JUDGMENT By this petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the petitioners challenge the order dated 28.01.1999 passed by Respondent No.1 - Hon'ble Minister in proceedings under Section 8A of Bombay Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 1953 Act). By said order, Respondent No.1 has canceled the license given to father of Petitioner No.2 and directed all concerned to apply under the provisions of Rule 100 and 101 of Maharashtra Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1966, (hereinafter referred to as 1966 Rules), for grant of fresh license. The said orders are stayed by this Court. This appeal under Section 8-A of above mentioned 1953 Act in turn challenge the orders of the Collector dated 30.07.1997 and by said orders, the Collector has found that the applicant before it viz. present Respondent No.2 should approach appropriate Civil Court for redressal of its grievance about possession of premises of Cinema Theater viz. Laxmi Theater and in interregnum the situation then prevailing would continue. It, therefore, rejected the application for suspension of Cinema license or for canceling license' moved by Respondent No.2 and permitted present petitioner No.2 through legal representatives to enter name of petitioner No.1 as its nominee. It is not in dispute that by this order, the Collector has disposed of three applicati9ns or objections filed before him by the parties. The first one is dated 14.06.1996 by which Respondent No.2 raised objection to introduction of petitioner No.1 as its nominee by the deceased petitioner No.2. The second one is dated 25.06.1996 by which Respondent No.2 sought cancellation of its license as per provisions of Section 6 of 1953 Act and the last one is dated 28.05.1996 by present petitioner No.1 to grant license to him. 2. The controversy has been considered in the light of earlier litigation between the parties. Civil Suit NO.145 of 1970 was filed by present Respondent No.2 against father of deceased petitioner No.2 for injunction. In that suit the contention was defendant therein viz., K. Appu was appointed as Manager sometime in the year 1946 and initially he was being paid Rs. I 50/- per month which was later on raised to Rs.225/- per month. His services were terminated vide order dated 06.06.1970. The prayer was to restrain said K. Appu from entering premises of Laxmi Talkies and from acting or representing himself as Manager of said firm/company. I 50/- per month which was later on raised to Rs.225/- per month. His services were terminated vide order dated 06.06.1970. The prayer was to restrain said K. Appu from entering premises of Laxmi Talkies and from acting or representing himself as Manager of said firm/company. A prayer for temporary injunction was made there and ultimately that dispute came before this Court in Civil Revision Application No.520 of 1971. Vide judgment dated 19.10.1972, this Court found that admittedly K. Appu was continuing to manage the Theater which was in the name of Respondent No.2 company and, therefore, during the pendency of suit, it made certain arrangement. The deceased was directed to maintain accounts of daily collection, to supply statement thereof to plaintiff, plaintiff was given right to enter and to inspect accounts and to watch the working. The collections were directed to be deposited in State Bank oflndia at Hinganghat. These orders were passed in revision filed by present Respondent No.2. The suit then remained pending and defendant K. Appu expired on 27.11.1982. The suit was then disposed of as abated on 23.04.1984. 3. On 17.03.1994, K. Ravi Appu s/o. defendant in Regular Civil Suit No.145 of 1970 filed Writ Petition No. 761 of 1994 before this Court against State of Maharashtra and its other officers for quashing of demand of Rs.l,93,3001- on account of land revenue. Petitioner No.1 therein was Manager of Laxmi Talkies while petitioner No.2 was K. Ravi Appu. Petitioner No.3 was shown as M/s. Rajlakshmi Pictures Pvt. Ltd., Akola, as proprietors of Laxmi Talkies through its Manager Shri. K. Ravi Appu. In the said petition, in para 2, K. Ravi Appu (deceased petitioner No.2 in present matter) has described himself as Manager of Petitioner No.1 Laxmi Talkies belonging to petitioner No.3 - Company. On the basis of this material, Shri. Dastane, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that Respondent No.1 has overlooked several material facts which has resulted in failure to exercise jurisdiction. He has invited attention to relevant provisions of 1953 Act as also 1966 Rules and urged that position prevailing after death of Shri. K. Appu on 27.11.1982 till 1996 has not been evaluated at a1l by Respondent No.1. He states that license was renewed on six occasions from 1983 till 1989 and Respondent No.2 - Company never raised any objection to the same. He states that license was renewed on six occasions from 1983 till 1989 and Respondent No.2 - Company never raised any objection to the same. The inclusion of name of Ravi K. Appu in license after the death of K. Appu was never challenged and in 1996, the challenge was only to proposed nomination of petitioner No.1 - Deepak as his nominee by Ravi K. Appu. Respondent No.3 Collector has rightly understood the nature and scope of controversy and has applied the mind correctly leaving rest of the dispute for adjudication in Civil Suit. 4. Shri. Dastane, learned counsel for the petitioners has invited attention to the provisions of Section 8-A to urge that appeal as filed was not tenable and at this stage the learned counsel for respondent No.2 stated that the order of Respondent No.1 impugned before this Court is not under Section 8-A but in fact the said order needs to be read as an order under Section 8-B of 1953 Act. In view of this position, Shri. Dastane, learned counsel then has urged that in proceedings before Respondent No.2, there was no challenge to license standing in the name of the deceased K. Appu or then as transferred to Ravi K. Appu. In the absence of such challenge, the findings on said aspect are recorded to the prejudice of the petitioners and without hearing them. He has urged that even under Section 8-8, such grounds could not have been looked into suo motu by Respondent No. I. In any case, the issues settled several years back could not have been looked into and the limitation ono days prescribed for preferring a revision also applies when power is exercised suo motu. The learned counsel urged that the cognizance in any case could have been taken in reasonable time and hear the cognizance of factors not expressly raised has been taken after 12 to 13 years. The reliance has been placed upon the judgments in the case of Shahabad Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Secretary to Government of Haryana Corporation, reported at (2006)12 SCC 404 , Vijayabai Vs. Shriram Tukaram, reported at (1999)1 SCC 693 : [1999(1) ALL MR 225 (S.C.»), Madhukar Rao Vs. Claims Commissioner, reported at (1998)8 SCC 544 , State of H. P. Vs. Rajkumar Brijender Singh, reported at (2004)10 SCC 585 and Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin Vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997)6 SCC 71 . 