Arun Tandon, J.: - Heard Sri H.B. Mishra, petitioner in person and Sri Subodh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents. Petitioner in both these writ petitions was employed as Flight Lieutenant in Indian Air Force. He was posted as Registrar, Sainik School, Kapurthala, Punjab w.e.f. 8th July, 1985 on deputation in pursuance to his selection for the post in response to the advertisement published by the respondent-authorities. Deputation was for a period of four years. While working as Registrar, allegations and counter-allegations were made between the petitioner and the Principal, Sainik School, Kapurthala, namely, Wing Commander, G.S.K. Yadav. This led to an order of General Court Martial Proceedings being initiated against the petitioner, with reference to the charges as noticed in the Charge-memo dated 14th June, 1988. At that stage the petitioner filed the first writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13581 of 1988 for the following reliefs: "(a) that a writ in the nature of certiorari as also quashing the enquiry proceedings contained in adventures 23 and 24 may be issued. (b) that a writ in the nature of mandamus to drop the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner may be issued. (c) that a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents directing them to restore the position of the Registrar of the Sainik School, Kapurthala to the petitioner extending prior to 14.5.86 and thereby directing them to allow the petitioner to continue as the Registrar for complete tenure of 3 to 4 years may be issued. (d) that a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to harass/ill-treat/victimize the petitioner any more may be issued. (e) that order or direction commanding the respondents to produce the proceedings of all the enquiries investigations for scrutiny of this Hon'ble Court may be issued. (f) a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to move the petitioner out of Hq CAC (Unit) Air Force, Bamrauli, Allahabad to any other Unit except Sainik School, Kapurthala during pendency of this writ petition in this Hon'ble High Court, may be issued. (e) and/or any other writ or direction which this Hon'ble High Court deems fit under the facts and circumstances of the case may also be issued." Petitioner also made an interim stay application seeking stay of the General Court Martial Proceedings. (e) and/or any other writ or direction which this Hon'ble High Court deems fit under the facts and circumstances of the case may also be issued." Petitioner also made an interim stay application seeking stay of the General Court Martial Proceedings. On the date the writ petition came up as fresh matter before the Court, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent-authorities qua territorial jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the writ petition. This Court after noticing the objection permitted exchange of affidavits and directed that it shall be open to the respondents to raise the objection, qua the maintainability of the proceedings initiated before this Court, at the time of hearing. While the first writ petition was pending before this Court, an order was passed by the President of India terminating the services of the petitioner in exercise of powers under Section 18 of the Air Force Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1950", as was communicated to the petitioner under the order of the Government of India dated 26th April, 1989. Against the order dated 26th April, 1989, he filed the second writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8282 of 1989 for the following reliefs: "(a) that a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of Govt of India passed on 26.4.1989, whereby it has been informed that the President of India has been pleased to order the termination of the petitioner's services and it has been conveyed by the respondent No.3 on 26th April, 1989 while ceasing his temporary duties and releasing him from illegal and wrongful solitary confinement enforced under the illegal and wrongful orders of the respondent no.4, may be issued. (b) that and/or any other writ/s, order/s, direction/s which this Hon'ble High Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case may be issued. (c) that filing of certified copies of adventures may be dispensed with. (d) that issue of advance notices on the respondents may also be dispensed with. (b) that and/or any other writ/s, order/s, direction/s which this Hon'ble High Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case may be issued. (c) that filing of certified copies of adventures may be dispensed with. (d) that issue of advance notices on the respondents may also be dispensed with. It is, further, prayed that during pendency of this writ petition, operation of the impugned order Annexure-5 may graciously and kindly be stayed and the respondent No. 4 may be directed to allow the petitioner to discharge the duties of his branch (Education) at Bamrauli with all the attached benefits of his appointment and rank, as he has reported back to the Central Air Command, IAF, Bamrauli, Allahabad on cessation of temporary duties from Air Force Station, Adampur, now without