceased and the State Government will have the jurisdiction to appoint a three members Committee for the purpose. The Court further observed as under: "An elected Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha, Pramukh or Up-Pramukh, as the case may be, has a statutory right to exercise his functions and discharge his duties, for which he is elected and he can neither be removed nor his powers can be curtailed, otherwise than in accordance with law. The elected office bearers aforesaid, can be removed by passing a vote of no-confidence or by an order of removal passed by the State Government, if they are found guilty of gross misconduct or abuse of powers under the rules. There cannot be any other procedure for ousting an elected office bearer. To protect the elected office bearer holding the office of the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha and to minimize the interference by the political parties and influential people, and to avoid group rivalry so as to pull down such an office bearer and consequently to give stability and due sanctity to the institution of self-government, duly recognised by the Constitution under Article 243-C, it appears that safeguard for holding preliminary enquiry has been provided before taking any drastic action against the Adhyaksha, may be of removal." 53. The aforesaid provision on the one hand gives protection to the elected Adhyaksha from the ill-designed or motivated complaints, but at the same time, allows the stringent action of removal from office, during the subsistence of his tenure, if he is found prima facie, guilty of misuse and abuse of his powers. 54. A person (Adhyaksha) cannot be found prima facie guilty, unless his/her version to the charges levelled, is also known. May be that this enquiry is summary in nature and is not taken to be regular enquiry, which is held under Rule 6 but the requirement of providing minimal opportunity before furnishing the report by the District Magistrate is inherent in the aforesaid proviso, as in the absence of any opportunity being given to the Adhyaksha and knowing his/her defence/version, a total one-sided enquiry would be conducted and an elected Adhyaksha would be deprived of his functions, to which he is otherwise legitimately entitled. 55.
55. This is not the intention of the provision aforesaid nor of the Rules. It cannot be lost sight of, nor it can be ignored that the political rivalry, vested interests and motivated designs, play an important role in the present democratic set up for ousting an Adhyaksha, who is an elected office bearer for achieving political gains and for ulterior motives. 56. The political parties, their high-ups and followers and particularly those, who control the power, many a times, for self-political gains, do not hesitate in taking recourse to such statutory provision, which permits them to oust an elected office bearer from the elected office, though he may not be guilty of any of the charges or does not fall within the mischief of Section 29, only because of political rivalry. 57. It is with this background, the provision of removal and of course, cessation of administrative and financial powers, as given in Section 29, has to be considered. 58. In the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and others, JT 2001(5) SC 645, the apex court, while dealing with the removal of a President of the Council under Punjab Municipal Act of 1911, held in Para 6 as under: "In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law....Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office a stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held." 59. In Paragraph 11 the apex court observed as under: "A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving dishonesty of intention....... The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action of error of decision." 60.
The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action of error of decision." 60. In the instant case, besides the plea of the petitioner that in the first enquiry report which was submitted on 30.6.08, she was not afforded reasonable opportunity, admittedly no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner while submitting the second report i.e. the report dated 31.7.08, by the District Magistrate. The State Government did not reply upon the first report dated 30.6.08, therefore, it lost its significance and was no more relevant. 61. Any enquiry conducted in whatever manner for submitting the report dated 31.7.08 was thus, of no consequence for the purpose of submitting the second report. 62. The second report dated 31.7.08 was submitted without giving any opportunity to the petitioner and without requiring her even to submit explanation. 63. Thus, the second enquiry report dated 31.7.08, on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed, was furnished without affording any opportunity to the petitioner was not only in violation of the principles of natural justice but also in violation of the proviso aforesaid. 64. The impugned order is vitiated also on the ground that the charge no. 3, which was specifically communicated to the petitioner on the basis of the affidavits, which were in verbatim the same, but for the affidavit of Sudesh Pal Singh, who added the charge no. 5 also, did specifically make an allegation of spending huge and hefty amount upon the official residence of the Adhyaksha but it having been found by the District Magistrate himself that there was no official residence of the Adhyaksha, it was converted into a charge that excessive amount without authority, was spent upon the repairs of the Dak Bungalow. 65. The petitioner in her reply which was given during earlier enquiry, when stated that there was no official resident of Zila Panchayat Adhyaksha and that the money was spent upon the repairs of Dak Bungalow, wherein she gave an explanation about the expenditure made and the reason for making repairs, the District Magistrate moulded the charge and diverted it towards the excessive amount being spent in the repairs of Dak Bungalow. 66. The District Magistrate was not authorised to do so. 67.
66. The District Magistrate was not authorised to do so. 67. The said charge, therefore, cannot be made the basis for cessation of powers of the Adhyaksha. 68. In regard to the charge of holding auction of Pashu Peth, it would be appropriate to take note of the fact that Sudesh Pal Singh himself was a contractor of the said Pashu Peth for the years from 2004 to 2007 and he had tried for extension of the Theka (contract) upto the year 2012. Having failed to get it extended, he filed a civil suit in which an interim injunction was granted. 69. The petitioner contested the said matter to get the interim order vacated and also pressurised Sudesh Pal Singh to deposit the outstanding money in the funds of Zila Panchayat in terms of the orders passed by the High Court at Allahabad and settled the contract for a sum of Rs. 66 lakh per year, which was 10% higher than the previous bid of the previous years. 70. Admittedly, Sudesh Pal Singh filed civil suit for extending the period of his contract upto the year 2012, in which an interim order of injunction was passed. Since Sudesh Pal Singh was pressurised for deposit of the outstanding amount, he approached the civil court and it was only under the orders passed by the High Court that the said auction was held and Theka was settled, as aforesaid. 71. It is a contradiction in terms that on the one hand the District Magistrate says that the contract of Pashu Peth (cattle market) is one of the main sources of income of Zila Panchayat and on the other hand, it has been complained that Theka has been wrongly given in the presence of the interim order. 72. The State Government did not take into account that Sudesh Pal was an interested person, who was the contractor during previous years and was adopting all means so that the Theka is not granted to anyone else. Bona fide of such complaint ought to have been tested before relying upon the same, moreso, when it was not a correct fact that in the presence of the interim order passed by the civil court, Theka was granted. The Theka was given only after the High Court permitted to do so. 73.
Bona fide of such complaint ought to have been tested before relying upon the same, moreso, when it was not a correct fact that in the presence of the interim order passed by the civil court, Theka was granted. The Theka was given only after the High Court permitted to do so. 73. From what has been stated and discussed above, we are persuaded to hold that neither there was any complaint before the State Government, as required under Rule 3 of the Rules of 1997 nor any opportunity was afforded to the petitioner by the District Magistrate before submitting the second report dated 31.7.08, on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed nor the two charges which have been made the basis for cessation of administrative and financial powers of the Adhyaksha, can be said to be proved, even prima facie, nor the petitioner could be removed on the basis of such charges. 74. The impugned order, in fact, has been passed without application of mind by the State Government merely on the report submitted by the District Magistrate, who also did not care to see that the Theka of Pashu Peth was granted after the orders passed by the High Court at 10% higher bid than the previous years, during which Sudesh Pal Singh was continuing with Theka. 75. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 4.9.08 is liable to be quashed, which is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be allowed to discharge her powers both, financial and administrative, forthwith. 76. The writ petition is allowed. No orders as to costs.