JUDGMENT Satya Poot Mehrotra and Kashi Nath Pandey, JJ.—We have heard Sri M. K. Tiwari and Sri Dinesh Mishra, holding brief for Sri Govind Saran, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, and perused the record. 2. As per the averments made in the writ petition the petitioner was selected/appointed as Tele Communication Inspector, Grade-II on 9.3.1984 in North East Railway, Gorakhpur, and was sent for training by the order dated 13.3.1984 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition). 3. It appears that a Notification dated 30.10.2009 has been issued for selection on the vacant post of the Assistant Signal and Communication Engineer (Group-B). Copy of the said Notification has been filed as Annexure-7 to the writ petition. 4. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition, inter alia, praying for quashing the aforesaid Notification dated 30.10.2009, as well as the provisional integrated seniority list as on 1.12.2006 in regard to the pay scale of Rs. 6,500 to 10,500. Copy of the said Provisional Seniority List has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 5. From the narration of the facts mentioned above, it is evident that the petitioner is an employee of North Eastern Railway, and thus is a person appointed on a civil post under the Union. Therefore, in view of the provision of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Central Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with service matters concerning the petitioner. 6. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC 1127 (paragraph 99), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the Tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 Act “like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislation (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.” 7. In Dwijendra Nath Roy v. Union of India and others, 2008 (1) AWC 1046, a Division Bench of this Court considered the import of the decision of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar’s case (supra) and held as under (paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said AWC) : “12. In Dwijendra Nath Roy v. Union of India and others, 2008 (1) AWC 1046, a Division Bench of this Court considered the import of the decision of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar’s case (supra) and held as under (paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said AWC) : “12. Central Administrative Tribunal is a forum for the purpose of due consideration of such matters, by virtue of Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution, which have been introduced by way of forty-second amendment of 1976 w.e.f. 3.1.1977. The object of forming the Tribunal is to minimize the work load of the High Courts in deciding the matters under Article 226 of the Constitution and that way, such Tribunal was created as Court of first instance. This is the true import of L. Chandra Kumar’s case (supra). We cannot be forgetful that the question of alternative remedy and the question of the Court of first instance, are the two different aspects all together. No doubt, the writ court in a particular situation, can ignore a question of alternative remedy and can start hearing of a matter on merits instead of sending the same back for exhausting the alternative remedy. But, when the Central Administrative Tribunal is created as a Court of first instance and all decisions of such Tribunal are subjected to scrutiny by a Division Bench of the High Court, this question cannot be ignored. If this Division Bench of the High Court hearing the writ matters regarding service passes an order ignoring the existence of the Central Administrative Tribunal and as a Court of first instance, it will become a jurisdictional error. 13. In our country, in different High Courts, there are different rules of hearing the matters under Article 226 of the Constitution. Some where it is to be heard by single Judge and some where it is to be heard by Division Bench and likewise, but in L. Chandra Kumar’s case (supra) it has been categorically ruled that the Central Administrative Tribunal is a Court of first instance, i.e., first hearing will be made by the Tribunal and thereafter against the decision of the Tribunal, it will be heard by the Division Bench of the High Court. In this way, the larger Bench of Supreme Court has propounded a principle of universal application to all the High Courts that the matters arising out of the decisions of the Tribunal, will be cognizable, exclusively by the Division Bench of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the Tribunals will heard the matters as a Court of first instance. Therefore, if the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, ignores this aspect and holds that the alternative forum of adjudication can be ignored and even in such matters High Court can be directly approached, it would lead to an anomalous position and would frustrate the objective sought to be achieved by creating the Tribunal as a Court of first instance.” 8. In view of the above decisions, the present writ petition is not maintainable at this stage as the appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to first approach the Central Administrative Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 9. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 11. However, passing of this order will not affect the petitioner’s right, if any, to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal in accordance with law, if so advised.