JUDGMENT 1. - This is an intra-court appeal filed by writ petitioner of Writ Petition No. 4214/2006 under Rule 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 against an order dated 15.11.2006 passed by Single Judge in above mentioned writ petition. 2. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by appellant and in consequence upheld the order of Board of Revenue. 3. So the question that arises for consideration in this writ-appeal is whether learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the appellant's writ petition? 4. This is what the learned Single Judge held while dismissing the writ petition: "No case for interference is made out as the question of limitation can not be gone into writ petition. Petition dismissed." 5. The dispute that travelled up to writ court at the instance of appellant relates to cancellation of land measuring 25 Bighas situated in village Rateu, Tehsel Barmer. The allotment was made in appellant's favour on 14.6.1968. However, it was cancelled on 6.11.1980. The appellant slept over his rights, which were subject matter of the land in question and after 18 years of its cancellation, filed appeal before Revenue Appellate Authority in the year 1998 against such cancellation. It is this appeal which was dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated 15.10.1998 (Annex.4) as hopelessly barred by time. The appellant felt aggrieved of this order and filed further appeal before the Board of Revenue. By the order dated 6.9.1999 (Annex.5), the Board of Revenue also dismissed the appeal and upheld the order dated 15.10.1998 holding the dismissal of appeal as barred by limitation to be legal and proper. The appellant felt aggrieved of this order, filed a writ petition out of which this appeal arises. By impugned order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and in consequence upheld the order of Board of Revenue. It is against this order, the writ petitioner has felt aggrieved and filed this appeal. 6. So the question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether courts below were justified in dismissing appellant's appeal as being barred by time? 7. It is against this order, the writ petitioner has felt aggrieved and filed this appeal. 6. So the question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether courts below were justified in dismissing appellant's appeal as being barred by time? 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to dismiss the appeal as in our opinion no case is made out to take any other view than the one taken by three courts below. 8. In our opinion, a delay of 18 years in challenging the cancellation order in appeal is not only inordinate but it is equally unexplained. There can be no justification on the part of appellant to have waited for 18 years before filing appeal against such cancellation. A person who sleeps over his legal rights and remedies for an inordinate period regardless of law of limitation, cannot take benefit of equitable jurisdiction of Court to condone the delay in his favour. By no stretch of imagination, the appellate court could have condoned the delay of 18 years despite the law of limitation being liberal in its application. 9. In our opinion, if the first appellate court was right in dismissing the application for condonation of delay by holding that no sufficient cause was made out for condonation thereby dismissing the appeal as barred by time, the second appellate court (Board of Revenue) and the writ court were equally justified on their part in upholding such order by concurring with the view of the first appellate court. 10. It is a trite law that whether there exists a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing appeal is a question of fact. Once a finding is recorded by the court concerned that no sufficient cause is made out on facts pleaded by the appellant in his application for condonation of delay, then such finding being pure finding of fact is binding on the second appellate court (as in this case Board of Revenue) and on the writ court in the writ petition arising out of such orders. It is equally binding in this intra-court appeal which arise out of writ petition. 11. It is equally binding in this intra-court appeal which arise out of writ petition. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant no doubt made attempt to argue the case on merits pointing out certain errors in cancellation of the allotment of land. We are afraid, we cannot go into the merits of the issue in this litigation. When the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation, then the only question involved in this case relates to limitation and sufficiency of cause but not the merits of the case. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant then argued that learned Single Judge did not assign any reasons and hence impugned order is not liable to be sustained. In our view, since we have examined the case and recorded our reasons by concurring with the eventual conclusions of learned Single Judge, then in such event, we do not consider it proper to entertain such submission. When we agree with the conclusion and support it with our own reasons though recorded at the appellate stage, then there arise no need to either set aside such the impugned order for want of reasons or to remand the case to the writ court for its fresh consideration. 13. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal is found to be devoid of any merit. It is accordingly dismissed in limine.Appeal dismissed. *******