5. Shriram Tukaram, reported at (1999)1 SCC 693 : [1999(1) ALL MR 225 (S.C.»), Madhukar Rao Vs. Claims Commissioner, reported at (1998)8 SCC 544 , State of H. P. Vs. Rajkumar Brijender Singh, reported at (2004)10 SCC 585 and Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin Vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997)6 SCC 71 . 5. The attention has been invited to form prescribed in Rules for grant of Cinema license i.e. Form - E. The original register of license made available by learned AGP is also shown to this Court to urge that such register is required to be maintained as per Rule 3 of 1966 Rules and in its column No.3 while recording its proprietor or manager, name of the deceased Shri K. Appu has been recorded as Manager, Laxmi Talkies, Hinganghat. The argument is form of Cinema license does not require name of Manager to be disclosed. Clause 21 in Cinema license is relied upon to show that it specifically requires names of persons nominated as Managers under Rule 116 to be added in Clause 21. Attention is also invited to the license placed as Annexure IV with writ petition to urge that names of persons appointed later on as Managers are required to be included at the end after clause 29 therein. As name of K. Appu never figured either in Clause 21 or at the end of Clause 29, he was never a Manager. Contention is, finding in this respect reached by Respondent No.3 - Collector has been erroneously interfered with by Respondent No.1. 6. The learned counsel states that after the death of K. Appu in 1982, Respondent No.2 did not move any application for grant of Cinema license or for its renewal in its name. He has further urged that it was nowhere the case of Respondent No.2 that the deceased K. Appu was nominated by it as a Manager under Rule 116. The provisions of Rule 2(t) of 1966 Rules are relied upon to show that Manager also includes a licensee. 7. The finding by Respondent No.1 about lapsing of license is also challenged by contending that the same runs counter to law on the point as declared by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramalaxmi Chimanlal Raval Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at 1997(6) LJ 1187. 7. The finding by Respondent No.1 about lapsing of license is also challenged by contending that the same runs counter to law on the point as declared by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramalaxmi Chimanlal Raval Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at 1997(6) LJ 1187. Attention has been invited to provisions of Rule 128 as also Rule 103 read with Rule 105 of 1966 Rules to show that after death of licensee, there is an express provision for renewal of such license and the license never lapsed. According to learned counsel, harmonious reading of Rule 128 with Rule 103 show that only transfer inter vivos is prohibited. In these circumstances, learned counsel argues that the impugned order passed by Respondent No.1 needs to be quashed and set aside and the order passed by Respondent No.3 - Collector needs to be restored. 8. On Civil Application No.4270 of 2002, learned counsel has urged that as per interim orders of this Court, amount of Rs. 1 0,000/- per month has been deposited by the petitioners but as Respondent No.2 does not own the license, they are not entitled to recover any amount from the petitioners and the amount in deposit with the Registry of this Court, therefore, be allowed to be withdrawn by the petitioners. 9. Mrs. Deshpande, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for Respondents No.1 & 3 has supported the order passed by Respondent No.1 - the Hon'ble Minister. The reference has been made to stand on affidavit taken before this Court to show that the impugned order has been passed by Respondent No. t only on an appeal under Section 8-A of t 953 Act. In the alternative and without prejudice, the learned AGP has urged that time limit of 30 days prescribed in Section 8-8 is only for filing of revision by aggrieved party and there is no time limit for exercise of suo motu power by the respondents. 10. Shri. Haq, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has relied upon the stand in Regular Civil Suit No.145 of 1970 or finding in Civil Revision Application No.520 of 1971 to urge that nowhere a finding that deceased K. Appu was not the Manager has been recorded. Attention is also invited to stand of the deceased K. Appu in written statement in that suit to show that deceased K. Appu also accepted his position as a Manager. Attention is also invited to stand of the deceased K. Appu in written statement in that suit to show that deceased K. Appu also accepted his position as a Manager. The findings of Respondent No.1 are stated to be based upon this material available on record and, therefore, not either erroneous or perverse. Similarly, stand of Ravi K. Appu in Writ Petition No. 761 of 1994 is pointed out to this Court to urge that such status as Manager was also accepted by him and he ever claimed as a licensee. In this background, contention is, for the first time in May, 1996, effort was made by Ravi K. Appu to claim ownership over license and hence at that time appropriate objection was immediately raised by Respondent No.2. The mischief was sought to be prohibited by requesting Respondent No.3 to suspend/ cancel license. Attention has been invited to findings recorded by the Collector with contention that there for the first time the finding that Ravi K. Appu was licensee has come. The provisions of Section 8-8 of 1953 Act are pressed into service to show that revision against the same can be filed within 30 days and hence appeal though styled under Section 8-A, the proceedings can also be treated as revision under Section 8-B. The various grounds raised in said memo are pressed into service to urge that in view of the findings recorded by the Collector, necessary grounds to meet the same were expressly raised in that memo and contention that the petitioners had no notice thereof is argued to be misconceived. The finding by Respondent No.1 about status of K. Appu is sought to be justified by pointing out that the material on record including old entry in register of licenses mentions K. Appu as Manager and interpretation or acceptance of that record by State Government is, therefore, neither erroneous nor perverse. 11. The Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ramalaxmi Chimanlal Raval Vs. State of Maharashtra, (supra) is stated to be not laying down correct law as provisions of Rule 128 of 1966 Rules were not pointed out to that Division Bench. The learned counsel argues that Rule 103 and Rule 128 both operate in different spheres and there is no inconsistency inter se. State of Maharashtra, (supra) is stated to be not laying down correct law as provisions of Rule 128 of 1966 Rules were not pointed out to that Division Bench. The learned counsel argues that Rule 103 and Rule 128 both operate in different spheres and there is no inconsistency inter se. According to him, the renewal contemplated by Rule 103 is only for the remaining period of license issued to the deceased. To illustrate his contention further, he states (hypothetical illustration) that here Ravi K. Appu expired on 18.04.2002 and hence his Legal representatives (if entitled) could have sought renewal for remaining period i.e. up to 31.12.2003. He has further urged that Respondent No.1 has correctly looked into violations which have occurred earlier and has ordered cancellation of license to take care of those violations. He further states that because of peculiar facts, all concerned have been given liberty to apply under Rule 100 and 101 for fresh license. He has also relied upon the judgment in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur, reported at (1989)1 SCC 101 , to urge how the principle of sub silentio works while interpreting and understanding the Division Bench of this Court (supra). 12. The learned counsel has further urged that when this Court granted interim stay to the impugned order passed by the Hon'ble Minister, that stay cannot and does not have the effect of restoring the position prevailing on 30.07.1997 when Respondent No.3 Collector passed the orders impugned before Respondent No.4. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association, reported at 1992(3) SCC 1 , is pressed into service for the said purpose. 13. During hearing, it became clear that the petitioners as also Respondent No.2 were accepting that the impugned order passed by Respondent No.1 on 28.01.1999 cannot be viewed as an order under Section 8-A of 1953 Act. By placing reliance upon the judgment in the case of Regional Medical Research Centre, Tribals Vs. Gokaran, reported at (2004)13 SCC 125 , Shri. Hag, learned counsel contended that when Respondent No.1 had authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 8-B, the order needs to be read as an order under Section 8-8 of 1-953 Act. By placing reliance upon the judgment in the case of Regional Medical Research Centre, Tribals Vs. Gokaran, reported at (2004)13 SCC 125 , Shri. Hag, learned counsel contended that when Respondent No.1 had authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 8-B, the order needs to be read as an order under Section 8-8 of 1-953 Act. Shri. Dastane, learned counsel has urged that when authority which has passed the order, it self is insisting that it has exercised jurisdiction under Section 8-A, it is not open to this Court to read that order as under Section 8-8 & attempt to uphold it. He urged that if Respondent No.2 has got any grievance against the order of the Collector, Respondent No.2 has to file fresh proceedings in accordance with law. He also expressly opposed even a possibility of remand to Respondent No.1 to treat and decide the matter as revision by urging that it would be indirectly causing prejudice to the petitioners by denying them the advantage of opportunity to raise grounds like delay, latches, waiver etc. He has invited attention to plaint as filed in Regular Civil Suit No.145 of 1970 to urge that there no plea that license was of plaintiff company was taken. His contention is, Respondent No.2 before this Court is estopped from claiming ownership of license. He has relied upon judgment in the case of Hindustan Co-operative Housing Building Society Ltd. Vs. Registar, Co-operative Societies, reported at (2009)14 SCC 302 to explain properties of deeming fiction contemplated under Rule 128 and argued that renewal granted under Rule 103 is, therefore, perfectly in accordance with law. 14. The rival arguments reproduced above clearly show that the business of Theater was going on since 1946 and in any case as per the license, since 1953, the deceased K. Appu was associated with that business. The first document available on record to show relationship between the parties in plaint in Regular Civil Suit No.145 of 1970. That plaint mentions K. Appu as a Manager and further states that he was terminated by order dated 06.06.1970. The observations of this Court in the matter are reflected in Civil Revision Application No.520 of 1971 which came to be decided on 19.10.1972. Those observations expressly show that in spite of his termination, the deceased K. Appu continued to manage the Theater though Theater was in the name of the Company. The observations of this Court in the matter are reflected in Civil Revision Application No.520 of 1971 which came to be decided on 19.10.1972. Those observations expressly show that in spite of his termination, the deceased K. Appu continued to manage the Theater though Theater was in the name of the Company. In view of this peculiar position, during the pendency of suit, some arrangements were made by this Court. That arrangement attained finality and no other arrangement or orders to the contrary are available on record. This arrangement continued till 23.04.1984 when suit itself was dismissed as abated at the instance of present respondent 2 because of death of K. Appu. Whether this arrangement was followed or not, protests or grievances about implementation and other facts relevant in this respect are not available anywhere. 