JUDGMENT By the Court.—In these connected writ petitions, the purchasers, owners and bhumidhars of the agricultural land in District Ghaziabad, have challenged the six notifications issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh under Section 4 (1)/17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short, the Act) all dated 16.10.2004, and the six notifications under Section 6/17 of the Act of various dates between 5.9.2005 to 31.10.2005 acquiring 499.446 hectares, equivalent to 1234.131 acres of land in village Sadarpur-I in district Ghaziabad, (area 269.004 hectares, vide notification under Section 6/17 dated 13.10.2005); Sadarpur II, (area 45.495 hectares, notification under Section 6/17 dated 5.9.2005); Rasoolpur Yakootpur, (area 68.537 hectares, notification dated 28.10.2005); Mahiuddinpur-Mainapur, (area 45.580 hectares, notification dated 5.9.2005); Naglapath, (area 67.179 hectare notification dated 28.10.2005); Morth (area 3.643 hectares notification, dated 28.10.2005). The Ghaziabad Development Authority (in short, ‘the GDA’) on the basis of the documents produced on record, alleges that the possession of the acquired land in respect of Sadarpur-I and Sadarpur-II was taken over on 18.11.2006, and that the possession of the acquired land in the remaining villages was taken over on 18.5.2006. 2. The land has been acquired under Section 4 with declaration that the provisions of Section 17 (1) are applicable to the land, also applying Section 17 (4) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, for the public purpose namely ‘planned development of Ghaziabad Development Authority’ for residential colonies. 3. In almost all the cases, interim orders were issued at the time of filing of the writ petitions, staying dispossession of the petitioners from the acquired land under the notifications. In leading Writ Petition No. 28505/2006 M/s Sahara India Commercial Corporation and others v. State of UP and others, the Court directed by its order dated 15.7.2009 to maintain status quo in respect of all the cases except those filed in the year 2009, and in which there was no interim order. The Ghaziabad Development Authority filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25127/2009 against the interim orders. The Supreme Court was pleased to pass an order on 23.10.2009, as follows : “Heard both sides. The petitioner has challenged the interim order passed by the High Court. It is submitted on behalf of G.D.A., who is the petitioner before us, that several lands have already been taken over by the Authority and the construction is going on in the properties. The petitioner has challenged the interim order passed by the High Court. It is submitted on behalf of G.D.A., who is the petitioner before us, that several lands have already been taken over by the Authority and the construction is going on in the properties. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that already there is an order passed in their favour passed by the High Court on 22.5.2006 protecting their rights. That order may protect the respondents herein if it is not varied by the Court thereafter. In the result, we set aside the present impugned order and request the High Court to dispose of the petitions pending before it at an early date. As there are several petitions pending before the High Court, the same Bench may bear all these petitions. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly.” 4. Hon’ble the then Chief Justice by his order dated 4.11.2009 passed orders nominating all these cases to us. The hearing commenced on 21.12.2009 and was concluded on 17.3.2010. 5. We have heard Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Shakti Swarup Nigam; Shri V.B. Upadhyay, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Satish Kumar Tyagi; Shri W.H. Khan, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri A.H. Khan, Shri Ravi Kant, Senior Counsel and Shri Anurag Khanna for the petitioners. Shri Jafer Naiyer, Additional Advocate General assisted by Shri M.C. Tripathi, Add C.S.C. appears for State of UP. Shri R.N. Singh, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Ashwini Kumar Mishra appears for GDA. 6. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, Senior Counsel requested for inspection of the records. The request was allowed. The counsels appearing for the petitioners were given opportunity to inspect the records. The relevant documents have also been placed on record by the GDA, in a separate compilation. 7. We propose to first consider the submissions of Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, Senior Counsel in the leading Writ Petition No. 28505/2006 filed by M/s Sahara India Commercial Corporation Ltd. and 11 others. 8. The parties have exchanged affidavits. They have also filed supplementary counter-affidavits and rejoinder affidavits. The Ghaziabad Development Authority filed a second supplementary counter-affidavit dated 6.9.2009 to which a reply was filed by the petitioners on 11.9.2009. 9. 8. The parties have exchanged affidavits. They have also filed supplementary counter-affidavits and rejoinder affidavits. The Ghaziabad Development Authority filed a second supplementary counter-affidavit dated 6.9.2009 to which a reply was filed by the petitioners on 11.9.2009. 9. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, Senior Counsel submits that the same land was sought to be acquired by the GDA by issuing notifications under Section 4 (1) dated 24.12.1991, and the notifications under Section 6/17 dated 5.2.1992 for the same purpose. The proceedings, however, lapsed as the Acquiring Authority could not deposit the required compensation. M/s Sahara India Commercial India Ltd.-petitioner No. 1 in Writ Petition No. 28505 of 2006, identified 145 acres of land in villages Yakutpur-Rasoolpur and Naglapath in District Ghaziabad for development of residential township ‘Sahara City Homes’. The petitioner No. 1 company is engaged in the business of developing residential township throughout the length and breadth of the country. The Company has completed four residential townships in the cities of Lucknow, Bhopal, Hyderabad and Gorakhpur on an area of 349 acres, apart from commercial projects in other cities of the country, and the prestigious Amby Valley project covering an area of 7500 acres in the Lake District of Lonavala, Mumbai. With a view to provide quality life style to every body. The Company has identified 217 towns throughout the country to develop self contained townships. The Ghaziabad is one of them. After making diligent enquiries, a patch of land measuring 145 acres of Villages Yakoobpur-Rasoolpur and Naglapath in District Ghaziabad was finalised for the purposes, and the MOU was executed on 11.10.2003, with a party to procure the land for the associated Companies, with whom petitioner No. 1 had entered into a joint venture. In keeping with the housing policy of the State provided to meet the increased demand of houses in urban areas and to provide modern facilities and quality life, the Government of Uttar Pradesh had issued a Government Order dated 22.11.2003 to attract private investment and for that purpose the policy provided the government role to be that of a facilitator. It also permitted the developers to purchase the land directly from the land owners. The petitioner No. 1 Company specifically informed the Vice Chairman, GDA on 1.10.2004, that its associated Companies were procuring the land for residential township on land measuring approximately 145 acres in villages Yakootpur-Rasoolpur and Naglapath in District Ghaziabad. 10. It also permitted the developers to purchase the land directly from the land owners. The petitioner No. 1 Company specifically informed the Vice Chairman, GDA on 1.10.2004, that its associated Companies were procuring the land for residential township on land measuring approximately 145 acres in villages Yakootpur-Rasoolpur and Naglapath in District Ghaziabad. 10. vide notification dated 16.10.2004 under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act published in local newspapers on 22.10.2004, the land, already procured by the petitioners for the same purpose i.e. for development of the residential colony, was proposed to be acquired. The Company wrote a letter to the Vice Chairman,GDA requesting him to exclude the land from the acquisition. The District Magistrate, Ghaziabad was also requested to take action under Section 48 of the Act to withdraw from the acquisition. 11. The State Government, in continuation with the Government Order dated 22.11.2003, issued another Government Order dated 21.5.2005 notifying the policy for land acquisition and development of residential schemes through private capital investment. The main thrust of the policy was that the State was to Act as ‘facilitator’ instead of ‘developer/builder’; removal of difficulties and simplifying procedures; and create a positive/favourable atmosphere to ensure participation of private sector in the land acquisition and development works in urban areas as per the housing policy of the State. 12. The petitioner No. 1 Company made an application to the State Government in pursuance to the policy of the State Government vide Government Order dated 21.5.2005, that the Company had already purchased 60% of the proposed land for a residential township at Ghaziabad, and the remaining land be provided in terms of the Government Order. The matter was referred by GDA to the State Government for their report. After some delay the Vice Chairman, GDA wrote to the Government on 2.9.2005, on the basis of a report submitted to it by the Committee that out of the total area of 1463.23 acres proposed for acquisition, the land is needed only for 500 acres for the four schemes. It was stated in the letter that it was not clear in the housing policy as to what should be done in cases, where the land has been procured by the developer before a notification under Section 4 of the Act. It was stated in the letter that it was not clear in the housing policy as to what should be done in cases, where the land has been procured by the developer before a notification under Section 4 of the Act. It is stated that in the report the GDA had proposed the remaining land to be used as ‘land bank’. 13. Shri Tulsi submits that inspite of the policy of the State Government, under which the petitioner had purchased 91.628 acres of land through various sale-deeds, for which it had spent more than 15 crores in purchasing the land, the State Government issued Notifications under Section 6/17 of the Act dated 28.10.2005 including the land purchased by the petitioner No. 1-Company, published in daily newspapers ‘Dainik Jagaran’ on 31.10.2005. 14. Shri Tulsi submits that it is impermissible to apply the emergency provisions under Section 17 (1) and to waive enquiry under Section 5A of the Act for constructions of residential colonies. Section 17 (4), being an exception to the normal mode of acquisition, mere urgency or emergency is not sufficient for acquisition under Section 17 (4). Section 5A confers a positive right. It cannot be taken away deeming it to be an empty formality. No relevant or valid considerations entered the minds of the authorities while proposing or approving the application under Section 17 (4) of the Act. The applicability of Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) is also bad on account of the pre-notification delay. He has elaborated the argument in his written submission as follows : “1.1. The respondent published a housing policy on 22.11.2003 (Vol VI @ 18-30) in view of the acute problem of housing in metro cities and paucity of founds with the development authorities and the government agencies. Thus, the urgent need was felt to attract and promote private investment in the housing sector. The principal object of the policy was that in view of the policy of economic liberalization and privatization in the housing sector, the role of the government was to be that of the ‘facilitator’ in place of that of the ‘provider’. 1.2. Since wide publicity had been given to the privatization of housing policy dated 22.11.03, and since the petitioners are the largest investors in residential housing sector in the country, the petitioners immediately, got into the Act and located a mega housing project, near Ghaziabad. 1.2. Since wide publicity had been given to the privatization of housing policy dated 22.11.03, and since the petitioners are the largest investors in residential housing sector in the country, the petitioners immediately, got into the Act and located a mega housing project, near Ghaziabad. They immediately took steps to acquire land directly from the farmers. By the end of December, 2003, the petitioners had already acquired about 150 acres. Sale-deeds in respect of 52 acres had already been executed and for the remaining 100 acres, the agreements to sell with the land owners or their agents, had been entered into. (Vol. 1, Annexure 5 at pg 55-57). 1.3 As soon as respondent No. 2 came to know about the purchases of land by the petitioner, it immediately mooted a proposal for acquisition of land for itself on 7.2.2004, directly, contrary to governments own policy, merely with a view to frustrate the project of the petitioners (Vol VI @ page 36) 1.4 Petitioner repeatedly approached the respondents for excluding their land from the proposal. In this regard letters dt. 25.9.04, (Vol. VI @ page 53) 27.9.04 (Vol. 1 @ page 122) and 1.10.04 (Vol 1 @ page 56) are relied upon. On 1.10.04, the petitioner submitted an application under the UP Urban Planning and Development Act along with all relevant documents for approval for developing residential colony. 1.5 Without considering the application for permission or in the alternative for exclusion, the respondent issued notification under Section 4 (1) r/2 17 (1) & (4) of the Act simultaneously. The said notification is at page 38 of the compilation of English translations. The sole reason mentioned for applying Section 17 (1) is “land is urgently required for construction of residential colony” and for Section 17 (4) “to eliminate delay likely to be caused by an inquiry under Section 5A”. 1.6 In the present case notification under Section 4 was done on 16.10.04 whereas notification under Section 6 was done on 28.10.05. This by itself negates the exercise of power under Section 17 (4) by which inquiry under Section 5A was waived off. This purported reason has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to be impermissible. The following judgment is relied upon. (i) Om Prakash Pr. And another v. State of U.P. and others, (1998) 6 SCC 1 (S. 6 notification issued nine months after Section 4 notification-Pr. This purported reason has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to be impermissible. The following judgment is relied upon. (i) Om Prakash Pr. And another v. State of U.P. and others, (1998) 6 SCC 1 (S. 6 notification issued nine months after Section 4 notification-Pr. 14 @ 16 dispensing 5-A under Section 17 (4) held to be illegal. 1.7 It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a number of decisions that mere development of area for residential or industrial use does not fall within the ambit of Section 17 (1) & (4). In this regard the following decisions are relied. (i) Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1977) 1 SCC 133 (Vol V pg 291 Pr. 40). Development for residential use does not call for 17 (4)-5A imperative-does not demand emergent action to eliminate 5A inquiry) (ii) UOI v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 (Vol V Pr. 32 @ 134)-Mere urgency not sufficient to dispense 5A-17(1) & (2) do not automatically lead to dispensing 5A-Pr 35 @ 136- 5A not an empty formality-a substantive right-can be taken away for good and valid reasons- just and wholesome principle-Pr. 37 @ 137-Application of mind can be assessed by looking into proceeding-no material on record-earlier attempt allowed to be lapsed-judgment of the High Court striking down notification upheld). (iii) UOI v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453 (Vol V Pr. 29 @ 133-Compulsory taking of mans property a serious matter-slumbering for year-suddenly exciting itself into immediate forceful taking travesty of emergency power-little difficulty in completing 5A expeditiously-Pr. 31 @ 115-notification must state nature of urgency-no material placed) (iv) Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others, (1998) 6 SCC 1 (Vol. V, Page 17, Pr 14- on one hand-deprived objections under Section 5A on ground of urgency, on other-delay more than 9 months in issuing declaration under Section 6-conduct falsified claim for urgency, Page 18, Pr. 14-Possibility of encroachment not germane ground for invoking urgency powers dispensing 5A inquiry-law and order problem-nothing to do with acquisition & urgency). 1.8. Instant case reveals a complete misuse and abuse of emergency power under Section 17 of the Act. Housing shortage is not a sudden development. 14-Possibility of encroachment not germane ground for invoking urgency powers dispensing 5A inquiry-law and order problem-nothing to do with acquisition & urgency). 1.8. Instant case reveals a complete misuse and abuse of emergency power under Section 17 of the Act. Housing shortage is not a sudden development. It’s a result of government slumbering for years over the issue and suddenly exciting itself into hyper activity by resorting to forcible taking over of land without even providing the minimum safeguards under Section 5A. Section 5A has been held to be the heart beat of fair play and the same cannot be permitted to be applied whimsically or for an ulterior purpose. 1.9. This Hon’ble Court had permitted inspection of records by itself dated 22.12.2009. The counsel for the petitioners, on inspection, found that neither the proposal nor the decision of respondent 2 or collector certificate under Section 17 of the Act contained any reasons other than the ones mentioned in the notification (Vol. VI @ pg 45). 15. Shri Tulsi further submits that the entire acquisition proceeding is arbitrary, and is in teeth of the government’s own policy to promote on priority, private investments in housing sector, on a large scale. The Government acknowledged paucity of financial infrastructure and thereby evolved a well considered policy for promotion of private investment in housing sector under which the role of the Government would be that of a facilitator in place of a provider. He has elaborated the submissions as follows : “2.1 Mala fide invocation of the acquisition proceeding is writ large from the fact that even in 1992, (about 11 or 12 years prior to the present acquisition), 419 acres of land were proposed to be acquired for the same purpose. A copy of the notification dated 11.2.92 is from pages 1-122 of the compilation of English translations. The said notification was however cancelled on 16.2.1994. Twelve years later, resurrection of the same scheme and that also with the aid of emergency provisions, within months of the petitioners launching a scheme and acquiring land for residential houses smacks of nothing but ulterior purpose. In similar circumstances where initial acquisition had lapsed, invoking emergency powers under Section 17 was struck down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (UOI v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 , Vol V, 123-138). In similar circumstances where initial acquisition had lapsed, invoking emergency powers under Section 17 was struck down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (UOI v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 , Vol V, 123-138). 2.2 The proposal for acquisition is directly contrary to and destructive of the policy of the government dated 22.11.2003 and 21.5.2005. It is quite clear that the left hand of the government does not know what the other hand is doing. Although the petitioner ran from pillar to post and approached each and every authority, yet, it is clear that what one wing of the government sought to achieve by attracting private investments in the housing sector, the other department was equally determined to frustrate.” 