1. Civil 2nd Appeals 14 of 2003 and 15 of 2003 arise from identical judgments and have been admitted for hearing on identical question of law, that reads as under: Whether suit was barred by provisions of section 139 of Land Revenue Act, 1996 Svt. (1939-AD) ? 2. The background facts may be summarized in the first instance. 3. The respondents 9.7.2003 filed two civil suits in the Court of Ld. Sub Judge Budgam registered as 46-A/Numbri and 46-B/Numbri. The averments made in the suits were identical. In suit No. 46-A/Numbri the respondents claimed to be owners in possession of a plot of land measuring 8 kanal and 12 marlas comprising of survey No. 145/1 min khewat No.233 min situated at estate Rawalpora Tehsil Budgam (Suit land for short). The respondents averred that Shri Gh. Mohammad Najar S/o Razak Najar R/o Bhagwanpora, Rawalpora (proforma respondents) on 30.6.1989 pursuant to a conspiracy hatched with Tehsildar Settlement Chadoora got an area measuring 4 kanal 12 marlas out of aforesaid plot entered in the revenue record in his favour and that on appeal the order of Tehsildar settlement was set aside by Assistant Commissioner Budgam vide order dated 30.10.1989. The respondents, it is averred, as such continued to remain in possession of the said plot of land. The respondents pleaded that the proforma respondent in connivance with the appellant to dispossess the respondents from the suit land with a criminal intention, executed a sale deed on 12.9.1989 registered on 11.12.1989 in respect of an area measuring two kanals out of the suit land in favour of the appellant. It was pleaded that as the proforma respondent was not owner in possession of the suit land or any part thereof including the part that form subject matter of the sale deed in question, the sale deed deserved to be declared null and void. 4. In civil suit 46-B/Numbri, the respondents after making the identical averments insisted that the proforma respondent had without any right including the propriety right over the suit land or any part thereof, executed a sale deed for an area measuring 2 kanals out of the suit land in favour of the appellant. 5. 4. In civil suit 46-B/Numbri, the respondents after making the identical averments insisted that the proforma respondent had without any right including the propriety right over the suit land or any part thereof, executed a sale deed for an area measuring 2 kanals out of the suit land in favour of the appellant. 5. The respondents in both the civil suites prayed for grant of declaratory decree declaring the sale deeds executed by proforma respondent in favour of the appellant on 12.9.1989 and registered on 9.12.1989 and 11.12.1989 respectively, as null and void. The respondents also prayed for grant of a permanent injunction decree restraining the appellant and proforma respondents from interfering with respondents possession over the suit land. 6. The appellant opted to stay away from the proceedings and was set ex-parte. The proforma respondent after filing written statement, absented himself from the proceedings and was proceeded exparte. Ld. Trial Judge after recording respondents evidence in ex-parte decreed the suit. The appellant before this court, filed an appeal against the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 31.3.2000 in the court of Ld. Principal District Judge Budgam. The appeals were partly allowed and as regards the relief, other than the relief of declaratory decree declaring the sale deeds null and void, were set aside. 7. The First Appellate Court held that the sale deeds impugned in the Civil Suits, executed by the proforma respondent in favour of appellants whereunder propriety rights were transferred, to be unauthorized, ineffective and bad ab-initio. The Ist. Appellate Court proceeded to observe that the impugned decree was correct, though for reason quite different from reasons, it was based upon. However, the Ist. Appellant Court held the trial court to have no jurisdiction in terms of section 25 of the Agrarian Reforms Act, to grant a permanent injunction decree in as much as the subject matter of the suit was agricultural land within the meaning of the J&K Agricultural Reforms Act 1976. 