15. The most important event which is available on record is the continuation of the Cinema license in the name of the deceased petitioner No.2 i.e. Ravi K. Appu. The renewal in his name from 1983 till 1996 is not in dispute. For one to presume that after death of K. Appu, the dispute between parties to civil suit came to an end, there is no such plea anywhere either by present petitioners or by Respondent No.2. The mode and manner or understanding with which business of Cinema Theater has been managed after 23.04.1984 till 1996 has not been brought on record. The subsequent grievance and interim orders passed by this Court as also application filed vide Civil Application No.4270 of 2002 in this petition clearly show that the situation had remained the same. 16. Petitioner No.1 - Deepak applied on 28.05.1996 to Respondent No.3 - Collector for grant of license to exhibit cinema at Laxmi Talkies, Hinganghat. In that application he has mentioned that as per agreement dated 28.02.1995 between himself and Ravi K. Appu, he secured permission, control and management of cinema. He further disclosed that he was already appointed as a nominee in cinema license as per said agreement dated 28.02.1995. It is also mentioned that Ravi K. Appu had no objection to grant oflicense in his favour. This application at its bottom carries signature of K. Ravi Appu with words "confirmed in toto". It, therefore, appears that K. Ravi Appu gave his no objection for such grant or transfer. It is also mentioned that Ravi K. Appu had no objection to grant oflicense in his favour. This application at its bottom carries signature of K. Ravi Appu with words "confirmed in toto". It, therefore, appears that K. Ravi Appu gave his no objection for such grant or transfer. Respondent No.2 has on 14.06.1996 raised objection before the Collector pointing out that they are the owners of Laxmi Talkies and exhibition license issued to it was misused by Ravi K. Appu. This communication also discloses knowledge of agreement between Deepak and Ravi K. Appu and expressed apprehension that either said Deepak or any third person might apply to the Collector for transfer of that license in his name. The communication states that Respondent No.2 had no intention to transfer the exhibition license to any third person and they were not interested in transferring the possession of Laxmi Talkies to any third person. The Collector was, therefore, called upon not to entertain any such application. The other communication dated 25.06.1996 by Respondent No.2 is on the subject of exhibition license of Laxmi Talkies and it mentions the previous history & is in continuation of earlier communication dated 14.06.1996. It states that the deceased K. Appu was appointed as a Manager by it and his son Ravi K. Appu was claiming to be appointed as a Manager by his father and looking after the exhibition of cinema at Laxmi Talkies. Then similar apprehension about unauthorized effort to nominate some third person including Shri. Deepak are reiterated and it is urged that at the relevant time, said Deepak was unauthorizedly exhibiting cinema films in their premises. The communication states that premises are in possession of Respondent No.2 and they were issuing necessary legal notice to him. As Deepak was not entitled to represent Respondent No.2 as nominee, exhibition of films was stated to be illegal and therefore the Collector was requested to suspend its license immediately. Some grievances about violation of provisions of entertainment duty are also reflected in it. In this representation ultimately request was made not to renew the license as Respondent No.2 was not intending to exhibit the cinema. 17. On the basis of these three communications, office of Respondent No.3 Collector initiated enquiry which was registered as C.R. No.350 of 1996. Some grievances about violation of provisions of entertainment duty are also reflected in it. In this representation ultimately request was made not to renew the license as Respondent No.2 was not intending to exhibit the cinema. 17. On the basis of these three communications, office of Respondent No.3 Collector initiated enquiry which was registered as C.R. No.350 of 1996. The present Respondent No.2 has been shown as applicant therein while deceased petitioner No.2 was non applicant No.1 and present Petitioner No.1 was non-applicant No.2. The Collector has made reference to documents filed by respective parties and found that Respondent No.2 established his title to the premises i.e. structure of Laxmi Theater. The Collector also found that though Respondent No.2 claimed to be a license holder for exhibiting films at Laxmi Theater, Hinganghat, it produced no documentary proof in support. The documents produced by the petitioner are found to support their claim that license to exhibit films and other relevant license were in the name of Ravi K. Appu. The Collector then found that as per provisions of 1953 Act, even an occupier can be given a license to exhibit cinema in theater. In the process, the Collector has also found that office record revealed that Laxmi Talkies was first licensed in the year 1953 and license was issued in the name of K. Appu. There was no mention of any firm in the office records and on the basis of this, a finding that license issued to Shri K. Appu was in his personal capacity has been drawn. The order also shows a finding that after expiry of Shri K. Appu, license was granted to his son Ravi K. Appu in the year 1983 and at that juncture, no objection was raised by Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.2 allowed Ravi K. Appu to carry out licensed business at Hinganghat. From this also inference that license was issued to K. Appu in his personal capacity has been drawn. Then there is reference to arrangement evolved during the pendency of Regular Civil Suit No. 145 of 1970, rejection of revision by High Court and ultimately