16. Shri Tulsi further submits, that the sequence of the events would reveal that the government’s action of inviting private investment on one hand and acquiring land for a State agency, on the other hand, was not only opposed to their own policy but was in fact mala fide and a colourable exercise of power, which was aimed merely to frustrate the project of the petitioners. He submits that the Government repeatedly asked the GDA to justify acquisition in the light of the policy of privatization. The GDA, inspite of the report of the Committee, was not specific in reply and repeatedly avoided the issue, on the ground that the land has been purchased by the petitioner No. 1 Company, prior to Section 4 notification. The Government had clarified in its policy on 29.12.2005, that if the land has been acquired prior to Section 4 notification then such land shall not be included in the notification. Despite this clarification from the Chief Secretary, the respondents chose to ignore their own policy and guidelines and declined to exclude petitioner’s land from the acquisition for no other reason except mala fide, ulterior purpose and by way of colourable exercise of power. 17. Shri Tulsi further submits that no valid publication, as required by Section 4 (1) of the Act, was made in the present case. There is no material to show that the public notice was made by beat of drums. 17. Shri Tulsi further submits that no valid publication, as required by Section 4 (1) of the Act, was made in the present case. There is no material to show that the public notice was made by beat of drums. The counter-affidavits of the State and the GDA are contradictory and demolish the averments of each other, whereas the State claims that public notice by beat of drums was made on 5.11.2005, the GDA merely claims the date of beat of drums to be 6.11.2004, and that too also on the basis of a deemed fiction, as that was to be the last date of local publication for calculating the limitation provided under the proviso to Section 6 for publishing notification under Section 6. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 it was held in para-9 that legal malice is nothing but colourable exercise of power with an object to reach an end, different from the one for which the power is entrusted and that the fraud on power voids the order because the considerations are extraneous to statute. 18. Shri Tulsi has placed reliance on the compilation of the documents submitted by the petitioners in submitting that the land was actually acquired for having no use other than creating a land bank vide report of the Committee appointed by G.D.A. In the report submitted by the Committee consisting of Secretary, G.D.A.; the Officer on Special Duty,G.D.A.; Town Planner, G.D.A.; Executive Engineer, U.P. Jal Nigam, Ghaziabad; A.D.M. (Land Acquisition) Irrigation, Ghaziabad and Executive Engineer, G.D.A. Ghaziabad. In the meeting of the Committee on 17.10.2002, it discussed the matter after making inspections on the spot that the total area of ‘Govindpuram’, ‘Karpuripuram’ and ‘Swarna Jayantipuram’ Schemes adjacent to villages Sadarpur Khair Raeespur, Mahiuddinpur Mainapur; Naglapath; and Rasoolpur Yakootpur is estimated to be 2000 acres in which atleast the proposal for acquisition of 1000 acres may be sent at present in the first phase. The Committee then observed in the second paragraph that the GDA has at present developed most of the acquired land, and that there will be no land bank left after one year when the remaining land will also be developed, and thereafter there will be no further land bank left for planned development of the city, and thus it is necessary to acquire the land. The Committee decided to propose for acquisition of 1000 acres in the aforesaid villages. On this proposal submitted and considered in the 18th Meeting of the GDA held on 30.11.2002, it was decided by the Board on item No. 41 as follows : Proposal for acquisition of about 1000 acres of land in revenue villages Sadarpur, Raeespur, Mahiuddinpur, Mainapur, Naglapath and Rasootpur Yakoobpur The proposal was accepted. The land be acquired in accordance with the new procedure under Section 4 on the basis of agreement with the farmers. Since houses in large numbers in several colonies are still, and have not been disposed of, instead of constructing the houses made, only the scheme concerning plotting be worked out. 19. It is submitted that instead of complying with the resolution of the Board of GDA as aforesaid in its meeting dated 30.11.2002, the Vice Chairman, GDA on his own, prepared proposals for acquisition of the land and submitted them to the State Government, which in turn asked the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad on 17.8.2003 to examine the request dated 14.1.2003, and to submit proposal to the State Government. 20. The District Magistrate thereafter collected the requisite information under the Land Acquisition Manual and submitted his preliminary report on all the 17 points for issuing notification under Section 4 (1) for consideration of Land Used Council, Government of Uttar Pradesh and obtained necessary details for deposit of compensation from the Ghaziabad Development Authority. The correspondence, between the office of the Collector, Ghaziabad, and the Ghaziabad Development Authority, shows consideration of various aspects relating to the selection of the site. The correction of revenue records collected from the office of the Tehsildar on which the proposals were amended by making requisite clarifications between November, 2003 to January, 2004, the proposals for acquisition of land at villages Sadarpur, Raeespur, Mahiuddinpur Mainapur, Naglapath and Rasoolpur Yakutpur were sent separately with all the details regarding the identification of the land and the land records and the demands were made from the GDA for depositing 10% of the proposed cost as the acquisition expenses and 10% as compensation. The District Magistrate, compiled these documents and forwarded the proposals along with the information that the requisite 20% amount has been deposited to the Director of the Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow on 12/11.2.2004 recording his satisfaction that the subject land is urgently required for development of the residential schemes by the GDA. 21. The Director, Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, U.P. at Lucknow by his letters dated 19.5.2004 and 20.5.2004, found that the details, with regard to the displacement of the Scheduled Caste farmers, the basis of rates of land for calculating the estimated proposed compensation, required clarification. The Board of Revenue also sought clarification by its order dated 18.5.2004 in respect of the land at village Sadarpur regarding some of the plots on which the names of the farmers were not recorded and the total number of Scheduled Caste persons to be displaced by the acquisition. Apart from other information regarding the rehabilitation of the persons, whose total land is acquired, and the rates of stamp duty, the District Magistrate by his letter dated 28.5.2004 clarified these aspects and sent the matter to the State Government. The State Government by its letter dated 19.7.2004 in respect of the 6 notifications again sought information on five points namely, the total area to be acquired in village Sadarpur; the details of the total number of farmers including Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe farmers to be affected by the acquisition, out of 305 families in village Mahiuddinpur Kanavani to be given separately, and for change of land used in the same village; the details of the land acquired for the development authority for last ten years; the possession taken of such land and its development and allotment; the details of the land to be required by the development authority in future for immediate development of the area by the development authority for housing purposes. The State Government also raised an issue with regard to the explanation as to why the Board of Directors including the Director of the Land Use Council or its representative in the meetings had failed to furnish the information with regard to the meetings of proposals for acquisition of the land. 22. The State Government also raised an issue with regard to the explanation as to why the Board of Directors including the Director of the Land Use Council or its representative in the meetings had failed to furnish the information with regard to the meetings of proposals for acquisition of the land. 22. The Secretary, GDA by his letter dated 19.7.2004 forwarded the requisite information to the State Government stating that a total area of 269.004 hectare of land is acquired in village Sadarpur and while submitting the statement with regard to displacement of total number of farmers and the break up of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe farmers and the total number, which is going to become landless, which included 107 at Mahiuddinpur Kanavani; 55 at Rasoolpur Yakootpur; 63 at Naglapath; 35 at Mahiuddinpur Mainapur and 22 at Sadarpur found that in the last 10 years, no land has been acquired for GDA. The authority would require about 2000 acres of land in future. In para 4 of this letter, the Secretary of GDA also informed that on the survey made for assessing the demand the GDA has received applications for allotment many times over the expected demand. The demand is many times more than the number of plots/building prepared in the proposal. In para 5 of this letter it was stated that in the board’s meeting, on the instructions of the Land Use Council, the Secretary of the GDA, Chief Town Planner, Executive Engineer and ADM (Land Acquisition) Ghaziabad and Superintending Engineer, Jal Nigam were present. They presented the proposals before the Board after spot inspections and that only after the board decides that the proceedings of acquisition are initiated, with a request for issuing notification under Section 4 (1) and 6 (17). 23. The record further shows that the matter along with the entire details and the report on the clarification sought from the GDA was placed before the Land Use Council chaired by Hon’ble Chief Minister. The proposal for issuing six notifications for acquisition of the land as aforesaid was approved by Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, the then Chief Minister, U.P. under his signatures on 13.9.2004. The proposal for issuing notifications under Section 4 (1)/17 of the Act was placed separately and was approved by Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, the then Chief Minister, also holding the charge of Housing Ministry on 13.10.2004. The proposal for issuing notifications under Section 4 (1)/17 of the Act was placed separately and was approved by Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, the then Chief Minister, also holding the charge of Housing Ministry on 13.10.2004. The six notifications under Section 4 of the Act with the opinion of the State Government expressed through the Governor of Uttar Pradesh applying provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 and with directions under sub-section (4) of Section 17 that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply, were published thereafter between 5.9.2005 to 31.10.2005. 24. Shri Tulsi submits that the records as aforesaid as well as the records obtained by the petitioners Company from the Public Information Officer (Revenue Department) Ghaziabad through its advocate Shri Amit Bansal under (The) Right to Information Act, 2005 given on 4.3.2010 annexing the entire order sheets relating to acquisition of the land from the office of Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Irrigation, Ghaziabad would show a total non-application of mind on the applicability of the provisions of Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 25. He submits that the Board of GDA had resolved on 30.11.2002, that the land be acquired on the basis of settlement with the cultivators and that since large number of houses in various colonies were lying unsold, instead of building houses only plan for plotted development be prepared. The Vice Chairman of the Board acting on his own in contravention with the statutory resolution of the Board in its 89th meeting dated 30.11.2002 prepared proposals for acquisition of the entire land under the Act for constructions of residential colony. The material placed before the Board, namely, the report of the Committee, proposed acquisition of 1000 acres of land for no immediate plan for development but for preparing land bank. He would submit, that in fact the record reflects that there was no resolution of the Board to construct residential colony. The applicability of the provisions of Section 17 (1) is without any need for land under Section 4 (1) for public purpose. The notifications under Sections 4 and 6, therefore, suffer from fatal flaw of mentioning public purpose of constructions of residential colony contrary to both the resolutions of the GDA and the government’s own policy to stop making constructions of residential colonies and to Act as facilitator. 26. The notifications under Sections 4 and 6, therefore, suffer from fatal flaw of mentioning public purpose of constructions of residential colony contrary to both the resolutions of the GDA and the government’s own policy to stop making constructions of residential colonies and to Act as facilitator. 26. Shri Tulsi further submits that the entire documents have not been placed before the Court and that relevant documents have been withheld preventing full and frank disclosure of facts. It is an extremely serious matter. He submits that the acquisition is nothing but mala fide and colourable exercise of power by the State authorities. 27. In the application dated 10.3.2010 supported by affidavit of Shri Dinesh Shukla on behalf of the Company, it is stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 that in the inspections dated 7th and 8th January, 2010 relating to the records of GDA, the Collector, Ghaziabad and the State of U.P. in pursuance to the order of the Court dated 21.12.2009, a large number of documents were not made available. The details of these documents have been given in the inspection report annexed to the affidavit and which included notifications under Section 4 (1) and 6/17 dated 5.2.1992, which stood lapsed. The details of these documents have been given in the inspection report annexed to the affidavit and which included notifications under Section 4 (1) and 6/17 dated 5.2.1992, which stood lapsed. The application of the petitioners dated 16.7.2004, letter of the petitioners dated 17.7.2004 by which the petitioners wanted to know the status of the proposed link road; the letter dated 16.9.2004 to the Vice Chairman,GDA regarding execution of sale-deeds in respect of 52 acres and proposed to purchase further 100 acres and approval under U.P. Urban Planning & Development Act, 1973; the letter to the Secretary, Housing & Urban Development, UP dated 25.9.2004 and the letter of Secretary to the Chief Minister addressed to Secretary Housing dated 27.9.2004 directing exclusion of the petitioner’s land from acquisition; the letters dated 1.10.2004, 24.10.2004 sent by the petitioner to the Vice Chairman,GDA informing procurement of land and exemption from acquisition; the replies dated 30.12.2004; the letter sent by the company to the District Magistrate to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 dated 5.5.2005; the application to Chief Secretary, U.P. dated 13.6.2005 that the petitioner has already purchased 60% of the land for proposed township, the letter of the Chief Secretary dated 18.8.2005 to the Vice Chairman, GDA to do needful according to the government’s policy and whether there is any objection, if 150 acres of land is released, the order of the Vice Chairman, GDA constituting Seven-Member Committee to give report on query to the Chief Secretary; the Committee’s report dated 24.8.2005; the letter of the State Government dated 29.8.2005 and the letter of GDA dated 2.9.2005 to Secretary, Urban Development that the acquisition will cover only 500 acres and rest of the land remains as land bank. He relies upon Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2009 (14) SCC 473, to submit that the Court should take a serious view, of the non-disclosure of these documents. 28. Shri Tulsi has also made detailed submissions with regard to applicability of principles of promissory estoppel. He would submit that the State Government held out a positive statement in its policy letters vide Government Orders dated 22.11.2003 and 21.5.2005 encouraging development of housing, in which the State is acting as facilitator and would provide 40% land, if 60% land is purchased for the project. The petitioner changed its legal position in response to the policy in making investment for the acquired land. The petitioner changed its legal position in response to the policy in making investment for the acquired land. The Government cannot go back on its own policy in an unequivocal manner. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is the pride of constitutional democracy and places the citizen and the State at the same footing. He has relied upon judgments in Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, (2005) 1 SCC 625 ; State of Orissa and others v. Mangalam Tiber Products Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 139 ; State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 465 ; State of Rajasthan and others v. Bhatnagar Cement Co. (P) Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 264 ; State of M.P. v. G.S. Dhall & Flour Mills, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 150; Comm. of Commercial Taxes (Asst.) v. Dharmendra Trading Co., (1988) 3 SCC 570 and Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala, (1986) Supp SCC 728 in support of his submission. 29. Shri Tulsi has also relied upon a decision taken by the Chief Minister on 27.9.2004 on the representation made by the petitioners to exclude the land from acquisition raising legitimate expectation. He submits that it was incumbent upon the State Government to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners consisting with principles of natural justice vide Prakash Ratan Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2009 (9) SCALE 529 (Vol. V & 48-53) and Zenith Mataplast P. v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (12) SCALE 433 (Vol. V & 1-11). 30. Shri Tulsi submits that no material was placed on the basis of which the Government could have applied its mind on the requirement of 1000 acres of land for land bank and that there is clear contradiction in the documents with the Government and the decision of the board. 31. Shri Tulsi submits that the claim of the respondents in the counter-affidavit, that the possession was taken on 18.5.2006, is concocted and false. The Writ Petition was filed on 18.5.2006 after serving advance copy on counsels of State and GDA. When the Writ Petition came up for hearing they never informed that the possession had been taken. There is no panchnama of possession on record. The order of Collector makes no reference of taking over of possession and no public witness has been associated. When the Writ Petition came up for hearing they never informed that the possession had been taken. There is no panchnama of possession on record. The order of Collector makes no reference of taking over of possession and no public witness has been associated. There is no reference of any government officer or officials visiting the land from 18.5.2006 to 22.5.2006, and that taking over of possession on a single day on 18.5.2006 of 1400 acres in one single sweep, is preposterous. Even if the symbolic or paper possession was taken, it is of no avail as there is no record of compensation deposited or tendered under Section 17 (3A) or deposited under Section 31 (2) of the Act. In Khasra Gidarvis of 2007, 2008 and 2009 the petitioners are shown in the cultivatory possession of the land. He has also relied upon photographs and prays that in the event the writ petition is allowed, the entire amount may be directed to be restored to the land owners irrespective of the fact whether they have challenged the acquisition or not vide HMT House Building Coop Society v. M Venkataswamappa, (1995) 3 SCC 128 and Vyakukaval House Building Coop Society v. Chandrappa, (2007) 9 SCC 304 . 