8. It needs to be recalled that Ld. Trial Judge declared the sale deeds, executed by proforma respondent in favour of the appellants, null and void on the grounds that the proforma respondents had no propriety rights over the subject matter of the sale deeds and thus had no right to execute the sale deeds or convey any title in the subject matter of the sale deeds. Ld. Ist. Ld. Ist. Appellate Court arrived at same conclusion but on different grounds. The Ist. Appellate Court found that the land in question was shamilat land recorded as banjar kadeem in the Revenue record and that the land thus was not propriety land but State land and for that matter even the respondents had no right over the land forming subject matter of the sale deeds. The proforma respondent, it was accordingly held, was not competent to execute the sale deeds in question. The Ist. Appellate Court remanded the suits to the trial court, with a direction to refer the matter to the Collector under the Agrarian Reforms Act for "assessment of factum and legality of passes by either of the parties over the suit land." 9. The judgment and decree dated 30.5.2003 passed by Ld. Pr. District Judge Budgam in CIA No.1/Appeal and CIA No.2/Appeal of 16.4.2002 titled Mushtaq Ahmad Rafiquee v. Gh. Mohammad Dar and Mohammad Iqbal Rafiquee v. Gh. Mohammad Dar and others, are being assailed in Civil second Appeals No.14/2003 and No.15/2003, on a number of grounds detailed in the memoranda of appeals. Having regard to the substantial question of law framed by this court on 5.8.2004, focus is to be exclusively on the said question, reproduced hereinabove. 10. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the appellant and have gone through record of the Ist. Appellate Court as also the Trial Court. Section 139 J&K Land Revenue Act excludes jurisdiction of civil courts in matters within the jurisdiction of Revenue Officers. Having regard to the nature of substantial question of law framed in these two appeals it would be advantageous to reproduce section 139 J&K Land Revenue Act 1996 (1939-AD). It reads as under:- 139. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of Revenue Officers. Having regard to the nature of substantial question of law framed in these two appeals it would be advantageous to reproduce section 139 J&K Land Revenue Act 1996 (1939-AD). It reads as under:- 139. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of Revenue Officers. Except as otherwise provided by this Act- (1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in any matter which a Revenue Officer is empowered by this Act to dispose of or take cognizance of; (2) A Civil Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters, namely:- (i) any question as to the limits of any land which has been defined by a Revenue officer as land to which this Act does or does not apply, (ii) any claim to compel the performance of any duties imposed by this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force on any Revenue Officer, as such; (iii) any claim to the office of [x x x x] village officer or in respect of any injury caused by exclusion from such office or to compel the performance of the duties or a division of the emoluments thereof; (iv) any notification directing the making or revision of a record-of-rights; (v) the framing of a record-of rights or annual record; or the preparation, signing or attestation of any of the documents included in such a record; (vi) the correction of any entry in a record-of rights, annual record or register of mutations; (vii) any notification of the undertaking of the general re-assessment of a district or Tehsil having been sanctioned by the Government (viii) the claim of any person to be liable for an assessment of land revenue or of any other revenue assessed under this Act; (ix) the amount of land revenue to be assessed on any estate or to be paid in respect of any holding under this Act; (x) The amount of, or the liability of any person to pay, any other revenue to be assessed under this Act, or any cess, charge or rate to be assessed on an estate or holding under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force; (xi) any claim relating to the allowance to be received by a landholder who has given notice of his refusal to be liable for an assessment, or any claim connected with, or arising out of any proceedings taken in consequence of the refusal of any person to be liable for an assessment under this Act; (xii) the formation of an estate out of waste-land; (xiii) any claim to hold free of revenue any land, mills, fisheries or natural products of land or water; (xiv) any claim connected with, or arising out of, the collection by the Government, or the enforcement by the Government of any process for the recovery of land revenue, or any sum recoverable as an arrear of land revenue; (xv) any claim to set aside, on any ground other than fraud, a sale for the recovery of an arrear of land revenue or any sum recoverable as an arrear of land revenue; (xvi) the amount of, or the liability of any person to pay any fees, fines, costs or other charges imposed under this Act; (xvii) any claim for partition of an estate, holding or tenancy, or any question connected with, or arising out of, proceedings for partition, unless such question is to be determined by a Civil Court as a question of title arising out of the said proceedings; (xviii) any question as to the allotment of land on the partition of an estate, holding or tenancy, or as to the distribution of land revenue on the partition of an estate or holding, or as to the