ORDER K.N. Keshavanarayana, J.— In this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner who has been arraigned as accused No. 2 in C.C. No. 14558/2002 on the file of VI Addl. C.M.M., Bangalore, has sought for quashing the criminal prosecution launched against him in the said case. 2. The respondent No. 1 represented by Labour Enforcement Officer (Central) filed a complaint under Section 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for short) against Jet Airways (India) Pvt. Ltd. represented by U.H. Shenoy, Area Manager, as accused No. 1 and the petitioner herein describing him as Chairman & Chief Executive of Jet Airways (India) Pvt. Ltd., alleging violation of Rules 74, 81(1)(i), 81(2), 81(3), 72, 73 & 82(2) of Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules' for short), inter alia contending that the Assistant Labour Commissioner inspected the establishment of Jet Airways (India) Pvt. Ltd., situated in J.C. Road. Bangalore, on March 9, 2002 at 14.10 hours and during the course of inspection, he observed contraventions and violation of various rules and accordingly, he prepared an inspection report and thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the accused persons calling upon them to show cause as to why prosecution should not be launched against them for such violations and also called upon them to submit compliance report immediately and to produce all the relevant records for verification. In spite of the same, the accused have not rectified the violations nor produced the records. Thus, they have committed offences punishable under Section 24 of the Act. 3. Upon presentation of the complaint, learned Magistrate on June 26, 2002, took cognizance of the offence against the two accused persons for offence under Section 32 of the Contract Labour Act, 1979 and directed issuance of summons to the accused persons. Thus, they have committed offences punishable under Section 24 of the Act. 3. Upon presentation of the complaint, learned Magistrate on June 26, 2002, took cognizance of the offence against the two accused persons for offence under Section 32 of the Contract Labour Act, 1979 and directed issuance of summons to the accused persons. After coming to know of the launching of criminal prosecution and the order directing issue of summons, the petitioner-accused No. 2 presented this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking for quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground that the learned Magistrate has failed to note that the complaint presented before him did not disclose in what manner the petitioner was responsible for running of the establishment at Bangalore and in what manner he was responsible for the offences alleged and without satisfying himself about these aspects of the matter, the learned Magistrate has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence, as such, there is no application of mind by the learned Magistrate before taking cognizance and directing issue of summons. It is also contended that cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate for the offence under Section 32 of the Contract Labour Act, 1979 itself shows that he has not applied his mind since there is no Contract Labour Act, 1979, but it is only the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 and Section 32 of the Act does not deal with any of the offence, but on the other hand, Section 32 deals with protection of action under that Act, as such the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate and directing issue of summons is bad in law. It is also contended that the learned Magistrate has failed to see that necessary averments to prosecute the petitioner as a functionary of the company or the establishment has not been made in the complaint and no case was made out against the petitioner as such, the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is bad in law and thus the' entire criminal proceedings launched against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. 4. Upon service of notice of this petition, the respondents have appeared through their; learned counsel. I have heard both sides and perused the records produced before this Court. 5. 4. Upon service of notice of this petition, the respondents have appeared through their; learned counsel. I have heard both sides and perused the records produced before this Court. 5. Sri K. Kasturi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner reiterating the grounds urged in the petition, vehemently contended that the very fact that the learned Magistrate has referred in the order of taking cognizance, the offence under Section 32 of the Contract Labour Act, 1979, itself is sufficient to indicate that he has not applied his mind before taking cognizance of the offence, as such, the entire proceedings initiated against the petitioner is vitiate and are liable to be quashed. It is also the submission of the learned senior counsel that, assuming for the purpose off arguments that the petitioner is a functionary of the Jet Airways, (India) Pvt. Ltd., in order to prosecute him for certain violations as a functionary of the company, necessary averment was required to be made in the complaint to show that he was in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time of commission of the offence, and in the absence of any such averment in the complaint, the entire prosecution initiated against the petitioner is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. It is also submitted by learned senior counsel that the complaint has been filed to wreck vengeance against the functionaries of the company and therefore, the entire prosecution as against the petitioner has to be quashed. The learned senior counsel also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and others Vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 , to contend that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment and the case on hand is the one which has been brought out only with a view to harass the petitioner who is the Chairman and Chief Executive of the Company. He also placed reliance, on the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1987-II-LLJ-333 and the judgment of this Court in the case of Siddharth Kejriwal Vs. Regional Director, ESI Corporation, ILR (1994) KAR 3484 in support of his contentions. 