32. Relying upon the rejoinder affidavit filed on 14.7.2009, Shri Tulsi submits that M/s Sahara India Commercial Corporation Ltd has proposed the development of 591371.92 square meters of land. The proposed lay out plan prepared by Joy Bose dated 6.10.2004 shows development of 351357.87 square meters (59.42%) for residential area marked as Residential Area-A, Residential Area-B, Residential Area-C, Plotted Development including row house, semi-detached house and bungalows. The total commercial area with multiplex, hotel with club, petrol pump and local shop, is shown as 24962.66 square meters (4.22%). The other amenities like schools, hospital, community clubs are approximately in 54722.87 square meters (9.25%). The area under green & park is shown as 77792.73 square meters (13.15%). The proposed lay out plan has not been submitted to the GDA so far. It is a proposed lay out plan as referred in the letter dated 16.9.2004/1.10.2004 of the Company to GDA and the State Government. During the course of arguments, Shri Tulsi submitted, after getting instructions from the petitioner, that the Company proposes to utilize 30% of the land for affordable houses for the lower, medium class and poor. 33. It is a proposed lay out plan as referred in the letter dated 16.9.2004/1.10.2004 of the Company to GDA and the State Government. During the course of arguments, Shri Tulsi submitted, after getting instructions from the petitioner, that the Company proposes to utilize 30% of the land for affordable houses for the lower, medium class and poor. 33. Shri V.B. Upadhyay, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri S.K. Tyagi appearing in 45 Writ Petitions relating to village Sadarpur; 18 relating to village Mahiuddinpur Mainapur; 09 relating to village Rasootpur Yakootpur and one each of village Naglapath and Mota, taking the arguments further on the points raised by Shri Tulsi, submits that the right to property, though not a fundamental right, and included under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, has a flavour of fundamental right. Section 5A of the Act is a valuable right giving a right of hearing to the person whose land is proposed to be acquired. It also serves a public purpose. The urgency, therefore, to dispense with Section 5A under Section 17 (4) of the Act, should be such which should not wait for hearing for even 21 days. He would submit that where proposals were made in the year 2003, on the report submitted on 21.11.2002, only for preparing a land bank, there could be no such public purpose, nor could there be any urgency to dispense with Section 5A. The entire object of the acquisition of land was to make profits. The GDA acquires land at cheaper rates and thereafter sells it on higher rates, making huge profits. 34. Shri Upadhyay submits that for the proposals of land in village Rasoolpur-Yakootpur, some deposits of compensation were made in December 2004 and 70% were deposited on 20.5.2005 before issuing notification under Section 6. The delay in the proposals and the deposits shows that there was no urgency in acquiring the land. He would submit that the possibility of encroachment is not a ground on which the enquiry under Section 5A could be dispensed with. It is writ large on the records of the case, that there was no urgency. A stereotype method was adopted in acquisition of the land with proposals of GDA forwarded by the Collector with the only ground of urgency that there is threat of encroachment. It is writ large on the records of the case, that there was no urgency. A stereotype method was adopted in acquisition of the land with proposals of GDA forwarded by the Collector with the only ground of urgency that there is threat of encroachment. The Government Order dated 11.12.1995, issued by the State Government providing for guidelines for invoking Section 17, provides for examination of all the proposals for acquisition by the District Magistrate. The proposals are to be forwarded after ensuring that the acquiring body has deposited 80% of the compensation in addition of 10%. The Government Order dated 19.6.2002 provides that where Section 17 is applied taking away the right of the hearing of the land owners, under Section 5A, the possession should be taken immediately, after 15 days. If the acquiring body takes possession after some delay, and does not deposit the required amount for acquisition, the purpose of invoking Section 17, is frustrated. 35. Shri Upadhyay has relied upon Om Prakash (supra); Hindustan Petroleum (supra); Devendra Singh (supra); Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Mukesh Hans (supra); Krishan Lal Arneja (supra); Essco Fabs Private Limited and another v. State of Haryana and another, (2009) 2 SCC 377 ; Mahendra Pal v. State of U.P., (2009) 4 AWC 3464 and Babu Ram v. State of Haryana, (2009) 10 SCC 115 to support his submissions. He submits that there has to be a public purpose and thereafter urgency of such nature based on relevant material on which the State has applied its mind to form an opinion to dispense with an enquiry to invoke the provisions of Section 17 (4) of the Act, and that there should be no delay in the entire process. The urgency should be real urgency and not merely a pretext of urgency. 36. Shri Ravi Kant, Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petitions No. 74529 of 2005 and 74527 of 2005 states that the petitioners in these writ petitions are owners and in possession of land of Khasra plot No. 940, Khata Khatauni No. 50 Village Sadarpur, Pargana Dasna, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad (area 2.084 hectares). A brick kiln stands over a portion of the plot in dispute. There are temporary huts for the residence of labourers working in the kiln. A brick kiln stands over a portion of the plot in dispute. There are temporary huts for the residence of labourers working in the kiln. He submits that under Section 4 (1) of the Act, the land should be needed or likely to be needed for public purpose. In the instant case, the record would show that the land was neither needed at any relevant time when the proposal was made, and upto to the date of notifications for any public purpose. The GDA required the land for the land bank as the land available with the GDA for development was going to exhaust within a period of one year as reflected from the report of the Committee accepted by the Board of GDA. He states that there was no material before the State Government to record satisfaction that there was such an urgency to acquire the same, which would brook no delay in disposal of objections under Section 5A of the Act. No reasonable person could have reached to a conclusion on such material that there exists such an urgency that the State Government could not wait even for disposal of objections under Section 5A of the Act. The subjective satisfaction, as recited in the impugned notifications, is subject to judicial review and that the non-publication of notification in the locality renders the entire proceedings for acquisition null and void. 37. Shri Ravi Kant further submits that for Madhubani and Bapudham Schemes, the GDA required only 390 acres of land. Besides, there are two more schemes, i.e. Indrapuram Prime and Indrapuram Extension. These two schemes required only 110 acres of land. Thus in all the GDA required only 500 acres of land. As against it, they are acquiring 1463.23 acres of land, i.e. three times the requirement for the aforesaid schemes. Further there exists report of a Committee constituted by the GDA dated 24.8.2005, according to which the GDA required only 444.970 acres of land or at the best 500 acres of land. The remaining will form land bank, which is not the public purpose for acquisition of land. The GDA has no other schemes on hand. The future requirement of the land, for which there was no plan, cannot be treated as the land needed, or likely to be needed, for the purpose of compulsory acquisition. 38. The remaining will form land bank, which is not the public purpose for acquisition of land. The GDA has no other schemes on hand. The future requirement of the land, for which there was no plan, cannot be treated as the land needed, or likely to be needed, for the purpose of compulsory acquisition. 38. Shri Ravi Kant submits that the opinion of the Government to apply Section 17 (4) is subjective satisfaction, based on the existence of urgency as specified in Section 17 (1) and 17 (4) of the Act. The term ‘urgency’, as it was held in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 133 , has to be urgency of such a nature, that even summary proceedings under Section 5A should be eliminated. He submits that in Shalini Soni v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 545 the Supreme Court held that whenever decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of the statutory functionary, it is an unwritten Rule of law, constitutional and administrative, that there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 (paragraphs 59, 60 and 61) the Supreme Court held that the grounds, on which the government’s opinion as to the existence of urgency can be challenged, are not unlimited and the power conferred has to be formulated in subjective terms. In cases, where an issue is raised challenging government’s opinion to be formed arbitrarily and in perverse fashion without regard to patent, actual and undeniable facts or that such opinion has been arrived at on the basis of irrelevant considerations or no material at all or on materials so tenuous, flimsy, slender or dubious that no reasonable man could reasonably reach that conclusion, the Court is entitled to examine the validity of the formation of that opinion by the government in the context and to the extent of that issue. Referring to Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (supra) and State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and others, (1980) 2 SCC 471 the Supreme Court concluded in para 66, that it is not possible to subscribe to the proposition propounded by the High Court that the satisfaction of the Central Government in regard to condition (ii), i.e. the existence of ‘immediacy’, though subjective is not open to judicial review. If an order is based on several grounds some of which are non-existed or irrelevant, the order can be sustained if the Court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of other relevant or existing grounds and the exclusion of irrelevant and non-existing grounds. Shri Ravi Kant also relies upon the judgment in Mukesh Hans (supra) and Krishan Lal Arneja (supra). 39. Shri Ravi Kant has referred to Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Darius Shapur Chenai and others, (2005) 7 SCC 627 (paragraphs 7 to 12) where the Supreme Court emphasized and approved the observations made by it in State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and in recent case of Bhikhu Bhai Vithla Bhai Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and another, (2008) 4 SCC 144 , in which the Supreme Court summarized the discussion in paragraph-33 : “33. The Court is entitled to examine whether there has been any material available with the State Government and the reasons recorded, if any, in the formation of opinion, and whether they have any rational connection with or relevant bearing on the formation of opinion. The Court is entitled particularly, in the event, when the formation of opinion is challenged to determine whether the formation of opinion is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is always open to the Court to examine the question whether reasons for formation of opinion have rational connection or relevant bearing to the formation of opinion and are not extraneous to the purposes of the statute.” 40. The Supreme Court further observed that it is not any or every material, howsoever vague and indefinite which would warrant the formation of the belief relating to escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment. The reason for the formation of the belief must be held in good faith and should not be a mere pretense. The Supreme Court further observed that it is not any or every material, howsoever vague and indefinite which would warrant the formation of the belief relating to escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment. The reason for the formation of the belief must be held in good faith and should not be a mere pretense. There is nothing like absolute or unfettered discretion and at any rate in the case of statutory powers. He would submit that in Essco Fabs Private Limited (supra) the Supreme Court has reiterated its earlier view on the question of urgency in acquiring the land. 41. Shri W.H. Khan, Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 73678 of 2005 submits that the notification under Section 6 (1)/17 of the Act is bad on the ground of limitation in its publication. He submits that in the State of U.P. by the Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1973 (U.P. Act No. 8 of 1974) Section 4 (1) was amended by inserting the words “and” and “the Collector” to be inserted and to be deemed always to have been inserted namely “except in the case of any land to which by virtue of a direction of the State Government under sub-section (4) of Section 17, the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply,”. He submits that in such cases the publication in the locality is thus not required by a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. The limitation of one year for publishing notification under Section 6 (1)/17 would thus be counted from the date of the last of the notifications as provided under Section 6, i.e., dates of the notification published in the official gazette or in the newspapers. He submits that in the present case, if the dates of publication of the notification under Section 4 (1)/17 of the Act, is not taken into account, the last of the dates of the notification published in the newspapers would be much before one year of the date of publication of the notification under Section 6 (1)/17 of the Act, and thus in accordance with the explanation appended to Section 6 of the Act, the notification is clearly barred by time. The notification under Section 4 (1)/17 was published in the Official Gazette on 16.10.2004. It was published in the newspapers on 22.10.2004. The notification under Section 4 (1)/17 was published in the Official Gazette on 16.10.2004. It was published in the newspapers on 22.10.2004. If we excludes its publication in the locality on 6.11.2004, by beat of drums, the notification under Section 6 published in the official gazette on 31.10.2005 is clearly beyond the period of one year. He relies upon judgments in Abdul Sattar v. State of U.P., 1994 ALJ 406; Ajib Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1993 Alld. Page 10; M/s Jhalani Iron & Metal Works v. State of U.P., 1983 ALJ 491; Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Jan Kalyan Samiti Shivpur, 1996 (2) SCC 365 ; Vijay Narayan Thatte v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 (1) AWC 121 SC. He submits that vide Narayan Govind Gavate (supra) in paras 6, 17 and 18 the Supreme Court held that proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is mandatory and bears no exception. In that case the Court was considering the effect of the delay in publishing notification under Section 6 (1) being barred under the second proviso and its consequent declaration to be beyond limitation, would not save the notification under Section 4. The notification in that case was clearly barred giving rise to the question whether in such case the notification under Section 4 would survive. In Vijay Narayan Thatte (supra) the Supreme Court relied upon Mimansa principles of interpretation as laid down by Jaimini in his Sutras around 6th Century B.C. in which negative injunction in Kalanja maxim were stated to be understood in its general condemnatory test to be not only as prohibiting an Act, but also the tendency, including the intention and attempt to do it. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and while setting aside the judgment of the High Court also quashed the notification under Section 4 making it open to the respondents-State of Maharashtra to issue a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act and to take proceedings in accordance with the law thereafter. 42. Shri Surendra Tiwari and Shri Vikas Mishra, appearing in Writ Petition No. 7066 of 2006 in respect of acquisition of land of village Mohiuddinpur and Mainapur, submit that the petitioners have their houses and abadi on their plot No. 121 area 0.0950 hectares and 1/3rd portion of plot Nos. 122, 127 and 128-Ga. 42. Shri Surendra Tiwari and Shri Vikas Mishra, appearing in Writ Petition No. 7066 of 2006 in respect of acquisition of land of village Mohiuddinpur and Mainapur, submit that the petitioners have their houses and abadi on their plot No. 121 area 0.0950 hectares and 1/3rd portion of plot Nos. 122, 127 and 128-Ga. They have relied upon Kashma Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(7) ADJ 133 (DB), in which the notifications, invoking urgency on the ground that the Allahabad Development Authority required the land urgently for constructing Olympic size stadium, was not found to be sufficient to invoke the provisions of Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act. 43. Shri Anurag Khanna, appearing in Writ Petition No. 27068/2006 and 29638/2006 challenging acquisition of land in Rasoolpur Yakootpur in District Ghaziabad, states that the petitioner has a small scale industry of manufacturing chemicals on the acquired plots since 1996. There are other units also in the vicinity which have not been acquired. 44. Shri A.K. Mishra, appearing for Ghaziabad Development Authority, states that the running industries have been left out, the other plots have been acquired. The petitioner does not have industry on all the plots owned by it. The two sale-deeds in respect of some of the acquired plots are post Section 4 notification. 45. Shri A.K. Sachan, appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 77821 of 2007 and 77817 of 2007, states that there are constructions of houses of the petitioners on the land. The dates or even the the year of the constructions of the houses, and the area, which the houses occupy on the plots have not been given. 46. Shri R.N. Singh, Senior Counsel appearing for GDA, submits that the State Government has power of ‘imminent domain’, to acquire the land for public purpose. It was held as far back as in the year 1986 in State of U.P. v. Pista Devi and others, (1986) 4 SCC 251 that the requirement of land by the Government for providing housing accommodation is of national urgency, of which Courts should take judicial notice. Where delay of one year between dates of notification under Sections 4 and 6 ensued due to error on the part of the concerned officer will not vitiate action under Section 17 (1) and (4). Where delay of one year between dates of notification under Sections 4 and 6 ensued due to error on the part of the concerned officer will not vitiate action under Section 17 (1) and (4). Where vast area of arable land is acquired for development purposes some small portions within the area cannot be left out merely because few super-structures are standing thereon. In Jai Narain and others v. Union of India and others, (1996) 1 SCC 9 , it was held that the expression used in the notification under Section 4, are not decisive. The Court cannot interfere with the satisfaction of the Government unless reasons given are wholly irrelevant. Where notification under Section 4 uses the expression ‘likely to be needed’ suggesting absence of urgency, the Court must examine the records and attending circumstances to satisfy about the justification for invoking the urgency provisions. The emergency must be reflected in the need of acquisition. The existence of urgency is a matter, which is entirely based on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. The Courts do not interfere unless the reasons given are wholly irrelevant and there is no application of mind. In the case of acquisition of land for construction of sewage treatment plants for planned development of Delhi under the directions of the Supreme Court, it was of utmost importance and urgency to complete the constructions. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that there was urgency to acquire the land. Where the land is shown in the master plan and zonal development plan as agricultural green the acquisition of land for public purpose for setting up STP’s for planned development of Delhi was not invalid. 