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2010 DIGILAW 1696 (PNJ)

Ram Phool v. State Of Haryana

2010-05-17

RANJIT SINGH

body2010
Judgment Ranjit Singh, J. 1. The appellant, Om Parkash was appointed as T. Mate in Irrigation Department whereas Jhabu Singh, Ram Phal, Karam Singh and Ram Phul were appointed as T. Mates on 01.01.1983,16.08.1983, 01.11.1981 and 16.01.1983. The appellants would claim that their service record was unblemished still, however, their services were terminated on 31.1.1986. The appellants would term this order to be illegal, null, void and against the service rules. Some of the persons, who were joined the appellants as plaintiffs namely Om Parkash, Karam Singh, Nihal Singh, Tarsem Singh, Lal Chand and Hanuman were found to have rendered more than 4 years of service and they accordingly pleaded that their services were liable to be regularized. Plea also was that para 1.129 of sub para 7 of the P.W.D. Code (for short the Code) would not apply to the case of the plaintiffs and that while passing the order of termination, principles of natural justice were not followed. They had accordingly filed the civil suit to challenge the order dated 31.01.1986. 2. The respondent appeared and filed joint written statement. The locus of the appellants to file the suit was challenged. The plea was that the suit was also not maintainable. On merits, it is submitted that the appellants were appointed purely on the temporary capacity on work charge basis and they would be governed by paragraph 1.129 of the Code as referred to above. Accordingly, the order of termination is justified. The provisions of this Code entitles the respondent to terminate the services by issuing 10 days notice as they had become surplus in the department. Accordingly, it is stated that the order is not passed in an arbitrary manner and no employee junior to the appellants was kept in service. 3. On the basis of the pleadings, following issues were framed:- 1. Whether the impugned order dated 31.1.1986 terminating the services of the plaintiffs is a null and void as alleged? If so to what affect? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file this suit? OPD. 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 4. Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to try this suit? OPD. 5. Relief. The order of termination was held legal by the trial Court. Other issues in regard to locus etc. were decided against the respondent. OPD. 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 4. Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to try this suit? OPD. 5. Relief. The order of termination was held legal by the trial Court. Other issues in regard to locus etc. were decided against the respondent. The suit was accordingly dismissed against which the appellants filed an appeal, which was also dismissed. The appellants have, therefore, filed the present Regular Second Appeal. 4. Learned counsel has mainly referred to instructions dated 6.3.1985 (Ex.P8) to urge that the appellants were not entitled to be regularized as per the policy then existed. These instructions were concededly not pleaded in the suit filed by the appellants. Before the First Appellate Court, reliance was placed on Piara Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and others, 1998 SLJ 856. The First Appellate Court also found that the service condition of the appellants were governed by the Code before issuance of instructions vide letter No. 6/4/87 dated 2 GS-I dated 24.3.1987 for the purpose of regularisation of the service of the work charge employee. It was found that these instructions provided that those who are completed 4 years of service or more continuous service on 31.12.1986, would be entitled to consideration for regularlisation. However, the services of the appellants had already been terminated on 31.1.1986. 5. The instructions as such would not have come to the rescue of the appellants. In this background, reference can be made to paragraph 1.129 of the Code, which reads as under:- "Members of work charged establishment, other then Road Inspectors, who are engaged on the footing of monthly servants, will be subject to discharge at ten days notice except in the case of serious misconduct or gross inefficiency (when no notice will be given) or no payment of pay for 10 days or for such period up to this extent as may be due to them in lieu of notice. Should they desire to resign they will be required to give 10 days notice or forfeit pay for this period or for such period upto this extent as may be due to them in lieu of notice." As per this Code, the work charge employee could be discharged at any time after giving them 10 days notice. Should they desire to resign they will be required to give 10 days notice or forfeit pay for this period or for such period upto this extent as may be due to them in lieu of notice." As per this Code, the work charge employee could be discharged at any time after giving them 10 days notice. In the cross examination, one of the appellant had admitted that all of them were work charge employee and no employee junior to them was discharged. Concededly, as per the evidence also, the appellants were employed as work charge employee and on the completion of work they would be discharged. The finding returned by the Court thus based on the evidence and the legal position. The right to regularization, if any, at this stage would be governed by ratio of law laid down in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs.Umadevi and others, 2006 (4) Supreme Court Cases 1. 6 The submission that this case has subsequently been considered by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Sharma vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1. Panipat (Haryana), JT 2010 (4) SC 229, may not help as reliance on this judgment appears misconceived. The issue before the Honble Supreme Court arose out of the award passed by the labour Court. The question in regard to applicability of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act arose in the said case. The issue before the Honble Supreme Court in Anoop Sharmas case (supra) was not of regularization but of violation of the provisions of 25F, which certainly could not have been regulated on account of any observation made in the case of Uma Devi (supra). There is no merit in the appeal. There is no substantial question of law arising in the present case, which would call for interference. The Regular Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed.