JUDGMENT Hon'ble MISHRA, J.—By way of filing writ petition, petitioner has assailed the constitutional validity of Section 86(d) of the Rajasthan VAT Act, 2003. Prayer has also been made to quash the order dated 20th August, 2010 passed by Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) II, Commercial Taxes, Jaipur. 2. Petitioner has assailed constitutional validity of Section 86(d) of the VAT Act on the ground that it does not provide any remedy against interim orders, even if they are passed illegally and in contravention of the orders passed by the Appellate Authority. Vide order dated 20th August, 2010, Deputy Commissioner, pending appeal, has directed to deposit Rs. 25,47,231/- out of the disputed liability of Rs. 73,53,293/-. Fifteen days' time was granted to deposit the amount. However, a notice was issued on 23rd August, 2010 by respondent No. 3, directing the petitioner to deposit the disputed tax in accordance with the interim order of stay. Though the petitioner was granted 15 days' time, order of attachment was passed on 28th August, 2010 attaching Bank Account of the petitioner. 3. Shri Alok Sharma, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that considering the scheme of the VAT Act, the provision contained in Section 86(d) is arbitrary and unconstitutional. There is a room to pass arbitrary and unreasoned orders of interim stay as no appeal has been provided against interim order. Interim order can be assailed along with final order in the appeal, not otherwise. He has also submitted that when 15 days' time was granted by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) to deposit the amount, there was no justification to issue notice on 23rd August, 2010 by respondent No. 3 and to attach Bank Account on 28th August, 2010. Amount has been illegally realised from the petitioner. Its refund be ordered. 4. Shri R.P. Singh, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the respondents has supported vires of provision of Section 86(d) of the VAT Act. He has submitted that the State has enacted the provision considering the economic expediency and in such matters greater latitude has been given to the Legislature. 5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that Section 86 (d) of the VAT Act cannot be said to be ultra vires for various reasons. 6. He has submitted that the State has enacted the provision considering the economic expediency and in such matters greater latitude has been given to the Legislature. 5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that Section 86 (d) of the VAT Act cannot be said to be ultra vires for various reasons. 6. Section 38(4) of the VAT Act provides that where dealer or a person has filed an appeal to the Appellate Authority against an order passed by an assessing authority or any other officer, the said Appellate Authority may, after registering such appeal and after having heard the appellant and the assessing authority or officer or any representative thereof, stay the recovery of the disputed amount of tax or demand or any part thereof for a period of six months from the date of such order or till the disposal of the appeal, whichever is earlier. Appellate Authority may for the reasons to be recorded in writing continue such stay beyond the aforesaid period of six months for a further period not exceeding six months. 7. Section 82(3) of the VAT Act provides that no appeal under this section shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of tax and other amounts admitted by the appellant to be due to him and in case of an appeal from an ex-parte assessment order, five percent and in other cases ten percent of the disputed tax amount. Section 82(3) envisages deposits which are necessary for hearing of the appeal. With respect to rest of the amount, interim order can be passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 38(4) of the VAT Act. When Section 38 (4) confers power upon the authority to grant stay after hearing and to extend life of the interim order by reasoned order, there is an obligation casts upon the authority to act in consonance with law while granting stay. Rule of reason is inhered in the provision itself When life of the interim order has to be extended for the reasons to be recorded in writing, obviously interim stay has to be granted for the reasons recorded by it, depending upon facts of each case. Rule of reason is inhered in the provision itself When life of the interim order has to be extended for the reasons to be recorded in writing, obviously interim stay has to be granted for the reasons recorded by it, depending upon facts of each case. Thus it cannot be said that arbitrary power is conferred upon the authority to deal with the interim stay matters under the provisions of Section 38(4) of the VAT Act. 8. Coming to the question of vires of Section 86(d) of the VAT Act, Section 38(4) is quoted below: "(4) Where a dealer or a person has filed an appeal to Appellate Authority against an order passed by an assessing authority or any other officer, the said Appellate Authority may, after registering such appeal and after having heard the appellant and the assessing authority or officer or any representative thereof, stay the recovery of the disputed amount of tax or demand or any part thereof for a period of six months from the date of such order or till the disposal of the appeal, whichever is earlier on the condition that the said dealer or the person furnishes sufficient security to the satisfaction of, the Assessing Authority or the officer, as the case may be, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. However, the appellate authority may for reason to be recorded in writing continue such stay beyond the aforesaid period of six months for a further period not exceeding months." 