47. Shri R.N. Singh submits that in Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab and others, (1996) 4 SCC 212 , the Supreme Court, relying upon Narayan Govind Govate (supra) and Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 2 SCC 549 , held that providing housing sites to the poor is an urgency, for which the exercise of the powers under Section 17 (4) to dispense with an enquiry under Section 5A would be justified. The exercise of power under Section 17 (4) cannot be struck down when the Government was of the opinion that it urgently requires possession of the land for providing housing sites to the poor. 48. The exercise of power under Section 17 (4) cannot be struck down when the Government was of the opinion that it urgently requires possession of the land for providing housing sites to the poor. 48. Shri R.N. Singh submits that in Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector Ranga Reddy, (2008) 9 SCC 552 the Supreme Court has reiterated the entire law relating to imminent domain and the public purpose. The public good always overrides public interest. He submits that the petitioners have to plead and prove that the purpose, for which the land was acquired, is not a public purpose and relies upon paragraphs 11 and 14 in Smt. Manju Lata Agarwal v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (9) ADJ 447 (DB) against which the SLP was dismissed. 49. Giving the facts of the case, Shri R.N. Singh submits that the land was needed for Madhuban and Bapu Dham Schemes, for residential sites. In these advertised schemes, 629 plots of 450 square meters, 480 plots of 300 square meters, 666 plots of 200 square meters and 911 plots of 120 square meters, are proposed. For lower income group there are 1084 plots of 60 square meters totalling 3770 plots. For Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) 5056 flats are proposed and are under constructions. There are 34 plots reserved for group housing and in this manner the acquisition relates to 1234 acres of private land. The remaining land to be used for housing ,is the Gaon Sabha land. 50. Shri R.N. Singh would submit, relying upon the averments made in the counter-affidavits, that 826 agreements for payment of agreed compensation have been executed with the farmers in respect of 874.9690 acres of land, which is 70% of the total area acquired with the land owners/farmers and bhumidhars. They have accepted compensation without protest. The respondents have distributed Rs. 389 Crores as compensation so far to the land owners and that the constructions of group houses is in progress. 51. Shri R.N. Singh submits that the principles of promissory estoppel are not attracted as there were no schemes under which any representation was made by the private builders to purchase the land. The Sahara Group of Companies did not submit any plan, nor there was any promise held out to them to sanction the plan and to drop the proposal of acquisition. The Sahara Group of Companies did not submit any plan, nor there was any promise held out to them to sanction the plan and to drop the proposal of acquisition. M/s Sahara India Commercial Corporation Ltd does not own any land. It is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act. It entered into some agreements with private persons on 11.10.2003 to procure some land for its associated companies. The first sale-deed was registered on 12.12.2003. The joint venture agreement, claimed to be executed for purchase of land by private persons for its associated companies arrayed as petitioner Nos. 2 to 9 was entered into on 3.4.2004. By that time, the first application is alleged to be made, the Company had acquired only 52 acres of land. There was no project or plan submitted to the GDA. An intimation of purchase of land for its subsidiary Companies cannot have any effect on the proposed acquisition. The subsidiary Companies purchased the remaining area totalling 91.628 acres, after notification under Section 4 (1)/17 was published. M/s Sahara India Commercial Corporation Ltd has also applied for compensation. The associated companies, through petitioner No. 1-Company and the private individuals arrayed as petitioners were fully aware of the public purpose and the notification acquiring the land invoking Section 17 (4). The claims for compensation have been filed by Shri Ram Vinai Prasad Singh-petitioner No. 12; Shri Chhote Lal petitioner No. 10 and petitioner Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 companies on 9.10.2007 claiming compensation @ Rs. 5000/- per square meter in addition to the compensation for trees, boring, wells, houses, tubewells etc. and also for damages. 52. Shri R.N. Singh further submitted that principles of promissory estoppel would also not apply for the reason that there was no promise held out by the State Government or GDA for purchase and development of the land. The petitioners had acquired 52 acres of land prior to the notification under Section 4 and upto 91 acres upto the last date of notification under Section 6/17. It is stated by petitioner No. 1-Company that it has agreements for the remaining land, totalling 145 acres. The persons claiming themselves to be Tyagi Associates, who were engaged to acquire the land and appears to have entered into some agreements, have not been impleaded as petitioner to the writ petition. The first agreement dated 11.10.2003 was with six Companies. It is stated by petitioner No. 1-Company that it has agreements for the remaining land, totalling 145 acres. The persons claiming themselves to be Tyagi Associates, who were engaged to acquire the land and appears to have entered into some agreements, have not been impleaded as petitioner to the writ petition. The first agreement dated 11.10.2003 was with six Companies. On 3.4.2004, the second agreement was with Shri Ram Vijai Prasad Singh for 9.5 acres and the third agreement is a joint venture agreement. The petitioners did not submit any plan for development of the land. The proposed plan is only for the benefit of a group of people. The promise made during the course of hearing to provide houses to poor, does not have any substance at all. 53. Shri R.N. Singh would submit that at no stage, the petitioners have made applications for release of land. The correspondence with the Chief Minister, and the letter by the Secretary to the Chief Minister to look into the matter, does not give or hold out any promise for release of land. After claiming compensation, the petitioners have no cause left to challenge the land acquisition proceedings. 54. Shri W.H. Khan submits that the Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1974 was published in the U.P. Gazette on 26.4.1974 to validate certain acquisitions. In Section 5 of the Amending Act, it is clearly stated that no acquisition of land made or purporting to have been made under the Principal Act before the commencement of the Amending Act, and no action taken or thing done (including any order made, agreement entered into, notification published or declaration made) in connection with such acquisition, shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the ground that Collector has not caused public notice on substance of notification under Section (1) of Section 4 to be given at convenient places in the locality. Section 5 (ii) provides that the notification, under Section 4 (1) stating that any land in the regulated area as defined in U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, was needed or likely to be needed for planned development, did not indicate the public purpose with sanction by October or that the proposed plan of development had not been prepared or finalised till the time of the issue of the notification. It is submitted that object of the amendment was to save certain acquisitions. The amendment was made to validate certain notifications and was limited to that purpose. The Land Acquisition Act has undergone extensive amendments in 1984. The publication in the locality is essential requirement of Section 4 (1) and that the effect of the validating Act is not to dispense with that requirement for all times to come and to count the limitation from the date when the notification was published in the Gazette or in the newspapers. Whenever the notification is made in the locality in compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act, the dates have to be counted with effect from the last of the dates of the publication. Shri R.N. Singh submits that the writ petitions challenging same notifications have been dismissed, and that in any case even on merits all the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 55. Shri A.K. Mishra appearing for Ghaziabad Development Authority submits that out of the total acquired land in villages Rasoolpur, Yakoobpur and Naglapath a substantial part of the area shown by green shade in ‘Sejra Plan’ annexed as Annexure SCA-2 to the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Ghaziabad Development Authority consists of the land for which the agreements for payment of compensation under the Settlement of Compensation Rules, 1997 has been duly entered into with the tenure holders, and that the actual compensation has been paid to them without any objection. The details of the area and the compensation paid in respect of the acquisitions of the villages Sadarpur I, Sadarpur II, Rasoolpur Yakoobpur, Mohiuddinpur and Naglapath, in para 7 of the supplementary counter-affidavit affirmed on 9.2.2009 as follows: “7. That out of the aforesaid total amount of compensation of Rs. 490 crores, the Authority/State has actually disbursed about Rs. 229.40 crores to the tenure holders under the 1997 Rules. The breakup showing payment of compensation in the five respective villages, with the amount disbursed is reproduced herewith: Name of Village Amount 1. Sadarpur I 1409468935.00 2. Sadarpur II 275008200.00 3. Rasoolpur Yakoobpur 187753249.00 4. Mohiuddinpur 133848.00 5. Naglapat 2888822244.00" 56. 490 crores, the Authority/State has actually disbursed about Rs. 229.40 crores to the tenure holders under the 1997 Rules. The breakup showing payment of compensation in the five respective villages, with the amount disbursed is reproduced herewith: Name of Village Amount 1. Sadarpur I 1409468935.00 2. Sadarpur II 275008200.00 3. Rasoolpur Yakoobpur 187753249.00 4. Mohiuddinpur 133848.00 5. Naglapat 2888822244.00" 56. He further submits relying upon the contents of paragraph 25 of the supplementary counter-affidavit that after holding meetings and deliberations at various levels, it was resolved in the joint meeting with the tenure holders, State and the Ghaziabad Development Authority that payment of compensation be paid @ Rs. 1100/- per square meter which works out to approximately Rs. 37 lacs per acre. It is more than adequate and just. The majority of farmers had agreed to receive compensation for the acquired land and that a sum of Rs. 230 crores has also been disbursed to the tenure holder out of total compensation payment of the entire land of the scheme of approximately Rs. 490 crores. 57. Shri A.K. Mishra would further submits that at the stage of publication of notification under Section 4, it is clear from the contents of the letter of the petitioner, that the sale-deeds were executed only of approximately 52 acres in favour of 8 different companies whereas it had claimed in its letter dated 16.9.2004 that the petitioners were desirous of establishing colony over 145 acres of land. In the letters of M/s Neelakshi Estate & Reality Pvt. Ltd and M/s Nayoditaa Estate & Reality Pvt. Ltd the area of the land purchased on behalf of the petitioner was mentioned at 41.53 acres. The proceedings for acquisition of the land and for determination of the rate of compensation had already commenced long back resulting into determination of the rate of compensation offered by the authority at Rs. 1100/- per square meters. 58. Shri Zafer Naiyer, Additional Advocate General has relied upon the ‘Manual of Land Acquisition Proceedings,’ prepared by the State Government and states that the acquiring body and the State have scrupulously followed the provisions of the manual. Six separate proposals were made for acquisition of land for public purpose for housing. Each proposal was scrutinized and subjected to detailed studies. All the requirements in law were complied with. Six separate proposals were made for acquisition of land for public purpose for housing. Each proposal was scrutinized and subjected to detailed studies. All the requirements in law were complied with. The proposals were approved by the Chief Minister as Chairman of the Land Development Council and thereafter as the concerned Minister for Urban Development for acquisition of the land and for invoking provisions of Section 17 (4) dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. Shri Naiyer submits that the public interest has to override the private interest. The petitioners did not have any plan nor any exemption was given by the State Government to the land purchased in the name of associated companies. In any case, he submits that after the petitioners have applied for compensation, they have lost their rights to challenge the notification. 59. In the supplementary submissions, Shri Tulsi states that adjudication in the earlier writ petition was not between the same parties. Neither the necessary facts nor the pleadings in the earlier case have been placed before the Court. Besides the earlier case was decided on technical ground of delay, and thus the judgment cannot operate as res judicata. He has relied upon the judgments in Ram Chandra Dagdu Sonavade (dead) by L.R.s and others v. Vithu Hira Mahar (dead) by LRs. 2009 (13) SCALE 226 and Bhag Mal v. Munshi, (2007) 11 SCC 285 that for res judicata the matter must be between the same parties and all necessary facts including pleadings must be placed on record. The law cannot be construed in a manner, which would defeat the ends of justice. He has relied upon judgments in State of Maharashtra v. National Construction Company, Bombay and others, (1996) 1 SCC 735 in submitting that adjudication merely on technical ground cannot operate as res judicata and in Gulam Abbas and others v. State of U.P., (1982) SCC 71 that in order to invoke the principles of res judicata the earlier adjudication must be between the same parties. 60. The policy of the State Government to encourage private investment to develop high-tech townships in the State in the Government Order dated 22.11.2003 provided that in order to raise the quality of life, overall development of the State, the development of urban areas; and development of the software industry, it was necessary to encourage private investment in the fast developing metropolitan towns. According to Census 2001, 28% population of the State lives in the six cities of Kanpur, Lucknow, Agra, Meerut and Allahabad. In the last decade 1991-2001 these cities have shown maximum increase of population at the rate of 48.10%. The Government Order provided that on taking into consideration the serious need of facilities of rehabilitation, and housing in these cities, it is not possible for the development authorities, and other government authorities, in view of their financial resources and pending dues to develop properties for sale, at such scale. In order to provide housing in an organized manner in the cities the only option available is to encourage private investment. The State Government decided that instead of providing housing, the State Government should adopt the role of facilitator to tap the opportunities. In order to achieve this object, it was necessary to provide facilities and atmosphere and thus it was necessary to encourage the development of high-tech township on priority basis, in accordance with the international standard in the big cities like Lucknow, Kanpur, Ghaziabad, Agra, Bareilly, Moradabad, Saharanpur etc. The State Government, decided to develop high tech townships in private sector with an investment of minimum of Rs. 750 crores for developing 1500 acres of land within a period of five years, and to provide special packages for private entrepreneurs. The policy provided to invite proposals for such townships from reputed and experienced Companies to be selected on the basis of their financial capacity, technical knowledge and experience and on the assessment of their Concept and Feasibility report. The company was required to have a turn over of atleast Rs. 100 crores in last three years. The development companies were provided to be selected by making advertisements in national newspapers, inviting proposals to be considered by the High Level Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary. The Government Order further provided that for the development of townships the land shall be acquired by the State Government for the development authorities, UP Awas and Vikas Parishad and other authorities under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or the UP Awas and Vikas Adhiniyam 1965 for which the compensation shall be determined and paid, so far as possible by agreement with the land owners under the Agreement Rules. The private developers shall be allowed to participate in the negotiation/settlement. The developer company can also purchase the land directly. The private developers shall be allowed to participate in the negotiation/settlement. The developer company can also purchase the land directly. In the matters, where the compensation cannot be determined by settlement, the District Magistrate was required to determine the compensation in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In case of any dispute if the compensation increased, the liability for such extra compensation was to be borne by the Company. The Government Order further provided that the entire cost of acquisition shall be borne by the development company but in this package the development company will be given relaxation in the prescribed 10% acquisition fees. The developer company will be permitted to sell or transfer the land on 90 year’s lease with exemption from stamp duty. After the development of the land, if the properties are sold, the stamp duty at 12%; free hold conversion fees and land value is provided to be paid by the developer-company to the acquiring-body. The proposed township will have a residential, commercial, institution, green area and community development land use etc. as land use structure in the township in accordance with the guidelines of the Master Plan and building bye-laws. The proposed townships were provided to be sustainable from the point of view of environment. The detailed project report was to be prepared by the developer company within 180 days proposing laying out plan, land used plan, infrastructure services plan, standard and specification, implementation schedule, resource mobilisation, land management, operation and maintenance. The detailed project report is provided to be sanctioned within 30 days. The other details given in the Government Order are not relevant for the purposes of the case. 61. The proposals for development and building plans submitted by some private owners of the land were rejected in the State on the ground, that the land is proposed for high-tech township. The High Court passed interim orders staying the implementation of the Government Order. In Special Leave Petition, the interim orders of the High Court were stayed. 62. By Government Order dated 21.5.2005, the State Government proposed another policy of the acquisition of land, and its development for housing schemes by private investment in urban areas. In the opening statement in the Government Order, it was stated that there is increasing pressure on the housing and rehabilitation schemes in fast developing urban areas. 62. By Government Order dated 21.5.2005, the State Government proposed another policy of the acquisition of land, and its development for housing schemes by private investment in urban areas. In the opening statement in the Government Order, it was stated that there is increasing pressure on the housing and rehabilitation schemes in fast developing urban areas. In the 10th five-year plan 16 lacs housing units @ 3.2 lacs housing unit per year are calculated to be in demand in the urban areas. The financial resource of the Governmental authorities are limited and thus in order to fulfill the requirements of providing buildings and plots, and to create new housing stock, it was necessary to encourage private investment. The State Government, in order to achieve these objects, decided to simplify the procedures for development and constructions and in order to prepare a value based atmosphere proposed a scheme for the registration of the developers in real estate in private sector in three categories namely, ‘A’, ‘B’, & ‘C’ in accordance with their financial capacity, technical knowledge and experience with the Awas Bandhu/Vikas Pradhikaran/Avas & Vikas Parishad or in the authorities nominated by the State Government. In category ‘A’, those real estate developers with a minimum turn over of Rs. 15 crores in last three years, and in category ‘C’ the builders with a minimum turn over of Rs. 5 crores in a year, were treated to be eligible. The land was to be made available to these developers in the two separate schemes of allotment of land namely, block allotment scheme and license based development permission scheme. 