6. He also placed reliance, on the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1987-II-LLJ-333 and the judgment of this Court in the case of Siddharth Kejriwal Vs. Regional Director, ESI Corporation, ILR (1994) KAR 3484 in support of his contentions. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that, at the time of Inspection, an employee who was present furnished the name of the petitioner as the Chairman and Chief Executive and it is on the basis of such particulars, the petitioner was arraigned as accused. Therefore, the petitioner is the person who was responsible for and who was in-charge of the business of the company as such, he is liable to be prosecuted. It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the averments made in the complaint are sufficient to indicate that the petitioner was the person in-charge of and was responsible for the business of the company at the time of commission of the offence and therefore, there are no grounds for quashing the proceedings. It is also submitted that, mere mentioning of wrong provision in the order of the learned Magistrate cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings in view of the fact that, in the complaint, all the details of violations have been set out and therefore, there are no merit in the petition and is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have bestowed my serious attention to the submissions made on behalf of both parties. 8. The principle relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the complaint and criminal proceedings are now well settled by catena of decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court. In the case of. Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2780 , the Apex Court after referring to various earlier decisions on the point, has summarised the principles at Para-9 of the judgment which reads thus at pp. 481 &'-482 of MLJ (Crl): 9. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal, proceedings have been reiterated by this' Court in several decisions. 481 &'-482 of MLJ (Crl): 9. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal, proceedings have been reiterated by this' Court in several decisions. To mention a few - xxx xxx xxx xxx The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the; allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the, reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the Court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and; inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle of scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out (a) purely a civil wrong, or (b) purely a criminal offence: or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law may also involve a criminal offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out (a) purely a civil wrong, or (b) purely a criminal offence: or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature of scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. These principles have been reiterated in subsequent decisions also. 9. A reading of the complaint filed by the respondents in this case indicates that the violations alleged were said to have been committed by the company. Section 25 of the Act provides that if the person committing an offence under this Act is a company, the company as well as the every person in-charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time of commission of offence, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly, The petitioner is arraigned as accused No. 2 in the complaint on the premise that he is the Chairman and Chief Executive. The Area Manager of Jet Airways (India) Pvt. Ltd. is arraigned as accused No. 1. inter alia stating that, they have engaged contract workers through the contract labourer for and on behalf of Jet Airways (India) Pvt. Ltd., and thus, he is the principle employer as defined under Section 2(1)(g) of the Act. It is not spelt out in the complaint as to who among accused 1 and 2, was the principle employer of Jet Airways (India) Pvt. Ltd., in relation to this establishment at Bangalore. Section 2(1)(g) of the Act defines "principal employer". Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 2(1)(g) are not relevant for our purposes. According to Sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(1)(g) "principal employer" means, in respect of any other establishment, any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment. Section 2(1)(g) of the Act defines "principal employer". Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 2(1)(g) are not relevant for our purposes. According to Sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(1)(g) "principal employer" means, in respect of any other establishment, any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment. Section 2(e)(ii) of the Act defines "establishment" as a place where any industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation is carried on. Even according to the complainant, he visited the office of Jet Airways (India) Pvt.: Ltd. situated in J.C. Road. Bangalore. Therefore, the office at J.C. Road is an establishment within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e)(ii) of the Act. In respect of this establishment, the principal employer would be any person responsible for the supervision and control of that establishment. Even according to the complainant, accused No. 1 is the Area Manager of the establishment in Bangalore. The averment in the complaint that accused is the principal employer as defined under Section 2(1)(g) or the Act is referable to accused No. 1 and not to accused No. 2. This Court in Siddharth Kejriwal and Ors. v. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance. Corporation, Bangalore (supra), while dealing with a case arising under the provision of E.S.I. Act. and while considering the provision of Section 86A of E.S.I. Act which deals with offences by a company, has observed thus in Para 24: 24. It is undisputed that, the factory was run by a company. As such the owner of the factory was the company. In that sense the company would be a principal employer. If the owner is sought to be prosecuted as the principal owner of the factory then it is the company which has to be prosecuted. Section 86A provides that where the offence is committed by the company then even others could be made vicariously liable for that offence. However to make others vicariously liable for that offence it will have to be, in the first instance, alleged that they were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company when the offence was committed. Without such an averment a complaint against other persons for the offence committed by the company cannot be maintained. In this connection I may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, AIR 1983 SC 67 . Without such an averment a complaint against other persons for the offence committed by the company cannot be maintained. In this connection I may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, AIR 1983 SC 67 . That was a case where for an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act by a company some Directors and Manager of the company were prosecuted. In the complaint the following averment had been made: Accused 3 is the Manager of accused 2 and accused 4 to 7 are the directors of accused 2 and as such they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of accused 2 at the time of sampling. In that case also the Supreme Court, while holding that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same no offence is established held that there was no clear averment in the complaint that, the Directors were really in charge of the manufacture and responsible far the conduct of the business and that the words "as such" found in the above portion of the complaint indicate that the complainant has merely presumed that the Directors of the company must be guilty because they are holding a particular office. Though the Supreme Court held that so far as the manager was concerned from the very nature of his duties it can be safely inferred that he would be vicariously liable for the offence so far as the Directors were concerned, the Supreme Court held that here was not even a whisper or a shed of evidence to show that, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant there was any act committed by the Directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court quashing the proceedings against the Directors, though it held that the proceedings could not be quashed against the Manager. 10. In the case on hand except stating that the petitioner herein is the Chairman and Chief Executive, it is not stated as to how accused No. 2-petitioner herein is the person in-charge of establishment at Bangalore and responsible for the conduct of its business. 10. In the case on hand except stating that the petitioner herein is the Chairman and Chief Executive, it is not stated as to how accused No. 2-petitioner herein is the person in-charge of establishment at Bangalore and responsible for the conduct of its business. In the absence of any such averments in the complaint, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of any of the offences, alleged in the complaint, against the petitioner herein; As held by the Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Surendra Prasad Sinha (supra), the Magistracy, is duty bound to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for and it is only on satisfying that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded, then only process should be issued. At that stage, the Court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration, before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. The learned Magistrate in this case appears to have not applied his mind at all to the averments made in the complaint to find out as to whether the petitioner herein is in any way responsible for the conduct of the business of the establishment in which the alleged violation of law was said to have been committed. The non-application of the judicious mind by the learned Magistrate is also very much apparent from the fact that in the course of the order dated June 26, 2002 passed for the purpose of taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate proceeded to take cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 32 of the Contract Labour Act, 1979. In the first place, it is necessary to note that there is no Act called Contract Labour Act, 1979. On the other hand, it is the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. In the second place Section 32 of the Act does not provide for any penal action or for initiation of criminal proceedings against any person. Section 32 deals with the protection given to the officers of the department. On the other hand, it is the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. In the second place Section 32 of the Act does not provide for any penal action or for initiation of criminal proceedings against any person. Section 32 deals with the protection given to the officers of the department. According to Section 32 of the Act, no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall he against any registering officer, licensing officer or any other government servant or against any member of the Central Board or the State Board, as the case may be, for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or order made, thereunder. In fact, the Section which provides for punishment are Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. The learned Magistrate even without looking to the provisions of the Act, has proceeded to take cognizance. From this it is clear that the learned Magistrate at the time of taking cognizance has not applied his mind, which has resulted in registration of the criminal case and ordering for issuance, of summons. 11. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in the absence of any clear averment in the complaint against the petitioner herein, the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance against the petitioner for any of the offences alleged therein. It is submitted that accused No. 1 is the principal employer in the capacity as an Area Manager of the establishment in Bangalore and in fact he was ready to plead guilty before the learned Magistrate and it is only because there is an order of stay in this petition no proceedings could take place before the Court below. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner herein is not sustainable and it is liable to be quashed. 12. Accordingly, petition is allowed. The criminal prosecution launched against, the petitioner-accused No. 2 in C.C. No. 14558/ 2002 on the file of VI Addl. C.M.M. Bangalore, stands quashed.