JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—This Division Bench has been constituted to consider following two questions referred to it : “(i) Whether an order passed in appeal under section 11 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by the Settlement Officer Consolidation deciding the appeal finally by setting aside the order of the [Settlement Officer Consolidation]1 and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer is an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and revision is barred against such order under section 48. (ii) Whether the law down in Ajab Singh and others v. Jt. Director of Consolidation and others, 1996 RD 104, Rajbir v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1999 (90) RD 313, Rajit Ram Singh and others v. Mahadev Singh and others, 2002 (93) RD 224, lay down the correct law.” 2. Brief facts of the case, which are necessary to be noted for deciding the above two questions, are; proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 were started in the village in which objections under Section 9-B of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 were filed by respondent No. 2. The said objections were allowed by order dated 18th January, 2005 against which an appeal under Section 11(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was filed by the writ petitioners before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. The Settlement Officer of Consolidation allowed the appeal by judgment and order dated 27th September, 2007 setting aside the order of Consolidation Officer dated 18th January, 2005 and remanding the matter before the Consolidation Officer for deciding the objections afresh. Against the order dated 27th September, 2007 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, revision under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was filed by respondent No. 2. An objection was raised on behalf of the writ petitioners, who were respondents in the revision, that revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 is not maintainable since the order of Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 27th September, 2007 remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer was an “interlocutory order”, the revision against an interlocutory order is not maintainable. The said objection was considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and vide order dated 13th February, 2008 the Deputy Director of Consolidation held that revision is maintainable. The said objection was considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and vide order dated 13th February, 2008 the Deputy Director of Consolidation held that revision is maintainable. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 13th February, 2009 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 3. The petitioners in the writ petition claim that revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was not maintainable, hence the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation is liable to be set-aside. In the writ petition reliance was placed by the petitioners on three judgments of this Court rendered by different learned Single Judges taking the view that revision against an interlocutory order of remand is not maintainable. The said judgments are Ajab Singh and others v. Jt. Director of Consolidation and others, 1996 RD 104, Rajbir v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1999 (90) RD 313, Rajit Ram Singh and others v. Mahadev Singh and others, 2002 (93) RD 224. Expressing doubt over the correctness of the aforesaid judgments, two questions, as noted above, have been referred for consideration. 4. We have heard Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for contesting respondent and learned Standing Counsel. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that order of remand by Settlement Officer of Consolidation was an interlocutory order it having not decided the lis between the parties. He further contended that revision was not maintainable in view of the express exclusion as contained in Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC 707 , Satyadhyan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another, AIR 1960 SC 941 and the aforesaid three judgments of the learned Single Judges of this Court as noticed above. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the order of remand passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation was not an interlocutory order. It is contended that appeal having been finally decided, it was a final order and the revision was maintainable under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the order of remand passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation was not an interlocutory order. It is contended that appeal having been finally decided, it was a final order and the revision was maintainable under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. Reliance has been placed on judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Mammu v. Hari Mohan and another, JT 2000(1) SC 65, Preetam Singh and others v. Assistant Director of Consolidation and others, (1996)2 SCC 270 and judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Bhagwat and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1990 RD 162. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 8. The main issue, which is to be considered in this proceedings, is as to whether the order passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation deciding the appeal finally by setting aside the order of Consolidation Officer and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer, is an “interlocutory order” within the meaning of Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, as to whether revision against that order is barred and as to whether three judgments of the different learned Single Judges, as noticed above, holding that revision is not maintainable against an interlocutory order lay down the correct law. 9. Before proceeding to consider the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. 