JUDGMENT Hon’ble Devendra Pratap Singh, J.—Heard counsel for the parties. 2. This petition is directed against concurrent judgments dated 21.3.1998 and 4.12.2003 by which a suit for eviction and arrears of rent filed by the contesting respondent has been decreed by both the Courts below. 3. The brief facts are that one Intizar Uddin together with respondent Nos. 2 to 5 instituted a S.C.C. Suit No. 1142 of 1978 with the allegations that they are the owners in possession of house No. 11/2/23 situated in Gudri Soot Nai Ki Mandi, Agra on the strength of a sale-deed dated 21.11.1977 alongwith other properties and they also have lease-hold rights of the land beneath the said house from one Gulam Haidar @ Achhey Mian where the petitioner was a tenant of his transferor at the rate of Rs.10/- per month. The tenants were informed about the said sale-deed through notice dated 1.12.1977 and rent was also demanded in view of the said transfer but the tenants refused to pay the rent forcing them to issue notice dated 22.8.1978 demanding rent and terminating the tenancy which was duly received by the tenant on 28.8.1978 but despite notice, neither they vacated the premises nor paid the rent. 4. The petitioner-tenant filed his written statement stating that the premises in dispute belongs to waqf Handi Dargah Handishah Maqub, but admitting that he was a tenant of the disputed premises. It was further stated that the waqf was duly registered with U.P. Sunni Central Board, Lucknow and it being a public waqf, Gulam Haidar had absolutely no right to sell the premises, and it being a void sale, no rights accrued in pursuance of the said sale-deed. It was also asserted that there was no relationship of tenant and landlord between him and Gulam Haidar and he has deposited rent from 1.12.1977 to 31.7.1978 in Misc. Case No. 153 of 1978 under Section 30 (2) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (here-in-after referred to as the Act). It was further asserted that in fact one Idrish was the Muttawalli and the suit was bad for non-joinder of Board and Idrish as parties. 5. After parties led their oral as well as documentary evidence, the trial Court framed five issues which were with regard to landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, ownership, denial of title and default etc. It was further asserted that in fact one Idrish was the Muttawalli and the suit was bad for non-joinder of Board and Idrish as parties. 5. After parties led their oral as well as documentary evidence, the trial Court framed five issues which were with regard to landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, ownership, denial of title and default etc. The trial Court found, on the basis of evidence on record, including judgment of the High Court, that the land belonged to the waqf while the constructions were made by private parties who were the owners and therefore Gulam Haidar had power to sell the premises. With regard to denial of title, the trial Court held that since the tenant admits to be a tenant of the waqf and since there was no denial of title, it refused to go further on the said issue. On the question of default, it found that the petitioners were in default for more than four months. On these findings, it decreed the suit vide order dated 21.3.1988. 6. Aggrieved, the petitioner-tenants preferred a revision No. 104 of 1998 where he raised one another issue which was not raised before the Court below with regard to validity of the notice. The revisional Court in its exhaustive judgment upheld the finding recorded by the trial Court and on the question of validity of the notice, it answered in favour of the respondent-landlord. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has firstly urged that there was absolutely no landlord and tenant relationship between the petitioner and the contesting respondent and since he bonafidely believed that there was a title dispute and entitlement to receive the rent, he in all fairness deposited the rent in proceedings under Section 30 (2) of the Act. 8. It is not denied that the petitioners had been paying rent to Gulam Haidar. It is also not denied that Gulam Haidar sold the property to the respondents who demanded rent which was not paid and deposited under Section 30 (2) of the Act. 8. It is not denied that the petitioners had been paying rent to Gulam Haidar. It is also not denied that Gulam Haidar sold the property to the respondents who demanded rent which was not paid and deposited under Section 30 (2) of the Act. Both the Courts below relied upon an order dated 25.8.1941 passed by Special Judge on a reference from Collector under the U.P. Encumbered Estate Act, 1934 and also of the resultant judgment dated 29.2.1960 where it was held that lessees had occupied the waqf land and built their houses and shops with their own money including constructions by Mohammad Bux, predecessor in interest of the respondent, which judgment was upheld in appeal before this Court, holding that Gulam Haidar was owner of the premises. However, It is vehemently contested on behalf of the petitioner, relying upon the rent receipt issued by Gulam Haidar where he himself admitted title of waqf. However, this aspect was considered in detail by both the Courts below and after relying upon a three Judge decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ambika Prasad Thakur and others v. Ram Eqbal Rai [ AIR 1966 SC 605 ] held that title cannot pass by mere admission. 