JUDGMENT T. Nanda Kumar Singh, J. 1. These two writ petitions, seeking the similar prayers on identical facts and law, are jointly heard for disposal by a common judgment and order. 2. The prayers sought for in the present writ petitions are for directions to the Respondents to place funds under the Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government Aided Schools) Rules, 2005 for payment of arrear of salaries and other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan, Agartala, West Tripura w.e.f. 01.04.2007 and to continue to place funds for payment of salaries and other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the School, resume operation of Mid-Day-Meal scheme in the School and also for issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari by quashing the Notification of the Government of Tripura being No. F. 15(2-41)-SE/GIA/08 dated 17.12.2008, issued by the Under Secretary, Government of Tripura, Education (School) Department for withdrawing the Grant-in-aid status given to the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan, Agartala, West Tripura with retrospective effect, i.e., from 01.04.2007. 3. Heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in both the writ petitions as well as Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel and Mr. N.C. Pal, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State-Respondents in both the writ petitions. 4. Since the bone of contentions between the parties are to the Constitutional requirement of the State Government to carry out the mandates under the Constitution of India to espouse the fundamental rights of the citizens of India to education under Part-III of the Constitution and their right under the Directive Principles of State Policy as under Part-IV of the Constitution and also the duties and obligations of the State under the Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government Aided Schools) Rules, 2005" (for short "Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005), it is necessary to reproduce the relevant Articles of the Constitution of India and also the relevant Rules of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 for easy reference: Constitution of India: 21.A. Right to education. The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine. 41. The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine. 41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases.-- The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want. 45. Provision for early childhood care and education to children be low the age of six years. The State shall endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six years. 46. Promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections. The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. 51A. Fundamental duties.-- It shall be the duty of every citizen of India.... * * * (k) who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child or, as the case may be ward between the age of six and fourteen years. 351. Directive for development of the Hindi language.-- It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for; ill the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India specified in the Eights Schedule, and by drawing wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages. The Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government Aided Schools) Rules, 2005. * * * 3. Terms and conditions for haying gram-in-aid status. The Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government Aided Schools) Rules, 2005. * * * 3. Terms and conditions for haying gram-in-aid status. In order to earn the status of Government grant-in-aid, f blowing terms and conditions will be taken into consideration: (a) A school shall have to be registered by the Director of School Education as per the existing guidelines applicable from time to time; (b) There should be minimum number of students ennobled in various classes which should be as per the following scale: SI. Category of Schools Classes Minimum No. number of pupils (i) Primary School Class-1-V 200 (ii) Junior High/Senior Class-VI 250 Basic School VII (iii) High School Class-VI 400 (iv) Class-XII School Class-VI 600 (H.S.) XII (c) There should be required teachers including trained teachers as per the guidelines applicable from time to time; (d) There should be Managing Committee duly approved by the Tripura Board of Secondary Education; (e) There is a transparent system of proper maintenance of accounts, audit; (f) There is adequate administrative apparatus, satisfactory discipline & acceptable standard of academic efficiency as per guidelines applicable from time to time; (g) Managing Committee of the concerned School shall have to provide a resolution to the effect that it shall abide by the existing instruction and Rules and regulations of the Education (School) Department; (h) The concerned school should have the following amenities or shall provide for: (i) Sufficient accommodation (at least 10 sq. ft.) floor area per pupil along with provision for cycle/car stand; (ii) Suitable site for future construction of school building as per need; (iii) The land belongs to the school; (iv) Adequate playing fields and ground for physical culture; (v) Satisfactory drinking water supply and sanitation facilities; (vi) Well-equipped library; (vii) Amenities for out school activities; (viii) Compulsory singing of National Anthem before the class work starts; (ix) No religious compulsion is to be resorted to in the school; (x) No criminal cases are pending against the school; (xi) The High and Higher Secondary schools must be an affiliate to Tripura Board of Secondary Education or the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi or ICSE Board. 4. 4. Eligibility for payment of grant-in-aid:-(a) A school already granted the status of grant-in-aid shall fulfill the following in order to become eligible for getting payment of grant-in-aid: (i) Has faithfully complied all the official instructions, provision of rules in the matter of staff, academic affairs, accounts, financial requirement etc.; (ii) Has submitted audit report from a qualified Chartered Accountant and also utilization certificate about expenditure of grant money to the Director of School Education; (iii) Has paid legitimate dues of the staff and others as per norms; (iv) Has maintained all records according to the instructions and also deposited GPF contribution of staff duty in the Post Office, in time; (v) Has not collected any extra fees, charges from the students than what has been permitted by the Director of School Education; (vi) Has not earned any bad name or entangled with unnecessary litigation; (vii) Managing Committee of the school has not done anything contrary to Government decision or against the Government; (b) A school shall apply to Director of School Education for grant after fulfilling above criteria. After examination of the annual budget duly approved by the Managing Committee and all other criterias listed at (a) above if it is so found that the concerned school is eligible to get grants, the concerned school will have to take following steps in order to get grants: (i) The Head of the Institution shall prepare a bill as per the existing procedure of the State Government and signed it strictly accordingly to the required fund as sanctioned by the Director of School Education. The said bills shall be countersigned by an authorized officer of the Education (School) Department as notified from time to time by the Education (School) Department for facilitating drawl of grant-in-aid from the Treasuries; (ii) The Head of the Institution shall be responsible for proper accounting, drawl of money including its timely payment; (iii) All monetary transactions are to be entered into the cash book along-with maintenance of other registers as may be instructed from time to time by the Director of School Education; (iv) A Bank Account has to be opened with prior approval of the Director of School Education wherein all such sums shall be credited. The said account shall be operated under the joint signature of the Secretary of the Managing Committee and the Head of the Institution. The said account shall be operated under the joint signature of the Secretary of the Managing Committee and the Head of the Institution. In case there is no Managing Committee, it shall be maintained by the Administrator and the Head of the Institution; (v) The Head of the Institution shall send a monthly expenditure statement to the Director of School Education; (vi) For settling all claims under TA, LTC, Medical reimbursement bills, prior sanction of the Director of School Education will be required; (vii) The countersigning authority shall have to be satisfied with every bill submitted for countersignature that it has got necessary sanction/allotment of fund from the Director of School Education. It shall be the duty of the countersigning authority also to verity periodically as to whether the drawn money has been duly accounted or not; 7. Facilities to be...provided to the Government Aided Schools: (a) Once a school is given status of grant-in-aid, following facilities may be provided: (i) 100% pay and allowances to the approved teaching and non-teaching staff including payment of the difference in rates of interest if GPF; (ii) The scale of pay and other admissible allowances, all retrial benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, LTC, HTC, House Building Advance and TA/DA shall be same as applicable in Government Schools subject to the condition that all instructions rules and regulations determining the recruitment of teaching and non-teaching staff are being adhered to strictly; (iii) Leave shall be guided as per the State Government Leave Rules applicable in Government Schools; (iv) Contingency and non-recurring grant in furniture, maintenance etc. at the scales to be decided by a State Level grant-in-aid Committee constituted by the Education (School) Department and also subject to availability of budgetary support; (v) All schools shall have to maintain 1:40 teachers students ratio. at the scales to be decided by a State Level grant-in-aid Committee constituted by the Education (School) Department and also subject to availability of budgetary support; (v) All schools shall have to maintain 1:40 teachers students ratio. Relaxation may be considered by the Education (School) Department with the prior approval of the Finance Department only in special cases; (vi) Following norms will be maintained for having non-teaching staff Category of Norms Schools Senior Basic Group-D -- 1 (One) School High School LDC … one for completed 300 student Group-D – 2 (two) Higher UDC -- 1 (One) Secondary LDC 2 (two) School 3 (three) (excluding Laboratory) (vii) U.S. Schools with science subjects shall have one post of Laboratory attendant for each laboratory subject High/Higher Secondary Schools having roll strength of 500 students or more and having a school library with strength including text books is not less than 3000, may have one post of Librarian. If any shortfall is there as per this norm, the concerned school may send proposal to the Director of School Education for necessary action and only on approval of the Department with the concurrence of the Finance Department, a school will be allowed to go for meeting the gaps. Similarly, even the re is extra manpower compared to the said norm, they will be allowed to continue till heir retirement/death or leaving the job whether is earlier and in the event of it, the said Dost will automatically be abolished till it reaches to the said norms. Schools having attached Boarding Houses will be entitled to engage Cook-cum-Masalchi/Helper in the scale as applicable in Government School; with the prior approval of the Director of School Education; (viii) Un rained teachers shall be provided professional training in phases; (b) Director of School Education shall reserve the right to provide part facilities for which no claim of the school shall be entertained. 