63. In the bulk land allotment scheme, the land was provided to be acquired by the Governmental authorities under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as far as possible under the Agreement Rules of 1997 by settlement with the land owners. The development plans/lay out modules were provided to be prepared between 25 acres to 100 acres. The reserve price of the land was to be calculated after taking into account 10% administrative expenses. The reserved price of land for different modules is to be fixed by inviting financial bids with earnest money under sealed cover to be given to the higher bidder. Paras 5 to 19 of the Scheme provided for further conditions of the bulk land allotment scheme. 64. The reserved price of land for different modules is to be fixed by inviting financial bids with earnest money under sealed cover to be given to the higher bidder. Paras 5 to 19 of the Scheme provided for further conditions of the bulk land allotment scheme. 64. In the license based development permission scheme, the policy in the Government Order dated 21.5.2005, provided that a minimum of 50 acres land will be provided for purchase and development in accordance with the prescribed license fee for which necessary provisions shall be made in UP Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and U.P. Awas and Vikas Parishad Act, 1965 and other concerned Acts. Separate licenses will be provided to the developers for acquiring the land valid for a period of two years to be renewed for a further period of one year on payment of prescribed renewal fees. The land was provided to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or under the UP Urban Planning and Development Act or under U.P. Avas and Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 for which the notification is provided for acquiring the land, and for which the developer is to deposit 10% of the administrative charges with the concerned Development Authority. Clause-4 of the license based scheme provided that after the developer has purchased 60% of the land, the remaining land will be acquired by the acquiring body under the Land Acquisition Act for which the acquisition cost and administrative charges shall be paid proportionately by the developer to the governmental authority. He will be required to pay the additional stamp duty and any enhancement in the compensation by the Court, or any liability arising out of any dispute. Clause 5 provided that the agreement shall specifically provide that at the time of purchase of land from the land owners, the interests of the land owners shall be protected. Clause 6 provided that under this scheme the registered developer shall be required to pay stamp duty in accordance with the notification by the Registration Department dated 22.5.2003, for the housing schemes. Clause 6 provided that under this scheme the registered developer shall be required to pay stamp duty in accordance with the notification by the Registration Department dated 22.5.2003, for the housing schemes. The other provisions of the license based scheme, required the payment of stamp duty and other development charges by the developer to Gram Samaj or Local Body in the land vested in it for requisition under the relevant Government Order or Rules, the preparations of the house and development of the land by the developer in accordance with the Master Plan and the prevalent building bye-laws. The detailed project report was required to be sanctioned by the development authority for laying out plan, land used plan, infrastructure and services and for completing the plan within five years under a time bound project. Paras 10 to 18 of the license based scheme are not relevant for the purposes of the Scheme. 65. We do not find that the petitioners had proposed to acquire the land for development of “Sahara City Homes” in villages Yakutpur/Rasoolpur in district Ghaziabad under the policy of the State Government given out in these Government orders dated 22.11.2003 or 21.5.2005. The Government Order dated 22.11.2003 was issued to develop high-tech townships. The object and reasons given in the opening paragraph of the policy refers to the development of software, as one of the main areas of economic progress. Though the policy of the State Government, was concerned with the fast growing population in the urban areas and the non-availability of the provisions of rehabilitation and housing, and that the Government should Act as a facilitator instead of provider, the policy provided for encouraging only those investors who wanted to invest a minimum amount of Rs. 750 crores and to develop about 1500 acres of land in a period of five years. The petitioner did not apply or even request the State Government to be treated as a private investor to develop such township. The petitioner’s application dated 1.10.2004 was addressed to the Vice Chairman, Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad. The applications did not refer to the policy of the State Government in the Government Order dated 22.11.2003. The Company requested for approval to develop residential township on land measuring approximately 145 acres for which sale-deeds were executed for the land measuring 52 acres. The petitioner’s application dated 1.10.2004 was addressed to the Vice Chairman, Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad. The applications did not refer to the policy of the State Government in the Government Order dated 22.11.2003. The Company requested for approval to develop residential township on land measuring approximately 145 acres for which sale-deeds were executed for the land measuring 52 acres. The application was accompanying by proposed ‘Sajra Plan’, Company Profile, Copy of Memorandum and Article of Associations, Authority Letters to SICCL and copy of the sale-deeds of the land purchased so far. 66. In the policy of the State Government announced by the Government Order dated 21.5.2005, the State Government once again reiterated the pressure on the development authorities to provide rehabilitation and housing in the fast growing urban populations, and the demands of at least 16 lacs housing units in the 10th five year plan. The scheme provided for investment in the housing sector by providing land under two separate schemes namely (1) Bulk land allotment scheme and (2) License based development permit scheme. In the Bulk land allotment scheme, the State Government provided for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, as far as possible by entering into settlements under the Agreement Rules of 1997 and for preparation of lay out plans with modules from 25 acres to 100 acres. In the Licence based permit scheme the developer registered with government authorities was required to obtain a license for purchase of at least 50 acres of land for development and for which necessary provisions were to be made in U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and U.P. Avas & Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1985. Separate licenses were to be issued for separate areas for which renewals could be obtained for a period of one year on prescribed fees. After issuance of the permit the land was to be acquired for the licensee by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or under the U.P. Urban Building and Development Act, 1973/U.P. Avas and Vikas Parishad Act, 1965 for which the developer was required to deposit the compensation in advance, alongwith a deposit of 10% as administrative fees with the Government authority. The Scheme provided for purchase of at least 60% of the land by the developer and the provisions of remaining land by the State Government. 67. The Scheme provided for purchase of at least 60% of the land by the developer and the provisions of remaining land by the State Government. 67. Paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the 2nd Supplementary Counter-affidavit of Shri Sanjeev Kumar, Assistant Engineer, Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad read as follows : “6. That thereafter process for planned development of the acquired land was proceeded further. Layout for the entire scheme of Madhuban/Papu Dham was prepared after measurement on the spot was taken by the officials of the Authority. Layout was considered at different levels and was ultimately approved in the meeting of the Authority in its Board on 17.1.2009. According to the said lay out plan which has been approved on 17.1.2009, total area over which scheme of Madhuban/Papu Dham situates works out to 5, 307, 303 sq. meter converted in terms of hectares the area works out to 530.7393 hectares and is equivalent to 1312 acres. Apart from 1234 acres of land acquired vide six notifications, referred to above, remaining land belonging to Land Management Committee in the form of chak road, nali etc. have been resumed. According to the scheme, residential construction constitutes 34.12% of the total area, which works out to 1, 810,906 sq. meters. Commercial construction is to take place over 1, 46, 784 sq. meters. Other facilities contemplated under the scheme include construction of road over an area of 1, 197, 935 sq. meters. Total green area amounts to 973,110 sq. meters and public facilities are provided on 977,150 sq. meters and industrial use according to the Master Plan situates over 123, 004 sq. meters. The acquired land thus has been used for different purposes permitted in the planned residential colony as per the guidelines/norms. Taken in terms of percentage, residential use is 34.13%, commercial 4.24%, public facilities 18.4%, industrial is 2.31%, green area 18.34% and roads amount for 22.58% of the total scheme area of 1312 acres, which is as per the norms meant for planned residential colony. 8. That according to the aforesaid lay out approved by the Authority, process of undertaking actual development has also commenced for the scheme. Development cost for undertaking various project works has been quantified to 825.1143 crores. 9. That pursuant to the aforesaid estimate, the authority has already commenced development work on the spot which are in various stages. 8. That according to the aforesaid lay out approved by the Authority, process of undertaking actual development has also commenced for the scheme. Development cost for undertaking various project works has been quantified to 825.1143 crores. 9. That pursuant to the aforesaid estimate, the authority has already commenced development work on the spot which are in various stages. Tender of different works has already been invited and in most of the matters contract has already been awarded, which is valued at 165.88 crores. Construction work of 5025 houses belonging to economically weaker Section, 512 houses for lower income group are already under progress. 10. That construction of more than 5000 houses for economically weaker Section has already commenced and construction of such houses are at different stages. Some of the photographs showing actual construction of about 5000 houses for economically weaker Section, which has already commenced on the spot, is being enclosed and is marked as Annexure SCA7 to this affidavit. 11. That apart from ongoing construction of more than 5000 houses for economically weaker Section, the scheme provides for 3770 residential plots and large number of group housing and residential plots etc. Apart from this commercial group housing and industrial plots are part of the scheme to be offered to the public. It is also brought on record that the authority has already published the scheme for allotment of the aforesaid plots/houses and thousands of applications along with partial deposit of registration fee has been received and crores of rupees have been received against such registration. 14. That it is also brought on record that the authority has already determined rate of compensation to the tenure holders, which has been voluntarily agreed upon in accordance with the provisions of 1997 Compensation Rules. Payment of compensation for the acquired land has been determined at Rs. 1100/- per sq. meter. Total amount of compensation of the entire scheme according to the said rate comes to Rs. 590 crores, against which 311.37 crores has already been disbursed.” 68. The Government Orders dated 23.11.2003; 21.5.2005 and 29.12.2005 was clarified/modified by Government Order dated 27.8.2008 annexed as Annexure SCA-3 to the supplementary counter-affidavit of Shri Sanjeev Kumar, Assistant Engineer, Ghazaibad Development Authority, Ghaziabad. Total amount of compensation of the entire scheme according to the said rate comes to Rs. 590 crores, against which 311.37 crores has already been disbursed.” 68. The Government Orders dated 23.11.2003; 21.5.2005 and 29.12.2005 was clarified/modified by Government Order dated 27.8.2008 annexed as Annexure SCA-3 to the supplementary counter-affidavit of Shri Sanjeev Kumar, Assistant Engineer, Ghazaibad Development Authority, Ghaziabad. The State Government amended the Government Order dated 21.5.2005 by subsequent orders dated 29.12.2005; 12.1.2006; 22.8.2006; 28.4.2006 and 10.10.2006, providing that after fixation of number of licenses for the city/area of the integrated township and determination of their maximum area by a Committee chaired by the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh, the developer will be selected by inviting bids by competitive bidding process. The development authorities and Awas and Vikas Parishad shall give the entire details of the registration of the developers upto 12.8.2008 to the State Government. In order to make the process of acquisition of the land easier, it was provided that the developer will purchase 75% of the land from the land acquisition by mutual settlement and that for purchase of remaining 25% of the land the Government authorities shall Act as facilitator. The persons and families affected by acquisition of the land will be provided facilities by the developer in accordance with the rehabilitation policy of the State Government. Further the license holder/developers will not make any proposals of acquisition of land in the areas identified for them for integrated development through the development authorities/Awas and Vikas Parishad. The licensees shall not be allowed sale of allotted land which is already notified for any scheme of the development authorities/Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, so that the continuity of the proposed schemes is not affected. The Government Order dated 27.8.2008, further provided that in accordance with the annual turn over of last three years the selected developer company/consortium will be allowed to develop 50 acres of land against Rs. 5 crores turn over in such a manner that for any licensee in category A, B, C the area of the land is not less than 500 acres, 100 acres and 50 acres respectively. Para-4 of the Government Order provided that the licenses for an area not less than 200 acres will be given to the selected developer in the urban area proposed under any Master Plan. Para-4 of the Government Order provided that the licenses for an area not less than 200 acres will be given to the selected developer in the urban area proposed under any Master Plan. For an area of more than 200 acres the licenses can be given for an area outside the Master Plan. The land, however, shall be utilized in the areas covered by the Master Plan in accordance with the provisions of the land use therein. Para-6 of the Government order dated 27.8.2008 provided that the details of the land use, density and standard for F.A.R shall be provided separately. 69. The petitioner’s request vide his letter dated 1.10.2004 to the Ghaziabad Development Authority, and the letter dated 13.6.2005 referred to in the letter of the Vice Chairman, Ghaziabad Development Authority to the Principal Secretary, Housing and Town Development Anubhag-1, Government of U.P. Lucknow, did not refer to, or fall in any of the two schemes referred to in the Government Orders dated 22.11.2003 and 21.5.2005, and the modification/clarification provided in Government Order dated 27.8.2008. The petitioner Company did not propose to Act on any of these schemes. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is thus not attracted in the present case. 70. In Aman Singh Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, (2005) 1 SCC 625 , the Supreme Court discussed the principles of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation, fairness, non-arbitrariness to be observed by the State in changing its policy decision. The Supreme Court observed that estoppel is a Rule of equity which has gained new dimensions in the recent years. It referred to Central London Property Trust Limited v. High Trees House Limited, (1947) 1 KB 130 and Kombe v. Kombe, (1951) 2 K.B. 215 followed by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M/s Anglo Afgan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 and subsequent decisions namely in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, (1970) 1 SCC 582 ; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 ; Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369 . Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, (1970) 1 SCC 582 ; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 ; Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369 . The Supreme Court has clarified the principle that where one party has by his words or conduct made to other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and such party has acted accordingly, then, once the other party has acted on it, the party who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relationship, as if no such promise or assurance has been made by him. He must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced, even though it is not supported by any consideration other than his words. The principle has been used not only as a defence, but also as a cause of action in India. In Kasinka Trading v. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 274 the Supreme Court pressed the doctrine into service as a principle evolved of equity to avoid injustice. The overriding public interest and statutory compulsion are exceptions to the policy. 71. In the present case the principles of promissory estoppel are not attracted. There was no promise made, nor there were any legal relations created or even proposed which were intended to be affected between the State Government and the petitioners to invoke the Rule of equity in favour of the petitioners. 72. The principles of legitimate expectation have been further explained in Bannari Aman Sugars Ltd. (supra) as a principle of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority, even though there may be no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. It can provide sufficient interest to enable one who cannot bind to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the Court to apply for judicial review. It may give the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review. In such case the decision maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest, vide Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988 . It may give the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review. In such case the decision maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest, vide Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988 . A State must justify that its action is not arbitrary and that discernible principles emerge from the impugned action and satisfies the test of reasonableness. There was no such legal right in private law nor any expectation could have arisen from the Government Orders dated 22.3.2003 and 21.5.2005 to Act in the manner in which the petitioner started purchasing the land. There was no consistent past practice which has been changed arbitrarily so as to give a cause of action to the petitioners, and to ask the State Government to justify its action by satisfying the test of reasonableness. We therefore do not find that in this case the principles of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation are attracted. The petitioner started purchasing land on his own without making appropriate enquiries. It simply informed the Ghaziabad Development Authority with its intention to establish ‘Sahara City Homes’ on the land purchased, and for which the applications for development of the land and for sanction of plan were awaited. In fact the petitioners have neither stated nor produced before us any such plan which may have been prepared for development of ‘Sahara City Homes’ in the year 2004 and 2005, prior to issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Company had by that time purchased only 52 acres of land at the cost of about Rs. 32 crores through middleman in the name of new companies incorporated to avoid the ceiling laws of the State. The remaining land upto the extent of 92 acres was purchased after the notification under Section 4 was issued. The reference to the State Government acting as facilitator, instead of provider, in the Government orders dated 22.11.2003 and 21.5.2005, was referable to the schemes, and not to a general policy by which the State Government may have given up the activity of providing houses through the Development Authorities or UP Awas Avam Vikas Parishad. 