JUDGMENT 1. These two appeals are directed against the judgment and decree dated 13th day of September, 2005 in RA. No. 32 of 2003 passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Basavan Bagewadi. 2. Appellants in these two appeals are defendants 1 and 2 and respondents are the plaintiffs before the Trial Court. In this judgment for convenience the parties are referred to their status before the Trial Court. 3. It is the case of plaintiffs that common propositor Basaiah had two sons by name Mahantayya and Channaveerayya and they are dead. Plaintiffs represent the branch of Channaveerayya and 1st defendant contends that he is the adopted son of Mahantayya. The genealogical tree of the family of Basaiah is as under: Mahantayya brother Channaveerayya I (father) Revanasiddayya (Plaintiff 1) I Parwatayya Irayya Chandrappa alias (adopted son) Chandrayya Defendant 1 (Plaintiff 2) 4. The plaintiffs contended that the schedule properties are the joint family properties. The 1st defendant claiming to be the adopted son of Mahantayya sold one item of schedule property in favour of 2nd defendant and therefore the same is not binding on them. The alleged adoption of 1st defendant is bogus, concocted and invalid in law. Therefore, the plaintiffs filed the suit to declare them as the owners of plaint schedule properties and for perpetual injunction. In the alternative the plaintiffs have prayed for partition of their 1/2 share in the plaint schedule properties. 5. The defendants entered appearance before the Trial Court and filed separate written statements. It is contended that after the demise of Mahantayya his wife Guravva adopted first defendant under a registered adoption deed dated 21-6-1976. Since 1st defendant is the owner of 50% share in the plaint schedule properties has sold one item and therefore the same is valid. The 2nd defendant contends that he is the bona fickly purchaser for valuable consideration of one item of plaint schedule property and the same is valid. On these grounds the defendants opposed the claim of plaintiffs. On the basis of pleadings the Trial Court framed the following issues and additional issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit properties are joint family properties of deceased Mahantayya and Channaveerayya? 2. Does the defendant 2 proves that he is the lawful and bona fide purchaser of suit property bearing No. 2519 for valuable consideration of Rs. 20,000/- from defendant 1? 3. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit properties are joint family properties of deceased Mahantayya and Channaveerayya? 2. Does the defendant 2 proves that he is the lawful and bona fide purchaser of suit property bearing No. 2519 for valuable consideration of Rs. 20,000/- from defendant 1? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief sought for? 4. What order or decree? Additional Issue: 1. Whether the plaintiffs further prove that the defendant 1 is not the adopted son of deceased Gurubai and the adoption deed is bogus and not binding on them? 6. Before the Trial Court plaintiffs examined six witnesses as P.Ws. 1 to 6 and got marked Exs. P. 1 to P. 9. The defendants examined six witnesses as D.Ws. 1 to 6 and got marked Exs. D. 1 to D. 11. 7. The Trial Court after hearing the arguments and on appreciation of pleadings, oral and documentary evidence held that 1st defendant is the adopted son of Guravva the wife of Mahantayya. The sale of one item of plaint schedule property by defendant 1 in favour of defendant 2 is valid. Consequently, the Trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit in part for partition vide judgment dated 20th September, 1995. Aggrieved by this judgment of the Trial Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the lower Appellate Court in R.A. No. 32 of 2003. After hearing arguments the lower Appellate Court framed the following points for its consideration: 1. Whether the appellants/plaintiff prove that the adoption deed dated 21-12-1976 adopting defendant 1 by Gurubai is concocted, invalid and same is not binding on them? 2. Whether the appellants prove that the affirmative findings recorded by the lower Court on issue 2 is erroneous and legally not sustainable? 3. Whether this Court in view of exercising powers under Section 107 of the CPC is required to frame the issue on the point of limitation and give finding on it? 4. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower Court requires any interference by this Court? 5. What order? 8. The lower Appellate Court on re-appreciation of the entire material on record held that the adoption of 1st defendant under a registered adoption deed dated 21-6-1976 is invalid in view of the bar under Section 10 (iv) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 5. What order? 8. The lower Appellate Court on re-appreciation of the entire material on record held that the adoption of 1st defendant under a registered adoption deed dated 21-6-1976 is invalid in view of the bar under Section 10 (iv) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Consequently, the lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and decreed the suit of plaintiffs declaring them as the absolute owners of plaint schedule properties, directed the defendants to handover possession of some of the schedule properties. Hence, these two second appeals by the defendants. 9. This Court vide order dated 1-7-2005 while admitting these two appeals framed the following substantial question of law: "Whether the finding of the First Appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff is contrary to material on record and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kondiba Rama Papal alias Shirke (dead) by his L.Rs and Another v Narayan Kondiba Papal!? 10. Heard learned Advocates on both sides and perused the entire appeal papers. 