10. 10. Withdrawal of Grant: If in the opinion of the Director of School Education, it is so found that any school is not fulfilling any terms and conditions of the grant or violating valid instructions of the Director of School Education or the State Government or taking contrary action which is violative of the various instructions and rules, the Director of School Education with the approval of the Education (School), Department either withdraw the grant in-aid status or status or payment of grant by issuing a speaking order after allowing a reasonable opportunity. Director of School Education may also proceed to suspend temporarily payment of grant subject to the inquiry on a grave complaint. In case of temporary suspension, the Director of School Education may arrange to draw in part or in full, the grant-in-aid of the school through a Departmental Officer for making payment. The amount so drawn and paid shall be deemed to have been given to the school concerned as grant-in-aid for that period. Separate accounts in respect of such grants and expenditure shall be maintained by the officer concerned. (Emphasis supplied) 5. Factual Backgrounds: In the year 1981. one Educational Institution, namely. Hindi Primary School was established by the local Hindi speaking people of Goalabasti, Agartala at Goalabasti within West Agartala R.S. and it was recognized as primary school by the Respondent No. 2 vide his Order/Notification No. F. 11(7-71)-DSE/94. dated 10.10.1994 for Classes-I to V with the condition that no Grant-in-aid shall be given to the school. Subsequently, the Hindi Primary School was upgraded to Class-VIII and it was recognized as Hindi Senior Basic School vide Memorandum No. F. 13 (1031 )-SE/G1 -I/05, Agartala, the 6th August, 2005 and later on upgraded and recognized as New Hindi Secondary School vide Memo No. F. 13 (1-31) SE/G1-1/05 dated 14.08.2006 with the conditions that (i) No grant-in-aid be allowed to the School, (ii) all the un-trained teachers shall have to be trained within a period of two years, (iii) adequate precautionary measure for fire extinguish/emergency exit have to be arranged, and (iv) directions of the State Government from time to time shall have to be complied with. 6. 6. It is stated that the Government of Tripura, even to the level of Hon'ble Chief Minister of Tripura, had considered if the New Hindi Secondary School had fulfilled the terms and conditions for having Grant-in-aid status under Rule 3 of the Grant-in-aid Rules. 2005; and after the conditions had been fulfilled, the Governor of Tripura had been pleased to undertake the New Hindi Secondary School. Khejurbagan. Agartala under the Grant-in-aid Scheme under the Education (School) Department w.e.f. 01.04.2007 along with all the existing 23 numbers of teaching staffs and 7 numbers of non-teaching staff of the School as shown in the Annexure with the eight conditions vide Notification No. F. 15 (2-41)-SE/GIA/2006, dated 16.04.2007, the relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder: No. F 15(2-41)-SE/GIA/2006 Government of Tripura Education (School) Department Dated, Agartala the 16.4.2007 Notification Governor of Tripura has been pleased to undertake the New Hindi Secondary (Hindi and English Medium) School, Khejur Bagan, Agartala under the State Grant-in-Aid Scheme under Education (School) Department with effect from 1st April, 2007. All the existing 23 (twenty three) Nos. teaching staff and 7 (seven) Nos. Non-teaching staff of the school as shown in Annexure-1 on fixed pay at the rates as shown against each which come under purview of aforesaid Grant-in-Aid Scheme w.e.f. first day of April, 2007 with the following conditions: (1) The school should constitute an elected School Managing Committee with a permanent nominee of Education (School) Department, i.e., District Education Officer, West District Zonal Office, Agartala. Tripura (West). (2) "The Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Govt. Aided Schools) Rules, 2005" as notified in Tripura Gazette extraordinary issue No. 147 dated 6th June, 2005 vide Notification No. F.10 (1-53) -DSE/90 dated 31.05.2005 shall be applicable to the School in its Management. (3) Provident Fund and Retirement Benefits of the employees of the Govt. Aided Private Schools Rules, 1991 as Notified vide Memo No. F 10(9)-DSK/90 dated 07.04.1992 published in Tripura Gazette, extra ordinary issue dated 31.01.1994 shall be applicable. (4) The service of teaching and non-teaching staff as per Annexure-1 are approved w.e.f. 01.04.2007. (5) The teaching and non-teaching staff as mentioned in Annexure-I will not get any benefit of their past services rendered prior to 01.04.2007. (6) The teaching and non-teaching staff contained in Annexure-I will be paid fixed pay at the rate shown against each with effect from Ist April, 2007. (5) The teaching and non-teaching staff as mentioned in Annexure-I will not get any benefit of their past services rendered prior to 01.04.2007. (6) The teaching and non-teaching staff contained in Annexure-I will be paid fixed pay at the rate shown against each with effect from Ist April, 2007. (7) The present Madhyamik level should continue for next 5 (five) years and before this period it should not be considered for further up gradation. (8) Keeping future expansion, in view, a separate plot of land for the School including standard play ground should be identified by the School Managing Committee. By order of Governor Sd/- (Kumar Jamatia) Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura. 7. The State Respondents were under legal obligation to pay the salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the School w.e.f. 01.04.2007 and also to grant other benefits as per the condition No. 2 to 6 of the said Notification dated 16.04.2007 for taking the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan under the said Grant-in-aid Scheme. The Headmaster of the School by his letter dated 08.06.2007 submitted budget estimate of the salaries of the teaching and nor Heaching staff for the primary section for the year 2007-08 to the Director of School Education (Grant-in-Aid Section), Government of Tripura, Agartala, Tripura West. The Headmaster again under his letters dated 12.07.2007 and 21.07.2007 informed the Director of School Education, Government of Tripura, Agartala, Tripura West about the non-payment of salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school. The Respondent No. 2, Director of School Education (Grant-in-Aid Section), Government of 'Tripura, Agartala, Tripura West by issuing Memo dated 04.08.2007 intimated that a separate plot of land for the school including; standard play ground should be identified by the School Management Committee and also instructed to furnish a clear land status of the school and that dispute regarding land ownership need to be settled and according to revised Grant-in-aid Rules, 2005, teacher student ratio is 40:1 and that there at e 23 teachers although as per norms there should be 14 teachers. The School Management Committee vide letter dated 20.08.2007 furnished all the particulars about the land asked for and informed that there were: 585 students in the Roll of the School and, therefore, according to prescribed ratio, there should be 23 teachers for the 885 students and the last election of the Managing Committee was held on 02.04.2006 and in that meeting the District Education Officer was present and he was nominated as honorary member of the Managing Committee. The School had been established on the present plot of land under Khatian No. 2725, Dag No. 9059 and 9393, Mouza - Barjala and has been possessing the present land since the establishment of the School, i.e. in 1981 and this fact was clearly known to the Erector of School Education, Government of Tripura, who had recognized the School as senior basis school in 2005 and upgraded the School as Secondary School in the year 2006 and the total area under possession of the School was 2 kanis of land but due to encroachment of road and other neighbour, the area reduced to 18 gandas. Of the 18 gandas of land, the School building was constructed on 5 gandas of land and remaining lands are utilized as playground and the children get enough scope to play in the said playground and also that the entire matter was narrated to the Hon'ble Chief Minister and finally he had given advised to bring the said School under Grant-in-aid Scheme. 8. The Headmaster of the New Hindi Secondary School vide Office Memo No. F. 1/NHSS/07, dated 03.06.2008 notified the constitution of the Managing Committee of New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan, Agartala after receiving the Government nominee vide Order No. 15 (2-41)-SE/GIA/2005 (L-1) dated 31.05.2008 and conclusion of the Election to the membership from amongst the teaching, non-teaching and other categories of the Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan, Agartala for three years term, i.e. from 03.06.2008 to 03.06.2011. The Secretary of the Tripura Board of Secondary Education vide his letter dated 04.07.2008 informed the Headmaster of the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan that the President, Tripura Board of Secondary Education had accorded approval of the Constitution of the Managing Committee of New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan, Agartala for a period of three years, i.e. w.e.f. 03.06.2008 to 03.06.2011. 9. 