73. We have examined the records produced before us to consider the legal submissions that the land was neither needed nor likely to be needed for public purpose. 73. We have examined the records produced before us to consider the legal submissions that the land was neither needed nor likely to be needed for public purpose. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi; Shri V.B. Upadhyay and Shri Ravi Kant laid great emphasis on the use of the words ‘land bank’ in the report of the Committee prepared after inspections on 17.10.2002. It is submitted that after inspecting the area the Committee assessed the total demand of land under the Schemes ‘Govindpuram Karpuripuram’ and ‘Swarnjayantipuram’ at 2000 acres, for which acquisition for 1000 acres was proposed to be made in the first phase. In the second paragraph of the report the Committee observed that after the development of the acquired land and the remaining land with GDA, there will be no land bank left after one year. The Committee’s proposals were put before the 18th Meeting of the GDA held on 30.11.2002, in which at item No. 41 the GDA resolved to accept the proposals of acquisition of 1000 acres of land, in revenue villages including Rasoolpur and Yakootpur with the condition that the land be acquired in accordance with the new procedure under Section 4, on the basis of agreement with the farmers. The six notifications under Section 4 followed after about two years on 16.10.2004 and the notifications under Section 6/17 of the Act were published between 5.9.2005 to 31.10.2005. In between the GDA had floated two schemes namely ‘Govindpuram Karpuripuram’ and ‘Swarnjayantipuram’, and received overwhelming response from public both for houses and developed plots for constructions. 74. In the 18th Meeting of the GDA held on 30.11.2002 the Board decided to accept the proposal for acquisition of 1000 acres of land. By the time the notifications were made, the plans for providing housing and residential colonies namely ‘Madhuban’ and ‘Bapoodham’ were advertised. The resolution to acquire the land in accordance with the new procedure under Section 4, on the basis of agreement with farmers with reference to Settlement Rules of 1997, under which a specific procedure of settlement is provided after issuing notification with the farmers. The Rules provide for meetings to be held between the District Magistrate, Special Land Acquisition Officer, the Acquiring body and landowners, and to arrive at a consensus for settlement of compensation. The Vice Chairman, GDA followed the resolution in making the proposals for acquisition of land. The Rules provide for meetings to be held between the District Magistrate, Special Land Acquisition Officer, the Acquiring body and landowners, and to arrive at a consensus for settlement of compensation. The Vice Chairman, GDA followed the resolution in making the proposals for acquisition of land. The later part of the resolution to prepare a scheme with offer of plots as several houses are still undisposed, was a matter to be considered by GDA looking into the housing requirement. The ‘Madhuban’ and ‘Bapudham’ housing schemes were launched and had received thousands of applications for registration. We are informed that number of applicants are more in the category of low cost housing for economically weaker Section and for small plots. We therefore do not find substance in the contention of learned counsels appearing for the petitioner that there was no need or likely need for acquiring land. The State Government was clear in its intention expressed in the Government Orders issued on 22.11.2003 and 21.3.2005, to provide housing in the National Capital Region and having acquired the land for the housing schemes, providing solutions for housing 5057 EWS flats and about 2686 developed plots, apart from 34 plots reserved for group housing. We do not find any substance in submission of learned counsel for petitioners that there was no need or likely need for public purpose for acquiring the land. The words ‘land bank’ used in the report of the Committee appointed by the GDA, was not by way of keeping the land in reserve, for which there was no need. The GDA considered the need in its meeting dated 30.11.2002 and found it to be genuine. The use of the words ‘land bank’ will not make the public purpose for acquisition of the land arbitrary, fancy or illegal. 75. The submission, that there was no immediate requirement, and proposal for development of 1000 acres of land, has also not been substantiated from the records. The proposal of the Committee was put before the Board and was approved in its 18th Meeting on 30.11.2002. There is no such requirement either in the Land Acquisition Act or any principle of law that there should be a concrete plan prepared on the planning board and approved by the development authorities before proposing to acquire the land for public purpose. 76. There is no such requirement either in the Land Acquisition Act or any principle of law that there should be a concrete plan prepared on the planning board and approved by the development authorities before proposing to acquire the land for public purpose. 76. Shri Tulsi laid great emphasis on the representation made by the petitioner to the Chief Minister on 27.9.2004, and the note of the Secretary to the Chief Minister, which according to him directs the exclusion of the land purchased by the petitioner from acquisition. He submits that the directions of the Chief Minister raised legitimate expectation for excluding the land purchased by the petitioner from acquisition. 77. The copies of the documents produced before us would show that the proposal for acquisition of the land was in active consideration. The State Government had asked for detailed information with regard to area of the land to be acquired; the persons including Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe to be affected by the acquisition and the utilization of land acquired in the last ten years. The GDA had sent the information to the Special Secretary, Housing and Town Planning, Lucknow on 19.7.2004. The information collected by the State Government was placed before the Land Use Council chaired by the Chief Minister, and that on 13.9.2004, the then Chief Minister had approved the acquisition of the land. He had thereafter as Housing Minister and Chief Minister approved the proposal for applying Section 17 of the Act for acquisition of the land on 13.10.2004. It is difficult to believe that after approving for the acquisition of the land, the Chief Minister would have ordered to exempt the land purchased by the M/s Sahara India and others from acquisition. The order made by the Secretary to the Chief Minister on the representation dated 27.9.2004, to Act accordingly, was not a direction given by the State Government to exempt the land purchased by M/s Sahara India Commercial Corporation Ltd and others from acquisition. The State Government has denied that there was any proposal or order for exemption to exclude the land. The note of the Secretary to the Chief Minister, as such, even if it exists on records, cannot be treated to be an order of the State Government to exempt the land from acquisition. 78. It is submitted by Shri Tulsi that no public notice of the acquisition was given. The note of the Secretary to the Chief Minister, as such, even if it exists on records, cannot be treated to be an order of the State Government to exempt the land from acquisition. 78. It is submitted by Shri Tulsi that no public notice of the acquisition was given. He submits that there was no record of publication by beat of drums in the locality. The order sheet of the Special Land Acquisition Officer does not refer to any public notice. 79. In the affidavit of Shri H.P. Singh, Under Secretary of Housing and Urban Planning Department, Government of U.P. it is stated in paragraph-20, that the notification under Section 4 was published in the Official Gazette; two leading newspapers and that the information of the notification was made at public places at the site of acquisition vide Munadi and Chaspa at the sites of the acquired land and at the office of Collector. The Munadi at Naglapath and Rasoolpur Yakootpur was made on 6.11.2004. The copies of Official Gazette, newspapers ‘Dainik Jagaran’ and ‘Amar Ujala’ dated 22.10.2004, corrigendum dated 24.11.2004 and photocopy of Munadi and Chaspa dated 6.11.2004 are annexed to the counter-affidavit. The public notice in respect of village Naglapath signed by ADM (Land Acquisition), Ghaziabad dated 5.11.2004 directing the Secretary, Ghaziabad Development Authority, Block Development Officer, Nazir, Tehsil Ghaziabad, Gram Pradhan, Naglapath, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad and Shri Mahaveer Singh Tamil Kulinda giving details of the plots and similar notice of the same date in respect of village Rasoolpur-Yakootpur with same directions as well as public notice of the same date in respect of publication of notice under Section 6 (1)/17 dated 5.11.2005, and the directions of the ADM (LA) to keep the order on the file, is sufficient proof of the publication of public notice. The petitioner No. 1, is a public limited company. The petitioner Nos. 2 to 9 are private limited companies. They had purchased 52 acres of the land in village Yakootpur-Rasoolpur and Naglapath. The names of these companies were not recorded in the revenue records. Shri Rashmi Narain Mishra the deponent of the affidavit accompanying the writ petition is an executive of the company. He is a resident of Tulsipur, Triveni Nagar, Lucknow. 2 to 9 are private limited companies. They had purchased 52 acres of the land in village Yakootpur-Rasoolpur and Naglapath. The names of these companies were not recorded in the revenue records. Shri Rashmi Narain Mishra the deponent of the affidavit accompanying the writ petition is an executive of the company. He is a resident of Tulsipur, Triveni Nagar, Lucknow. He could not have had knowledge of the publication of the public notice in the village to make an assertion in para 23 of the writ petition, sworn on personal knowledge that the public notice of the substance of the notification was not published at convenient place of the locality. 80. We have examined the material produced by the State Government for invocation of urgency clause under Section 17 (1) and 17 (4) to dispense with the requirement of Section 5A is concerned. In the counter-affidavit of Shri Sanjeev Kumar, Assistant Engineer, Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad filed in Writ Petition No. 28058/2006 (para 26) it is stated that the notifications were published in December, 1991 of much smaller area measuring less than 200 acres as against the proposed acquisition of more than 1400 acres. In the notification of 1991-92 the land use of the area was not residential; the connectivity was not available and in such circumstances the proposal as conceived at that scheme was not viable. The present scheme has been launched on a much larger scale, as per Master Plan, by providing better connectivity for which wide public demand was made by the members of public. In para-31 it is stated that the authority had already formulated its scheme prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 4 (1) and final lay out was drawn after the exercise of acquisition was completed. The planned development of entire acquired land of about 1400 acres was for different colonies. The affidavit encloses public notices dated 5.11.2005 in the villages publishing the substance of the notification in the local area and the documents showing that the possession was transferred by the Amin in the office of Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Irrigation Ghaziabad on 18.5.2006 to Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad in respect of lands in village Rasoolpur Yakoobpur and of the same date in respect of the land in Naglapat. The document was signed by Shri Magan Bihari Trivedi, Amin (Land Acquisition) in the office of Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Irrigation, Ghaziabad and Shri Surendra Kumar Saxena, Amin and Assistant Engineer, Land Acquisition, Ghaziabad Development Authority for the persons taking possession. These documents also describe in detail the number of trees and constructions on the acquired land. 81. The documents produced before us include the certificate given by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad dated 12/11.2.2004 recording his satisfaction that the land is needed urgently for development of the housing scheme and that it is necessary to invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Act in the case. By the same certificate he verified that the Khasra numbers of the land proposed to be acquired are not affected by ceiling and that an amount of 10% of the estimated compensation has been deposited by the authority. 82. In all the proposals for acquisition the Joint Secretary, Ghaziabad Development Authority appended certificates to the effect that land is proposed for planned development; plots are not disputed and that all statutory formalities have been complied with. The certificate also verified that in the proposed scheme the environmental norms will be kept in mind and that efforts will be made to control the environmental pollution. He further certified that no problems with regard to the density of the land, and its utility will arise. The Joint Secretary certified that since the land is proposed to be acquired without any delay, and is needed for public purpose, any delay in acquisition of the land will result into unauthorised constructions over the site which will give rise to difficulty in taking possession. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad Development Authority by his letter dated 20.2.2003 informed the Joint Secretary (1st) of Ghaziabad Development Authority that a proposal of acquisition of land in village Sadarpur of 621.843 acres has been forwarded to the State Government on 14.1.2003. The land owners are making unauthorised constructions over the spot for which action may be taken to stop it, in accordance with the law, so that in future difficulties may not arise in taking possession. The land owners are making unauthorised constructions over the spot for which action may be taken to stop it, in accordance with the law, so that in future difficulties may not arise in taking possession. The satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad that the land is urgently needed for development of the housing scheme was thus primarily based upon the public purpose to be served by the acquisition and the possibility of unauthorised constructions which could be raised over the land with the passage of time, if the enquiry under Section 5A is not dispensed with. 83. The earlier proposal of acquisition of land in the year 1991-92 was for a small area of about 200 acres. At that time the proposed land did not have connectivity with main roads and thus the proposal for acquisition was given up. The Ghaziabad Development Authority started sincere efforts for proposal of 1000 acres of land for development of housing colonies and plots after the proposals were approved by the Board of Ghaziabad Development Authority in its meeting dated 30.11.2002. We therefore do not find that earlier proposals of acquisition can be tagged on with the proposals made by the Committee in its meeting dated 17.10.2002 approved in the Board meeting dated 30.11.2002 for the purpose of considering the submissions on the delay defeating the invocation of urgency clause. The Development Authority was required and submitted the relevant information to the District Magistrate on which the proposals were made for acquisition of the land to the State Government in February 2004, invoking urgency clause. These proposals were considered and approved after seeking further information from the District Magistrate and the Ghaziabad Development Authority by the Land Use Council on 13.9.2004 and for acquisition of land by invoking urgency clause under Section 17 by the Chief Minister on 13.10.2004. There was as such no delay in the proceedings of acquisition which may be considered to be contrary to the object of invoking the urgency powers for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 84. There was as such no delay in the proceedings of acquisition which may be considered to be contrary to the object of invoking the urgency powers for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 84. Learned counsels appearing for the parties have relied on the observations made by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others, 1998 (6) SCC 1 (para-14) that the possibility of encroachment over the area cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered the germane ground for invoking urgency powers for dispensing with Section 5A enquiry and that there is no guarantee that the acquired land will not be encroached upon by unruly persons within 15 days of issuance of notice under Section 9 (1) and further that the raising of construction is a law and order problem which is nothing to do with the acquisition and urgency of taking possession. The argument does not take into account the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. 85. In para 16 of Krishan Lal Arneja’s case (supra) the Supreme Court held : “Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a land owner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The Authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. Whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the land owners and the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen’s property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority, while applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed Act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration.” 86. In Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli (supra) the Supreme Court held in para 5 as under : “The question of urgency of an acquisiton under Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account, and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a given situation there existed urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the concerned authorities. If an order invoking power under Section 17 (4) is assailed, the Courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. Whether in a given situation there existed urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the concerned authorities. If an order invoking power under Section 17 (4) is assailed, the Courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. Any post notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-A by invoking powers under Section 17 (1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. Though the satisfaction under Section 17 (4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of law, except for the grounds already indicated, but the said satisfaction must be of the Appropriate Government and that the satisfaction must be, as to the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency even though cannot be conclusive but is entitled to great weight, as has been held by this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1971 SC 1033 . Even a mere allegation that power was exercised mala fide would not be enough and in support of such allegation specific materials should be placed before the Court. The burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles if the circumstances of the case in hand are examined it would appear that the premises in question was required for the students of National Medical College, Calcutta and the notification issued in December, 1982 had been quashed by the Court and the subsequent notification issued on 25.2.1994 also had been quashed by the Court. It is only thereafter the notification was issued under Sections 4 (1) and 17 (4) of the Act on 29.11.1994 which came up for consideration before the High Court. It is only thereafter the notification was issued under Sections 4 (1) and 17 (4) of the Act on 29.11.1994 which came up for consideration before the High Court. Apart form the fact that there had already been considerable delay in acquiring the premises in question on account of the intervention by Courts, the premises was badly needed for the occupation of the students of National Medical College, Calcutta. Thus, existence of urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, said exercise of power in the case in hand, cannot be interfered with by a Court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. The conclusion of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, therefore, is unsustainable.” 