any obstruction and the respondents may further be refrained from further harassment to any more in any manner whatsoever." In both the writ petitions, affidavits have been exchanged, they have been clubbed and heard together. The Court may first deal with the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent-authorities qua maintainability of the writ petitions before this Court on the issue of territorial jurisdiction. According to the respondent-authorities, no cause of action has arisen in the facts of the present case, within the territorial limits of the High Court at Allahabad and therefore, in view of the Full Bench Judgement of this Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra vs. Union of India & others reported in 2005 (5) AWC 4542 (FB), it has been contended that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. It has been stated that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Dinesh Chandra Gahtori vs. Chief of Army Staff, reported in (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1275 has been examined and has been explained by the Full Bench. The Full Bench, inturn, has relied upon the Constitution Bench Judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.S. Rashid vs. Income-Tax Investigation Commission, reported in AIR 1954 SC 207 . There can be no dispute with regard to the legal proposition stated on behalf of the respondents qua the power of judicial review of the High Court being available only in respect of matters, where whole or part of cause of action has arisen within its territorial limits. There can be no dispute with regard to the legal proposition stated on behalf of the respondents qua the power of judicial review of the High Court being available only in respect of matters, where whole or part of cause of action has arisen within its territorial limits. "Cause of action" is a bundle of facts which, taken with the law applicable, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. However, it must include some act done by the defendant, since in the absence of an act, no cause of action can possibly occur. (Vide Radhakrishnamurthy Vs. Chandrasekhara Rao, AIR 1966 AP 334 ; Ram Awalamb Vs. Jata Shankar, AIR 1969 All. 526 (FB); and Salik Ram Adya Prasad Vs. Ram Lakhan & ors., AIR 1973 All. 107 ). In Subodh Kumar Gupta Vs. Shrikant Gupta, (1993) 4 SCC 1 the Apex Court held that in order to maintain the writ petition it is to be shown that a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. In Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta Vs. Bombay Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1995 SC 577 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that for deciding whether cause of action has arisen within the territory of the particular Court, it will have to be determined in each case on its own facts in the context by the subject matter of the litigation, and relief claimed. In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Chand Koer Vs. Partab Singh, 15 Ind. Appeals 156, wherein it had been observed as under:- "The cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set-forth in the plaint as the cause of action; in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asked the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." From the facts as are on record, this Court finds that one of the charges levelled against the petitioner is qua his absence from duty without leave from Bamrauli, Allahabad from 0700 hrs 12th May, 1986 until apprehended by Sq. Leader Virendra Singh (11778) Adm of No. 15 P&S Unit, AF at Kapurthala (Punjab) at 1100 hrs on 14th May, 1986. (Reference Charge-sheet dated 22nd May, 1986 enclosed as Annexure-12 to the writ petition no. 13581 of 1988). Similarly in the charge-sheet dated 23rd April, 1987 enclosed as Annexure-16 to the writ petition no. 13581 of 1988, one of the charges is that at Allahabad he failed to pay his mess bill to the Officers' Mess Head Quarter CAC, IAF Bamrauli. Similarly in the charge-sheet dated 19th May, 1987 enclosed as Annexure-17 to the writ petition no. 13581 of 1988, there is a charge pertaining to his conduct at Allahabad. We further find that between 3rd February, 1989 to 6th February, 1989 petitioner was kept under solitary confinement after being arrested from Allahabad and further for implementation of the order of termination, he was shifted to Bamrauli, Allahabad on 25th April, 1989. From the aforesaid facts, this Court finds that part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court, Allahabad and the writ petition is maintainable before this Court. Even otherwise, it may be recorded that the writ petitions are pending consideration before this Court since 1988/89 i.e. for nearly 21st years. Counter and rejoinder affidavits were called for and have been exchanged. This Court feels that it would be too harsh in these set of facts and circumstances of the case, to accept the preliminary objection of the respondent-authorities qua lack of territorial jurisdiction by this Court. As already noticed above, cause of action means every fact, which is material to be proved, to entitle a plaintiff to succeed. (Reference Daya Shanker Bhardwaj versus Chief of the Air Staff, New Delhi & Others reported in AIR 1988 Alld. 36 and Rakesh Dhar Tripathi versus Union of India & others, reported in AIR 1988 Alld. 47) In the totality of the circumstances, as noticed herein above, this Court holds that both the writ petitions presented before this Court are maintainable. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent-authorities is rejected. Now on the Merits of the writ petitions In the first writ petition no. 13581 of 1988, various facts and pleas have been raised by the petitioner for suggesting that he has been harassed and tortured by the Air Force Authorities. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent-authorities is rejected. Now on the Merits of the writ petitions In the first writ petition no. 13581 of 1988, various facts and pleas have been raised by the petitioner for suggesting that he has been harassed and tortured by the Air Force Authorities. Reference has been made to Suit No. 259 of 1985 filed by the petitioner before the Senior Sub-Judge, Kapurthala. Civil appeal filed before the District Judge, Kapurthala against the order rejecting his interim stay application filed in the suit. Revision No. 1781 of 1986 filed by the petitioner before the Punjab & Hayana High Court, wherein he was granted an interim order. Suit No. 170 of 1986 filed before the Civil Court, Kapurthala qua her daughter being restrained from prosecuting her studies in the school at Kapurthala. Suit filed by the Air Force Authorities for eviction against the petitioner and revision as well as second revision arising out of the said suit proceedings. Reference has also been made to the various documents on record for establishing that the petitioner has been made a scape goat only because of the reports submitted by him against the Principal of the Sainik School, Kapurthala, who was involved in gross irregularities and false claim because of which he in collusion with the higher authorities of Indian Air Force singled out the petitioner for unfair treatment. Petitioner has also made reference to the habeas corpus petition filed by his son, Arun Kumar Mishra, being Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 979 of 1989 before the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, wherein an order was passed directing the respondent-authorities to produce the petitioner before the Court as he was illegally detain by the authority at Kapurthala for being routed back to Bamrauli, Allahabad on 19th March, 1988. Petitioner has vehementally contended that the charge-sheets issued against him had to be dropped as there was no evidence worth its name to bring home charges. While his first writ petition was pending, petitioner has been served with an order intimating the termination of his services by the President of India, in exercise of powers under Section 18 of the Indian Air Force Act. It is stated that because of the aforesaid order, the proceedings of General Court Martial stand dropped. While his first writ petition was pending, petitioner has been served with an order intimating the termination of his services by the President of India, in exercise of powers under Section 18 of the Indian Air Force Act. It is stated that because of the aforesaid order, the proceedings of General Court Martial stand dropped. The order of termination under Section 18 of Air Force Act is only a camouflage to oust the petitioner from service on false charges. So far as the legal and factual contentions raised on behalf of the the petitioner in respect of second writ petition of 1989 are concerned, the Court will deal with them at latter stage. However, it has been admitted by the petitioner before this Court that if the second writ petition filed by him against the order of termination of his services is decided against the petitioner, his first writ petition will not survive, the reliefs as prayed in the same would be rendered infructuous. We, therefore, proceed to examine the second writ petition on merits first first. It has been vehementally contended by the petitioner that respondent-authorities found that it was not possible to bring home the charges levelled against the petitioner in General Court Martial, adopted a short cut method for dispensing with the Court Martial proceedings and therefore, terminated the services of the petitioner under Section 18 of Air Force Act. It is submitted that order of President of India is infact a camouflage to dismiss the petitioner on the charges of misconduct without holding any General Court Martial. Respondents knew that there is no evidence, which could substantiate the charges during Court Martial. The petitioner was victimized for raising voice against the corrupt acts of Wing Commander, GSK Yadav, who was the Principal of Sainik School, Kapurthala at the relevant time. Petitioner, in person, submitted that even in respect of order under Section 18 of Air Force Act, Rules 16 and 17 of the Air Force Rules, 1969 have to be followed and that the principles of natural justice being facets of Article 14 of the Constitution of India have to be read, in the powers conferred under Section 18 of Air Force Act, 1950. Enquiry into the alleged misconduct is a must and no authority