9. It is worthy of note that in proceedings under Section 30 (2) of the Act, the petitioners neither impleaded the erstwhile Gulam Haidar nor the waqf as parties. Apart from a bald statement, there is no evidence to show that Idrish was ever Mutawalli either at the time of execution of the sale-deed or thereafter. The document brought on record to show that Idrish was appointed as Muttawalli is a letter of the Board of 1985 which allows Idrsih to work as such from 1985 onwards. The Courts have found that even in his statement, the petitioner had time and again repeated that he bonafidely believes that the waqf was the landlord/owner, if that was so, there was no reason forthcoming as to why he did not implead the waqf in proceedings under Section 30 (2) of the Act. Further, apart from the bald statement, there is no evidence worth believing to show that Idrish had ever demanded rent from him. Further, there is also no evidence that the rent was ever tendered to Sri Gulam Haidar or to the waqf. 10. Further, apart from the bald statement, there is no evidence worth believing to show that Idrish had ever demanded rent from him. Further, there is also no evidence that the rent was ever tendered to Sri Gulam Haidar or to the waqf. 10. However, it is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the documents filed on behalf of the petitioner do not relate to the disputed property. The Courts below have examined this aspect in detail and found that the petitioner has failed to prove that any other property of the waqf Handi Dargah Handishah Maqub was situated in that area and this finding of fact has not been shown to be perverse. 11. It is then urged that the notice was totally illegal as there was absolutely no demand of rent and therefore, the entire proceedings stood vitiated. In support thereof, he has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Mangat Ram v. Sardar Meharban Singh, 1987 (13) SC 479. 12. It is apparent from the record that the validity of the notice was never challenged by the petitioner before the trial Court. However, before the revisional Court, he had raised the issue which has been decided. 13. A copy of the notice is on record, it states that immediately after the sale-deed, the petitioner was informed about the transfer of right and a demand for payment of rent was also raised. When the tenant did not pay the rent, a demand notice dated 22.8.1978 was sent and received by the petitioner. It was categorically stated in the notice that even after intimation about the sale-deed and demand, no rent was paid from 1.12.1977 till the date of notice and since the petitioner was a bad pay master, the landlord did not wish to keep him further. 14. The revisional Court after considering the argument of the parties and after relying upon a decision of this Court rendered in the case Gussainram and another v. Mohammad Siddiqui and others [1966 ALJ 414] held that the notice was valid. In the case of Mangat Ram (supra), the Supreme Court has deciphered the twin requirements under Section 20 (2) of the Act. In the case of Mangat Ram (supra), the Supreme Court has deciphered the twin requirements under Section 20 (2) of the Act. It held that firstly the tenant should be in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and secondly, determination of the tenancy if he failed to pay the sum to the landlord within one month of the notice of demand. These are the two necessary pre-requisites for a valid notice under the Act. There can be no dispute with the said pronouncement but the question is whether in the present case, the twin requirements are met in the notice at hand. The Apex Court was considering a somewhat identical provision under the Delhi Rent Act in Rakesh Kumar v. Hindustan Everest Tool Ltd. [ 1988 (2) SCC 165 ] where a somewhat identical notice was served on the tenant, it held that the notice must be read in a common sense point of view, keeping in mind how such a notice is understood by ordinary people. In fact, the Supreme Court went on to uphold a decision of Delhi High Court rendered in the case of Ram Swarup v. Sultan Singh [1977 (2) RCJ 552] that a notice of demand could be expressed or implied and the conduct of the landlord could prove it. In the present case, vide notice dated 22.8.1978 the tenant was cautioned that despite demand, he has not paid the rent from 21.11.1977 and if he does not pay the rent, he would be liable for eviction. In the present notice, both the requirements have been satisfied and therefore the argument cannot be accepted. 15. Lastly, it is contended that the Courts have carved out a new case which was neither pleaded nor proved with respect to the ownership of land beneath the building and the ownership of the building. 16. It is apparent from the reading of the plaint itself that right from the beginning, the case set up by the plaintiff was that they are lessees of the waqf land over which the premises was built. It is apparent that both the parties had full knowledge of the case set up in the plaint and they also led evidence on the said issue. Therefore, it cannot be said that any new case was carved out by the Courts below. 17. It is apparent that both the parties had full knowledge of the case set up in the plaint and they also led evidence on the said issue. Therefore, it cannot be said that any new case was carved out by the Courts below. 17. Considering all these facts together, it cannot be said that the petitioner bonafidely deposited the rent under Section 30 (2) of the Act. The Apex Court in the case of Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao [ AIR 1989 SC 2187 ) in somewhat similar circumstances had held that where the tenant denies title of the landlord, it was not necessary for the landlord to amend his pleadings and if the denial was not bona fide, on this ground alone, the tenant could be evicted in the same proceedings. 18. Assuming that the notice was irregular, in the present case the petitioner has denied the title of the landlord, therefore on this ground alone he was liable for eviction. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the Court extensively through the findings but has not been able to point out any error apparent on the face of the record which requires interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. In view of the aforesaid this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rejected. ————