in this situation Respondent No.2 was advised to approach appropriate Civil Court for redressal of its grievances as regards the possession of premises of Laxmi Theater. The situation then prevailing was ordered to continue ie directed to be maintained till adjudication of such Civil Suit. The situation then prevailing was ordered to continue ie directed to be maintained till adjudication of such Civil Suit. 27th OCTOBER, 2010 18. Section 8 of 1953 Act confers power upon respondent No.3 Collector to revoke or cancel or suspend the license. Section 8-A enables the person aggrieved by his order refusing to grant a license or the order revoking or suspending any license made under Section 8 to file appeal. In present matter order passed by respondent No.3 Collector is not an order refusing to grant license or then revoking or suspending the license. It is, therefore, obvious that appeal under Section 8-A is not available. Section 8-B permits filing of revision and against any order passed by respondent No.3 said remedy and forum is available. Respondent No.2, who filed said proceedings before the State Government has expressly stated before me that the same should be treated as revision under Section 8-B. The stand is being opposed by the petitioner as also respondent No.1. Perusal of the judgment of the Hon 'ble Apex Court, reported at (2004)13 SCC 125 (Regional Medical Research Centre, Tribals Vs. Gokaran) shows that the appellant before the Hon'ble Apex Court had not pointed out in the application that their right to appear in the proceedings was under Section 50 of Land Acquisition Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that right does not arise from the fact that the party has or has not mentioned a particular section in the application. If under law the party has a right then irrespective of the fact that a particular section is not mentioned, that right does not get defeated. In application it was mentioned by applicants that it is the body on whose behalf land was acquired and the Hon'ble Apex Court noted that this was admitted position. In view of this position the Hon 'ble Apex Court noted that it was absolutely necessary to implead them and to notice them. In AIR 1983 SC 537 (Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad Vs. Ben Hiraben), Hon. Apex Court holds that a notice under Section 260 (I) (a) of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (59 of 1949) in respect of an unauthorised construction would not be illegal because the construction was not made by the notice but was in existence when she purchased the premises. In AIR 1983 SC 537 (Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad Vs. Ben Hiraben), Hon. Apex Court holds that a notice under Section 260 (I) (a) of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (59 of 1949) in respect of an unauthorised construction would not be illegal because the construction was not made by the notice but was in existence when she purchased the premises. The expressions used in Section 260 by themselves were found to be not quite clear, as to whether it is directed against the person who has commenced or carried out the construction contrary to the provisions of the by-laws or the rules or whether in view of the language used in subcl. (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 260 namely "has erected such building" notice could also be issued to any person other than one who actually built the unauthorised structure as the power to take action against the persons who had not built the infringing constructions is available when S.260(1)(a) is read in conjunction with S. 478. The question involved being one of construction of a provision of a statute that construction must be so made as to be in conformity with the other provisions of that particular statue and the provisions must be read as a whole. This being a question of law, Section 478 can be relied upon in support of the notice under Section 260 (1) ( a). Section 478 comprehends both the owner or the occupier who has actually constructed and as well as the owner or occupier of the building which has been unauthorizedly constructed & the action of the Corporation can be supported. Hon. Apex Court states that it is well settled that the exercise of a power if there is indeed a power, will be referable to a jurisdiction, when the validity of the exercise of that power is in issue, which confers validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under which it would be nugatory though the correct section was not referred, and a different or a wrong section was mentioned. The notice as issued was held legal though the notice impugned in this case was not issued under Section 478. 19. In 2002(1) Mh.L.J. 350 : [2001(4) ALL MR 594] (Tejbai Tejshi Vs. The notice as issued was held legal though the notice impugned in this case was not issued under Section 478. 19. In 2002(1) Mh.L.J. 350 : [2001(4) ALL MR 594] (Tejbai Tejshi Vs. Smt. Gangubai) this Court (learned Single Judge) has found in paragraph 6 that when the impugned order makes a specific reference to a particular provision under which the subordinate Court proceeded to pass the same, it is not open to the superior Court before which the matter is in appeal to infer that said order is not passed under that provision but some other provision. These observations are made after noticing that ex parte decree was passed by the trial Court in exercise of powers under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and remedy to the aggrieved party against it was by way of appeal. The notice of motion filed under Order 9, Rule 13 was not maintainable. The appeal from order rejecting that motion was also, therefore, not maintainable. The questions, whether the trial Court was justified in invoking Order 8, Rule 5 was not gone into and it has been held that such question can be gone into in their appeal only. In somewhat similar circumstances when the judgment and decree delivered by the trial Court was found to be not an ex parte decree, while holding that it cannot be set aside as ex parte judgment and decree under Order 9, Rule 13, similar observations are made by me in 2005(2) Mh.L.J. 623 (Ramchandra Vs. Kamalkishore). However, these observations clearly show that the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court