10. Section 11 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 provides for appeal before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. Section 11(1) contemplates decision thereon by Settlement Officer of Consolidation after hearing the parties. Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 provides for revision. By U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982 Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was amended excluding revision against an interlocutory order. The words “interlocutory order” were also defined by Explanation-(2) of Section 48. Section 48, as amended by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982, is as follows : “48. By U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982 Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was amended excluding revision against an interlocutory order. The words “interlocutory order” were also defined by Explanation-(2) of Section 48. Section 48, as amended by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982, is as follows : “48. Revision and reference.—(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case of proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case of proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1) Explanation (1).—for the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation (2).—for the purposes of this section, the expression ‘’interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceedings, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. Explanation (3).—for the purposes of this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority, and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence.” 11. One more section, which is necessary to be noted, is Section 40 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, which provides that proceedings before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings. Rule 65 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954 contains provisions with regard to transfer of a case. Section 40 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 and Rule 65 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954 are quoted below : “”40. Rule 65 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954 contains provisions with regard to transfer of a case. Section 40 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 and Rule 65 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954 are quoted below : “”40. Proceedings before Settlement Officer Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer to be judicial proceedings.—A proceeding before a Director of Consolidation, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Settlement Officer Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer, shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. “65. [See Section 54].—(1) The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, may withdraw any case from the file of any Consolidation Officer or Assistant Consolidation Officer subordinate to him may refer the same for disposal to any other Consolidation Officer or Assistant Consolidation Officer competent to deal therewith. [(1-A) The officer before whom appeals, revisions or references under the provisions of the Act or these rules are instituted may transfer any case instituted or pending before him to any other officer empowered to hear and decide such case, or recall case pending before any other officer from the file of that officer to his own file. The District Deputy Director of Consolidation of a district where Joint/Deputy/Assistant Director of Consolidation is posted may call for record of any revision or case pending before such officer for disposal and may transfer it to such officer if he is unable to decide it for some reason.] (2) The Director of Consolidation may withdraw any case from the file of any Settlement Officer, Consolidation, and refer the same to any other Settlement Officer, Consolidation for disposal.” 12. The dictionary meaning of the words “interlocutory order” according to Law Lexicon (P. Ramanath Ayer) 1997 Edition, is as follows : “Interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is one which is made pending the case and before a final hearing on the merits. An interlocutory order is made to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the suit, and generally collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not connected with the final judgment.” 13. The dictionary meaning of the words “interlocutory order” according to Halsbury’s Law of England, 4th Edition, Vol.26, Paragraph 506, is as follows : “Interlocutory order. The dictionary meaning of the words “interlocutory order” according to Halsbury’s Law of England, 4th Edition, Vol.26, Paragraph 506, is as follows : “Interlocutory order. An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either - (1) is made before judgment and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed ‘’interlocutory’. An interlocutory order, even though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinates matter with which it deals.” 14. The dictionary meaning of the words “interlocutory order” is, an order made during the progress of an action, which does not finally dispose the rights of the parties. Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. also uses the words “interlocutory order”. The words “interlocutory order” as used in Section 397 of Cr.P.C. came for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 , in which it was held that the term “interlocutory order” merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. 