11. The relationship between the plaintiffs and 1st defendant is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the plaint schedule properties are the joint family properties. The only controversy between the parties is with regard to the validity of adoption of 1st defendant. According to 1st defendant he was adopted by Guravva w/o Mahantayya under a registered adoption deed dated 21-6-1976 as per Ex. D. 7. On the other hand the plaintiffs contended that on the date of adoption 1st defendant was aged about 30 years and therefore he was not eligible to be adopted in view of the bar under Section 10(iv) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. This contention of plaintiffs is accepted by the lower Appellate Court and accordingly held that the adoption deed-Ex. D. 7 is invalid. It is necessary to extract Section 10(iv) of the Act and the same reads as under: "10. Persons who may be adopted.-No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely.- (i) to (iii) .......... D. 7 is invalid. It is necessary to extract Section 10(iv) of the Act and the same reads as under: "10. Persons who may be adopted.-No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely.- (i) to (iii) .......... (iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption". 12. The Supreme Court of India in Kondiba Rama Papal's case, while interpreting Section 10 of the Act held that a custom judicially recognised need not be proved in subsequent cases. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Siddegowda v Smt. Mallamma and Others1, held that the necessity of pleading and proof of custom in every case does not arise when the Privy Council has by law declared that there is a custom amongst the sudras to adopt a boy who is aged above 15 years. 13. Keeping in view the law laid down in the two decisions referred to above; it is necessary to examine the fact situation in the present case. It is not in dispute that on the date of adoption deed-Ex. D. 7 defendant 1 was aged about 30 years. Therefore, clause (iv) of Section 10 of the Act is a bar for adopting a person more than 15 years. The only exception to the bar under Section 10(iv) of the Act is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permit persons who have completed age of 15 years being taken in adoption. In the instant case there is no pleadings and there is no proof with regard to the custom or usage applicable to the parties to take in adoption of person above the age of 15 years. The admitted fact situation is that both the parties are from Managoli Village, Bagewadi Taluk in Bijapur District. It is not in dispute between the parties that the entire Bijapur District was a part of old Bombay State. The Supreme Court in Kondiba Rama Papal's case held that "in long line of decisions before the Act came into force and also subsequent to the Act came into force the judicial pronouncement recognised in the old Bombay State custom and usage of adopting a person above the age of 15 years". The Supreme Court in Kondiba Rama Papal's case held that "in long line of decisions before the Act came into force and also subsequent to the Act came into force the judicial pronouncement recognised in the old Bombay State custom and usage of adopting a person above the age of 15 years". In view of this judicial recognition of the custom and usage in old Bombay State it is not necessary in subsequent cases in plead and prove the very same custom and usage of adopting a child who is more than 15 years age arising from the very same area. The lower Appellate Court without noticing this aspect of the matter committed an error in holding that the adoption deed-Ex. D. 7 is invalid in view of the bar under Section 10(iv) of the Act. Therefore, the finding of the lower Appellate Court is liable to be set aside. The question of law framed above is answered affirmatively. 14. Sri Ramesh B. Anneppanavar, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs relying on two decisions of this Court in AIR 1972 Kant. 73 and Gangavva and Others v Ningavva and Others1 contends that in the absence of pleadings and proof of custom the adoption deed-Ex. D. 7 is to be held as invalid in the eye of law. There is no dispute with regard to the legal preposition that pleadings and proof is necessary in support of the custom or usage as specified in clause (iv) of Section 10 of the Act. If judicial pronouncement has recognised a particular custom or usage in a community or in a province, it need not be necessarily pleaded and proved in subsequent disputes. This is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Kondiba Rama Papal's case and this Court in Siddegowda's case. It is not in dispute that the parties in the instant litigation are from a place which was a part of old Bombay State. The judicial pronouncement held that in the province of old Bombay State there is a custom and usage to adopt a child who is more than 15 years of age. Therefore, the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for plaintiffs will not be of any use to them. For the reasons stated above, the following.- ORDER These two appeals are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 13-9-2005 in RA. Therefore, the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for plaintiffs will not be of any use to them. For the reasons stated above, the following.- ORDER These two appeals are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 13-9-2005 in RA. No. 32 of 2003 passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Basavana Bagewadi is hereby set aside. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court in O.S. No. 25 of 1986, dated 25-1-1996 passed by Additional Munsiff, Basavana Bagewadi is hereby confirmed and restored on file. Parties to bear their own costs.