JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—This First Appeal From Order has been filed by the U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) against the order dated 21.7.2006 passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad in Misc. Case No. 115 of 2000 (D.S. Mathur v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and another), whereby he has set aside the award dated 31.12.1999 passed by the Collector, Ghaziabad in Case No. 41/98-99 between Smt. Leela Mathur and U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.. 2. The facts of the case are that a plot No. D-107 Bulandshahr Road, Ghaziabad was allotted to Sri D.S. Mathur (hereinafter referred to as the allottee) on 15.7.1971. Certain conditions were contemplated in the allotment letter and the allottee applied for extension of time to complete the constructions, which was rejected by the Corporation on 29.8.1971. On 9.1.1973, a reminder was sent to the allottee regarding completion of construction and registration of a lease-deed. The lease-deed was executed on 3.7.1973 in favour of proprietor M/S Mason Mathur Engineering. On a report obtained by the Corporation it was found that the plot was being used for a purpose other than for which it was allotted and notice was given to such effect as also that the allottee is in default of the payment schedule. A recovery certificate was issued on 10.8.1976 for recovery of certain dues upon the allottee as arrears of land revenue and in default the Collector, Ghaziabad issued notice for auction sale of the plot. The Corporation alleges that it had sent several notices during the years 1975, 1976 and 1984 to the allottee at his address at Ghaziabad and also at his address at London (U.K.) but when no response was received the lease was forfeited and determined and re-entry by the Corporation was ordered. The Corporation alleges to have re-entered the plot on 24.2.1986 and subsequently it was allotted/transferred by the Corporation to some other persons and ultimately to one Sri Mohan Lal Arora, Proprietor M/S Gears (India) on 19.2.1992, which was followed by execution of a Registered lease-deed on 24.4.1992 in his favour. 3. The case of the Corporation is that on 4.3.1998 the wife of Sri D.S. Mathur namely Smt. Leela Mathur made an application for invoking the Arbitration Clause contained in the lease-deed. 3. The case of the Corporation is that on 4.3.1998 the wife of Sri D.S. Mathur namely Smt. Leela Mathur made an application for invoking the Arbitration Clause contained in the lease-deed. The Corporation claims to have appeared before the Arbitrator and filed their detail objections and the documents as evidence whereupon the Collector Ghaziabad/Arbitrator gave an award on 31.12.1999, wherein he rejected the application of Smt. Leela Mathur on the ground of limitation and maintainability. 4. An application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed by Smt. Leela Mathur as Attorney of the allottee Sri D.S. Mathur, which was registered in the Court of District Judge as Misc. Case No. 115 of 2000 (D.S. Mathur v. UPSIDC and others). The application was dismissed by the District Judge by an order dated 7.9.2000. The Corporation alleges that the allottee filed a review application to the award dated 31.12.1999 of the Collector Ghaziabad, which was dismissed on 7.8.2003. A Writ Petition No. 45731 of 2003 was filed by the allottee against the said order and for restoration of possession which was dismissed by the Writ Court on 26.8.2004 on the ground of statutory alternative remedy. It is alleged that the allottee filed a Civil Appeal No. 6985 of 2005 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order passed by the Writ Court which was disposed of with directions on 3.5.2006 and thereafter by the impugned order dated 21.7.2006 passed on the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the District Judge has set aside the award dated 31.12.1999 where against the Corporation has preferred this appeal. 5. Sri Siddharth Verma, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the finding recorded by the District Judge in the impugned order on the issue of non-service of notices upon the allottee prior to cancellation of his lease-deed is illegal and is not based on any material on record. He further submits that the finding recorded that the allottee did not get any opportunity of hearing before cancellation of the lease-deed is illegal. He also states that the application invoking the Arbitration Clause made by Smt. Leela Mathur on 4.3.1998 was beyond time and barred by limitation and the finding contrary thereto recorded in the impugned order is erroneous. He further submits that the finding recorded that the allottee did not get any opportunity of hearing before cancellation of the lease-deed is illegal. He also states that the application invoking the Arbitration Clause made by Smt. Leela Mathur on 4.3.1998 was beyond time and barred by limitation and the finding contrary thereto recorded in the impugned order is erroneous. Learned counsel has also challenged the locus-standi of Smt. Leela Mathur to maintain the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on the basis that although she was wife of the allottee she did not possess a registered power of attorney to act on his behalf. A further submission is made that no grounds were made out for setting aside the award as enumerated in Section 34 of the Act and therefore, the impugned order has been passed illegally. 