9. Section 86(d) of the VAT Act is also quoted below: "86. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 82, 83 and 84, no appeal or revision shall lie against:- (d) an interim order passed in assessment or other proceeding, subject however, it will be open to the party aggrieved to challenge such interim order in any appeal or revision preferred against the final order." 10. As per the aforesaid provision no appeal or revision can be filed as against inter-locutory order. It can be assailed in appeal or revision preferred against final order, not otherwise. Right to file an appeal is statutory right. It is upon the Legislature to provide appeal or revision against an order. The Legislature in its wisdom has considered appropriate not to provide appeal or revision against interim order. It can be assailed in appeal or revision preferred against final order, not otherwise. Right to file an appeal is statutory right. It is upon the Legislature to provide appeal or revision against an order. The Legislature in its wisdom has considered appropriate not to provide appeal or revision against interim order. Considering the entire scheme of the VAT Act, object behind not providing appeal or revision against interim order appears to be that these are fiscal and economic matters and are required to be decided at an early date. Case cannot be permitted to linger at the interim stage itself. In case orders are challenged in appeal or revision, that is likely to delay the decision of the main matter itself. The Legislature in its wisdom has considered it appropriate not to provide appeal and revision against interim order before final decision is rendered. Provision, therefore, cannot be said to be ultra vires in any manner. 11. In M/s. Babybhai & Co. and others vs. State of Gujarat and others (1985) 2 SCC 732 , the Apex Court has laid down a provision for corrective machinery by way of appeal or revision by a superior authority against an adverse order passed by an authority on whom power is conferred is only one of the several ways in which the power could be checked or controlled. Mere absence of a corrective machinery by way of appeal or revision by itself would not make the power unreasonable or arbitrary, much less it render the provision invalid. Its absence will be one of the factors to be considered along with several others before coming to the conclusion that the power so conferred is unreasonable or arbitrary. Mere absence of a corrective machinery by way of appeal or revision by itself would not make the power unreasonable or arbitrary, much less it render the provision invalid. Its absence will be one of the factors to be considered along with several others before coming to the conclusion that the power so conferred is unreasonable or arbitrary. Regard will have to be had to factors such as, on whom the power is conferred, whether on a high official or a petty officer, what is the nature of the power- whether the exercise thereof depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the authority or body on whom it is conferred or it is to be exercised objectively by reference to some existing facts or tests, whether or not it is a quasi-judicial power requiring that authority or body to observe principles of natural justice and make a speaking order etc.; last mentioned factor particularly ensures application of mind on the part of the authority or body only to pertinent or germane material on the record excluding the extraneous and irrelevant and also subjects the order of the authority or body to a judicial review under the writ jurisdiction of the Court on the ground of perversity, extraneous influence, mala fides and other blatant infirmities. Moreover, all these facts will have to be considered in the light of the scheme of the enactment and the purpose intended to be achieved by the concerned provision. 12. By Virtue of Section 86(d) of the VAT Act challenge to the interim order has been deferred till passing of the final order by the concerned authority. Thereafter, appeal or revision, as the case may be, can be filed. Thus finality is attached for the time being to the interim order, which is permissible. Authority has to act after hearing the parties and is bound to make reasoned speaking order duly applying mind, considering the relevant material on record and such a decision is subject to judicial review in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, by not providing an appeal or revision before final decision is rendered by the concerned authority, Section 86(d) of the VAT Act cannot be said to be ultra vires of the Constitution. 