distribution of rent on the partition of a tenancy; (xix) any claim to set aside or disturb a division or appraisement of produce confirmed or varied by a Revenue officer under this Act; (xx) any question relating to the preparation of a list of village cesses or the imposition by the Government of conditions on the collection of such cesses; (xxi) any proceedings under this Act for the commutation of the dues of a superior land-holder; (xxii) any claim arising out of the enforcement of an agreement to render public service in lieu of payment of land revenue; (xxiii) any claim arising out of the liability of an assignee of land revenue] to pay a share of the cost of collecting or re-assessing such revenue, or arising out of the liability of an assignee to pay out of assigned land revenue, or of a person who would be liable for land revenue if it had not been released, compounded for or redeemed to pay on the land revenue for which he would but for such release, composition or redemption be liable, such a percentage for the remuneration of a Zaildar, inamdar or village officer as may be prescribed by rules for the time being in force under this Act; and (xxiv) The claim of any person for declaring ownership or any right in respect of grazing land and other prohibited Shamilat lands. 11. However, having regard to the nature of controversy involved, the focus is to remain on section 139 (2) of XXIV of the Act. The aforesaid provisions debars jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of claims for declaring ownership or any right in respect of "grazing land" or other "prohibited shamilat lands". It follows that whenever any person lays a claim to "grazing land or prohibited shamilat land" or insist on any right, such claim is not to be dealt with by the Civil Court. Section 139 sub section 1 and sub section 2 are to be read conjointly. Whereas section 139 (1) lays down a general rule that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in any matter Which a Revenue Officer is empowered under the Land Revenue Act, to dispose of or take cognizance of, section 139 (2) is illustrative in nature and illustrates the cases conceived by section 139 (1) for exclusive jurisdiction of a Revenue Officer. When read together the aforesaid provisions lead to the conclusion that the matter brought out of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be of a such a nature which a Revenue officer is empowered to deal with, dispose of or take cognizance of. If a matter by its very nature can not be dealt with by a Revenue Officer or dispose of or taken cognizance by the Revenue Officer, the matter can not be said to fall outside jurisdiction of the Civil Court merely because some ancillary matter can be dealt with by Revenue Officer. The scope of section 139 Land Revenue Act and its fall out for the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 9 CPC to deal with a civil dispute, has fallen for consideration of this Court in quite a few cases. In Mumtaz Begum v. Amanullah Khan and others 1963 KLJ 279 the plaintiffs case before Civil Court was that the plaintiff was entitled to 1/3 of the land in dispute. The plaintiff sought a declaratory decree to the said effect. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matter was assailed under section 139 (2) (XVII). It was held that the rights of the parties in the disputed land were to be determined by the Civil Court and after such determination the actual partition was to be done by the Revenue Officer in accordance with the verdict of the Civil Court. It was held that the rights of the parties in the disputed land were to be determined by the Civil Court and after such determination the actual partition was to be done by the Revenue Officer in accordance with the verdict of the Civil Court. The Court observed: "..... It may be remarked that S 139 (2) (xvii) of the Land Revenue Act makes mention of a claim simplicitor and does not apparently cover cases where more contested questions of title are involved." 12. The court in Kaneez Fatima & others v. Khushia & others AIR 1965 J&K 118 had once again an occasion to deal with the challenge thrown to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court on the basis of section 139 Land Revenue Act. The Court observed: "....these matters could be adjudicated upon only by civil court and no revenue court or revenue officer had jurisdiction to entertain such a claim." 13. In this case the plaintiffs suit are for declaration that the plaintiffs were owners of certain land that will propounded by the defendants was forged and fake documents and that the defendants should not interfere with the possession over the suit land. It was laid down: "All that S. 139 (2) (vi) lays down is that a pure suit for the correction of an entry in the records of rights does not lie in a civil court, but the section does not prohibit the institution of a suit the result of which may be that the correction of the revenue records is an incidental matter which has to be made under the provisions of S.27 by the Revenue authorities. The Civil Court need not order the correction of the revenue records, it will be made ipso facto upon the decree of the civil court; the revenue authorities must give effect to that decision or decree of the civil court." 