6. Smt. Leela Mathur wife of the allottee Sri D.S. Mathur appearing in person has argued that her husband is living abroad and has authorised her by issuing a power of attorney in her favour and even otherwise being wife of the allottee, she is entitled to maintain these proceedings. She has admitted the execution of the lease-deed in favour of her husband of the plot in question. Her main submission is that the allottee was never served with any notice prior to cancellation of the lease-deed and re-entry by the Corporation. It is submitted that on 16.11.1995, the Corporation wrote a letter to the allottee that since the terms and conditions have been violated and notices dated 24.4.1984 and 2.5.1984 have already been issued and served but even then default has been made by the allottee hence, in view of the violation of the lease conditions by notice dated 17.2.1986, the allotment has been cancelled and Corporation has re-entered on 24.2.1986. It was also informed that the land has been allotted to another person. She submits that the allottee protested against the said letter dated 16.11.1995 and correspondence took place between the parties on several dates but to no avail and hence, the application was filed invoking the Arbitration Clause treating the letter dated 16.11.1995 as the date when the right accrued. 7. In these facts, the arbitration was started and the Collector, Ghaziabad gave the award dated 31.12.1999 rejecting the application dated 4.3.1998 on the ground of limitation and maintainability. 8. 7. In these facts, the arbitration was started and the Collector, Ghaziabad gave the award dated 31.12.1999 rejecting the application dated 4.3.1998 on the ground of limitation and maintainability. 8. While considering the application under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award dated 31.12.1999, the District Judge, Ghaziabad considered the question of limitation and recorded that notice dated 24.4.1984 was sent to the allottee at the factory address and his London address but the allottee had denied receipt of the notice and stated that earlier correspondence was made by the Corporation to the allottee on his Delhi address but deliberately the notice for cancellation of lease-deed was not sent to the Delhi address. The District Judge found that U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. had sent the receipt of payment of Rs.2000/- to the allottee at his Delhi address, which was the address of the father-in-law of the allottee. It has been recorded that the notice sent to the factory address and London address were returned unserved and the Corporation again sent a notice at the same address. The District Judge found that the notice dated 24.4.1984 was not served on the allottee prior to cancellation of the lease-deed and hence the allottee was not given any opportunity of hearing prior to cancellation of his lease-deed nor the intimation of cancellation of the lease-deed by letter dated 17.2.1986 was ever served on the allottee. He has concluded that when the letter was not served upon the allottee, the allottee had no knowledge of the cancellation of the lease-deed and re-entry over the plot in question. The District Judge has found that the allottee and his wife came to know about the cancellation of lease-deed only on 16.11.1995 when they received the letter sent by the Corporation. He has also taken into account the search made by the allottee in the office of the Sub-Registrar-I, Ghaziabad in the year 1995 which showed that till then the plot in question was still registered in the name of Sri D.S. Mathur. The District Judge was of the opinion that the limitation would start from the date of knowledge which was 16.11.1995 and invoking of the Arbitration Clause on 4.3.1998 was within the limitation of 3 years as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The District Judge was of the opinion that the limitation would start from the date of knowledge which was 16.11.1995 and invoking of the Arbitration Clause on 4.3.1998 was within the limitation of 3 years as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. On the aforesaid reasoning the finding recorded by the Arbitrator on the question of limitation has been negatived by the District Judge, who has held that invoking of the Arbitration Clause on 4.3.1998 was within the period of limitation. 