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2010 DIGILAW 1568 (PAT)

Puja Priya W/o Pankaj Kumar v. State Of Bihar

2010-07-16

NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH

body2010
JUDGEMENT 1. All these writ applications have been directed against the order dated 9.6.2010 passed by the District Panchayat Teachers Appointment Appellate Tribunal, Madhepura in Appeal No. 52 of 2009. By the aforesaid order, the Tribunal upon examination of records found that the Selection Committee was not duly constituted and, as such, the entire appointment process stood vitiated. Let it be noted that the appointments were made way back in the year 2007, which came to be challenged before the Tribunal in 2009. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the petitioners had nothing to do with the constitution of the committee or its validity. They had applied, given their consent and they were duly selected. A reference to the order would show that not a single irregularity in the selection process has been noticed. In the order, it is not mentioned that whether applicants were wrongly left out or any person was wrongly selected. Thus, on mere technicality petitioners appointment could not be terminated and, that too, after almost three years of service. It is further submitted that the order cannot be sustained on the ground that notices were not issued to the petitioners. The order, being an order adversely affecting the petitioners, cannot be passed, except upon notice to the petitioners. 3. Having heard the parties, in my view, the impugned order cannot be sustained and must be set aside. Firstly, the order mentions that the allegation was that Up-Mukhiya unauthorizedly presided over the Selection Committee. The Up-Mukhiya does not deny that she, in fact, presided over the meetings of the Selection Committee, but in her show cause she has clearly given a ground for the same. She has clearly stated that as the elder brother-in-law of the Mukhiya himself was a candidate and was figuring in the merit list, Mukhiya had decided to abstain from the selection process. In view of the Court that was the right step and in absence of Mukhiya by virtue of Section 17(2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 it is obvious that it would be the Up-Mukhiya who would then preside over the meeting. There could be nothing wrong in that. It is then noticed in the order that the Panchayat Secretary now makes a statement that he was made to sign the deliberations on threat being given. There could be nothing wrong in that. It is then noticed in the order that the Panchayat Secretary now makes a statement that he was made to sign the deliberations on threat being given. It is only to be noted that no such stand had been taken by the Panchayat Secretary in all these years as was being for the first time taken before the Tribunal. 4. Be that as it may, none of these officials complained to the Tribunal that the selection process stood vitiated because they were deprived of being part of the Committee. It is for the first time after three years that these stands are being taken. It is well established that any defect in the constitution of the Selection Committee would not render the actions of the Committee to be bad. This is the principle of de facto/de jure control of office. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gokaraju Rangaraju V/s. The State of Andhra Pradesh since reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1473 wherein the Apex Court has held as under: "The de facto doctrine is now well established that the acts of the Officers de facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding, as if they were the acts of officers de jure." 5. The next ground for this Court to interfere is that so far as the petitioners are concerned and even otherwise in the entire order there is no other irregularity in the selection process that has been pointed out. It is not pointed out that eligible candidates were wrongly left out and ineligible candidates were selected. It has not been noticed that undue preference was given to any person. Yet, merely because there was defect in the constitution of the Selection Committee, the entire selection process has been set aside. 6. In my view, that could not have been done without finding of any particular irregularity being committed in the selection process or the selection as made. None having been found out, therefore, I am constrained to hold that the impugned order cannot sustain and it is quashed accordingly. 6. In my view, that could not have been done without finding of any particular irregularity being committed in the selection process or the selection as made. None having been found out, therefore, I am constrained to hold that the impugned order cannot sustain and it is quashed accordingly. It is, however, open to the Tribunal that if proper facts being pleaded it would take appropriate action as permissible in law. 7. With the aforesaid observations and directions, all the writ applications are disposed of.