JUDGMENT By the Court.—1. Heard Sri Neerav Chitravanshi learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri H.P. Srivastava learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the opposite parties. Since purely substantial question of law is involved, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel does not intend to file the counter-affidavit. Hence, with the consent of the parties, we proceed to decide the writ petition finally at the admission stage. 2. Short question involved in the present writ petition is as to whether after submission of the annual return, the proceedings could have taken place in pursuance to the provision contained in Section 25 (1 ) (ii) of Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 in short ‘Act’. 3. The petitioner is a proprietorship firm engaged in the business of trading of mustered oil and cake, had filed the annual original return in pursuance to Section 24 of the Act on 9.3.2010. Thereafter by the impugned order dated 16.3.2010 passed by the opposite party No. 3, in pursuance to the power conferred under Section 25 (1) (ii) of the Act, the provisional assessment was made and in pursuance to which demand notice has been issued to pay the tax. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no proceeding could have been taken place under Section 25 (1) (ii) of the Act since original annual return was filed. Only option left is to proceed for the final assessment. In support of the arguments, petitioner’s counsel has relied upon a judgment in M/s Dinesh Chandra Gupta & Sons v. State of U.P. and another, 2010 (42) NTN 196. 5. On the other hand, Sri H. P. Srivastava learned Additional Chief Standing counsel submits that notice under Section 25 (1) (ii) of the Act was issued on 8.1.2010 and three dates were fixed. Hence, the department has got right to proceed under Section 25 (1) (ii) of the Act. Submission of the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel is that the impugned demand notice does not suffer from any illegality or impropriety. However, argument of learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has been rebutted by the petitioner’s counsel with submission that annual original return was filed within the stipulated period. Hence, as and when return is filed, respondents looses its right to proceed under Section 25 (1) (ii) of the Act. However, argument of learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has been rebutted by the petitioner’s counsel with submission that annual original return was filed within the stipulated period. Hence, as and when return is filed, respondents looses its right to proceed under Section 25 (1) (ii) of the Act. One other argument advanced by the learned Additional Chief Standing counsel is that the petitioner should approach the appellate forum under Section 55 of the Act. 6. For convenience Section 25 (1) (ii) of the Act is reproduced as under: 25. Assessment of tax for a tax period.—(1) Where in respect of any tax period of an assessment year— (i) any dealer has not submitted tax return within the time prescribed or within the time extended by the assessing authority, or if tax return has been submitted without payment of tax shown payable in such return; or (ii) preliminary examination of tax return, by the assessing authority, reveals that computations shown in the tax return are wrong or amount of input tax credit claimed or tax payable shown is incorrect; or (iii) on the basis of material available on records with the assessing authority, it appears to the assessing authority that the turnover of sales or purchases or both, disclosed by the dealer is not worthy of credence; the assessing authority may, after making such inquiry as it may deem fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the dealer, determine - (i) to the best of its judgment the turnover, amount of tax payable and amount of input tax credit admissible, where the dealer has not submitted tax return or if the tax return has been submitted, the assessing authority is of the opinion that turnover disclosed by the dealer in such return is not worthy of credence; or (ii) the amount of tax payable and amount of input tax credit admissible, in any other case, by passing a provisional order of assessment for such tax period. A plain reading of Section 25 shows that the power may be exercised only when the tax return is not being filed. Once the annual tax return is filed, then the assessing authority had to proceed in pursuance to provision contained in Section 26 of the Act. A plain reading of Section 25 shows that the power may be exercised only when the tax return is not being filed. Once the annual tax return is filed, then the assessing authority had to proceed in pursuance to provision contained in Section 26 of the Act. In the event of filing of annual return within the stipulated period in view of the power conferred by Section 24 of the Act, no proceeding could have been taken place under the impugned provision. 7. The argument of the respondents’ counsel that the appeal should be relegated to the alternative forum is not sustainable in view of the fact that their lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court by a catena of judgments ruled that things should be done in the manner provided under the Act and statute and in case the authorities had not discharged their obligation within the four corners of law or has acted without jurisdiction, then Court should not shirk from its responsibility to interfere under its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. The relegation of alternative remedy or exercise of power by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are discretionary in nature. The Courts act under self impose restriction and whenever from the record, it appears that some decision is taken without jurisdiction, then it is the constitutional obligation of the higher judiciary to interfere and compel the authorities to act within the four corners of law within their respective jurisdiction. 9. In case an authority lacks jurisdiction to impose penalty, then such order is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, vide judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and others, AIR 1987 SC 2186 . 