14. In Noor Hassan and others v. State and others 2008 (2) JKJ 630 (HC) the plaintiffs suit was resisted by the opposite party on the ground that the land in question was prohibited shamilat land and Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to try the suit in terms of the bar created by section 139 of the Land Revenue Act. The court held: "...(In) order to attract bar created under aforesaid Section, three essentials must exist in the matter. The court held: "...(In) order to attract bar created under aforesaid Section, three essentials must exist in the matter. First, that the plaintiff before the civil court seeks a declaration of his right or other interest in land, second, that the land is prohibited Shamilat and thirdly that the nature of interest claimed is triable by a Revenue Officer under the Land Revenue Act. From perusal of impugned order it appears that learned trial Judge was impressed by respondents contention that land under reference in the instant matter was prohibited Shamilat in respect of which he lacked jurisdiction/the bar create, under section 139 of the Act operated. The impugned order, however, does not contain anything to suggest that before returning a finding the learned trial Judge tried to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding nature of the land which is simply recorded as Shamilat in the revenue record appended with the file which in other words suggests that the impugned order actually rests on a mere presumption and not a definite finding regarding nature of the land and consequence hereof if any under the Land Revenue Act or any other statute. 15. In the present case the contesting respondents sought a declaratory decree in each of the two suits declaring the sale deed executed by proforma respondent in favour of appellants null and void, on the ground that the contesting respondents were in possession of the suit land as owners thereof, whereas the proforma respondents had no right or interest in the suit land that could have been transferred by him to the appellant. The controversy involved, was not thus within competence of the Revenue Officer nor could the Revenue Officer deal with, dispose of or take cognizance of the controversy projected by the contesting respondents before the Civil Court. The Revenue Officer was not competent to pass a declaratory declaring the sale deeds null and void. It may be recalled that in order to oust and debar jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 139 Land Revenue Act, it is necessary that the matter sought to be brought out from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, must be of such character and Chemistry which a Revenue Officer is empowered by the Land Revenue Act, to dispose of or take cognizance of. This apart the subject matter of the suit is admittedly not grazing land (kahcharai) and it was nobodys case before the trial Court not even that of the appellants that the subject matter of the suits was prohibited shamilat land. The appellants, as a matter of fact, claim propriety rights over part of the suit land (four kanals-two kanals under each of the sale deeds) on the strength of the sale deeds executed by the proforma respondent in their favour. Tehsildar concerned is even said to have attested a mutation in respect of the suit land vide mutation order No.3788 immediately whereafter the sale deeds were executed. The contesting respondents, however, claiming propriety rights over the suit land insist to have got the mutation order set aside in appeal. The rival claims of the parties over the suit land notwithstanding, there is agreement between the parties that the suit land is not prohibited shamilat land or Kahchariai land. 16. In the circumstances and for the reasons discussed above the substantial question of law reproduced above is answered in negative and jurisdiction of civil court (Sub Judge Budgam) to entertain and try civil suit 46-A/Numbri and 46-B/Numbri titled Gh. Mohammad Dar & others v. Gh. Mohammad Najar & others is held not to be barred under section 139 of J&K Land Revenue Act 1996. Resultantly the civil 2nd Appeals 14 of 2003 and 15 of 2003 are dismissed with costs and the judgments and decrees dated 30.5.2003 of Ist. Appellate Court in Appeal (File No. 1/Appeal) titled Mushtaq Ahmad Rafiquee v. Gh. Mohammad and others, are up held. Decree sheets be drawn up. Record be sent down. Record of Civil 2nd Appeals No.14 of 2003 and 15 of 2003 be consigned to records. Dismissed.