under a particular Section conferred upon the aggrieved party a specific statutory remedy and because of that remedy, the contention to treat order impugned as passed under other relevant provisions (or correct provisions) to justify recourse to jurisdiction invoked has been rejected. Thus, the consequences of mentioning a particular provision created some rights and opened a particular forum, & therefore, those observations came to be made. Here, it is obvious that appeal under Section 8-A or revision under Section 8-B lies before the same authority. The facts clearly show that by impugned order, at the most it can be said that a license forming subject matter of controversy being claimed by respondent No.2 stood transferred to deceased petitioner No.2. Here, it is obvious that appeal under Section 8-A or revision under Section 8-B lies before the same authority. The facts clearly show that by impugned order, at the most it can be said that a license forming subject matter of controversy being claimed by respondent No.2 stood transferred to deceased petitioner No.2. Order, therefore, could not have been assailed in appeal and as the appeal is not provided, remedy of revision was/is the only remedy. There is no argument of prejudice, if any, by petitioners to oppose such reading of the impugned order of respondent 1. I, therefore, do not find any substance in objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 28th January, 1999 cannot in these facts be treated as an order passed under Section 8-B of 1952 Act. 20. Perusal of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ramalaxmi Chimanlal Raval Vs. State of Maharashtra, (Supra) reveals that the petitioners before this Court were legal representatives of deceased Chimanlal who was carrying on business of cinema talkies and there was no dispute that he was holding a valid cinema license. The dispute arose between Chimanlal and owners of the property and Chimanlal filed a suit for declaration of his status as a tenant. The contention was, after expiry of Chi mania I, heirs and legal representatives had no right to the property wherein cinema business was run. In the impugned order the Minister held that the agreement between the parties expired in 1977 and as the claim of heirs of Chimanlal was subjudice in Civil Court, the building was held to be in possession of the owners and hence, finding was given that cinema license could not be renewed. This Court, in this background, has found that during pendency of the dispute the appellate Court declared heirs of Chi mania I to be tenants and hence, it is held that the petitioners/tenants were protected by Bombay Rent Act and were entitled to carry cinema business. While distinguishing the judgment of Madras High Court, cited before it, the Division Bench of this Court noticed that as per Rule 30 of Madras rules, the applicant for license were required to satisfy the Licencing Authority with regard to their lawful possession. In the case between Gopalprasad Vs. While distinguishing the judgment of Madras High Court, cited before it, the Division Bench of this Court noticed that as per Rule 30 of Madras rules, the applicant for license were required to satisfy the Licencing Authority with regard to their lawful possession. In the case between Gopalprasad Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court was found dealing with Andhra Pradesh Cinema Rules and the Hon'ble Apex Court there had held that after expiry of lease the tenant continued to be in possession but his possession cannot be treated as lawful for the purposes of grant of cinema license. In the background of these precedence and facts in paragraph 10 of the report, the Division Bench has found that Rule 103 of 1966 Rules gives right to heirs and legal representatives of licensee to apply for renewal of the license. It is found that unlike Madras and Andhra Pradesh Rules, it is not necessary for the licensee to satisfy that he is in lawful possession as even an occupier can apply for renewal of license. It is held that till such tenant is evicted by a decree passed by the competent Court in accordance with the provisions of law, he has right to apply for renewal of license. It is therefore evident that Rule 128 was not relevant in said controversy. This I am required to undertake scrutiny of this aspect in more details little later while finding out the nature & extent of deeming fiction as contained in said Rule in the scheme of 1966 Rules. Here also, deceased K. Appu, after him his legal heir R. Appu and thereafter legal heirs of R. Appu (substituted in WP & representing R. Appu) have been using license from 1970 till today, getting it renewed without any express protest from respondent 2 at least from 1984 till 1996. They are also in possession of theater building. This possession can be safely presumed to be unobstructed since 1982 atleast for now. Hence, the entitlement of legal heirs of R. Appu as of now to apply for & secure renewal appears to be within four corners of law. Law as explained by this Division Bench clinches the facts as on record now and helps these legal heirs. 21. It is apparent that the attention of the said Division Bench was not invited to the provisions of Rule 128 of the 1966 Rules. Law as explained by this Division Bench clinches the facts as on record now and helps these legal heirs. 21. It is apparent that the attention of the said Division Bench was not invited to the provisions of Rule 128 of the 1966 Rules. Rule 103 is specifically on the subject of death or disability of licensee. While Rule 128 declares that license granted is not transferable. Rule 128 stipulates that license granted is personal for the benefit of person to whom it is granted and on the death of licensee, the license shall be deemed to be revoked. In 2004 the proviso had been added to it and it states that the said rule shall not apply to a registered company. Rule 103 states that if such licensee dies or becomes mentally incapable or otherwise disabled, the person carrying on the business shall not be liable to any penalty if during reasonable time he makes application for renewal of the license. Again in 2004 similar proviso had been added to it. It is, therefore, clear that emphasis in Rule 128 is on the personal character of such license and