9. On the question of locus-standi the District Judge found that Smt. Leela Mathur was wife of the allottee namely Sri D.S. Mathur and is General Power of Attorney holder of her husband, which was executed on 22.8.1996. 10. From the submissions advanced on behalf of both the parties, the dispute clearly appears to be that the lease-deed was cancelled and the Corporation re-entered the plot in question without any notice to the lessee. The District Judge in the impugned order has also recorded his findings on the aforementioned grievance of the allottee. 11. The record indicates that the lease-deed was executed in the year 1973, wherein the address of the allottee was clearly mentioned as : “Sri D.S. Mathur R/o 257 Bonja Patel Marg, Ghaziabad.” 12. On 30.10.1975, the allottee appears to have written a letter to the post-master GPO, Ghaziabad informing him that he has changed his address and his mail be delivered at the new address. The new address was of the plot in question i.e. “M/s Mason Mathur Engineering D-107, Industrial Area Site No. 1, Bulandshahar Road, Ghaziabad-201001.” 13. On 19.11.1975 another letter was written by the allottee to the ADO, Ghaziabad informing him of the same address, which was given by him to the post-master GPO, Ghaziabad. These two letters do not communicate in any manner that the allottee had informed the Corporation about any change of address but it has informed the Postal Authority and other Government Authority to deliver his mail at the address of the plot in question. 14. The record indicates that certain proceedings were initiated against the allottee by the State Bank of India for default in repayment of the loan. The Corporation appears to have communicated with the allottee with regard to default in payment of instalment of premium at the addresses mentioned below : 1. 14. The record indicates that certain proceedings were initiated against the allottee by the State Bank of India for default in repayment of the loan. The Corporation appears to have communicated with the allottee with regard to default in payment of instalment of premium at the addresses mentioned below : 1. Mason Mathur Engineering D-107 Industrial Area Site No. 1, Bulandshahar Road, Ghaziabad (letters dated 30.4.1976, 10.8.1976, 24.4.1984 and 2.5.1984). 2. Mason Mathur Engineering 257 Kuchha Road Patel Marg, Ghaziabad (letters dated 9.5.1975, 8.8.1975 and 30.4.1976) 3. Mason Mathur Engineering 257 Bonja Patel Marg, Ghaziabad (letters dated 24.4.1984 and 2.5.1984) 4. 88- Back Lane London NW-90 AJ (U.K.) (letters dated 24.4.1984, 2.5.1984 and 17.2.1986) 15. The Corporation also received a communication from one Sri L.B. Mathur R/o IX/115-98 West Azad Nagar Delhi -51 stating that Sri L.B. Mathur is the father-in-law of the allottee D.S. Mathur and is looking after the interest of the allottee in the absence of D.S. Mathur who is away at U.K.. The Corporation appears to have started communication at the address of Sri L.B. Mathur regarding the default of payments at his Azad Nagar, Delhi address. 16. A letter dated 23.12.1976 appears to have been written by the Corporation to the allottee at the address mentioned below : To, Sri D.S. Mathur C/o Sri L.B. Mathur XI/115(98) West Azad Nagar, Delhi-51 17. From the aforesaid record, it appears that the allottee was having several addresses for communication and apart from his address given in the lease-deed there is no communication available on record by the allottee to the Corporation regarding change of address for communication but it appears that from time to time the allottee/his representatives must have furnished addresses for communication where the Corporation may communicate. A receipt of Rs.2,000/- was issued by the Corporation on 16.7.1976 mentioning therein the address of Sri L.B. Mathur : “Mason Mathur Engineering XI/115-98 West Azad Nagar, Delhi-51" 18. The notice issued by the Corporation informing the allottee of default in payment were issued in the year 1984 and 1986 at the addresses : “1. 257, Bonja Patel Marg, Ghaziabad, 2. D 107, Industrial Area Site No. 1, Bulandshahr Road Ghaziabad 3. 88 Back Lane, London NW 90 AJ, (U.K.)” 19. The above addresses of the allottee were available with the Corporation and they have sent notices by post. 20. 257, Bonja Patel Marg, Ghaziabad, 2. D 107, Industrial Area Site No. 1, Bulandshahr Road Ghaziabad 3. 