JUDGEMENT Mridula Mishra and Dharnidhar Jha JJ. 1. Affidavit was filed yesterday, which has been sworn by one Binod Kumar Yadav, to which, he has attached a death certificate, issued by the Registrar of Birth and Death, Mahipatoli in the district of Begusarai, indicating that appellant no. 2, Chandradeo Yadav of Cr. Appeal No. 637 of 2004, demised on 15.7.2010. 2. In the light of the appellants death, the appeal of appellant, Chandradeo Yadav stands abated. 3. The six appeals arise out of the judgment dated 18.8.2004, rendered by Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Begusarai in Sessions Trial No. 53 of 1992. The appellants were put on trial in the abovenoted case, by framing joint charges against them under Sections 302/34 IPC and 342/34 IPC. The verdict of conviction was recorded against them by the learned Trial Judge and while passing sentence on 23.8.2004, each of the appellant of the six appeals, was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life for his individual conviction under Section 302/34 IPC and further to undergo Rl for one year for his conviction under Section 342/34 IPC. We have heard the appeals, which have set up the challenge to the above finding of guilt and order of sentence. 4. The prosecution story emanates from the FIR, Exhibit-4, which was lodged by Chulho Yadav, P.W. 3 at Balia Police Station on 24.11.1984 at about 11.30 a.m. The informant stated that he alongwith Shankar Yadav (deceased) and Mushaharu Yadav, P.W. 1, were going to Begusarai Court on 24.11.1984 at about 8.00 a.m. and when they had reached near a bridge, which has been described as Simardahi bridge, the accused persons, who are named in the FIR, which consisted of the 9 appellants also emerged from a brickkilns, armed with rifles, guns and pistols and surrounded the deceased Shankar Yadav. It is further alleged that the accused persons captured Shankar Yadav, lifted him and started taking him away towards through Diha Road in the direction of west of that particular road and when they had reached a place about one and half kilometers from the place where Shankar Yadav was picked up, Rampadarath Yadav fired a shot on the deceased Shankar Yadav. Shulo Yadav remonstrated him again to kill the deceased, upon which he again fired a shot upon the deceased. Shulo Yadav remonstrated him again to kill the deceased, upon which he again fired a shot upon the deceased. Besides, Rampadarath Yadav, appellants, like, Chhotan Yadav and Kapil Yadav also fired on the deceased and killed him. 5. The informant apprehended that the accused persons might take away the dead body and as such he alongwith others picked up the dead body to bring it to his house and came to the police station with Bhola Yadav, (not examined), Rasho Yadav, (P.W. 2) and Mahadev Yadav (not examined) for lodging a report. The informant stated that the occurrence was witnessed by Sagar Yadav, (not examined), Bhola Yadav, (not examined), Rasho Yadav, (P.W. 2), Ganeshi Yadav, (P.W. 4), Sagar Yadav, (P.W. 5). The informant further alleged that the reason for the occurrence was the previous enmity between the parties. 6. On the basis of the FIR, Exhibit 4, the police investigated the case and sent up the accused persons for trial. Originally there were 12 accused persons named as accused in the FIR, but some of them, like Rampadarath Yadav, Mahavir Yadav died, prior to the case was taken for trial and thus leaving the appellants on trial. 7. The defence of the appellants was that no occurrence in the manner as alleged by the prosecution, had ever taken place and the deceased was killed by someone else, as he was a person of criminal antecedents and in order to feeding fat the grudge and animosity, which the informant and the others were nursing towards the appellants, they falsely implicated the appellants. 8. In support of the charges, the prosecution examined six witnesses. P.W.1, Mushaharu Yadav, is named in the FIR as an eye witness and appears to be brother of the deceased. P.W. 2, Rasho Yadav has claimed himself to be a witness of occurrence. P.W. 3, Chulho Yadav, was the informant of the case and admittedly the brother of the deceased, Shankar Yadav. P.W. 4, Ganeshi Yadav, is an eye witness to the occurrence. Besides, the above, Ram Sagar Yadav, P.W.5 is another eye witness, cited in the FIR. P.W. 6, Dr. Madan Mohan Prasad held the post mortem examination on the deceased and has issued post mortem examination report, Exhibit-2. 9. The defence did not lead any evidence in support of its defence. Besides, the above, Ram Sagar Yadav, P.W.5 is another eye witness, cited in the FIR. P.W. 6, Dr. Madan Mohan Prasad held the post mortem examination on the deceased and has issued post mortem examination report, Exhibit-2. 9. The defence did not lead any evidence in support of its defence. The learned Trial Judge, after considering the evidence, which was available to him passed the judgment, which is being impugned in the present six appeals. 