13. Thus, by not providing an appeal or revision before final decision is rendered by the concerned authority, Section 86(d) of the VAT Act cannot be said to be ultra vires of the Constitution. 13. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. P. Laxmi Devi (Smt.) : (2008) 4 SCC 720 the Apex Court has laid down that as regards fiscal or tax measures greater latitude is given to such statutes than to other statutes. All decisions in the economic and social spheres are essentially ad hoc and experimental. Since economic matters are extremely complicated, this inevitably entails special treatment for special situation. The State must therefore be left with wide latitude in devising ways and means of fiscal or regulatory measures, and the court should not, unless compelled by the statute or by the Constitution, encroach into this field, or invalidate such law. The Apex Court has further observed that as regards economic and other regulatory legislation judicial restraint must be observed by the court and greater latitude must be given to the legislature while adjudging the constitutionality of the statute because the court does not consist of economic or administrative experts. It has no expertise in these matters, and in this age of specialisation when policies have to be laid down with great care after consulting the specialists in the field, it will be wholly unwise for the court to encroach into the domain of the executive or legislative and try to enforce its own views and perceptions. Hardship is not confined to constitutionality of taxing statute. 14. In Excel Wear vs. Union of India : (1978) 4 SCC 224 it was held by their Lordships that Sections 25-O and 25-R of the Industrial Disputes Act as amended by Act 32 of 1976 were violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as they impose unreasonable restrictions on the management. Reasonableness of the provisions has to be tested both from the procedural and substantive aspects of the law. All the comprehensive and detailed information given in the application for permission would be of no avail to the employer if the law permits the authority to pass a creptic, capricious, whimsical and one sided order. 15. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is not attracted to the instant case as the provisions which came for consideration in Excel Wear vs. Union of India were totally different. 16. 15. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is not attracted to the instant case as the provisions which came for consideration in Excel Wear vs. Union of India were totally different. 16. Right of appeal at every stage cannot be claimed as of right. Appeal is provided against an interim order after final decision is rendered. Interim order of stay with respect to tax recovery which is passed is final for the time being. The provision cannot be said to be conferring whimsical or arbitrary power upon the authority. Intendment of Section 38(4) of the VAT Act is clear. Interim order has to be operated for a particular period of time and there is a mandate to decide appeal also as early as possible and in case interim order has to be extended, reasons have to be recorded. 17. Coming to the legality of order dated 30th August, 2010 passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), out of total disputed liability of Rs. 73,53,293, amount of Rs. 25,47,231/- has been ordered to be deposited within 15 days. Notice was served on 23.8.2010 by respondent No. 3 to comply with the aforesaid direction. No doubt about it that attachment of back account was made on 28th August, 2010, it could not be said to be violative of the interim order which was passed. It was only step in aid to ensure that order of deposit was complied with and money was not transferred out of the bank account in an illegal manner so as to defeat the interim order which was passed. The date on which money was realised by respondent No. 3 has not been mentioned in the petition. In case it was after 15 days, obviously there was no violation of the interim order which was passed. Whatever that may be, there was liability to deposit a sum of Rs. 25,47,231/- as per the interim order and that amount stands paid. We are not inclined to interfere in the interim order passed by the Appellate Authority. Order is reasoned and mind has been duly applied. It cannot be said to be arbitrary one. We find that no case is made out to interfere with the merits of the order in the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 18. Order is reasoned and mind has been duly applied. It cannot be said to be arbitrary one. We find that no case is made out to interfere with the merits of the order in the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 18. Prayer has been made by Shri Alok Sharma to decide the appeal at an early date. Shri R.P. Singh, Additional Advocate General has offered to decide the appeal on merits within two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. Accordingly, it is ordered that let the appeal be decided within two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. 19. Resultantly, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that the provision of Section 86(d) of the VAT Act is intra vires. The writ petition being devoid of merits deserves dismissal and it is hereby dismissed. 20. No order as to costs.