9. The Director of School Education, Government of Tripura under his letter being No. F.8 (10-SE/Plan/2007, dated 05.09.2007) requested the Inspector of Schools. Sadar 'A' Abhoynagar, Kunjaban, Agartala, Tripura West to take necessary steps so that the NP-NSPL: (Mid-Day-Meal) Scheme may be implemented in the Primary Section of New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan with immediate effect and it reads as follows: No. F. 8(10)-SE/Plan/2007 Government of Tripura Directorate of School Education Planning Section (MDM Cell) Dated, Agartala, the 05.09.2007 To The Inspector of Schools, Sadar 'A' - Abhoynagar, Khejur Bagan, Agartala, Tripura (W). Subject: Introduction of Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in the New Hindi Secondary School Khejur Bagan Gowala Basti. Agartala Tripura (W). Sir, In inviting reference to the subject cited above, I am to inform you that the Principal, New Hindi Secondary School, Khejur Bagan Gowala Basti has requested vide his letter No. F. NHSS/MDM/01/07 dated 17.08.07 (copy enclosed) for implementation of the National Programme of Nutritional Support to Primary Education (Mid-Day-Meal) Scheme in the School (Primary Section i.e. classes I-V) the School is running under the Grant-in-aid Scheme since 1st April, 07. As per guideline of Mid-Day-Meal Scheme Govt. Aided Schools are eligible for the Scheme. So, you are requested to take necessary steps so that the NP-NSPE (Mid-Day-Meal) Scheme may be implemented in the Primary Section of the School with immediate effect. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Director of School Education Tripura Enclo:- As stated. 10. The Joint Director of Education, Directorate of School Education, Tripura under his letter being No. F. 8 (6-160)-SE/Plan/2008, dated 11.09.2008 requested the Principal, New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan, Agartala, West Tripura to furnish the details views regarding the proposed part of land selected for relocation and upgradation of the school by the SDM, Sadar, under letter No. F. 25(10)-DM/W/REV/2003/2295-96 dated 13.08.2008 immediately and it reads as follows: No. F. 8 (6-160)-SE/Plan/2008 Government of Tripura Directorate of School Education (Planning Section) Dated, Agartala, the 11.09.2008 To The Principal, New Hindi Secondary School Khejur Bagan, Agartala, West Tripura. Subject:- Identification of land for setting up of Hindi School. Sir, In inviting reference to the subject mentioned above, I am directed to request you to furnish the detailed views regarding the proposed part of land selected for relocation and up-gradation of the school by the SDM, Sadar under letter No. F. 25 (10)-DM/W/REV/2003/2295-96 dated 13.08.08 (copy enclosed) immediately. This is for kind information and necessary action. Sir, In inviting reference to the subject mentioned above, I am directed to request you to furnish the detailed views regarding the proposed part of land selected for relocation and up-gradation of the school by the SDM, Sadar under letter No. F. 25 (10)-DM/W/REV/2003/2295-96 dated 13.08.08 (copy enclosed) immediately. This is for kind information and necessary action. Enclo:- As stated. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (D.K. Debbarma) Joint Director of Education Directorate of School Education Tripura. 11. The Principal of New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan under his letter dated 15.09.2008 informed the Director, Directorate of School Education (Grant-in-Aid), Government of Tripura, Agartala, Tripura West that the he along with the members of the Managing Committee had visited the proposed land measuring 2.00 acres RS Plot No. 8822/pin Mouza-Barjala of Khatian No. 1/163 as Government Khas land, classified as tilla and plain table land and the said land is extremely suitable for setting up and up-gradation of New Hindi Secondary School and also that the School Managing Committee had already obtained the lawful Government documents front the competent authority and accordingly, there will be no hindrance to act by the Directorate of School Education for future aspect. The said letter dated 15.09.2008 real as follows: Office of the Principal New Hindi Secondary School Khejur Biigan, Agartala, Tripura West No. GRANT/01/NHSS/07 Dated, Agartala, the 15.09.2008 To The Director, Directorate of School Education (Grant-in Aid) Government of Tripura, Agartala, Tripura West. Sub:- Identification of land for setting up of Hindi School. Ref: Your kind letter No. F. 8 (6-160)-SE/Plan/2008, dated 11.09.08. Sir, In reference to the subject stated above I have the honour to inform your kind self that myself along with members of Managing Committee of New Hindi Secondary School have visited the pre posed land measuring 2.00 acres R.S. Plot No. 8822/p in Mouza - Barjala of Khatian No. 1/163 as Government Khas land, classified as till a and plain table land, the said land is extremely suitable for setting up and upgradation of New Hindi Secondary School. We have already obtained the lawful Government documents from the competent authority. So, there will be no hindrance to act by the Directorate of School Education for future aspect. The requisite papers on land related matters have beer obtained from SDM Sadar. So, it is your kindness to examine the documents to act accordingly. With high regards. We have already obtained the lawful Government documents from the competent authority. So, there will be no hindrance to act by the Directorate of School Education for future aspect. The requisite papers on land related matters have beer obtained from SDM Sadar. So, it is your kindness to examine the documents to act accordingly. With high regards. Yours faithfully, Sd/-Principal New Hindi Secondary School Khejur Bagan, Agartala, Tripura West 12. It is the further case of the writ Petitioners that a substantial number of schools similarly situated with the New Hindi Secondary School within Agartala Municipality are having either no land under its ownership or less quantity of land than that possessed by the New Hindi Secondary School but yet those schools are regularly receiving all facilities under the Grant-in-aid Rules, 2005. Sakhicharan Vidvaniketan HS (+2 stage) School, Netaii Subhas Road. Agartala. has no land of its own and it is occupying less quantity of land than that of New Hindi Secondary School. Another Government aided High School, namely, Ramkrishna Ashram Vidvamandir, Gangail Road, Agartala is occupying only a small piece of land which is less than half of the area occupied by New Hindi Secondary School. That apart, Hariganga Girls' High School at Banamalipur, Agartala run by the Government of Tripura is also in occupation of land less than that of the New Hindi Secondary School. 13. Without giving any show cause notice or without giving any opportunity of being heard and also without informing the Petitioner, the Governor of Tripura in clear infraction of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 has been pleased to withdraw the grant-in-aid status given to the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan w.e.f. 01.04.2007 alleging that the Management Committee of the School had failed to comply with the standard conditions stipulated in the Notification and in the Rules and consequently, the Notification issued vide No. F. 15(2-41)-SE/GLV 08, dated 17.12.2008 stands cancelled. Hence, the present two writ petitions for the reliefs mentioned above. Hence, the present two writ petitions for the reliefs mentioned above. The impugned Notification dated 17.12.2008 reads as follows: No. F. 15 (2-41)-SE/GIA/08 Government of Tripura Directorate of School Education (Grant-in-Aid Section) Dated, the 17.12.2008 NOTIFICATION The Governor of Tripura has been pleased to withdraw, henceforth, the Grant-in-Aid status given to the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan, Agartala, West Tripura w.e.f. 1st April, 2007 as the private management of the said school has failed to comply with the standard conditions stipulated in the notification and in the Grant-in-Aid Rules. Consequently, the Notification issued vide No. 15 (2-4D-SE/GIA/2006 dated 16.04.2007 stands cancelled. This for information of all concerned. By order of the Governor, Sd/- (Kumar Jamatia) Under Secretary Government of Tripura, Education (School) Department, 14. The State Respondents filed the affidavit-in-opposition, wherein the case of the Respondents are that the School Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan failed to fulfil the conditions mentioned in the Notification dated 16.04.2007 for taking New Hindi Secondary School under the State Grant-in-Aid Scheme under Education (School) Department w.e.f. 01.04.2007 and also failed to comply the standard conditions stipulated in the Grant-in-Aid Rules, that the State Government in furtherance of its aim and objective for the cause of spread of education had taken the decision for setting up/establishing a school of its own in the area and as such instead of going for any grant-in-aid school, the State Government has decided to set up a school of its own and also that the State authority had never taken any responsibility for providing standard quantity of land vide condition No. 8 in the said Notification dated 16.04.2007 and the writ Petitioner had misconstrued and misunderstood the said letter of the Joint Director of Education, Directorate of School Education, Tripura dated 11.09.2008 to the Principal, New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan, which has been quoted above in its entirety and also the proposed land under the letter of the SDM, Sadar dated 13.08.2008 was for establishment of new Government Schools, and also that it is not correct to allege that the impugned Notification dated 17.12.2008 is a non-speaking order and does not specify the reasons for issuing of the said Notification dated 17.12.2008. 15. Article 21A of the Part-III of the Constitution of India provides that every citizen has the fundamental right to education. 15. Article 21A of the Part-III of the Constitution of India provides that every citizen has the fundamental right to education. Articles 41,45 and 46 of the Directive Principles of State Policy, Part-IV of the Constitution of India, provide that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six years and also the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. Further, it is the mandate of the Constitution under Article 351 that it shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India. 16. It is now well settled that the fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in Part-IV of the Constitution of India and also that the fundamental rights must be construed in the light of the Directive Principles. The right to education further means that a citizen has a right to call upon the State Government to provide educational facilities to him within the limits of its economic capacity and development. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Unni Krishnan, J.P. and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2178 , i.e., (1993) 1 SCC 645 held (paras 140 o 149 of the AIR) as follows: 140. In Stat: of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy AIR 19711 SC 215 Krishna Iyer, J. stated: Our thesis s that the dialectics of social justice should not be missed if the synthesis of Part III and Part IV is to influence State action and Court prone luncements. In U.P. State Electricity v. Hari Shankar Jain, AIR 1979 SC 65 it was observed: Addressed to Courts, what the injunction (Article 37) means is that while Courts are not free to direct the making of legislation, Courts are bound to evolve, affirm and adopt principle of interpretation which will further and not hinder the goals set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy. This command of the Constitution must be ever present in the minds of the judges while interpreting statutes which concern themselves directly or indirectly with matters set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy. This is on the view that the 'State' in Article 36 read with Article 12 includes the judiciary as well. In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 Chandrachud, C.J. quoted with approval the simile of Granville Austin that Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot and observed that to give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. The learned Chief Justice observed further: Those rights (fundamental rights) are not an end in themselves but are the means to an end. The end is specified in Part IV. 141. It is thus well established by the decisions of this Court that the provisions of Parts III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and that fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in Part IV. It is also held that the fundamental rights must be construed in the light of the directive principles. It is from the above standpoint that Question No. 1 has to be approached. Article 21 and Right to Education: 142. In Band hua Mukti Morcha, AIR 1984 SC 802 , this Court held that the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 does take in "educational facilities". (The relevant portion has been quoted hereinbefore.) Having regard to the fundamental significance of education to the life of an individual and the nation, and adopting the reasoning and logic adopted in the earlier decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore, we hold, agreeing with the statement in Bandhua Mukti Morcha that right to education is implicit in and flows from the right to life guaranteed be Article 21. That the right to education has been treated as one of transcendental importance in the life of an individual has been recognised not only in this country since thousands of years but all over the world. In Mohini Jain (1992 AIR SCW 2100) the importance of education has been duly and rightly stressed. The relevant observations have already been set out in Para 7 hereinbefore. In Mohini Jain (1992 AIR SCW 2100) the importance of education has been duly and rightly stressed. The relevant observations have already been set out in Para 7 hereinbefore. In particular, we agree with the observation that without education being provided to the citizens of this country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail. We do not think that the importance of education could have been better emphasised than in the above words. The importance of education was emphasised in the 'Neethishatakam' by Bhartruhari (First Century B.C.) in the following words: Translation: Education is the special manifestation of man: Education is the treasure which can be preserved without the fear of loss; Education secures material pleasure, happiness and. fame; Education is the: teacher of the teacher; Education is God incarnate; Education secures honour at the hands of {he State, not money. A man without education is equal to animal The fact that right to education occurs in as many as three articles in Part IV viz.... Articles 41, 45 and 46 shows the importance attached to it by the Founding Fathers. Even some of the articles in Part III viz, Articles 29 and 30 speak of education. 143. In Brown v. Board of Education (1953) 98 EAW Ed. 873 Earl Warren, CJ., speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court emphasised the right to education in the following words: Today, education is perhaps the most important function of State and local Governments.... It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)32 LAW Ed. 2d 15 the Court recognised that: Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State. The said fact has also been affirmed by eminent educationists of modern India like Dr. Radhakrishnan, J.P. Naik, Dr. Kothari and Ors. 144. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)32 LAW Ed. 2d 15 the Court recognised that: Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State. The said fact has also been affirmed by eminent educationists of modern India like Dr. Radhakrishnan, J.P. Naik, Dr. Kothari and Ors. 144. It is argued by some of the counsel for the Petitioners that Article 21 is negative in character and that it merely declares that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Since the State is not depriving the Respondents students of their right to education, Article 21 is not attracted, it is submitted. If and when the State makes a law taking away the right to education, would Article 21 be attracted, according to them. This argument, in our opinion, is really born of confusion; at any rate, it is designed to confuse the issue. The first question is whether the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 docs take in the right to education or not. It is then that the second question arises whether the State is taking away that right. The mere fact that the State is not taking away the right as at present does not mean that right to education is not included within the right to life. The content of the right is not determined by perception of threat. The content of right to life is not to be determined on the basis of existence or absence of threat of deprivation. The effect of holding that right to education is implicit in the right to life is that the State cannot deprive the citizen of his right to education except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 145. In the above state of law, it would not be correct to contend that Mohini Jain AIR 1992 SCW 2100 was wrong insofar as it declared that "the right to education flows directly from right to life". But the question is what is the content of this right? Mow much and what level of education is necessary to make the life meaningful? Does it mean that every citizen of this country can call upon the State to provide him education of his choice? But the question is what is the content of this right? Mow much and what level of education is necessary to make the life meaningful? Does it mean that every citizen of this country can call upon the State to provide him education of his choice? In other words, whether the citizens of this country can demand that the Stale provide adequate number of medical colleges, engineering colleges and other educational institutions to satisfy all their educational needs? Mohini Jain seems to say, yes. With respect, we cannot agree with such a broad proposition. The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 must be construed in the light of the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. So far as the right to education is concerned, there are several articles in Part IV which expressly speak of it. Article 41 says that the "State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want". Article 45 says that "the State shall endeavour to provide, within a period often years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years". Article 46 commands that "the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation". Education means knowledge and "knowledge itself is power". As rightly observed by John Adams, "the preservation of means of knowledge among the lowest ranks is of more importance to the public than all the property of all the rich men in the country". (Dissertation on Canon and Feudal Law, 1765) It is this concern which seems to underline Article 46. It is the tyrants and bad rulers who are afraid of spread of education and knowledge among the deprived classes. Witness Hitler railing against universal education. (Dissertation on Canon and Feudal Law, 1765) It is this concern which seems to underline Article 46. It is the tyrants and bad rulers who are afraid of spread of education and knowledge among the deprived classes. Witness Hitler railing against universal education. He said: "Universal education is the most corroding and disintegrating poison that liberalism has ever invented for its own destruction." (Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction: Hitler Speaks.) A true democracy is one where education is universal, where people understand what is good for them and the nation and know how to govern themselves. The three Articles 45, 46 and 41 are designed to achieve the said goal among others. It is in the light of these Articles that the content and parameters of the right to education have to be determined. Right to education, understood in the context of Articles 45 and 41, means: (a) every child/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years and (b) after a child' citizen completes 14 years, his right to education is circumscribed by the limits of the economic capacity of the State and its development. We may deal with both these limbs separately. Right to free education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years (Article 45). It is noteworthy that among the several articles in Part IV only Article 45 speaks of a time-limit; no other article does. Has it no significance? Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44 years of the Constitution? Can the State flout the said direction even after 44 years on the ground that the article merely calls upon it to "endeavour to provide" the same and on the further ground that the said article is not enforceable by virtue of the declaration in Article 37. Does not the passage of 44 years--more than four time; the period stipulated in Article 45 convert he obligation created by the article into an en forceable right? In this context, we feel constrained to say that allocation of available fund to different sectors of education in India discloses an inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution. The Constitution contemplated a crash programme being undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in Article 15. In this context, we feel constrained to say that allocation of available fund to different sectors of education in India discloses an inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution. The Constitution contemplated a crash programme being undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in Article 15. It is relevant to notice that Article 45 does not speak of the "limits of its economic caps city and development" as does Article 41, which inter alia speaks of right to education. What has actually happened is more money is spent and more attention is directed to higher education than to and at the cost of primary education. (By primary education, we mean the education, which a normal child receives by the time he completes 14 years of age.) Neglected more so are the rural sectors, and the weaker sections of the society referred to in Article 46. We clarify, we are not seeking to lay down the priorities for the Government we are only emphasising the constitutional policy as disclosed by Articles 45 46 and 41. Surely the wisdom of these constitutional provisions is beyond question. This inversion of priorities has been commented upon adversely by both the educationists and economists. Gunnar Myrdal, the noted economist and sociologist, a recognised authority on South Asia, in his book 'Asian Drama' (Abridged Edition published in 1972) makes these perceptive observations at page 335: But there is another and more valid criticism to make. Although the declared purpose was to give priority to the increase of elementary schooling in order to raise the rate of literacy in the population, what has actually happened is that secondary schooling has been rising much faster and tertiary schooling has increased still more rapidly. There is a fairly general tendency for planned targets of increased primary schooling not to be reached, whereas targets are over-reached, sometimes substantially, as regards increases in secondary and, particularly, tertiary schooling. This has all happened in spite of the fact that secondary schooling seems to be three to five times more expensive than primary schooling, and schooling at the tertiary level five to seven times more expensive than at the secondary level. What we see functioning here is the distortion of development from planned targets under the influence of the pressure from parents and pupils in the upper strata who everywhere are politically powerful. What we see functioning here is the distortion of development from planned targets under the influence of the pressure from parents and pupils in the upper strata who everywhere are politically powerful. Even more remarkable is the fact that this tendency to distortion from the point of view of the planning objectives is more accentuated in the poorest countries, Pakistan. India. Burma and Indonesia, which started out with far fewer children in primary schools and which should therefore have the strongest reasons to carry out the programme of giving primary schooling the highest priority. It is generally the poorest countries that are spending least, even relatively, on primary education, and that are permitting the largest distortions from the planned targets in favour of secondary and tertiary education. In his other book Challenge of World Poverty (published in 1970, Chaptcr-6'Education') he discusses elaborately the reasons for and the consequences of neglect of basic education in this country. He quotes J.P. Naik, (the renowned educationist, whose Report of the Education Commission, 1966 is still considered to be the most authoritative study of the education scene in India) as saying "Educational development...is benefiting the 'haves' more than the 'have nots'. This is a negation of social justice and 'planning' proper" - and our Constitution speaks repeatedly of social justice [Preamble and Article 38(1)]. As late as 1985, the Ministry of Education had this to say in Para 3.74 of its publication Challenge of Education A Policy Perspective. It is stated there: 3.74 Considering the constitutional imperative regarding the universalisation of elementary education it was to be expected that the share of this sector would be protected from attribution (sic). Pacts, however, point in the opposite direction, from a share of 56 per cent in the First Plan, it declined to 35 per cent in the Second Plan, to 34 percent in the Third Plan, to 30 per cent in the Fourth Plan. It started going up again only in the Fifth Plan, when it was at the level of 32 percent, increasing in Sixth Plan to 36 per cent, still 20 per cent below the First Plan level. On the other hand, between the First and the Sixth Five Year Plans, the share of university education went up from 9 per cent to 16 per cent. On the other hand, between the First and the Sixth Five Year Plans, the share of university education went up from 9 per cent to 16 per cent. Be that as it may, we must say that at least now the State should honour the command of Article 45. It must be made a reality at least now. Indeed, the National Education Policy 1986 says that the promise of Article 45 will be redeemed before the end of this century. Be that as it may. we hold that a child (citizen) has a fundamental right to free education up to the age of 14 years. 146. This does not however mean that this obligation can be performed only through the State Schools. It can also be done by permitting, recognising and aiding voluntary nongovernmental organisations, who are prepared to impart free education to children. This docs not also mean that unaided private schools cannot continue. They can indeed, they too have a role to play. They meet the demand of that segment of population who may not wish to have their children educated in State-run schools. They have necessarily to charge fees from the students. In this judgment, however, we do not wish to say anything about such schools or for that matter other private educational institutions except 'professional colleges'. This discussion is really necessitated on account of the principles enunciated in Mohini Jain AIR 1992 SCW 2100 and the challenge mounted against those principles in these writ petitions. 147. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to the additional affidavit filed by the Union of India. In this affidavit, the present state of primary and upper primary education is set out. (Primary stage means Classes I to V. Upper primary stage means Classes VI to VIII.) After setting out the particulars of number of schools and enrolment therein, it is stated in Para 3 that "this increase provided Indian Education System with one of the largest systems in the world, providing accessibility within I km. walking distance of primary schools to 8.26 lakh habitations containing about 94% of the country's population. Growth in enrolment in the decade of 80s showed an acceleration that has now brought enrolment rates close of 100% at primary stage". Again in Para 4, under the subheading "Free education", the following statement occurs: 4. walking distance of primary schools to 8.26 lakh habitations containing about 94% of the country's population. Growth in enrolment in the decade of 80s showed an acceleration that has now brought enrolment rates close of 100% at primary stage". Again in Para 4, under the subheading "Free education", the following statement occurs: 4. In the endeavour to increase enrolment and achieve the target of UEE, all State Governments have abolished tuition fees in Government schools run by local bodies and (sic education in) private aided institutions is mostly free in these States; however, in private unaided schools which constitute 3.7% of the total elementary schools in the country, some fee is charged. Thus, overall, it may be said that education up to elementary level is practically all schools is free. Other costs of education such as textbooks, uniforms, schools-bags, transport etc are not borne by Slates except in a very few cases by way of incentives to children of indigent families or hose belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe categories. The reason why the Stale Governments are unable to bear this additional expenditure is that 96% of expenditure on elementary education goes in meeting the salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff. Para 5 of the affidavit deals with "Compulsory education". It reads as follows: 5.14 States and 4 Union Territories have enacted legislation to make education compulsory but the socio-economic compulsions that keep the children away from schools have restrained them from in prescribing the rules and regulations whereby those provisions can be endorsed. The affidavit also mentions the steps taken by Central and State Governments in pursuance of National Education Policy including "Operation Blackboard" and its contribution to the increase in primary education, it was indeed gratifying to note these facts, though much more remains to be done to raise the quality of instruction. Before proceeding further, we think it right to say this: We are aware that "education is the second highest sector of budgeted expenditure after the defence. A little more than three per cent of the Gross National Product is spent in education", as pointed out in Para 2.31 of Challenge of Education. But this very publication says that "in comparison to many countries. A little more than three per cent of the Gross National Product is spent in education", as pointed out in Para 2.31 of Challenge of Education. But this very publication says that "in comparison to many countries. India spends much less on education in terms of the proportion if Gross National Product" and further "in spite of the fact that educational expenditure continues to be the highest item of expenditure next only to defence the resource gap for educational needs is one of the major problem;. Most of the current expenditure is only in this form of salary payment. It hardly needs to be stated that additional capital expenditure would greatly augment teacher productivity because in the absence of expenditure on other heads even the utilisation of staff remains low. "We do realise that ultimately it is a question of resources and resources-wise this country is not n a happy position. All we are saying is that while allocating the available resources, due regard should be had to the wise words of the founding fathers in Articles 45 and 46. Not that we are not aware of the importance and significance of higher education. What may perhaps be required is a proper balancing of the various sectors of education. Right to education after the child/citizen completes the age of 14 years. 148. The right to education further means that a citizen has a right to call upon the State to provide educational facilities to him within the limits of its economic capacity and development. By saying so, we are not transferring Article 41 from Part IV to Part III we are merely relying upon Article 41 to illustrate the content of the right to education flowing from Article 21. We cannot believe that any State would say that it need not provide education to its people even within the limits of its economic capacity and development. It goes without saying that the limits of economic capacity are, ordinarily speaking, matters within the subjective satisfaction of the State. 