10. We have heard Shri Akhileshwar Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants of Criminal Appeal Nos. 622, 637, 719 and 739, all of year 2004 and Shri Rama Kant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos. 648 and 739, both of year 2004. The two learned counsel appearing for the appellant have advanced common arguments. In fact, Shri Sharma, the learned Sr. Counsel, appearing in two appeals has adopted most of the arguments advanced by Shri Singh and has added a few of his own. Shri Singh has submitted that the very manner of picking the deceased up and taking him to a place which could be one and half kilometers away from the real place of occurrence does not appear acceptable. It was contended that if all the appellants were bent upon killing the deceased Shankar Yadav, there was no obstruction to them in accomplishing the act on the very place where Shankar Yadav was captured by them. It was contended that the claim of the witnesses on carrying the deceased up to the field of Phulo Devi appears not reasonably acceptable inasmuch as their very conduct appears against ordinary human conduct. It was expected that they could have rushed for help or would have made a hue and cry and would not have allowed the appellants to take away the deceased so that he could be murdered in the field of Phulo Devi. Contention was also made on the merits of the individual witnesses. It was contended that P.W. 2, Rasho Yadav appears a chance witness, as he has stated that he was going to purchase some fertilizers from a particular place and when he was on way, he could see the occurrence. Contention was also made on the merits of the individual witnesses. It was contended that P.W. 2, Rasho Yadav appears a chance witness, as he has stated that he was going to purchase some fertilizers from a particular place and when he was on way, he could see the occurrence. His presence was further challenged by drawing our attention to some part of the cross-examination evidence of the witness in which attention of the witness was drawn to some statements made by him in Court so as to suggest to him that he had not made these statements to the Investigating Officer. Similar was the case while Shri Singh was criticizing the quality of evidence of P.W. 5 Ram Sagar Yadav, the son of the informant. It was contented that it was simply unacceptable that he will be going for purchasing some household articles to Balia and during that course he could see the occurrence. It was contended that the witnesses were admittedly interrelated to each other as may appear from the evidence of P.W. 2 in paragraph 10 and no independent person came forward to support the charges. In support of the above contention on non-examination of independent witnesses, a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 2005 (3) Criminal Law Journal 2579 (State of U.P. V/s. Gambhir Singh and Others) was cited before us. Besides, citing the above decision, yet another decision of Supreme Court has been cited on interestedness of the witness, which has been reported in AIR 1981 SC 942 [: 1982 PLJR (SC)27] (Ram Ashrit and Others V/s. State of Bihar). Shri Singh has further submitted that the Doctor deposed that the death should have been caused within 48 hours of the holding of post mortem examination and that also indicates as if the deceased had been killed at some other place and after recovering the body from that place, the informant and others implicated the appellant falsely to settle his grudge. It was, lastly, contended that there could be two views possible on the evidence of the case and in that case the acquittal of the appellants was highly desirable in the face of the evidence. In support of this contention, Shri Singh has cited before us a judgment reported in AIR 1964 SC 1622 (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda V/s. State of Maharashtra). In support of this contention, Shri Singh has cited before us a judgment reported in AIR 1964 SC 1622 (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda V/s. State of Maharashtra). It was contended that if a witness has been found not acceptable on account of infirmities, which could be found in his evidence, then his evidence could not be utilized in seeking support to the charges by getting support to the evidence of other PWs. To buttress the above submission, Shri Singh has placed reliance upon a judgment reported in AIR 1976 SC 989 (MulUwa and Others V/s.The State of Madhya Pradesh). 11. Shri Sharma, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing in the two appeals, has submitted that the blood stained earth was not sent for chemical analysis to the Forensic Science Laboratory and as such there is no report confirming that any blood which was recovered from the field of Phulo Devi was human blood and as such the site of assault was not established. Besides, the witnesses were of the same family and no one was coming from the outside the family, to support the charges and as such the prosecution was to be thrown overboard. In support of the above contention, Shri Sharma has placed reliance on a judgment reported in AIR 2003 SC 801 (State of U.P. V/s. Arun Kumar Gupta). The other argument of Shri Sharma was that the witnesses were simply moving behind the appellants and were not raising any protest nor were they seeking any assistance by rushing to the nearby Village-Manjapur for garnering support of the villagers of that village and the charge-sheet witnesses like Garib and Sarju, were withheld, as such the whole prosecution case is doubtful, as was held by the Honble Supreme Court in case reported in 2002 SC 3582 (Mohan Singh V/s. Prem Singh and Another). 