15. Again in the case of V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC 962 , the Apex Court held that interlocutory order has to be construed in contradiction to or in contrast with final order, it means not a final order, but an intermediate order. It is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. 16. In the present case we are concerned with an order, which is an order of remand by which remand order the appeal filed under Section 11 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was allowed, the order of Consolidation Officer, which was appealed against was set-aside and the Consolidation Officer was directed to decide the rights of the parties afresh. Thus our consideration in the present case has to be confined to an order of remand of the above category. 17. Thus our consideration in the present case has to be confined to an order of remand of the above category. 17. The Apex Court in Kshitish Chandra Bose’s case (supra) was considering an order of remand as contemplated under Order XLI, Rule 25 of C.P.C. In the said case plaintiff’s suit was decreed by the trial Court on question of title and adverse possession. The defendant filed an appeal before the Additional Judicial Commissioner which affirmed the findings of the trial Court on both the points. Thereafter defendant went up in second appeal to the High Court which held that there was no clear evidence to show that the plaintiff had obtained title by adverse possession and by its judgment dated 17.2.1967 remanded the case to the trial Court for a decision only on the question of title. After remand, the Additional Judicial Commissioner dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. The plaintiff then went up in appeal to the High Court which affirmed the finding of the Additional Judicial Commissioner. Thereafter the appeal by special leave was filed in the Apex Court. It is contended before the Apex Court that plaintiff did not come in appeal before the Apex Court against the first judgment of the High Court because the order passed by the High Court was not a final order but in the nature of interlocutory order, hence the appellant could not be debarred from challenging the validity of the first judgment of the High Court even after the second judgment was passed. In the above context, following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said judgment : “”5. Secondly, it was contended that even so the finding of the High Court on the question of adverse possession was given without at all considering the materials and evidence on the basis of which the two posts had concurrently found that the plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession. Secondly, it was contended that even so the finding of the High Court on the question of adverse possession was given without at all considering the materials and evidence on the basis of which the two posts had concurrently found that the plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession. It is contended that the plaintiff did not come up in appeal before this court against the impugned judgment of the High Court obviously because the order passed by the High Court was not a final one but was in the nature of an interlocutory order as the case had been remanded to the Additional Judicial Commissioner and if the revisional court had affirmed the finding of the trial court, no question of filing a further appeal to the High Court could have arisen. Thus, the appellant could not be debarred from challenging the validity of the first judgment of the High Court even after the second judgment by the High Court was passed in appeal against the order of remand. In support of this contention, the counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Satyadhavan Ghosal v. Shiksha Mitra. Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590 : ( AIR 1960 SC 941 ) where under similar circumstances this Court observed as follows: “In our opinion the order of remand was an interlocuroty judgment which did not terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the final order.” In coming to this decision this Court relied on an earlier decision in the case of Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria and vice versa, 1953 SCR 136 : ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ) where the same view was taken. 6.Mr. Sinha appearing for the respondent was unable to cite any authority of this Court taking a contrary view or overriding the decisions referred to above. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that it is open to the appellant to assail even the first judgment of the High Court and if we hold “that this judgment was legally erroneous then all the subsequent proceedings, namely, the order of remand, the order passed after remand, the appeal and the second judgment given by the High Court in appeal against the order or remand would become non est.” 18. Another judgment, which has been relied by learned counsel for the petitioners is judgment of the Apex Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal’s case (supra). The Apex Court in the said case considered Sections 11 and 105 of C.P.C. and laid down as to when an interlocutory order can be challenged in appeal from final decree. In the said case the Apex Court laid down that Section 105(2) does not apply to the Supreme Court and an order of remand can be challenged while challenging the final decree. Following was laid down in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment : “15. When the code of 1877 made provisions in Chapter 43 for appeal against certain orders, Section 591 thereof provided “Except as provided in this chapter, no appeal shall lie from any order passed by any court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction” and went on to say “but if any decree be appealed against any error, defect or irregularity in any such order affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objecting in the memorandum of appeal”. The position remained the same in the code of 