149. In the light of the above enunciation, the apprehension expressed by the counsel for the Petitioners that by reading the right to education into Article 21, this Court would be enabling each and every citizen of this country to approach the Courts to compel the Stale to provide him such education as he chooses must be held to be unfounded. In the light of the above enunciation, the apprehension expressed by the counsel for the Petitioners that by reading the right to education into Article 21, this Court would be enabling each and every citizen of this country to approach the Courts to compel the Stale to provide him such education as he chooses must be held to be unfounded. The right to free education is available only to children until they complete the age of 14 years, hereafter, the obligation of the State to provide education is subject to the limits of its economic capacity and development. Indeed, we are not stating anything new. This aspect has already been emphasised by this Court in Irancis C. Mullin v. Administrator. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 SCR 516 : AIR 1981 SC 746 . While elaborating the scope of the right guaranteed under Article 21, this Court stated: But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it viz...the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human self. 17. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ Petitioners strenuously contended that the Government of Tripura is extending all the formalities under the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 to the Schools mentioned above which are even occupying the land less than or half of the land occupied by the New Hindi Secondary School and one of the Schools has no land of its own. He further contended that the present land, where the school building of the New Hindi Secondary School had been constructed, has been in possession of the school since 1981. He further contended that the present land, where the school building of the New Hindi Secondary School had been constructed, has been in possession of the school since 1981. i.e. about 29 years, without any disturbance from any quarter and this fact is known to the Slate Respondents inasmuch as the authorities of the School Education Department. Government of Tripura had been recognizing the Schools from stage to stage since 1994 and also that after terms and conditions for having Grant-in-Aid under Rule 3 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 had been fulfilled by the New Hindi Secondary School, the Governor of Tripura vide said Notification/Order dated 16.4.2007 had taken the New Hindi Secondary School under Grant-in-Aid Scheme. Mr. Bhowmik learned senior counsel for the Petitioners by placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Slate of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi and Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 730 , contended that the paucity of funds can be no reason for such discrimination in taking the Schools under the State Grant-in-aid Scheme: hence, interference in the nature of affirmative action or direction in the form of remedial measure is called for. The Apex Court in Manubhai Pragaji Vashi case (supra) observed that "a plea was taken in the High Court that the Petitioner has no right to seek a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution basing his relief on a directive principle contained in the Constitution. The High Court, rightly in our opinion, repelled this plea relying on the decision of this Court in State of A.P. v. Umed Ram Sharma, (1986) 2 SCC 68 : AIR 1986 SC 841. The High Court referred to the dictum laid down in the aforesaid decision to the effect (a) the Court can in a lit case direct the executive to carry out the directive principles of the Constitution, and (b) when there is inaction or slow action by the executive the judiciary must intervene. We have no doubt that the above conclusion of the Court below is also justified".... In Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 , (which again is a Constitution Bench decision). We have no doubt that the above conclusion of the Court below is also justified".... In Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 , (which again is a Constitution Bench decision). B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. stated the law thus : (SCC p. 730, Para 165) It is thus well established by the decisions of this Court that the provisions of Parts III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and. that fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in a part IV. It is also held that the fundamental rights must be construed in the light, of the directive principles. (Emphasis supplied). At P. 732, the learned Judge has further declared thus: (SCC Para 171) The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by. Article 21 must be construed in the light of the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied). Article 21 of the Constitution dealing with personal liberty has many dimensions as held by the series of decisions of this Court. A few of them have been catalogued in the judgment of Mohan J. in Unni Krishnan case (1993) 1 SCC 64 It is now fairly settled that the right to legal aid and speedy trial ate part of the guarantee of human rights envisaged by Article 21 of the Constitution of India see M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC 544 1978 SCC (Cri) 468 ; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar., (1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40 and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93. In the light of the above, we have to consider the combined effect of Article 21 and Article 39-A of the Constitution of India. The right to free legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The preamble to the Constitution of India assures "justice, social, economic and political". Article 39-Aof the Constitution provides "equal justice" and "free legal aid". The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice. It means justice according to law. In a democratic polity, governed by rule of law it should be the main concern of the State, to have a proper legal system. Article 39-Aof the Constitution provides "equal justice" and "free legal aid". The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice. It means justice according to law. In a democratic polity, governed by rule of law it should be the main concern of the State, to have a proper legal system. Article 39-A mandates that the State shall provide free legal aid by suitable legislation )r schemes or in any other way to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The principles contained in Article39-A are fundamental and cast a duty on the State to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on the basis of equal opportunities and further mandates to provide free legal aid in any way by legislation or otherwise, so that justice is not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, the crucial words are (the obligation of the State) to provide free legal aid "by suitable legislation or by schemes" or "in any other way", so that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The above words occurring in Article 39-A are of very wide import. In order to enable the State to afford free legal aid and guarantee speedy trial, a vast number of persons trained in law are essential. Legal aid is required in many forms and at various stages, for obtaining guidance, for resolving disputes in Courts, Tribunals or other authorities. It has manifold facets. 18. The Apex Court (11 Judges) in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors., (2002) 8 SCC 481 , held that the decision in Unni Krishnan case, AIR 1993 SC 2178 , i.e., (1993) 1 SCC 645 insofar it framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the fixing of the fee, was not correct. The Apex Court further reiterated that the State Government would also be under obligation to protect the interest of the teaching and non-teaching staff and it is also the responsibility of the State to ensure that teachers working under Institution are governed by the proper service conditions. Paras 45,72 and 73 of the SCC in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (supra) read as follows: 45. Paras 45,72 and 73 of the SCC in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (supra) read as follows: 45. In view of the discussion hereinabove, we hold that the decision in Unni Krishnan case, (1993) 1 SCC 645 insofar as it framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the fixing of the fee, was not correct, and to that extent, the said decision and the consequent directions given to UGC, AICTE, the Medical Council of India, the Central and State Governments etc. are overruled. 72. Once aid is granted to a private professional educational institution, the Government or the Stale agency, as a condition of the grant of aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution. The State, which gives aid to an educational institution, can impose such conditions as are necessary for the proper maintenance of the high standards of education as the financial burden is shared by the State. The State would also be under an obligation to protect the interest of the teaching and non-teaching staff. In many States, there are various statutory provisions to regulate the functioning of such educational institutions where the States give, as a grant or aid, a substantial proportion of the revenue expenditure including salary, pay and allowances of teaching and non-teaching staff. It would be its responsibility to ensure that the teachers working in those institutions are governed by proper service conditions.The State, in the case of such aided institutions, has ample power to regulate the method of selection and appointment of teachers after prescribing requisite qualifications for the same. Ever since In Re, Kerala Education Bill, 1957 AIR 1958 SC 956 : 1959 SCR 995 this Court has upheld, in the case of aided institutions, those regulations that served the interests of students and teachers. Checks on the administration may be necessary in order to ensure that the administration is efficient and sound and will serve the academic needs of the institutions. In other words, rules and regulations that promote good administration and prevent maladministration can be formulated so as to promote the efficiency of teachers, discipline and fairness in administration and to preserve harmony among affiliated institutions. At the same time it has to be ensured that even an aided institution does not become a government-owned and controlled institution. In other words, rules and regulations that promote good administration and prevent maladministration can be formulated so as to promote the efficiency of teachers, discipline and fairness in administration and to preserve harmony among affiliated institutions. At the same time it has to be ensured that even an aided institution does not become a government-owned and controlled institution. Normally, the aid that is granted is relatable to the pay and allowances of the teaching staff. In addition, the management of the private aided institutions has to incur revenue and capital expenses. Such aided institutions cannot obtain that extent of autonomy in relation to management and administration as would be available to a private unaided institution, but at the same time, it cannot also be treated as an educational institution departmentally run by Government or as a wholly owned and controlled Government in situation and interfere with constitution of the governing bodies or thrusting the staff without reference to management. Other aided institutions. 