88 Back Lane, London NW 90 AJ, (U.K.)” 19. The above addresses of the allottee were available with the Corporation and they have sent notices by post. 20. Whenever service has to be affected of a communication it shall be deemed to be effected if it is properly addressed, prepaid and posted. Unless a contrary is proved it will be deemed to have been effected in the ordinary course of post. In the present case, there is no allegation of refusal or denial of issuing the letters. When the presumption of service is rebutable the same requires to be rebutted by leading evidence. The presumption under Section 114 (f) of the Evidence Act arises on proof of the fact of posting the letter in the ordinary post and the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is with regard to the letter sent through registered post. It is settled law that the presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence but the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebute the presumption. 21. In the present case admittedly the allottee was living abroad and communication was received by the Corporation from his father-in-law Sri L.B. Mathur giving his address for communication. The Corporation had issued notices at the address provided by and on behalf of the allottee to the Corporation and such addresses including the address of district Ghaziabad, Delhi and London (U.K.) were available with the Corporation for communications to the allottee. The notices were sent on the aforesaid addresses including the address of plot No. D-107. There is nothing on record to indicate that the allottee has set up a case that the Corporation did not dispatch any such letters/notices. The Corporation clearly pleaded that it has sent letters and notices from time to time to the allottee at all his addresses including those at Ghaziabad, Delhi and London. When the factum that the Corporation sent the letters/notices is not denied then the presumption would be that if the communications were sent at the proper address the service would be deemed sufficient. The Corporation cannot be held responsible if an allottee frequently changes his address and does not inform the Corporation of such change of address. When the factum that the Corporation sent the letters/notices is not denied then the presumption would be that if the communications were sent at the proper address the service would be deemed sufficient. The Corporation cannot be held responsible if an allottee frequently changes his address and does not inform the Corporation of such change of address. The letters written by the allottee to the GPO Ghaziabad and ADO, Ghaziabad indicate that the allottee has changed his address and requested that his mail be delivered at the changed address. But the changed address was not given to the Corporation. Therefore, if the Corporation dispatched the letters/notices at the last address of the allottee or last known address its service would be presumed and the Corporation cannot be placed at a disadvantage if the GPO, Ghaziabad failed to deliver the letters/communication at the changed address of the allottee. Moreover this address was none other than the postal address of the plot in question where the notices were sent. 22. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the notice dated 24.4.1984 was sent at Mason Mathur Engineering, 257 Bonja Patel Marg, Ghaziabad and at D-107 Industrial Area, Bulandshahr Road, Ghaziabad and also at 88-Back Lane London, NW-90 AJ (U.K.). The letter dated 2.5.1984 was issued by the Corporation at all the three above addresses and when the violation of the terms of the lease-deed were not rectified the Corporation issued the notice dated 17.2.1986 at the following addresses : “1. 257, Bonja Patel Marg, Ghaziabad, 2. D 107, Industrial Area Site No. 1, Bulandshahr Road Ghaziabad 3. 88 Back Lane, London NW 90 AJ, (U.K.)” It re-entered the plot on 24.2.1986. Admittedly the defaulted instalments of premiums were not paid till this date nor they were paid thereafter. 23. Under these circumstances when there is presumption of service of notice sent by post by the Corporation and it has not been successfully rebutted then it cannot be held that the proceedings for determination of lease-deed were conducted ex-parte or without issuing notice. There is no plea that the Corporation did not issue the letters/notices. 24. By the impugned order such submission of the Corporation has not been considered nor any finding has been recorded in view of Section 114(f) of the Evidence Act. There is no plea that the Corporation did not issue the letters/notices. 24. By the impugned order such submission of the Corporation has not been considered nor any finding has been recorded in view of Section 114(f) of the Evidence Act. The application under Section 34 of the Act has been allowed on the ground of non service of notice. The impugned order has not considered the effect of the provision of Section 114 (f) of the Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. As such the finding contrary thereto recorded in the impugned order are not based on any evidence and appear to be based upon the general understanding of the facts pleaded by the allottee through his Power of Attorney Holder. 25. Under these circumstances it has to be held that the Corporation had sent the letters and notices by post at the address of the allottee given in the lease deed, as also on the address provided by him to the post-master GPO, Ghaziabad for communication of all his mail and at the London address of the allottee which was the last known address. There is no plea that the Corporation did not issue the letters/notices by post nor the presumption of service has been rebutted by any evidence. When the letters/notices were sent during the period prior to cancellation of the lease deed the plot in question was in possession of the allottee and hence it was a proper address for communication and this address of plot No. D-107 was also unchanged till the lease deed was cancelled on 17.2.1986. Therefore, it cannot be held that letters/notices sent to the address of the plot in question i.e. D-107, Industrial Area, Site No. 1, Bulandshahr Road, Ghaziabad were not properly addressed. 26. In view of the aforesaid finding recorded in this appeal the question of limitation would arise and the letters written by the wife of the allottee (Power of Attorney holder) in the year 1995 to the Corporation cannot be said to have been written when the right accrued or with due diligence and further the application dated 4.3.1998 made for invoking the provision of the Arbitration Clause was clearly barred under Section 137 of the Limitation Act since it was not filed within three years of the date when the right accrued to the allottee. Even the letter dated 16.11.1995 written by the Corporation to Smt. Leela Mathur was in response to her querry dated 13.9.1995 and it was sent at the West Azad Nagar, Delhi address. The said communication cannot be held to be the date of knowledge for limitation to start running. Clearly it cannot be the date when the right to sue or right accrued to Smt. Leela Mathur. 27. For the aforementioned reasons the impugned order cannot be upheld. It requires to be set aside. 28. Another reason given in the impugned order is that the award dated 31.12.1999 does not contain any reason and hence is in violation of Section 31(3)(a) of the Act. The conclusion of the Arbitrator is self explanatory for the purpose of the submission. It is quoted here under : “In view of available facts and evidence produced by both the parties observed lawfully. On perusal of the file it is clear that being a old matter this cannot be decided under the Arbitration Act because the applicant has sought natural justice in her application. But the applicant has not stated clearly anything with regard to the notices sent in year 1976 non-payment of dues. As the matter is very old and in the same interest of the other parties except UPSIDC is also involved who have not been made party nor their interest have been highlighted. On the basis of above facts the proceedings of arbitration by Smt. Leela Mathur W/o for Sri D.S. Mathur after 12 years is fully time barred and is not maintainable is liable to be dismissed. Order On the above discussion the application of Smt. Leela Mathur W/o Shri D.S. Mathur dt.4.3.1998 has been dismissed. Because the application being time barred and not maintainable being out of jurisdiction of this Court. For the applicant it would be proper to approach competent Court. Any relief to applicant cannot be given to the applicant. File be consigned to record room after completion. Dated :31.12.1999 Sd/- Inderjit Verma, District Magistrate/Arbitrator, Ghaziabad”. 29. The arbitrator has dismissed the application as time barred and as not maintainable. Reasons for such conclusion are available in the body of the Award. Any relief to applicant cannot be given to the applicant. File be consigned to record room after completion. Dated :31.12.1999 Sd/- Inderjit Verma, District Magistrate/Arbitrator, Ghaziabad”. 29. The arbitrator has dismissed the application as time barred and as not maintainable. Reasons for such conclusion are available in the body of the Award. Hence when the application has been dismissed as time barred and not maintainable for reasons recorded therein then no reasons or conclusions were required to be given or made on the merits of the claim of the applicant. Therefore the reference to Section 31(3)(a) of the Act and its alleged violation are totally misplaced. 30. In view of the findings recorded above the impugned order dated 21.7.2006 passed by District Judge, Ghaziabad in Misc. Case No. 115 of 2000 (D.S. Mathur v. UPSIDC and another) is set aside. The application dated 4.3.1998 made under Section 34 of the Act is rejected. This First Appeal From Order is allowed. 31. Parties to bear their own costs. ————