Vaidehi v. The Inspector General of Registration Chennai
2010-04-05
K.CHANDRU
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : The petitioner has come forward to challenge the order, dated 29.3.2010, wherein and by which she was transferred from the Sub Registrar office, Periamet coming under Central Madras Registration office to the Sub Registrar office at Red Hills. 2. The petitioner was working as a Sub Registrar. She has come forward to challenge the transfer order dated 29.3.2010. The ground taken by the petitioner was that only 40 days before, she was transferred from Red Hills to Periamet. Once again, she was transferred back to the old station. Therefore, it is illegal. The present order came to be made cancelling the order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Registration, dated 25.2.2010 and restoring the order passed by the Inspector General of Registration, dated 15.2.2010. 3. In fact the petitioner was working as an Assistant in the Registration District of Central Chennai and by promotion, she was posted as Sub Registrar, Redhills. Even before she could continue in the post and complete her probation, for reasons best known, the Deputy Inspector General of Registration, i.e. the second respondent transferred her back to the Central Chennai in the same post. This she calls as the transfer order. However, it is open to the respondents to pass an appropriate posting order. The petitioner only on promotion got the post of Sub Registrar and that she is yet to complete her probation in the said post. Even otherwise, there is no case made out to interfere with the order of transfer in the absence of any malafide or lack of jurisdiction. On the contrary, the only contention was that the Government guidelines regarding frequent transfer was not followed, which cannot be gone into by this court. 4. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court reported in State of U.P. Vs. Siya Ram and another ( 2004 (7) SCC 405 ). In paragraph 5 observed as follows. 5. The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned.
In paragraph 5 observed as follows. 5. The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan 1. 5. Further, the Honble Supreme Court in yet another decision reported in 2004 (11) SCC 402 (State of U.P. Vs. Gobardhan Lal), in paragraph 7 observed as follows:- 7. It is too late in the day for any government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made.
Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. 6. In the light of the above, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition stand closed.