73. There are a large number of educational institutions, like schools and non-professional colleges, which cannot operate without the support of aid front the state. Although these institutions may have been establish by philanthropists or other public-spirited persons it become necessary in order to provide Education to the students to seek aid from the State in such cases as those of the professional aided institutions referred to here-in above, the Government would be entitled to make regulations relating to the terms and conditions of employment of the teaching and non-teaching staff whenever the aid for the posts is given by the State as well as admission procedures.Such rules and regulations can also provide for the reasons and the manner in which a teacher or any other member of the staff can be removed. In other words, the autonomy of a private aided institution would be less than that of an unaided institution. (Emphasis supplied) 19. The Apex Court in Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India and Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 398 held (Paras 24, 32 and 33 of SCC) that "education occupies an important place in our Constitution and culture. There has been emphasis on free and compulsory education for children in this country for a long time. There is a very strong historical perspective. The Hunter Commission in 1882-1883, almost 125 years ago, recommended universal education in India. It proposed to make education compulsory for the children. There has been emphasis on free and compulsory education for children in this country for a long time. There is a very strong historical perspective. The Hunter Commission in 1882-1883, almost 125 years ago, recommended universal education in India. It proposed to make education compulsory for the children. Education remains essential to the life of the individual, as much as health and dignity, and the State must provide it comprehensively and completely, in order to satisfy its highest duty to citizens. Unlike other fundamental rights, the right to education places a burden not only on the Stale, but also on the parent or guardian of every child, and on the child herself. Article 21-A, which reads as follows, places one obligation primarily on the State: 21-A. Right to education. The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the are of six to fourteen years in such manner as he State may, by law, determine. By contrast, Article 51-A(k), which reads as follows, places burden squarely on the parents: 51-A. Fundamental duties.-- It shall be the duty of every citizen of India- * * * (k) Who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child or, as the case may be, ward between the age of six and fourteen years. The Constitution directs both burdens to achieve one end: the compulsory education of children, free from the fetters of cost, parental obstruction, or State inaction. The two Articles also balance the relative burdens on parents and the State. Parents sacrifice for the education of their children, by sending them to school for hours of the day, but only with a commensurate sacrifice of the State's resources. The right to education, then, is more than a human or fundamental right. It is a reciprocal agreement between the State and the family, and it places an affirmative burden on all participants in our civil society. 20. Mr. The right to education, then, is more than a human or fundamental right. It is a reciprocal agreement between the State and the family, and it places an affirmative burden on all participants in our civil society. 20. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appear in a, for the Petitioners urged that the impugned order dated 17.12.2008 was issued in clear violation of the Principles of natural justice a id also in infraction of Rule 10, i.e., withdrawal for grant, of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 20(6) which provides that the Director of School Education with the approval of the Education (School) Department either withdraw the grant-in-aid status or stop payment of grantee issuing a speaking order after allowing a reasonable opportunity and also the procedure followed, and also that the impugned order dated 17.12.2007 is arbitrary. In support c if this contention he relied upon several decisions of the Apex Court, some of which are being taken up for discussion. 21. This Court is of the firm view that rules/laws are to be obeyed. Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian (as then he was) observed in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (Constitution Bench) that: law is made not to be broken but to be obeyed and the respect for law is not retained by demonstration of strength but by better appreciation of the reasons, better understanding of its reality and implicit obedience. It goes without saying that the achievements of law in the past are considerable, its protection in the present is imperative and its potential for the future is immense. It is very unfortunate that on account of lack of respect, lack of understanding, lack of effectiveness, lack of vision and lack of proper application in the present day affairs, law sometimes falls in crisis. 22. The executive instruction issued by the Government is also binding to the Government inasmuch as the purpose of issuing instruction is for complying the instruction and not for disobeying it. Ref. British Machinery Supplies Co. v. Union of India and Ors., (1996) 9 SCC 663 , wherein the Apex Court held that while determining the classification as for tariff, the authority concerned cannot overlook the circular or instruction in that regard issued by the Government, which is, atleast, binding on the department. Ref. British Machinery Supplies Co. v. Union of India and Ors., (1996) 9 SCC 663 , wherein the Apex Court held that while determining the classification as for tariff, the authority concerned cannot overlook the circular or instruction in that regard issued by the Government, which is, atleast, binding on the department. In the given case, the Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005, which provides for reasonable opportunity of being heard before withdrawing the grant-in-aid status or stop payment of grant by issuing a speaking order is to be followed by the State Respondents in issuing the order for withdrawing the grant-in-aid status or stop payment of grant and also that such order should be speaking order. 23. One golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Apex Court in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 24 held that: While it is true that over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Strait-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance with the doctrine, the law Courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the person concerned and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most-accepted methodology of a governmental action. 24. The Apex Court in Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 held that the principles of natural justice will have to be read into Regulation. 24. The Apex Court in Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 held that the principles of natural justice will have to be read into Regulation. The Punjab National Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 does not require an opportunity of being heard being given to the delinquent officers when the disciplinary authority discharged with the findings of the enquiry authority once the enquiring authority had given a hearing to them. The Apex Court further held that even the regulation does not require to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent, the opportunity should be given in compliance with the principles of natural justice to the delinquent officer when the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the enquiring officer. Paras 7 and 19 of the SCC read as follows: 7. The only contention urged by Shri V.R. Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, was that the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 (for short "the Regulations") did not require an opportunity of being heard being given to the delinquent officers when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiring authority once the enquiring authority had given a hearing to them. It was further submitted by the learned Counsel that the requirement of giving such a hearing could not be read into the said Regulations and no prejudice could be said to have been caused to the Respondents inasmuch as the enquiring authority had given full opportunity to them. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. 