12. Shri Ashwini Kumar Sinha, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has countered the above submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, firstly, by submitting that the medical evidence is not a perfect evidence as medical science has not achieved such perfection, by which it could accurately tell the age of injury or time of death. It is simply an opinion-evidence, which is mainly given on guess work, taking into account various attending features or circumstances of a given case. It is simply an opinion-evidence, which is mainly given on guess work, taking into account various attending features or circumstances of a given case. In support of the contention, Shri Sinha cited before us a decision reported in 2007(2) SCC (Criminal) 626 [: 2006 (4) PLJR (SC)78] (Ramjee Rai and Others V/s. State of Bihar). It was contended that the witnesses appear corroborating each other on the material parts of the prosecution case and a ring of consistency appears around their evidences. The learned Trial Judge, who had the occasion of observing the witnesses while recording their evidence relied upon them and as such this could be simply not permissible for this Court to reject their evidence. 13. The criticism of P.W. 2, Rasho Yadav is on the ground that he is a chance witness as has been in the case of P.W.5, Ram Sagar Yadav, the son of the informant. We may point out that in our society there is no fixed mode of behaviour and similarly there is no fixed time for us to take up a particular work to be completed or accomplished. We live in a society where we all behave casually at most of the times of a day. We may be roaming around without any purpose on any road or could be found present at any place again without any purpose or remaining present anywhere. We have to consider the claim of a witness that he had seen the occurrence after keeping ourselves informed about the casual behaviour of most of the people who live in our society. Besides, it is not that the two witnesses had given no reason for going to a particular place in connection with their individual needs. The credibility of the witnesses of being present on or around the scene of occurrence would be tested on many parameters. But, the most important of them can be the reason, which could be appearing from his evidence as regards his presence at the place of occurrence. P.W. 2 and P.W. 5 have given reasons, for being somewhere near the place of occurrence so as to seeing the occurrence and they have said that they had reached the place of occurrence where the deceased was captured on account of moving on road for going to a particular place. P.W. 2 stated that he was going to Balia Bazar for purchasing some fertilizers. P.W. 2 stated that he was going to Balia Bazar for purchasing some fertilizers. This appears in paragraph 1 of P.W.2. The witness has been cross-examined on the above fact in paragraph 11 of his evidence which appears at pages 30 and 31 of the paper book. He has stated that it was true that he was going to purchase the fertilizers, but he did not do it and further that he could purchase the fertilizers after four days of the occurrence. He has stated as to what were the fertilizers which were purchased by him. When questioned on the price of fertilizer or about obtaining any receipt, the witness has very categorically stated that he could not exactly remember at what price he purchased the fertilizers. We understand as to why he could not have purchased fertilizer on the day of occurrence.. The deceased had been picked up, he was being taken to a particular place for being murdered. P.W.2 as may appear from his own evidence in paragraph 10, appeared related to the family of the deceased. The whole incident must have upset him. It would have been the only fact in his mind occupying it completely. Being one of the family members of the deceased, he alongwith informant and others would have made all attempts to salvage the dead body as the informant claimed that he salvaged it with others including P.W. 2 so that a report was made in time. In such circumstance, it could be simply unreasonable to expect a person to proceed ahead with his plan of purchasing fertilizers leaving his relative, who can be a person like the deceased in an injured or wounded condition or desert his dead body in a lonely field. 14. The same criticism was made against the evidence of P.W. 5, Ram Sagar Yadav, who was the son of the deceased. He claimed to be present near the scene of occurrence, because he was also proceeding to Balia Bazar and he saw the accused persons, capturing his father near the brick-kiln. The witness had been cross-examined in paragraph 7 of his evidence and during that course he pointed out to the Court that he was going to Balia Bazar to purchase some household articles, which can be required by the family. The witness had been cross-examined in paragraph 7 of his evidence and during that course he pointed out to the Court that he was going to Balia Bazar to purchase some household articles, which can be required by the family. In the same paragraph P.W. 5 has stated that on the same day, his father had proceeded to attend the Court proceeding and was going to make pairvi in a pending case in some Courts. He has further indicated as to what was the case and who were accompanying his father. These factual data, which are available to us from paragraph 7 of P.W. 5, give several reasons to us to believe the presence of the witness near the place of occurrence. We do not find either in the evidence of P.W. 2 or in that of P.W. 5. Even that suggestion was given to either of the witnesses by the defence that their claim that they were going to Balia Bazar for purchasing fertilizer or household articles was a lie. The defence probably was trying to live with the situation and was probably admitting their claim that they had legitimate, sound reasons for remaining present at the seen of occurrence. 15. As regards other witnesses, P.W.1, Mushaharu Yadav alongwith P.W. 4, Ganeshi Yadav are named in the FIR. Their claims also appear to be legitimately acceptable. The only criticism about the presence of three witnesses, which was generally made against all of them, was that it was unthinkable and unacceptable that the witnesses could be moving behind the appellants when the appellants were carrying the deceased to a particular place for committing his murder. It was contended that if the accused persons were so heavily armed then it would have been very easy for the appellants to scare them away or to obstruct them to follow them. We find from the evidence that it was not that the appellants were not scaring them away. P.W. 3 in paragraph 4 has stated that when they were following the appellants, they used to threaten them by even pointing out their guns and weapons towards them, as a result of which they would either retreat or take shelter by the side of the road. P.W. 3 in paragraph 4 has stated that when they were following the appellants, they used to threaten them by even pointing out their guns and weapons towards them, as a result of which they would either retreat or take shelter by the side of the road. This evidence is available in the deposition of almost all the witnesses, as may appear from paragraph 19 of P.W. 1, Mushahari Yadav and paragraph 9 of P.W. 4 Ganeshi Yadav. This appears a natural behaviour of the appellants and a natural reaction of the witnesses also. 16. So far as the contention that the witnesses were not raising any hue and cry nor were rushing to the nearby village i.e., Manjapur for garnering support so as to obstructing the appellants from not succeeding in taking away the deceased and killing him, we have one line of evidence coming from P.W. 1 in paragraphs 17 and 18 of his deposition. It was not that people were not available either on the road or in surrounding area. P.W. 1 has stated in paragraph 7 that while the accused persons were taking away the deceased, people were still passing by the road. But in the same paragraph he has stated that as soon as they found such a dreaded incident being accomplished by the appellants, they started running away out of fright from all around the scene of occurrence. This could probably indicate as to what could be the degree of fright, which was unleashed by the acts of the appellants. The appellants being heavily armed had picked up the Mukhiya of a Gram Panchayat from a highway and were moving with him ultimately to kill him in a field. We while sitting in a Court room may not fathom the intensity of freight or degree thereof, which would have been unleashed at the scene of occurrence by the acts of the appellants. That degree and intensity is exhibited by that particular line of evidence of P.W. 1, when he was stating to the Court that everyone who was moving either on the road or in the surrounding area started running away to take shelter at various places. That degree and intensity is exhibited by that particular line of evidence of P.W. 1, when he was stating to the Court that everyone who was moving either on the road or in the surrounding area started running away to take shelter at various places. If this could be the circumstance, which was created by the dreadful acts of the appellants, it is simply unreasonable to think that anyone from the surrounding village would come and intercept the highhanded acts of the appellants. This appears to us the real reason that none was coming or intervening in the acts of the appellants. 17. The witnesses are consistent as they were found by the trial court. We were taken through the evidence of each and every witness and found that they are consistent on almost all material parts of the prosecution case. It might be that some one had failed in adding one name or omitting the other. We have always to be alive to the situation that the date of occurrence was the 24th of November, 1984 and cnarges were framed on 21st of February, 1994, i.e., 10 years after the occurrence, the first witness was examined on 23rd of September, 1996 and the last witness on 18.1.2001. Thus, we find that a complete 17 years were consumed in concluding the recording of the evidence during trial of the case. Those 17 years would have been very meaningful or relevant when we consider the fact that the witnesses, who were coming forward to the Court were deposing after 15-16 years of occurrence. They were rustic persons and above all no one keeps a written record in our society of incidents. Memory of a person is what is recalled for reproducing the facts of the case. When the human process is there to give evidence in a Court, some omissions or aberrations are bound to occur, when a man is narrating a series of an incident to the Court, one may add or omit some fact. Besides, if witnesses are coming after 15-16 years of the occurrence to depose then they had always to be very conscious about their credibility that the Court may not rely upon their evidence. As such there could be a tendency in them to add up