its lapsing in case of death. However, Rule 103 incorporates a procedure which enables business to continue and permits a person carrying on business to make an application for its renewal within a reasonable time. The renewal of licenses is dealt with by Rule 105. Opening part of Rule 105 states that upon application for renewal the licensing authority may renew it for requisite period subject to Rule 103. The procedure prescribed for renewal is different and all formalities required to be complied with while applying for fresh license are not required to be fulfilled again. It is, therefore, apparent that after death or insanity or other similar disability of licensee, law envisages renewal obviously by his legal heir or representative. This renewal cannot be for remainder of the term of license as then in case of death, legislature would not have made this provision applicable. Thus though in case of death, the license originally granted lapses, legal representative is entitled to apply for renewal under Rule 103. Deeming fiction in Rule 128 therefore cannot be used to curtail otherwise very clear arrangement in Rule 103 or control its obvious sweep. Its extent is limited to situation specifically prescribed in Rule 128. Thus though in case of death, the license originally granted lapses, legal representative is entitled to apply for renewal under Rule 103. Deeming fiction in Rule 128 therefore cannot be used to curtail otherwise very clear arrangement in Rule 103 or control its obvious sweep. Its extent is limited to situation specifically prescribed in Rule 128. Whenever inspite of death of licensee the business continues & is continued by legal heir or representative, deeming fiction is not attracted. Thus license cannot be transferred after death but investment or labour of licensee his family does not go waste and his legal representative gets right to apply for renewal of license. 22. In present matter, perusal of the order passed by' respondent No.1 reveals that in paragraph 3 the provisions of Rule 128 are looked into and then it is noticed that the order of the Collector does not disclose, how license in the name of K. Appu, Manager was transferred to Ravi K. Appu. After perusal of records respondent No.1 has found that license had expired on 29.04.1983 and its renewal has been done till 29.12.1989, vide orders of Collector dated 02.12.1989. The renewal for intervening six years was not looked into by the Collector. In this situation the provisions of Rule 107 of 1966 Rules are relied upon to hold that as renewal was not sought within one year, application ought to have been treated as application for fresh license and hence, all formalities relevant for such fresh grant entitled to be complied with. The procedure prescribed in Rule 100 and 101 is then pointed out and respondent No.1 has held that before grant, approval of the State Government was essential but then, though the Collector has taken steps to transfer the license, previous permission of State Government was not obtained. 23. The challenge raised before the Collector is briefly mentioned by me above while commenting upon the applications/representations dated 14.06.1996 and 25.06.1996. There was no challenge to transfer or grant of license to Ravi K. Appu in 1983 or thereafter. Even the order of the Collector dated 02.12.1989 was not assailed even remotely. Respondent No.1 has overlooked the fact that it was nowhere the case of either respondent No.2 or then the Department that after 1983 the license was renewed for the first time on 02.12.1989. Even the order of the Collector dated 02.12.1989 was not assailed even remotely. Respondent No.1 has overlooked the fact that it was nowhere the case of either respondent No.2 or then the Department that after 1983 the license was renewed for the first time on 02.12.1989. The absence of discussion in the order of Collector, therefore, could not have been relied upon to reach of such conclusion. The recourse to provisions of Rule 100, 101 and 107 is therefore, unwarranted & misconceived. 24. Respondent No.1 has, because of these findings recorded in paragraph 4 of its order, then proceeded further and found that subsequent transfer or agreement between Ravi K. Appu and petitioner No.1 Deepak is also vitiated. The terms and conditions of agreement between Ravi K. Appu and Deepak are noted and it is found that Ravi K. Appu was claiming adverse possession against respondent No.2. This claim is found to be inconsistent after holding that Cinema license was in the name of K. Appu because of his capacity as manager and Collector could not have acted under impression that it was personally the property of K. Appu. It is noticed that the Collector was right in holding that the ownership of Cinema Theater and the right to carry on business in its were independent and distinct aspects and were of civil nature cognisable by Civil Court. Filing of Regular Civil Suit No.145 of 1970 is then mentioned and it is found that necessary evidence about that suit was not produced by respondent No.2. The contents of the plaint are noted and then fact of abatement of suit is also noticed. The statement by Ravi K. Appu before the Collector on 02.05.1997 that it was not necessary to file civil suit is also considered. Ultimately, at the end of paragraph 5 respondent No.1 has concluded that ownership of cinema theater needed to be adjudicated by competent Civil Court. Because of these findings, ultimately in paragraph 8 it has allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Collector. 25. It can therefore be seen that the facts relevant for adjudication have been totally lost sight of by respondent No.1. The order of the Collector shows that the controversy as raised was looked into and decided. Respondent No.1 has traveled beyond that controversy. 