25. The Apex Court (8 Judges) in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597 , in a clear term held that if the statute makes itself clear on the point of Audi Alteram Partem rules then no more question arises. The ratio of the Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi case (supra) is that if the statute itself provides for Audi Alteram Partem rules before taking the drastic action, no drastic action could be taken without observing the principles of Audi Alteram Partem. The relevant portion of Para 57 of the AIR in Maneka Gandhi case (supra) reads as follows: 57. The question immediately arises does the procedure prescribed by the Passports Act. 1967 for impounding a passport meet the test of this requirement' is it 'right or fair or just'? The argument of the Petitioner was that it is not. because it provides for impounding of a passport without affording reasonable opportunity to the holder of the passport to be heard in defence. To impound the passport of a person, said the Petitioner, is a serious matter, since it prevents him fro n exercising his constitutional right to go a board and such a drastic consequence cannot in fairness be visited without observing the principle of audi alteram partem. Any procedure which permits impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and hence, there is in the present case clear infringement of the requirement of Article 21. Any procedure which permits impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and hence, there is in the present case clear infringement of the requirement of Article 21. Now, it is true that there is no express provision in the Passports Act, 1957 which requires that the audi alteram partem rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the question, if the stature makes itself clear on this point, then no more question arises.But even when t lie stature is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J., in Cooper v. Wands worth Board of Works(1863) 14 CBNS 180: "A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentley's case(1723) 1 Str 557 and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in the stature requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature." The principle of audi alteram par tern which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the rules of natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in which the rules of natural justice are manifested namely, Nemo Judes in Sua Causa and audi ilteram partem. We are not concerned here with the former since there is no case of bias urged here. The question is only in regard to the right of hearing which involves the audi alteram partem rule. Can it be imported in the procedure for impounding a passport? (Emphasis supplied) 26. The Apex Court (3 Judges) in West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission v. CESC Ltd, (2002) 8 SCC 715 in a very clear term held that: under Regulation 32 the manner of hearing before the Commission is also provided for. These Rules and Regulations framed by the State Government and the Commission will have to be placed before the State Legislature under Section 59 of the 1998 Act. Thus, these Rules and Regulations have the necessary statutory force. These Rules and Regulations framed by the State Government and the Commission will have to be placed before the State Legislature under Section 59 of the 1998 Act. Thus, these Rules and Regulations have the necessary statutory force. A combined reading of these provisions of the Act, Rules and Regulations, clearly shows that the statute has unequivocally provided a right of hearing/representation to the consumers, though the manner of exercise of such right is to be regulated by the Commission. This right of the consumers is neither indiscriminate nor unregulated as erroneously held by the High Court. It is true that in Calcutta the Respondent Company supplies energy to nearly 17 lakh consumers, but the statute does not give individual rights to every one of these consumers. The same is controlled by the Regulations. Therefore, the question of indiscriminate hearing as held by the High Court will not arise. That apart, when a statute confers a right which is in conformity with the principles of natural justice, in our opinion, the same cannot be negative by Court on an imaginary ground that there is a like likehood of an unmanageable hearing before the forum concerned. 27. To the contra, Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the State Respondents contended that observance of the principles of natural justice is an empty formality inasmuch as there is only one conclusion possible that the New Hindi Secondary School had not fulfilled the conditions mentioned in the said Notification/Order dated 06.04.2007 and also the terms and conditions for having Grant-in-aid under Rule 3 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005. This Court could not persuade itself to accept the submission of Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the State-Respondents that the principles of natural justice is an empty formality in the present case for the simple reason that the principles of natural justice is itself embodied in the relevant rules and also whether the New Hindi Secondary School has or has not fulfilled the conditions mentioned in the said Notification dated 16.04.2007; or is highly disputed. This Court also, in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in (i) Maneka Gandhi case (supra); (ii) West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission case (supra); (iii) Punjab National Bank case (supra), is of the considered view that when the rules itself confer a right to the New Hindi Secondary School, which is in conformity with the principles of natural justice, the same cannot be negatived by the State Respondents on an imaginary or/vague ground and also that if the rules make itself clear on this point, then no more question arises. 28. As discussed above, this Court is of the view that the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 is made not to be broken but to be obeyed. Even the instruction, by implication having the force of rules, is also binding upon the Government. According to accepted principles of interpretation of rules/statutes, rules has to be read as a whole and every part of it should be operative and no words should be treated as surplus. Ref. Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam and Ors., AIR 1978 SC 17 (3 Judges), wherein the Apex Court held that it is a cardinal rule of construction that no words should be considered redundant or surplus in interpreting the provisions of a rule or law. 29. The Apex Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 111 held that: We are not oblivious of the law that when a public functionary is required to do a certain thing within a specified time, the same is ordinarily directory but it is equally well settled that when consequence for inaction on the part of the statutory authorities within such specified time is expressly provided, it must be held to be imperative. 30. Mr. 30. Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents in order to impress the Court that the principles of natural justice in the given case is an empty formalities inasmuch as only one conclusion is possible in the admitted fact that the New Hindi Secondary School had not fulfilled the conditions mentioned in the said Notification dated 16.04.2007 and also terms and conditions for having Grant-in-aid under Rule 3 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India and Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 54 , wherein the Apex Court held that "there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the Audi Alteram Partem is one of the basic pillar of natural justice which means no one should be condemned unheard. However, whenever possible the principles of natural justice should be followed. These principles cannot be put in any straitjacket formula. The said principles may not be applied in a given case unless a prejudice is shown. It is not necessary where it would be a futile exercise. A Court of law does not insist on compliance with useless formality." In that case, admittedly, the Appellant was not qualified on the cut of date and being ineligible the direction to consider the Appellant would be a futile exercise. The fact of that case is diametrically different from the case in hand. 31. Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel relies on the decisions of the Apex Court in A jit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ). Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Haldia and Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 764 and also Aligarh Muslim University and Ors. v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 , wherein the Apex Court held that the '"useless formality" or "empty formality" theory is an exception and also the application of principles of natural justice is an empty formality or useless formality in the given case where the admitted or undisputed fact leading to only one conclusion. Para 15 of the SCC in Aligarh Muslim University case (supra) reads as follows: 25. The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is in exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. Para 15 of the SCC in Aligarh Muslim University case (supra) reads as follows: 25. The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is in exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent view s expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta, (1999) 6 SCC 237 referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilber force. Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J, and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case." But in the given case it is not so inasmuch as there is no admitted and indisputable fact leading to only one: conclusion that the New Hindi Secondary School has not fulfilled the conditions mentioned in the said Notification dated 16.04.2007. This Court is constrained to observe that what is given by one hand cannot be taken by another hand. Ref. Bhavnagar University a se (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that it is not and cannot be the intention of the legislature that what is given by one hand should be taken away by the other. 32. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned Notification dated 17.12.2008 is hereby quashed. The State Respondents are directed to give reasonable opportunity in compliance of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 to the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan through the Principal or School Managing Committee or/authorized representative by allowing them to file the documents and their pleadings, if necessary by hearing them in person before passing any orders for withdrawal/cancellation of the said Notification dated 16.04.2007 and the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan at present shall be under Grant-in-aid scheme. However, it is left to the wisdom of the State Respondents to decide the quantum of the arrear of pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the School and also the date of implementation of the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in the Primary Section of the School within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this Judgment and Order. It is also made clear that the State Respondents shall keep in view of the observations and findings of this Court in the present judgment and order in passing order regarding the matters relating to the Grant-in-aid to the New Hindi Secondary School and that the State Respondents shall make the funds available for payment of the salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school at the rate fixed for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Government aided Schools in the State of Tripura. 33. The writ petitions are partly allowed to the extent indicated above. The parties are to bear their own costs.