howsoever, high he may be, can be permitted to short circuit the procedure prescribed by law and to terminate the employment of a Commissioned Officer like the petitioner on charge of misconduct without holding any enquiry. He explains that an order passed under Section 18 of Air Force Act, 1950 is subject to the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore, unless there are reasons and material to support the decision arrived at, such power of juridical review cannot be exercised/rendered negatory. Petitioner submits that the procedure for dismissal or removal from service on the charge of misconduct is regulated by Rule 16 of Air Force Rules, 1969, including the cases, when it is not possible to hold a Court Martial, reference Rule 16 (4) of Rules, 1969. Similarly, Rule 17 of Rules, 1969 confers a power of removal from service of an officer on ground other than misconduct. He therefore, submits that in any eventualities, explanation from the officer concerned has to be called for and has to be taken into consideration before any order of removal from service can be issued. According to the petitioner, in no case under the Air Force Act and Rules, a Commissioned Officer can be removed without asking for explanation in respect of the charges, which may have lead the authorities, to terminate the employment either on the misconduct or otherwise. Lastly he submitted that in the facts of the present case no order has been passed by the President of India. A proposal to resort to the powers under Section 18 of Act, 1950 was made on 21st March, 1989 only i.e. after the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the habeas corpus petition filed by the son of the petitioner, passed the order dated 19th March, 1989 for production of the petitioner before the Court and had fixed 6th April, 1989 as the date for the purpose. To avoid the harassment during the hearing of the habeas corpus petition, Mrs. To avoid the harassment during the hearing of the habeas corpus petition, Mrs. Meeta Nambiar, Under Secretary to the Government of India, posted at Air Force Head Quarter, New Delhi, after noticing the order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court recommended for appropriate action under Section 18 of Act, 1950 being taken before the date fixed for production of the petitioner before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Allegations of mala fide have also been made. On the facts, it is further alleged that the impugned order of termination is a mala fide order and attempt to overreach the directions of the Writ Court. Petitioner with reference to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India & others versus Ex. Major N.R. Ajwani & others, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 406 , submits that the orders passed under Section 18 of Act, 1950 are also open to judicial review and can be challenged on the ground of mala fide. Relevant portion of said judgement read as follows: "According to us, all that the impugned judgment holds is that an order passed under Section 18 of the Army Act can be challenged on the ground of mala fides. This statement of law is unexceptional. However, it is for the person who challenges it on the ground of mala fides, to make out a prima facie case in that behalf. It is only if he discharges the said burden, that the Government is called upon to show that is not passed in the mala fide exercise of its powers. While doing so, the Government is not precluded from claiming the privilege in respect of the material which may be in its possession and on the basis of which the order is passed. The Government may also choose to show the material only to the court. With regard to the pleadings in respect of the challenge to the order on the ground of mala fides, no particular formula can be laid down. The Government may also choose to show the material only to the court. With regard to the pleadings in respect of the challenge to the order on the ground of mala fides, no particular formula can be laid down. The pleadings will depend upon the facts of each case." Reference is also made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Uma Nath Pandey versus State of U.P., reported in 2009 (237) E.L.T. 241 (S.C.), wherein it has been held that every order passed, which results in evil civil consequence to a party, must be consistent with the rules of principles of natural justice, failing which the same would be unsustainable in the eyes of law. Sri Subodh Kumar, Learned counsel for the Union of India in reply submits that Air Force is a disciplined and an important part of defence forces of our Country. Since the petitioner was not permitting the General Court Martial to proceed and he was continuously misbehaving during such proceedings resulting in offence after offence, the Air Force Authorities had no other option but to bring the facts to the knowledge of the Authority for suitable action under Section 18 of Act, 1950. The petitioner was not permitting the Member-Officers of the General Court Martial to continue the proceedings, the General Court Martial was dissolved and the matter was referred to the Competent Authority for exercising powers under Section 18 