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tewari, AIR 1970 SC 786 , held that alternative remedy is the rule of discretion and not an exclusion of jurisdiction under Article 226. It has been further held in the case in Century Spg. And Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ullas Nagar Municipal Council and others, AIR 1971 SC 1021 , that in case the petition may be decided on the basis of material on record, then alternative remedy shall be no bar. 11. It has been further held in the case in Century Spg. And Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ullas Nagar Municipal Council and others, AIR 1971 SC 1021 , that in case the petition may be decided on the basis of material on record, then alternative remedy shall be no bar. 11. In the case in Rasid Ahmad v. Municipal Board Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163 ; Babu Ram v. Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 and Himmat Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 403 , it has been further held that it is self-imposed limitation and does not oust the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India even if an alternative remedy is available to an aggrieved person. 12. Their lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case in State of Bombay v. United Motors, AIR 1953 SC 252 , held that alternative remedy shall not come into the way where party come to Court with an allegation that his fundamental right has been violated and sought the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. It has been settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case in Calcutta Discount Company v. I.T.O., AIR 1961 SC 372 and AIR 1967 SC 549 (Bhopal Sugar Industry v. STO), that where mandatory provision of law has not been complied with and petitioners suffer from no fault on his or her part, the alternative remedy shall not be a bar to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. It has also been settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court that where important question of law is involved it shall be open to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India to settle a controversy. It has further been held that where public authority is acting contrary to provision of law or taking undue advantage of its own then alternative remedy shall not be a bar, vide, judgments in Union of India v. State of Haryana, 2000 (10) SCC 482 and Maharashtra State Judicial Services Association v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2002 (3) SCC; Salonah T. Company v. Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1990 SC 772 ; T.N. Transport Corporation v. Neethivalangan, 2001 (9) SCC 99 ; Shiv Shankar Dal Mill v. State of Haryana, 1980 (2) SCC 437 . 15. 15. In a case in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that alternative remedy shall not be a bar and dismissal of writ petition by High Court held to be not proper. The order passed by the authorities arbitrarily by abusing the power or in violation of principle of natural justice, may always be subjected to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. In a case in Godreg Sara Lee Ltd. v. Commr., (2009) 14 SCC 338 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed held that if the order of statutory authority is questioned on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, Court may interfere and the alternative remedy is no bar. Their lordships held that where issue relating to jurisdictional fact is raised, it should have been determined by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 17. In the case in Babubhai Jamunadas Patel v State of Gujarat, (2009) 9 SCC 610 , Hon’ble Supreme Court held that High Courts and Supreme Court are sentinels of justice. They have been vested with extraordinary powers of judicial review and supervision to ensure that rights of citizens are duly protected. Courts have to maintain a constant vigil against inaction of authorities in discharging their duties and obligations in the interest of citizens for whom they exist. Directions may be issued to authorities to perform their duties as required under various statutes. 18. In view of the above, submission of the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel to relegate the matter to statutory forum does not seem to be correct. Since the authorities lacks jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, it is a fit case where the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be exercised keeping in view the settled propositions of law (supra). 19. Apart from above, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner seems to be laid down correct law on the point and we are also of the view that instead of proceeding under Section 25 (1)(ii) of the Act, the department has to proceed with regard to assessment in pursuance to Section 26 of the Act. The filing of annual return under Section 24 of the Act, is one more reason for setting aside the impugned order. The filing of annual return under Section 24 of the Act, is one more reason for setting aside the impugned order. While proceeding under Section 26 of the Act, the revenue has got right to look into the entire facts, circumstances and material on record while dealing with the annual return. In case revenue is permitted to proceed under Section 25 of the Act, then it shall result into conflicting opinion on the part of the revenue while assessing under Section 26 of the Act. The revenue has got ample power to look into all the materials including the material gathered while passing the impugned order under Section 25 of the Act. 20. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 16.3.2010 passed by the opposite party No. 3 under Section 25 (1) (ii) of the Act as well as the notices of demand issued in pursuance to the order dated 16.3.2010 with all consequential benefits with liberty to the revenue to proceed on the basis of the original annual return expeditiously preferably within three months on merit. Writ petition allowed accordingly. ————