Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 17 (ALL)

National Insurance Company Limited Lucknow Thr. Manager v. Jahanara and Others

2010-01-04

DEVI PRASAD SINGH, SURESH CHANDRA CHAURASIA

body2010
S.C. Chaurasia, J.:- List revised.? None responds for the respondents.? Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the records. 1. Present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been filed against the impugned award dated 15.7.2006, passed in C.P. No.61/2002 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 2. In brief, the deceased Mohammad Adil while going to petrol pump on cycle on 28.12.2001 suffered with the accident in question by Vikram Tempo No. U.P.32/T-4905.? In consequence thereof, Mohd. Adil succumbed to the injuries on 29.12.2001 in Medical College.? At the time of death, he was aged about 12 years.? A First Information Report under Case Crime No.422/01 was lodged.? It has been brought on record that the deceased Mohd. Adil was a student of Class-VI.? During the course of trial, the material facts have been brought on record with regard to registration of vehicle as well as the insurance with the appellant National Insurance Company Limited.? The vehicle was insured for a period of 19.10.2001 to 18.10.2002.? The case was contested by the appellant inter alia on the ground that the vehicle was being plied on the road in violation of the terms and conditions of insurance policy.? Hence, the defendants were not entitled for any compensation. 3. After due trial, a finding of fact has been recorded by the tribunal that the accident was caused because of rash and negligent driving of the driver of Vikram Tempo resulting into death of Mohammad Adil due to the injuries suffered by him.? 4. While assailing the order of the tribunal, Mr. Rajesh Nath, learned counsel for the appellant has raised a solitary ground stating that since Vikram Tempo was being plied on the road in violation of the terms and conditions given in the insurance policy, the appellant is not liable to pay compensation.? Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment reported in [2005(1)T.A.C. 4(S.C.)]National Insurance Company versus Challa Bharathamma and one other judgment of this Court reported in [2005(2)T.A.C. 6(All.)] Chandresh Kumar Agarwal versus Yogendra Kumar Srivastava and another.? 5. Issue No.3 relates to the appellant's objection with regard to plying of vehicle in violation of alleged terms and conditions of the permit.? 5. Issue No.3 relates to the appellant's objection with regard to plying of vehicle in violation of alleged terms and conditions of the permit.? The tribunal has considered the plea raised by the appellant and recorded a finding that the vehicle was being plied on the road in accordance with the terms and conditions given in the insurance policy and permit was granted by the authorities for plying of the vehicle.? The tribunal further recorded a finding that no evidence has been led by the appellant to establish that the vehicle was being plied in violation of alleged terms and conditions of the insurance policy.? 6. In the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in case a vehicle is driven against the terms and conditions of the policy or the vehicle is plied on the road without valid permit or certificate of fitness, the insurance company shall not be liable to pay compensation.? It is the owner of the vehicle who is liable to pay compensation to the claimant.? 7. The proposition of law raised by the appellant's counsel does not seem to be in dispute.? Of course, whenever a vehicle is plied on road without valid permit or without complying with the statutory provisions unauthorisedly, then in such a situation, the insurance company may not be held liable to pay compensation.The burden shall shift on the owner of the vehicle. 8. But whether a vehicle is plied on road without valid permit or in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy is a question of fact. Whenever a plea based upon a factual dispute is raised, then such plea should be proved by the person who alleges like other evidence.? In absence of any evidence, led by the party who raised such plea, a presumption may be drawn with regard to fitness of the vehicle to ply on road. 9. In the present case, it appears that no evidence was led by the appellant before the tribunal to establish that the vehicle was being plied on road in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy or the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act.? 9. In the present case, it appears that no evidence was led by the appellant before the tribunal to establish that the vehicle was being plied on road in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy or the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act.? Since a plea was raised by the appellant before the tribunal with regard to violation of the terms and conditions of the policy, it was also incumbent on the appellant to lead evidence specifying the terms and conditions which is alleged to have been violated by the tempo owner.? In case a plea is raised with regard to violation of certain terms and conditions, then that condition should be specifically mentioned and it should also be proved by supporting relevant evidence.? Merely by saying that the vehicle was being plied on the road in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy shall not suffice the purpose and meet out the requirement of law.? Every plea or defence taken by the parties during the course of trial should be proved like other evidence. 10. No other argument has been advanced or plea raised against the impugned award of the tribunal.? 11. In view of above, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order, passed by the tribunal.? The appeal is devoid of merit.? It is accordingly dismissed.? Let the unpaid amount be paid to the claimants forthwith, expeditiously, say within a period of two months from today. 12. No order as to costs.