of the Air Force Act, 1950. After examination of records, the order under Section 18 of Act, 1950 has been issued. It is clarified that the Competent Authority after taking into consideration all aspect of the matter has exercised its discretion under Section 18 while passing the order dated 25th April, 1989 for terminating the services of the petitioner. Such order has been communicated vide letter dated 26th April, 1989. It is submitted that the order so passed by the President of India under Section 18 of the Act, 1950 does not require any opportunity of hearing to be offered to the petitioner. Issue in that regard stands settled under the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Hajara Singh versus Union of India reported in 1982 LAB. I.C. 208. It is submitted that protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is not available to defence employees. Issue in that regard stands settled under the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Hajara Singh versus Union of India reported in 1982 LAB. I.C. 208. It is submitted that protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is not available to defence employees. Reference: Lekhraj Khurana vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1971 (SC) 2111 , pr.4, Union of India & another versus K.S. Subramanyam reported in AIR 1989 SC 662 Prs. 5,10 & 11. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India & Another versus Tulsi Ram Patel, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 has upheld the doctrine of pleasure not because its prerogative but because public policy requires so. It is clarified that Rules 16 and 17 of the Air Force Rules, 1969 have no application qua exercise of powers by the President of India under Section 18 of Act, 1950. He points out that no mala fides have been pleaded against the President of India nor can be so pleaded. The President of India has exercised his discretion with reference to the powers vested in him under Section 18 of Act, 1950 considering the entire facts and circumstances brought on record before him. The President of India while exercising powers conferred by Article 77 (3) of the Constitution of India has framed the Rules on Allocation of Business of the Government of India, namely, "The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961". Under Item No. 9 of Schedule I of the said rules, the Minister for Defence has been duly authorized to take decision on behalf of President of India. Consequently, decision taken under the signatures of Defence Minister is an order on behalf of President of India referable to Section 18 of Act, 1950. We have considered the submissions made by the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent-authorities and have gone through records of both the writ petitions. We may first deal with the issue of applicability of principles of natural justice in respect of an order passed under Section 18 of Act, 1950. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India & Anr. We may first deal with the issue of applicability of principles of natural justice in respect of an order passed under Section 18 of Act, 1950. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India & Anr. Versus Tulsiram Patel (Supra) has specifically upheld the pleasure doctrine and has held that it is neither a relic of the feudal age nor is based upon any special prerogative of the Crown but upon public policy. In paragraph-59, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has further explained that the Pleasure of the President or the Governor is not required to be exercised by either of them personally, and that is indeed obvious from the language of Article 311. The Constitution Bench has further held that on simple reading of the language of Article 311 (2), which applies to the Civil Servants, principles of natural justice have no application. What is not provided for under said Article 311, cannot be reintroduced by recourse to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution Bench has further held that it is not necessary for the President or Governor to communicate the reason to the Government Servant for dispensing with his services without enquiry and further that reasons for the satisfaction reached by the President or Governor are not required to be recorded in the final order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank nor can they be made public. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Krishna S/O Bulaji Borate versus State of Maharashtra & others, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 441 , Paragraph-11, has held that once the doctrine of pleasure is applied, neither the principles of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving any opportunity before removal would arise. What applies to the Government Servant covered by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India will apply with more rigger to an employee of Defence Services, inasmuch as defence employees are not even entitled to protection of Article 311. Legal position in that regard has been explained by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Lekhraj Khurana (Supra). Legal position in that regard has been explained