1882. The present Code in its 105th section uses practically the same phraseology except that the word “any such order” has been substituted by “any order” and an additional provision has been made in the second sub-section in respect of orders of remand. The expression “such order” in Section 591 gave rise to a contention in some cases before the Privy Council that Section 591 applied to nonappealable orders only. This contention was overruled by the Privy Council and that view was adopted by the Legislature by changing the words “any such order” to “any order”. As regards the orders of remand it had been held that under Section 591 of the Code a party aggrieved by an order of remand could object to its validity in an appeal against the final decree, though he might have appealed against the order under Section 588 and had not done so. The second sub-section of Section 105 precludes an appellant from taking, on an appeal from the final decree, any objection that might have been urged by way if appeal from an order of remand. 16. The second sub-section of Section 105 precludes an appellant from taking, on an appeal from the final decree, any objection that might have been urged by way if appeal from an order of remand. 16. It is clear therefore that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order. A special provision was made as regards orders of remand and that was to the effect that if an appeal lay and still the appeal was not taken the correctness of the order of remand could not later be challenged in an appeal from the final decision. If however an appeal did not lie from the order of remand the correctness thereof could be challenged by an appeal from the final decision as in the cases of other interlocutory orders. The second sub-section did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court, one reason being that no appeal lay to the Privy Council or lies to the Supreme Court against an order of remand.” 19. It is relevant to note that in the above cases while referring to order of remand as an interlocutory order, the Apex Court laid down that in a case when appeal lay against remand order and is not filed or no appeal lay against such an order, the higher Court is not precluded from considering the correctness of remand order. The question considered by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments was as to whether when an appeal is not filed against remand order, the correctness of the same can be challenged or not when the appeal is filed against final order. No such ratio has been laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment that no appeal lay against an order of remand, which is an interlocutory order. It is true that order of remand has been termed as interlocutory order in the aforesaid two judgments but the observation has been made in the judgments itself that appeal may or may not lay against such interlocutory order of remand. Thus above two judgments cannot be held to be laying down proposition that order of remand, which is an interlocutory order, cannot be appealed. 20. Thus above two judgments cannot be held to be laying down proposition that order of remand, which is an interlocutory order, cannot be appealed. 20. At this juncture, it is relevant to note the provisions of of the appeal as contained in Code of Civil Procedure with regard to an order of remand. Order XLI Rules 23 and 23A of Code of Civil Procedure provide for remand by the appellate Court. Order XLI, Rules 23 and 23A of Code of Civil Procedure Code are quoted as below : “23. Remand of case by Appellate Court.—Where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal, the Appellate Court may, if it thinks fit, by order remand the case, and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded, and shall send a copy of its judgment and order to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, which directions to re-admit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit; and the evidence (if any) recorded during the original trial shall, subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand. [23A. Remand in other cases.—Where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and the decree is reversed in appeal and a re-trial is considered necessary, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers as it has under rule 23.]” 21. Under Order XLIII, Rule 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure an order under Rule 23 or Rule 23A of Order XLI is appealable. Thus Code of Civil Procedure itself provides appeal from an order of remand. 22. We in the present case have to decide the question in the light of the statutory scheme as is delineated by Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. “Interlocutory order” has been defined in Explanation (2) of Section 48. Explanation (2) provides that expression ‘’interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceedings, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. “Interlocutory order” has been defined in Explanation (2) of Section 48. Explanation (2) provides that expression ‘’interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceedings, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. Thus an order deciding any matter in a case or proceeding, which does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding, is an interlocutory order. Explanation (2) also contemplates a category of orders, which are excluded from expression ‘’interlocutory order’ i.e. those orders which have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. 23. Section 40 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, as quoted above, provides that proceedings before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation are judicial proceedings. Rule 65 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954, as quoted above, uses the word ‘’case’. The appeal filed before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation is a case pending before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and is also a proceeding within the meaning of Section 40 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. By the order passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 27th September, 2007 Appeal Nos. 2308/3964 and 2318/3979 both were finally decided. The order of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation thus finally disposed of the appeals or proceedings, thus on the plain wordings of Explanation (2) of Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was excluded from the definition of interlocutory order as provided therein. 24. The order of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, which finally decided the appeal by setting aside the order of Consolidation Officer and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer was an order finally deciding the appeal and thus cannot be termed to be an interlocutory order. 25. The judgment of the Apex Court relied by learned counsel for the respondent in Mammu’s case (supra) fully supports the view, which we are taking. The facts of the said case are to be noted in detail. In the said case proceedings were initiated under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 by the respondents before the Land Tribunal, who were tenant for purchase of Kudikidappukaran right under Section 80-B of the Act. The applications were dismissed by the Land Tribunal. The facts of the said case are to be noted in detail. In the said case proceedings were initiated under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 by the respondents before the Land Tribunal, who were tenant for purchase of Kudikidappukaran right under Section 80-B of the Act. The applications were dismissed by the Land Tribunal. An appeal was filed by the respondents before the appellate authority, which was allowed. The appellate order was challenged before the High Court in revision. The High Court set-aside the order of the appellate authority and remanded the matter to the appellate authority. The appellate authority again passed an order in favour of the appellants. The appellate authority remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal. The above appellate order was not challenged in revision. The Land Tribunal found that the appellant was entitled to 10 cents of land. The order was challenged in appeal by the respondents before the appellate authority. The appeal was dismissed on the finding that previous order of the appellate authority was a final order and since that order was not challenged in revision, the order has become final. The appellate order was challenged before the High Court, which was set-aside. The question, which arose for consideration before the Apex Court, was as to whether the order of the appellate authority remanding the matter to the Land Tribunal was a final order and, therefore, was available to be challenged in revision or it was merely an interlocutory order against which no revision could be filed. The Apex Court after considering the aforesaid issue held that the order of remand was a final order and revision lay against such an order. Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the said judgment, which are relevant, are quoted below : “8. On the case pleaded by the parties and the findings recorded by the Land Tribunal, the appellate authority and the High Court in the orders passed in the proceedings, two questions emerge for consideration : (1) whether the High Court was right in holding that the order passed by the appellate authority remanding the matter to the Land Tribunal was not a final order and therefore, not challengable in revision before the High Court and (2) whether the finding of the High Court that the appellant cannot claim kudikidappu right in respect of the structure in question is sustainable in law. 9. 9. Section 103 of the Act, so far as it is material for the present proceeding, is quoted hereunder : “103. Revision by High Court.—(1) Any person aggrieved by— “(i) any final order passed in an appeal against the order of the Land Tribunal or; (ii) any final order passed by the Land Board under this Act or; (iii) any final order of the Taluk Land Board under this Act, xxx xxx xxx xxx may, within such time as may be prescribed, prefer a petition to the High Court against the order on the ground that the appellate authority or the Land Board, or the Taluk Land Board, as the case may be, has either decided erroneously, or failed to decide, any question of law. (2) The High Court may, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, pass such orders as it deems fit and the orders of the appellate authority or the Land Board, or the Taluk Land Board, as the case may be, shall, wherever necessary, be modified accordingly.” 10. The question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the order of the appellate authority remanding the matter to the Land Board with a direction to pass order in the light of the observations/directions in the order is a ‘final order’ within the meaning of Section 103(1) of the Act? The Kerala High Court in certain decisions has taken the view that only an order which disposes of a proceeding before the Land Board, can be said to be a ‘final order’ and against such an order, a revision petition shall lie; any other order of the appellate authority which does not dispose of the proceeding before the Land Board cannot be said to be a ‘final order’ and no other revision petition shall lie against such an order. This interpretation, in our considered view, does not flow from the language of the statutory provision. Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 103 provides that any final order passed in an appeal is available to be challenged in revision by any person aggrieved by such order. The clear and unambiguous language in which the section is couched conveys the meaning that a revision petition cannot be filed against an interlocutory order passed in an appeal. Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 103 provides that any final order passed in an appeal is available to be challenged in revision by any person aggrieved by such order. The clear and unambiguous language in which the section is couched conveys the meaning that a revision petition cannot be filed against an interlocutory order passed in an appeal. To put it differently, an order which does not dispose of the appeal is not a ‘final order.’ An order of remand in which the matter is remanded to the Land Board for disposal in accordance with law cannot be said to be an interlocutory order for the simple reason that the appeal filed before the Land Tribunal stands disposed of by such order. In a case where the Land Tribunal keeps the proceeding pending and calls for a finding on a specific issue or point formulated by it from the Land Board or any other authority, then such an order cannot be said to be a final order against which a revision can be filed before the High Court. The reasoning in some of the judgments of the Kerala High Court, particularly in Bhaskara Menon v. Gangadharan (1983 Ker LT 435) (supra) and in Joseph v. Velayudhan Pillai (1976 Ker LT 870) (supra) that a ‘final order’ is one which disposes of the proceeding before Land Board, in our view, is clearly erroneous. The view taken by the High Court in Mahadevan Iyer v. Bhagavaty Ammal, 1979 Ker LT 910, is extracted. “a literal understanding of sub-section (i) of Section 103 only . . . . . .means that there must be an appeal from an order of the Land Tribunal and the appellate order should be a final one as distinguished from an interlocutory order. The final order must dispose of the appeal. The words “final order in an appeal” mean only that and this is all that is contemplated by the Legislature will be clear from the nature of the appeals provided for under Section 102 of the Act to the appellate authority. An appeal will lie from any order passed by the Land Tribunal under the various sections enumerated in Section 102. An appeal will lie from any order passed by the Land Tribunal under the various sections enumerated in Section 102. Such orders may be either orders of final disposal of the proceeding taken before the Land Tribunal or may be only preliminary orders which conclusively determine the status of the parties and direct incidental enquiries leading to a final order by the Land Tribunal closing the proceedings. Such being the character of the orders against which appeals can be filed before the appellate authority ‘final order’ passed in an appeal against the order of the Land Tribunal in Section 103(1)(i) can only an order finally disposing of the proceedings initiated before the Land Tribunal. Finality must relate to the appeal only and not to the Land Tribunal proceedings. To understand or to interpret the section to mean final order disposing of the Land Reform proceedings on appeal will be recasting the section which is not allowed.” That view has our approval. Therefore, the finding of the High Court in the impugned order that no revision petition could be filed against the order of remand passed by the Land Tribunal is erroneous. The first question is answered in the negative.” 26. The proposition of law as laid down in the above case is fully attracted in the present case. The order of remand made by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation was, thus, a final order against which revision was fully maintainable. 27. Now comes the judgments of learned Single Judges in Ajab Singh’s, Rajbir’s and Rajit Ram Singh’s cases (supra). In Ajab Singh’s case (supra) following was laid down in paragraph 15 : “15. It is next to be seen whether the order of remand passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation was not open to revision it being an ‘interlocutory order’ within the meaning of section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which excludes, in no uncertain terms, an ‘interlocutory order’ from the purview of revisional jurisdiction. In Satya Dhayan Ghosal v. Smt. Deo Rajan Devi, an order of remand has been held to be an interlocutory judgment in that it does not terminate the proceeding and its correctness can be challenged in appeal from the final order. In Satya Dhayan Ghosal v. Smt. Deo Rajan Devi, an order of remand has been held to be an interlocutory judgment in that it does not terminate the proceeding and its correctness can be challenged in appeal from the final order. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion the Apex Court has relied on its earlier decision rendered in Keshar Deo Chamaria v. Radhey Kissen Chamaria and the proposition laid down therein has been reiterated in Kshistish Chandra v. Commissioner of Ranchi. In view of these authorities, I am of the considered view that the order of remand passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation was an ‘interlocutory order’ within the meaning of section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and, therefore, not open to revision. Its legality can, however, be examined in revision against the final judgments and orders rendered pursuant to the order of remand and if at that stage the Deputy Director of Consolidation finds that the order of remand was legally erroneous, all subsequent proceedings, viz. The order passed by the Consolidation Officer pursuant to the order of remand as also the appellate order passed in appeal preferred against such order of the Consolidation Officer would become non est. Since the order of remand is neither appealable nor revisable, its correctness is open to examination at subsequent stage when the matter comes up finally in revision. The impugned order is therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground as well. The decision in Bhawat and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, has no application to the facts of this case and in any case it cannot be accepted in view of the Apex Court’s direct decisions on the point.” 