87. In Mahender Pal and others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 2009 SC 3220 it was a case of acquisition for development and utilization of land for residential/commercial purpose where the appellants were using the land for residential purpose on which Samadhis of his ancestors and a Shiva temple was situate in which the High Court had dismissed the writ petition in limine and in such facts relying upon Mukesh Hans (supra) and Krishan Lal Arneja (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraphs 13, 14 and 16 as follows : “13. The purported public purpose for which the land is to be acquired is for laying down a road. We are not unmindful of the fact that the road connection is one of the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act in respect whereof sub-section (4) thereof would apply. But the same would not mean that for the purpose of road connection irrespective of the nature of cases and/or irrespective of the nature of the road to be constructed; sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act could be invoked. 14. As an extraordinary power has been conferred upon the Appropriate Government in terms whereof the normal procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act could be dispensed with, the High Court, in our opinion, should have entered into the merit of the matter. [See Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2008) 12 SCC 418 : 2008 (3) SCCD 1152 : 2008(3) AWC 2966 (SC)].” 16. [See Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2008) 12 SCC 418 : 2008 (3) SCCD 1152 : 2008(3) AWC 2966 (SC)].” 16. It is a well-settled principle of law that an exception carved out from the main provision as a result whereof a citizen of India may be deprived of his property particularly having regard to the fact that if it is considered to be a human right, procedural safeguards laid down therefor must be scrupulously complied with. It being an expropriatory legislation deserves strict construction. (See Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and others, (2005) 7 SCC 627 ; Devinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, (2008) 1 SCC 728 ; and City Montessori School v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2009 (2) SCALE 740.” 88. In M/s Sheikhar Hotels Gulmohar Enclave (supra) the Supreme Court held : “Therefore, it depends upon case to case where in a given situation Section 5-A has been correctly invoked and the authorities were satisfied in an objective manner. In the present case, there is no two opinion that because of the globalization of economy Indian economy is progressing with fast speed, therefore, in order to keep pace with the speed, invocation of Section 5-A has become imperative. Traffic congestion is a common experience of one and all and it is very difficult to negotiate with the traffic congestion in Delhi and National Capital region. Therefore, in the present situation, it cannot be said that the invocation of Section 5-A was for ulterior purpose or was arbitrary exercise of the power. Since the Master Plan has already been prepared and it has been approved by the Planning Board and they have sanctioned a sum of Rs. 20.65 crores for the development of this Transport Nagar and widening of the National High No. 91 into four lanes. Therefore, the proposal was approved by the Board and it got the sanction from the National Capital Region Planning Board and ultimately the Government invoked the power under Section 17 (4) read with Section 5-A of the Act dispensing with the objections. In the light of these facts it cannot be said that invoking of power was in any way improper exercise. In the light of these facts it cannot be said that invoking of power was in any way improper exercise. There is need for decongestion of the traffic and it is really the dire need of the hour and earliest it is implemented, better for the people at large.” 89. In Babu Ram (supra) the Supreme Court held : “In the present case, we are not concerned with technicalities but the likelihood of a health-hazard to the inhabitants of the area if the STP was set up in the acquired site. The stand taken by the respondent that the appellants could have filed objections to the proposed acquisition is difficult to appreciate since the right to file such objections had, in fact, been taken away by invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act. Such a stand taken on behalf of the respondent authorities only serve to strengthen the case of the appellants that an opportunity should have been given to them to file objections to the proposed acquisition. As indicated hereinabove in the various cases cited by Mr. Pradip Ghosh and, in particular, the decision in Krishan Lal Arneja’s case (supra), in which reference has been made to the observations made by this Court in Om Prakash’s case (supra), it has been emphasized that a right under Section 5-A is not merely statutory but also has the flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Such observations had been made in reference to an observation made in the earlier decision in Gurdial Singh’s case (supra) and keeping in mind the fact that right to property was no longer a fundamental right, an observation was made that even if the right to property was no longer a fundamental right, the observations relating to Article 14 would continue to apply in full force with regard to Section 5-A of the L.A. Act. The observations made both in Gurdial Singh’s case (supra) and in Om Prakash’s case (supra) assign a great deal of importance to the right of a citizen to file objections under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act when his lands are being taken over under the provisions of the said Act. The observations made both in Gurdial Singh’s case (supra) and in Om Prakash’s case (supra) assign a great deal of importance to the right of a citizen to file objections under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act when his lands are being taken over under the provisions of the said Act. That in the said decisions, such right was elevated to the status of a fundamental right, is in itself sufficient to indicate that great care had to be taken by the authorities before resorting to Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act. and that they had to satisfy themselves that there was an urgency of such nature as indicated in Section 17(2) of the Act, which could brook no delay whatsoever. Since Section 5-A of the L.A. Act had been dispensed with, the stage under Section 9 was arrived at within six months from the date of the notice issued under Section 4 and 17(2)(c) of the L.A. Act. While such notice was issued on 23rd November, 2005, the Award under Section 11 was made on 23rd May, 2006. During this period, the appellants filed a suit, and, thereafter, withdrew the same and filed a writ petition in an attempt to protect their constitutional right to the property. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was either any negligence or lapse or delay on the part of the appellants. The only other aspect of the matter which requires consideration is whether the lands in question have already been utilized for the Sewage Treatment Plant. From the averments made and photographs which were brought to our notice, it appears that the site is still lying unutilized. In such circumstances, we consider it only proper that the appellants should get an opportunity to file their objections to the proposed acquisition under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act and the respondents would be at liberty to take consequential steps after disposal of the same. We, accordingly, dispose of the appeal by directing that notwithstanding the invocation of Section 17(2)(c) of the L.A. Act in its application to the States of Punjab and Haryana, the appellants will be at liberty to file objections under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act within a month from the date before the concerned authority, who will, thereafter, dispose of the same upon giving the objectors, if any, an opportunity of hearing and placing their respective cases. The learned Advocate for the appellants is directed to communicate this order to the L.A. Collector-cum-District Revenue Officer, Jind, Haryana, within a week from date. There will be no order as to costs.” 90. This Court has consistently followed the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matter of invoking Section 17 (4) and dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, in Smt. Manju Lata Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (9) ADJ 447 (DB); Sudhir Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., 2008 (3) ADJ 289 (DB) and Munshi Singh v. State of U.P., 2009 (8) ADJ 360 (DB). In Manju Lata Agrawal (supra) this Court summed up the legal position as follows : “Thus, from the aforesaid settled legal propositions, it is apparent that the Government must be satisfied that demand of land by invoking urgency powers is bona fide and persons interested cannot be deprived of their legal right to file objection just to avoid lethargy on the part of the officers of the State Government or for achieving some other ulterior purpose. It is a settled legal proposition that the scope of judicial review is limited to the decision making procedure and not against the decision of the authority. The Court could review to correct errors of law of fundamental procedural requirements, which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in exceptional circumstances. In judicial review, the Court cannot trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion as it is not an appeal from a decision. Review of the decision is not permissible where the findings are recorded by an authority on the basis of legal evidence and the said findings are not based either on ipsi dixit or conjectures or surmises. The Court cannot interfere on the ground that the matter requires appraisal of evidence. “Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence, there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of.” 91. In Sudhir Chandra Agrawal (supra) once again the legal position was summed up as follows : “The sufficiency or insufficiency of the material, and the names of industries, which may have applied with concrete proposals for establishment of industrial units, is not material for the purposes of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government. In Sudhir Chandra Agrawal (supra) once again the legal position was summed up as follows : “The sufficiency or insufficiency of the material, and the names of industries, which may have applied with concrete proposals for establishment of industrial units, is not material for the purposes of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government. When there exists material before the State Government, in the shape of recommendations and that material is relevant for applying the mind for recording subjective satisfaction of invoking the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the law does not permit the Court to consider the material as if it was weighing the evidence for the purposes of recording subjective satisfaction of invoking the urgency clause for acquisition of the land. If the material is relevant, on which competent authority, as reasonable person may invoke the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the Court would not put such material on the scales, to weigh or measure such urgency. The Court is not competent to carry out judicial review of the sufficiency or insufficiency on the material placed before it. What the Court required to see is whether such material is relevant, and that the competent authority in the State Government could have formed an opinion without their being any motive or ill-will for invoking the urgency clause. In the present case the State has given in the counter-affidavit, the material on which it had placed reliance and has produced the material before us, which we find to be relevant for the purpose of invoking urgency clause. Even if we may, after perusing the record arrive on different conclusion, we would restrain ourselves from interfering, as in such case we would be substituting our opinion in place of opinion of the competent authority in the State Government. If we do so, we would be sitting in appeal over the subjective satisfaction recorded by the State Government. The legal position obtained form the judicial precedents restrain us from doing so.” 92. If we do so, we would be sitting in appeal over the subjective satisfaction recorded by the State Government. The legal position obtained form the judicial precedents restrain us from doing so.” 92. In Essco Fabs Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court after considering its earlier judgment in Nandeshwar Prasad and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1964) 3 SCR 425 ; Jai Narain and others v. Union of India and others, (1996) 1 SCC 9 ; Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans (supra); Chameli Singh (supra) and Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and another (supra) held in paragraphs 44 and 47 as follows: “44. In our judgment, from the above case law, it is clear that normal Rule for acquisition of land under the Act is issuance of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, hearing of objections under Section 5A and issuance of final notification under Section 6 of the act. Award will be made by the Collector, notice has to be issued to the land owners or the person interested and thereafter possession can be taken. Section 17, no doubt, deals with special situations and exceptional circumstances covering cases of ‘urgency’ and ‘unforeseen emergency’. In case of ‘urgency’ falling under sub-section (1) of Section 17 or of ‘unforeseen emergency’ covered by subsection (2) of Section 17, special powers may be exercised by appropriate Government but as held by a three-Judge Bench decision before more than four decades in Nandeshwar Prasad and reiterated by a three Judge Bench decision in Mukesh Hans, even in such cases, inquiry and hearing of objections under Section 5A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with unless a notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act is issued. The legislative scheme is amply clear which merely enables the appropriate Government to issue such notification under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A if the Government intends to exercise the said power. The use of the expression ‘may’ in sub-section (4) of Section 17 leaves no room of doubt that it is discretionary power of the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5A would not apply to such cases covered by sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act. 47. In the instant case, the facts are eloquent. The use of the expression ‘may’ in sub-section (4) of Section 17 leaves no room of doubt that it is discretionary power of the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5A would not apply to such cases covered by sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act. 47. In the instant case, the facts are eloquent. Initial action of acquisition of land was taken as early as in 1982 but the proceedings lapsed. In 1991, when Essco made an application praying for change of user of land, it was rejected on the ground that the land was likely to be required for public purpose. Nothing, however, was done for about a decade. It is only in 2001 that again Notification under Section 4 was issued and urgency clause was applied. We are, therefore, satisfied that the ratio laid down in Mukesh Hans squarely applies to the facts of the case. No urgency clause could have been invoked by the respondents and inquiry and hearing of objections provided by Section 5A of the Act could not have been dispensed with. The actions of issuance of urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17, dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A and issuance of final notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 are required to be quashed and they are accordingly quashed.” 93. The Supreme Court did not approve the dismissal of writ petition by the High Court in limine and requested the State to produce the records before the High Court, so as to enable it to arrive at a satisfaction on the facts and circumstances of the case. 94. The case law cited above would show that in the matter of invoking emergency powers under the Act for acquisition of the land, each case has to be seen on its own facts, both for finding out the purpose of acquisition and whether the State Government had sufficient material available with it, to arrive at a conclusion to invoke such powers. In the present case we find that there is urgent need of urban housing at Ghaziabad. The State of U.P had not made any acquisition of land for housing for GDA for last more than ten years. There was overwhelming response on the advertisement made by GDA, both for low cost flats and small plots. In the present case we find that there is urgent need of urban housing at Ghaziabad. The State of U.P had not made any acquisition of land for housing for GDA for last more than ten years. There was overwhelming response on the advertisement made by GDA, both for low cost flats and small plots. The GDA had made inspections and assessment for both the area and location of land for development and placed sufficient material before the State Government to acquire the land and to invoke urgency clause under Section 17 (1) and 17 (4) to urgently acquire and to take possession of the land. 95. The submissions made by Shri W.H. Khan, that the notification under Section 6 dated 31.10.2005 has been published after more than one year from the last of the dates of the publication of notification under Section 4 (1), is based upon the argument, that the Court should ignore the publication of the notification in the locality in calculating the period of one year. According to him, the last of the dates of publication is the publication in the newspapers on 22.10.2004. He submits that as a consequence of the amendment in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in its application to U.P. by Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1974, the date of publication in the locality by beat of drums on 6.11.2004, has to be ignored on the ground that the State Government had applied sub-section (4) of Section 17 on which the provisions of Section 5A of the Act were not applicable. Shri W.H. Khan submits that in the State of Uttar Pradesh, after the enforcement of the Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1974 (UP Act No. 8 of 1974), in such cases the publication is not necessary in the locality. The limitation, therefore, has to be counted from the last of the dates of the publication of the notification in the newspapers. 96. The argument is fallacious for two reasons. In order to avoid delay, the proviso of sub-section (1) of Section 6 was amended providing for limitation of one year in publishing the notification under Section 6. The limitation, therefore, has to be counted from the last of the dates of the publication of the notification in the newspapers. 96. The argument is fallacious for two reasons. In order to avoid delay, the proviso of sub-section (1) of Section 6 was amended providing for limitation of one year in publishing the notification under Section 6. The proviso (ii) of sub-section (1) provides that no declaration, in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, shall be published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the notification. The date of publication of notification is provided by the same amendment of 1984, to Section 4 (1) to be the last of the dates of the publication under sub-section (1) of Section 4, and the giving of such public notice. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 provides for three different methods of publication. The notification has to be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulated in the locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language. Further, the Collector is required to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. By Act No. 68 of 1984, it was provided that the last of the dates of such publication, and giving of such public notice, is to be referred to as the date of publication of the notification. The last of the dates of the publication in the present case being the date on which the notice was published in the locality on 6.11.2004, by beat of drums is thus to be treated as the last of the dates of publication for the purposes of counting limitation under the proviso (ii) to Section 6 (1) of the Act. 97. The Land Acquisition (U.P. Amendment and Validation) Act, 1974 was enacted to cure the purported defects in some notifications published in the State of Uttar Pradesh in which notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were published simultaneously. The preamble of Validation Act of 1974 states : “An Act further to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in its application to Uttar Pradesh and to validate certain acquisition of land under the said Act.” The Validating Act served its purpose by validating certain acquisitions. The preamble of Validation Act of 1974 states : “An Act further to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in its application to Uttar Pradesh and to validate certain acquisition of land under the said Act.” The Validating Act served its purpose by validating certain acquisitions. Section 5 of the Amending Act, provided that no acquisition of land made or purporting to have been made under the Principal Act before the commencement of the Validating Act and no action taken or thing done shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the ground : (i) “except in the case of any land to which by virtue of a direction of the State Government under sub-section (4) of Section 17, the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply”; that the Collector has not caused public notice of the substance of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 to be given at convenient places in the locality; or (ii) that the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Principal Act stating that any land in any regulated area as defined in the Uttar Pradesh (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, was needed or likely to be needed for ‘planned development of the area’ in which the land is situated, did not indicate the public purpose with sufficient particularity or that the proposed plan of development had been prepared or finalised at the time of the issue of such notification and was as such not available for inspection by the persons interested in the land. Sub-section (b) of Section 5 of the Amending Act further provided that any acquisition in pursuance of any such notification published under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Principal Act before the commencement of this Act may be made after such commencement, and no such acquisition and no action taken or thing done (including any order made, agreement entered into, notification published or declaration made), whether before or after such commencement, in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid merely on any ground referred to in clause (a). 98. The amendment to Section 4 by the Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1974, was thus made to cure certain acquisitions and served its purpose. 98. The amendment to Section 4 by the Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1974, was thus made to cure certain acquisitions and served its purpose. Even otherwise in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kanthimathy Plantations Pvt Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1990 SC 761 , the Validating Act after the exhaustive amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by the Act No. 68 of 1984, (a Central Act), has been rendered ineffective. The State amendments shall stand automatically repealed in view of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. 99. We cannot conceive of a situation where land may be acquired under the Act even after applying the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 dispensing with the hearing under Section 5A of the Act, or otherwise without giving public notice of the substance of such notification at convenient places in the concerned locality. The purpose of providing the three modes of publication of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, and the consequent powers of officers thereupon to enter upon, survey, etc. is to inform the land owners, or the persons having interest in such lands, that the land is needed or is likely to be needed by the Government for public purpose or for a company. The legislature thought that the publication in official gazette and newspapers is not sufficient, and thus it provided for publication of substance of such notification at convenient places in the locality. The argument that in Uttar Pradesh wherever sub-section (4) of Section 17 is applied, the public notice of the substance of notification is not necessary to be made in the said locality, will not only make the exercise of powers arbitrary but will also take away the rights of persons whose land is proposed to be acquired, provided by Section 6, 9, 11A and other provisions of the Act. The acquisition in such case may become violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India providing constitutional rights to the persons to be deprived of the property except save by authority of law. 100. The acquisition in such case may become violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India providing constitutional rights to the persons to be deprived of the property except save by authority of law. 100. Where a Validating Act is enacted to validate certain acts done by statutory authorities, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, the effect of such validation for future Acts has to be seen with the object and purpose of the Validation Act. Where the Validating Act is enacted only to cure the defects for certain acts, the amendments, if they are otherwise in consistent with the provisions of the Act, will not survive beyond the purpose of such validation. The amendments made for a limited purpose would not apply to any subsequent non-statutory acts. The Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1974, was enacted with a specific purpose to validate certain acquisitions, such as the acquisition of land, and having served its purpose, the Validating Act would not apply to the future acquisitions of land by the State of Uttar Pradesh. 101. In Satchidananda Mishra v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 2004 SC 4639 the Supreme Court while interpreting the effect of the Orissa Medical Education Service Appointment of Junior Teachers Validation Act (11 of 1993) held in para 12 of the judgment that the Legislature has the power to validate an Act by removing the infirmity indicated in any judgment and that too also retrospectively but they cannot merely set aside, annul or override a judgment of the Court. Relying upon Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and another v. Broach Borough Municipality and others, (1969) 2 SCC 283 the Supreme Court held in para 14 as follows : “14.The question here is about the validity of the validating statute seeking to regularise illegal appointments without either repealing 1979 Rules or changing the definition of the Selection Board. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Vijay Mills Company Limited and others v. State of Gujarat and others, (1993) 1 SCC 345 . The Court referred to various decisions which considered the law of validation generally including the decision in the case of Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra). Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Vijay Mills Company Limited and others v. State of Gujarat and others, (1993) 1 SCC 345 . The Court referred to various decisions which considered the law of validation generally including the decision in the case of Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra). The conclusions have been set out in Para 18 that there are different modes of validating the provisions of the Act retrospectively, depending upon the intention of the Legislature in that behalf. Where the Legislature intends that the provisions of the Act themselves should be deemed to have been in existence from a particular date in the past and thus to validate the actions taken in the past as if the provisions concerned were in existence from the earlier date, the Legislature makes the said intention clear by the specific language of the Validating Act. It is open for the Legislature to change the very basis of the provisions retrospectively and to validate the actions on the changed basis. In the said case, it was held that the Legislature had changed the very basis of the provisions retrospectively as was apparent from the provisions of the Amending Act. In the present case as already noticed, the validating statute has done nothing of the kind and only sought to regularise illegal appointments without repealing the Rules that were applicable at the relevant time or amending the definition of the Selection Board with retrospective effect. “ 102. In paragraph 23 of the judgment the Supreme Court held : “The purpose of a Validating Act is to remove the cause of ineffectiveness or invalidity. A Validating Act presupposes a positive act, on the part of the legislature of removing the cause of ineffectiveness or invalidity.” In ITW Signode India Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, (2004) 3 SCC 48 the Supreme Court observed that a Validation Act removes actual or possible voidness, disability or other defect by confirming the validity of anything, which is or may be invalid. 103. 103. We therefore do not find substance in the argument of Shri W.H. Khan that after enforcement of Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1974, there is no need in Uttar Pradesh of publication of the substance of the notification of sub-section (1) of Section 4 at the convenient places in the locality, if sub-section (4) of Section 17 has been applied and that the provisions of Section 5A do not apply, and consequently the last of the dates of the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 is the date when the notification was published in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality. The Validating Act after serving its purpose to validate certain acquisitions, has outlived its utility, and is not applicable to the acquisitions made subsequently i.e after 26.4.1974. Any other interpretation will not only lead to absurdity, but will also invalidate furture acquisitions of land in the State. 104. The Act was further amended in the State of Uttar Pradesh by the Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1991 to validate notifications under Sections 4 and 6 issued simultaneously in the matter of certain acquisitions by the Meerut Development Authority and Lucknow Development Authority, and to cure the defect pointed out by the Supreme Court in the State of U.P. v. Radhay Shyam Nigam, (1989) 1 SCC 591 . In Meerut Development Authority v. Satveer Singh, (1996) 11 SCC 462 the Supreme Court held that the Validating Act was not invalid. In paragraph 15 of the judgment it was held : “15. It is true that normally the legislature has to give effect to the judgment of the Court only to cure the defects pointed out in the previous judgment so that the operation of the law would be consistent with the law declared by this Court. But in view of the peculiarity, namely, the special needs of the State, Article 254 (2) itself gives such a power to the State Legislature to amend the law to make applicable in relation to that State though Central law may be inconsistent with the law operating in other States. In other words, when the topic is occupied in the Concurrent List, uniformity of operation of the law is not the Rule but simultaneous existence of the inconsistency would also operate in the same field. In other words, when the topic is occupied in the Concurrent List, uniformity of operation of the law is not the Rule but simultaneous existence of the inconsistency would also operate in the same field. But when the State Amendment was reserved and received the assent of the President to the extent of inconsistency it is saved in relation to that State. Therefore, the amendment by proviso to Section 17 (4) is not invalid. Any other construction would dry out the power of the State Legislature to enact the law on the subject of acquisition.” 105. The State of UP first amended the Act by amending Section 17 (4) to cure the defects pointed out in Radhay Shyam Nigam’s case. It, however, appears that the State needed further amendments and for that reason Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1991 was passed giving retrospective effect from the date of the Amendment Act, 1984 upholding the validity of the Validating Act, 1991. The Supreme Court observed in Tika Ram and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2009) 10 SCC 689 , in para 83 as follows : “83. Secondly, the basic objective of the Validating Act was to protect the Scheme during the period 1984-1989 only, and subsequently, there has been no such case of simultaneous notification in the State of Uttar pradesh for the last two decades, as stated by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of LDA. Even in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part III, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act is published much after the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.” 106. If the effect of the Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act 1974, was to last beyond its purpose of validating certain acquisitions of land, there was no need to enact Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1991, to validate certain acquisitions with same defects. 107. In the present case there are no allegations of mala fides in acquisition of the land and in invoking the urgency clause. In Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, AIR 1974 SC 2077 the land was acquired for planned development of Delhi. 107. In the present case there are no allegations of mala fides in acquisition of the land and in invoking the urgency clause. In Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, AIR 1974 SC 2077 the land was acquired for planned development of Delhi. It was held that the acquisition of land does not depend upon preparation and approval of a scheme and it is not necessary that a final and effective scheme is framed of the housing board before the proposal for acquisition is given. The Constitutional Bench dealt with the question whether the acquisition of a large extent of land is for public purpose via. ‘Planned Development of Delhi”. The Supreme Court held that it is not necessary to state in the notification that the land is needed for public purpose for filing objections under Section 5A. In Leelaram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2112 the Constitution Bench held that the public purpose mentioned in the notification concerned therein viz. “for the execution of the intermediate general plan for Greater Delhi” is specific in the circumstances and does not suffer from any vagueness. The Court pointed out that where the notification does not pertain to a small plot but a huge area covering thousands of acres, it is difficult to insist with greater precision for specifying the public purpose because it is quite possible that various plots covered by the notification, may have to be utilized for different purposes than set out in the intermediate general plan. In State of T.N and others v. L. Krishnan and others, AIR 1996 SC 497 the land was acquired for Tamilnadu Housing Board for public purpose stated in the three notifications. The purpose was implementation of the housing schemes to meet the demands made by various sectors of the population under ‘Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Further Extension Scheme” and for increasing housing accommodation for the development of South Madras neighbourhood. 108. The purpose was implementation of the housing schemes to meet the demands made by various sectors of the population under ‘Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Further Extension Scheme” and for increasing housing accommodation for the development of South Madras neighbourhood. 108. The satisfaction of the Ghaziabad Development Authority, District Magistrate and thereafter the State Government in this case that the land is needed for public purpose and that there is urgency to acquire the land for housing accommodation for invocation of the provisions of sub-section (1) and (4) of Section 17 dispensing with the hearing under Section 5A was based on sufficient material for exercise of statutory powers for acquisition of the land dispensing with enquiry giving opportunity to the land owners to make objections against the acquisition. The right of hearing of an individual before acquisition of the land in the schemes serving larger public purpose is subject to the bonafide exercise of powers to dispense with such hearing. Where the statutes provides for a procedure by which the right of hearing can be dispensed with, the power of judicial review is limited to find out whether the power has been exercised for the purpose for which it is given to the statutory authorities. If there is material on record to show that the scheme for acquisition of land serves public purpose and that the statutory authorities have applied their mind on the material before them, for invoking urgency clause, the Court is not required to sit in appeal over the sufficiency and insufficiency of such material. The Court is required to see whether the material is relevant for exercising the powers and that the competent authorities in the State Government could have formed an opinion on such material without there being any motive or ill-will. 109. In the present case we are satisfied that there was urgent need of acquisition of large areas of land by the Ghaziabad Development Authority, which had not proposed or developed the land in last ten years before the subject proposal for acquisition for housing colonies. The general public had responded in large numbers to the housing schemes floated by the Ghaziabad Development Authority. The general public had responded in large numbers to the housing schemes floated by the Ghaziabad Development Authority. The statutory authorities including the Ghaziabad Development Authority; the District Magistrate, the Land Use Council and the State Government, had applied their mind on the materials collected for invoking Section 17 (1) and (4) and to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 110. It was urged that the physical possession of the land has not been taken and that the petitioners are still in possession over the acquired land. There is sufficient material on record by way of the documents of transfer of possession, that the possession of the land was taken over by the State Government and handed over to the Ghaziabad Development Authority and that since the land had vested in the State free of all encumbrances, the provisions of Section 48 (1) of the Act are not applicable. In case of large areas of open land the physical possession is not required to be taken or given with reference to actual possession. The possession taken on the spot, and recorded in the documents is sufficient exercise of such powers. 111. The State has acquired a total area of 1234 acres of land by the subject notifications. The remaining land has been taken by resumption of the state land under the management of the Land Management Committee in the form of chak road, nali etc. Almost the entire land has been developed. The construction of more than 5000 houses for economically weaker Section is in progress and is at different stages. The farmers have been paid Rs. 311.37 crores out of estimated total compensation of Rs. 590 crores by way of settlement. These facts have also been considered by us, in deciding these writ petitions. 112. All the writ petitions are consequently dismissed, with no order as to costs.