by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Lekhraj Khurana (Supra). In view of the aforesaid settled legal position it is to be held as follows: (a) The order passed under Section 18 of Act, 1950 need not be passed by the President of India himself and if the order has been passed by the Defence Minister in accordance with "The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, then such an order has to be treated to be an order of President of India, (b) Principles of natural justice are not attracted in a case covered by Section 18 of Act, 1950 and therefore, the plea of violation of principles of natural justice has to be rejected. It may be clarified that Rules 16 of Rules, 1969 deal with the matter pertaining to dismissal or removal of officers for misconduct by the Central Government after holding an enquiry and in cases where it is not expedient or reasonably practicable to hold such an enquiry, then the Chief of the Army Staff/Chief of the Air Staff may direct further retention in services of the officer as undesirable. Similarly, under Rule 17 of Rules, 1969, the Chief of the Air Staff may direct removal of an officer, if he is found unfit to be retained in service due to insufficiency, physical disability or similar grounds other than misconduct. The aforesaid rules do not touch upon the power of the President of India under Section 18 of Act, 1950, which is based on the doctrine of pleasure and therefore, reliance upon the aforesaid rules by the petitioner is totally out of context. This Court may record that the allegations of mala fide are without any substance nor do they need examination by this Court in absence of any person having been impleaded by name in both the writ petitions. It is settled legal proposition that in case allegations of mala fide are made against any person he is to be impleaded by name, otherwise the allegations cannot be considered. (Vide State of Bihar & Anr. Vs. P.P. Sharma, I.A.S. & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 1260; Dr. J.N. Banavalikar Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 326 ; All India State Bank Officers Federation & Ors Vs. (Vide State of Bihar & Anr. Vs. P.P. Sharma, I.A.S. & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 1260; Dr. J.N. Banavalikar Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 326 ; All India State Bank Officers Federation & Ors Vs. Union of India & Ors., JT 1996 (8) SC 550; & I.K. Mishra Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 228 ). In Federation of Rly. Officers Association Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1344 , the Apex Court has held that the allegations of mala fide have to be specifically made and the person against whom such allegations are made has to be impleaded and in absence of same, such allegations cannot be taken into consideration. This Court, although not relevant, did examine the conduct of the petitioner during the Court Martial Proceedings against the members of General Court Martial and others, as reflected from the document brought on record as Annexure-CA-5 filed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8282 of 1989. Relevant portion whereof is quoted herein below: "[At No. 8 Wing, Air Force on 3rd February, 1989, when brought before the GCM as an accused, shouted (referring to the members of the court) "They are all "Goondas"...................." I am being crucified. My son will take revenge of my killing and will kill all of you" or words to that effect and again shouted that "He was facing Tughlak, Ghazni, and Sikandar and that the Court may hang him, but the Court will not survive. He will not leave any body". During the course of his trial by a General Court Martial, petitioner improperly fell flat on the floor in the open Court, pointing accusing fingers towards the Court and also improperly shouted "AOC-in-C Bawa is a dacoit............... "Bawa will make this Punjab into Pakistan". He also shouted "Inqulab Zindabad", Inqulab Zindabad, Main Itihaash Badal Doonga" (i.e. I will change the history). When he had been asked by the Prosecutor to come into the Court Martial Hall) for the continuation of his trial, improperly refused to do so and improperly exerted pressure on station authorities by refusing to take food from 2nd February, 1989 to 13th March, 1989.] It is on all these materials that a decision has been taken to exercise the power under Section 18 of the Act, 1950 by the President of India. In the totality of the circumstances, as they stand on record, we find that none of the grounds raised by the petitioner have any substance. Exercise of powers under Section 18 of Act, 1950, cannot be said to be illegal in any manner, so as to warrant any interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The first Writ Petition No. 13581 of 1989 has to be dismissed, in view of the dismissal of second writ petition i.e. 8282 of 1989, whereby the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service stands affirmed by us. None of the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition no. 13581 of 1989 can be granted. Accordingly, both the writ petition no. 13581 of 1989 and writ petition no. 8282 of 1989 are dismissed.