28. Learned Single Judge relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Satyadhan Ghoshal’s and Kshitish Chandra Bose’s cases (supra) took the view that remand order by Settlement Officer of Consolidation was an interlocutory order. Learned Single Judge did not refer to definition of ‘’interlocutory order’ as given in Section 48, Explanation (2). Learned Single Judge held that correctness of remand order is open to examination at subsequent stage when the matter comes up finally in revision. Learned Single Judge did not refer to definition of ‘’interlocutory order’ as given in Section 48, Explanation (2). Learned Single Judge held that correctness of remand order is open to examination at subsequent stage when the matter comes up finally in revision. As observed above, the judgment of the Apex Court in Satyadhan Ghoshal’s and Kshitish Chandra Bose’s cases (supra) were not the judgments laying down any proposition that against an order of remand no appeal lay, rather the Apex Court in the above judgments held that against an interlocutory order of remand if no appeal is filed or no appeal is available, the correctness of the same can be challenged in the High Court in subsequent proceedings. There cannot be any dispute to the above proposition as laid down by the Apex Court. 29. In Rajit Ram Singh’s case (supra) learned Single Judge again held that the order of remand is an interlocutory order without referring to Explanation II of Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. In paragraph 6 of the judgment even Explanation (2) has not been quoted. In Rajbir’s case (supra) again the learned Single Judge without considering Explanation (2) has committed the same error taking the view that order of remand is an interlocutory order. We may notice another judgment of learned Single Judge in the case of Ram Bhajan and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, 2001(92) RD 330. In the said case learned Single Judge opined that remand orders would be interlocutory order if they are simplicitor remand orders. However, if the Court remanding the matter has recorded finding of fact or even finding of law which would be finding after remand upon the Court to which matter has been remanded, the remand order would not be interlocutory order. Following was laid down in paragraph 3 of the said judgment : ‘’3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the revision of the respondents was not maintainable because the order of S.O.C. dated 5.1.1985 passed in appeal was remand order and, therefore, interlocutory order as held by decision of this Court in the case of Ram Narayan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and decision reported in 1999(90) RD 313. Both these decisions rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner, Ranchi. Both these decisions rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner, Ranchi. The decision of the Supreme Court has been given in the context of Civil Procedure Code. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pritam Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, for the proposition that remand orders are not always interlocutory order and it depends upon the remand order. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the bar of revision against interlocutory order was introduced in Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in the year 1982 for the first time and, therefore, the decision of the Division Bench of the year 1978 cited by the respondents is no longer good law. Having considered all the decisions as well as logical points I am of the opinion that remand orders would be interlocutory order if they are simplicitor remand orders. However, if the Court remanding the matter has recorded finding of fact or even finding of law which would be finding after remand upon the Court to which matter has been remanded, the remand order would not be interlocutory order, as in respect of those issues it has finally decided the controversy.” 30. We are of the view that no such distinction can be drawn for purposes of determining as to whether order of remand is an interlocutory order or not. The definition of interlocutory order as given in Explanation (2) does not contemplate any such distinction. 31. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the order of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation by which appeals were finally decided was not an interlocutory order and the revision under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was clearly maintainable. 32. Our answers to the questions are as follows : (1) an order passed in appeal under Section 11 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by the Settlement Officer Consolidation deciding the appeal finally by setting aside the order of the [Settlement Officer Consolidation]2 and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and revision is not barred against such order under Section 48. (2) the law down in Ajab Singh and others v. Jt. Director of Consolidation and others, 1996 RD 104, Rajbir v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1999 (90) RD 313, Rajit Ram Singh and others v. Mahadev Singh and others, 2002 (93) RD 224, do not lay down the correct law. 33. After answer to the above two questions nothing more remains to be decided in the writ petition. The order of Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 13th February, 2008 holding the revision to be maintainable against the order of remand passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation is fully justified. Thus we decide the entire writ petition by this order. 34. The writ petition is dismissed. 35. Parties shall bear their own costs. —————