25. It can therefore be seen that the facts relevant for adjudication have been totally lost sight of by respondent No.1. The order of the Collector shows that the controversy as raised was looked into and decided. Respondent No.1 has traveled beyond that controversy. However, while so doing, the fact that after disposal of the civil revision by this Court on 19th October, 1972, the management of theater continued with the deceased K. Appu, has been overlooked. The giving up of suit because of death of K. Appu in 1984 and implications flowing therefrom are again overlooked. The fact that respondent No.2 did not come up with a case that after death of K. Appu it was running cinema business in that theater is also ignored. It was never the case of respondent No.2 that it appointed Ravi K. Appu as Manager or authorized him as licensee after death of K. Appu. This position and management of the entire business by Ravi K. Appu continued till 1996 and thereafter till his death in 2002. The interpretation of entry in cinema license mentioning K. Appu, Manager as licensee was not done by any competent authority and in civil suit 145/1970 that was not done. The facts reveal that after his alleged termination in 1970, K. Appu continued in possession of cinema theater and was excessively managing the business. This exclusive management of the business or use of license has continued even after his death by his son without any hindrance till 1996 as far as present records show. As already observed above, whether interim arrangement made by this Court was obeyed or not has not been disclosed by parties on record. If after death of K. Appu, Ravi K. Appu stepped in to his shoes, was there any other arrangement or agreement between the parties has also not come on record. In so far as this litigation is concerned, it can safely be said that when respondent No.2 learnt that Ravi K. Appu is handing over not only the license, but also possession of the theater to petitioner No.1, an objection has been raised and then effort was made to have cinema license itself canceled/ revoked so as to indirectly dispossess or discourage either Ravi K. Appu or petitioner No.1. These facts, therefore, are sufficient in present litigation to hold that earlier K. Appu and after his death Ravi K. Appu has continued to use the cinema license to the exclusion of respondent No.2 and hence, was authorised and competent to claim its renewal or to exercise other powers in relation thereto within framework of 1966 rules. The interpretation of entry in the name of K. Appu raises questions of facts also which warrant an investigation into disputed facts. Such complex issue could not have been resolved by respondent No. I and by respondent No.3. Respondent 3 Collector has rightly left it for adjudication by the competent Civil Court. The said interpretation cannot be attempted even in this petition by this Court. 26. I, therefore, find the impugned order passed by respondent No.1 unsustainable. However, it is made clear that during pendency of this petition petitioner No.2 Ravi K. Appu has also expired and thereafter the license in dispute is being renewed in the name of his legal representatives. In accordance with the scheme of 1966 Rules or 1953 Act, as presently there is no declaration that building of cinema theater does not belong to respondent No.2, said legal heirs can continue with its use & use of license. They have to maintain & preserve position prevailing as directed by Collector and cannot transfer the possession or license to either petitioner I or any third person. Respondent 2 can file appropriate civil dispute if it is still open to it, for ventilation and redressal of its grievances in the matter. In view of these findings, I have not considered the arguments of Advocate Shri. Dastane about absence of specific challenge in memorandum of appeal/revision or then absence of notice to the petitioners before recording findings thereon by respondent No.1. 27. Subject to these observations, the impugned order dated 29th January, 1999, passed by respondent No.1, is hereby quashed and set aside. Writ petition is, thus, partly allowed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. 28. As this stage, this Court has found that the petitioners have been using the license exclusively and there is no declaration that cinema theater (building) does not belong to respondent No.2, the amount in deposit with the Registry of this Court is allowed to be withdrawn by respondent No.2. 28. As this stage, this Court has found that the petitioners have been using the license exclusively and there is no declaration that cinema theater (building) does not belong to respondent No.2, the amount in deposit with the Registry of this Court is allowed to be withdrawn by respondent No.2. However, this shall not affect the rights and contentions of the parties in the civil matter, if any civil matter is filed. The liberty given to respondent No.2 to withdraw the amount shall be exercised only after 30th November, 2010. 29. At this stage it is pointed out to the Court by respective learned counsel that the question whether legal representatives of petitioner No.2 can be brought on record to prosecute this writ petition also needs to be adjudicated. It is apparent that the license after death of K. Appu was in the name of deceased petitioner No.2. The impugned order is against his interest and the order of the Collector impugned before respondent No.1 was in his favour. They are enjoying benefits of that license. It is, therefore, clear that his legal representatives needed to be brought on record to prosecute that cause further. The question whether, because of their capacity as legal heirs they are entitled to any civil rights in the said/ such license needs to be adjudicated upon by the competent Civil Court. This Court has already found them entitled to apply for renewal under Rule 103 and appropriate directions in the matter are already issued above. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the objection to their impleadment, being raised by respondent No.2. 30. The impugned order dated 29th January, 1999, passed by respondent No.1, is hereby quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the legal heirs are held entitled to continue with use of theater & use of license as per 1953 Act & 1966 Rules. But they are directed to maintain & preserve position prevailing as ordered by Collector and shall not transfer the possession or license to either Petitioner No.1 or any third person. Respondent 2 may file appropriate civil dispute if it is still open to it, for ventilation and redressal of its grievances in the matter. The writ petition is, thus, partly allowed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute in above terms. Petition partly allowed.