a few facts to their depositions under a psychological pressure that their evidence is accepted by the Court as believable. As such there could be a tendency in them to add up a few facts to their depositions under a psychological pressure that their evidence is accepted by the Court as believable. These are the reasons why we often find some facts stated or some facts omitted in the deposition of different witnesses. The whole criteria of marshalling the facts by reading the evidence is to consider the material parts of prosecution story and then seek corroboration of those parts from the evidence of witness. After being taken through the brief containing the evidence of 5 witnesses, who were produced in trial court, we found them extremely consistent on the most material part of the case. There was no variation in any details so as to hold that the appellants were not the persons who forcibly surrounded the deceased, captured him and finally lifted him to be taken to the field of Phulo Devi, where he was shot and killed. 18. In addition to the above, we find that each and every witness was consistent on the fact that it was the field of Phulo Devi, which was the place of occurrence. While cross-examining the witnesses, it was never suggested to any of them that that field could not be the real place of occurrence and further that the occurrence had taken place at some other place, that place also being suggested to the witnesses. In our considered view, the place of occurrence is fully established and non-examination of the I.O. of the case or not sending the seized blood stained earth for chemical analysis to FSL appear of no consequence. In our opinion the place of occurrence was fully established by the oral evidence of witnesses, who appeared the most trustworthy. In that view of the matter, we find the contention of Shri Sharma, which is based on the Supreme Court decision, reported in AIR 2003 SC 801 , is not applicable to the facts of the case. It could be appropriate to consider the law in support of the contention of interestedness and partisan character of the P.Ws., who were examined in the case. The same argument was advanced by both the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the case. It could be appropriate to consider the law in support of the contention of interestedness and partisan character of the P.Ws., who were examined in the case. The same argument was advanced by both the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the case. Shri Singh has placed reliance on 1981 SC 942, whereas Shri Sharma has placed his reliance upon 2005(3) Criminal Law Journal, 2579 (State of U.P. V/s. Gambhir Singh and Others). We first want to point out that facts of two cases are never similar and a decision in a criminal case is a decision under the special facts and circumstances of that particular case. As regards principle of law, we may not have any quarrel with those principles, but when we apply the principles enunciated by the above decisions, to the facts of the present case, we find that the same could not be applicable. As regards the interestedness or partisan nature of witnesses, we have already noted the circumstances in which the offence was committed. We have also referred to the evidence of P.W. 1, when he was pointing out to the Court that since the accused persons picked up the deceased and started taking him to be killed, people who were moving either on road or were present in surrounding area, started running away, out of fear for taking shelter. This could be one reason for non-production of any independent witness. If this could be the impact of the occurrence on account of which the people were frightened, this would be the reason for disinterest in independent persons in coming to the Court for deposing against such persons, who had indulged in such dreaded acts. Interestedness is there. The enmity is also admitted but for that enmity, P.W. 4 could never had come to depose inasmuch as he is one of the witnesses, who does not appear holding any blood relationship with the appellants. He has admitted that he was accused in some other case with the witnesses, but that may not be sufficient to discard his evidence, unless we have some very compelling reasons as to how he can be adverse to the appellants and as to for what reasons he could be personally inimical to them, so that he can be coming to the witness box for deposing against the appellants. That reason has not been shown to us. 19. That reason has not been shown to us. 19. Though suggestion appears given to P.W. 4 in paragraph 12 that he was deposing in the case out of enmity, if we go back to the prosecution document like, the FIR, it is stated in the documents itself that the informant alongwith the deceased was going to Begusarai for attending the Court proceeding. It has been suggested to many of the witnesses that it was false that the deceased or the informant was going to attend the Court proceeding. The suggestion is not direct rather it is oblique when the witnesses were put a question about the details of the case, which the deceased or the informant were required to attend the proceeding. They have stated that it was a murder case in respect of one Dukhan. Trend of cross-examination of witnesses suggested that the defence wanted the Court to believe that neither the informant nor the deceased were accused in that case, it was for the murder of one Dukhan and it was a false story of the prosecution that they were going to attend a proceeding. We would not act upon supposition of the defence as it did not produce any document, because document in the above behalf would be available to show that the two persons, namely the informant and the deceased were not required to attend the proceedings of a Court in Begusarai. Other persons who were examined in the case except P.W. 4 are all related and we could draw an inference that they could be well acquainted with the affairs of their other family members as to why the deceased or the informant was going to Begusarai. 20. In addition to the above, we find that the non-examination of witnesses, like, Garib and Sarju was not that much consequential as to call upon us to draw an adverse inference. It is on account of the provisipns of Section 134 of the Evidence Act that it was not required for the prosecution to multiply the number of witnesses. What was material was the quality of the evidence and not its quantity. We have already held that the witnesses appeared to us reliable. If two witnesses, Garib and Sarju were not examined, their non-examination appears to us of inconsequential. 21. We have noticed the decision cited before us, which is reported in AIR 2003 SC 801 . What was material was the quality of the evidence and not its quantity. We have already held that the witnesses appeared to us reliable. If two witnesses, Garib and Sarju were not examined, their non-examination appears to us of inconsequential. 21. We have noticed the decision cited before us, which is reported in AIR 2003 SC 801 . This decision was cried by Shri Sharma, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing in two appeals for making submission on the witnesses belonging to same Baradari. In the cited case P.W. 4 was belonging to the Baradari of the informant and other persons of the locality being available had not been produced. The Supreme Court was raising an adverse inference on that account. We have already discussed this aspect of the matter, while answering the arguments on examination of only interested persons as also non-examination of persons, who had been available around the place of occurrence and our discussions probably takes care of that particular argument of Shri Sharma. 22. The last contention of Shri Singh was that the Doctor was opining that the death could have occurred from one hour to 48 hours of his holding the post mortem examination. From perusal of the evidence of P.W. 6, we find that he has stated that death had occurred 48 hours prior to the holding of the post mortem examination. Shri Sinha, the learned Addl. P.P., has cited a decision reported in 2007 (2) SCC (Criminal) 626 [: 2006 (4) PLJR (SC)78], in which the Honbie Supreme Court has pointed out that the medical science has not achieved perfection so as to accurately pointing the time of death or injury. That judgment probably takes care of the contention of Shri Sharma. 23. Another argument on the basis of medical evidence was that the evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 5 indicated as if the deceased had been assaulted with butt of the gun, but the Doctor did not find any injury caused by hard and blunt substances and the three injuries which were recorded were all of gun shots. Except P.W. 5, there was no evidence coming from any of the witnesses on the above fact. 4 and 5 indicated as if the deceased had been assaulted with butt of the gun, but the Doctor did not find any injury caused by hard and blunt substances and the three injuries which were recorded were all of gun shots. Except P.W. 5, there was no evidence coming from any of the witnesses on the above fact. While discussing the quality of the evidence and the tendency in witnesses of adding up or omitting some facts, we have already pointed out that it is done very often on account of some psychological pressure that they must not be disbelievable, that sometimes a witness adds up a fact and on the other occasion omits to state a fact. These are issues, which may not be relevant for rejecting the prosecution case in its entirety. Medical evidence, as has been pointed out by the Honble Supreme Court, in the decision reported in 2007 Vol. 2 SCC (Criminal) 626 [: 2006 (4) PLJR (SC)78] (Ramjee Rai and Others V/s. State of Bihar) is simply an opinion-evidence corroborating in nature. A case could be rejected after considering the medical evidence only when it makes the manner of occurrence highly improbable. It is not the case with the case in hand. The basic prosecution allegation is that the appellants fired shots and killed Shankar Yadav. Three gun shot injuries were found on the body of the deceased which were sufficient to cause the death of Shankar Yadav, the deceased. Non-finding of any injury which could be found in consonance with the evidence of P.W. 5 appears to us inconsequential. 24. In the light of the discussions, which we have had, we find that the appellants were rightly convicted for the offence and the sentence, which was imposed against each of them was also proportionate to the offence proved against them. In the result we find all six appeals without merits and they are dismissed. All the appellants, except Chhotelal Yadav @ Chhotan Yadav, are on bail, their bail bonds are hereby cancelled, directing them to surrender in the Court below to serve out the remaining sentence.