JUDGEMENT S.K.Katriar, J. 1. Defendant No. 1 of Eviction Suit No. 2 of 2006 (Smt. Radha Devi V/s. Shravan Thakur and Others) has preferred this application under the provisions of Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and challenges the judgment dated 18.3.2008, whereby the suit preferred by opposite party no. 1 herein on the ground of her personal necessity has been decreed. 2. According to the plaint, opposite party no. 1 instituted the present Eviction Suit No. 2 of 2006 for eviction of the defendants (the petitioner and opposite party nos. 2 and 3 herein), on the ground of her personal necessity. It is stated in the plaint that the plaintiff is the owner of a property mentioned in detail towards the foot of the plaint. The same originally belonged to Rajeshwari Devi (defendant no. 3), widow of late Kali Thakur. She alienated the same in favour of one Shankar Prasad by a registered deed of absolute sale of 4.1.1989. Shankar Prasad inducted the defendants as a tenant. After the tenancy had so commenced, Shankar Prasad transferred the right, title and interest of the entire property in favour of the plaintiff (opposite parly no. 1 herein) by means of a registered deed of absolute sale dated 7.6.2005. The plaintiff requested the defendants to vacate the premises because of her personal necessity. On refusal to do so, she instituted the present eviction suit. 3. The defendants filed a joint written statement, wherein they stated that Rajeshwari Devi, own grandmother of the petitioner herein (defendant no.1), had never alienated the property to anybody. Therefore, there is no question of sale deeds dated 4.1.1989 and 7.6.2005 which, if in existence, were sham transactions. Their further case is that Rajeshwari Devi had really alienated the property in question in favour of the petitioner herein (defendant no. 1), her grandson, by a registered deed of absolute sale dated 26.7.2005. In view of the alleged sale deed dated 26.7.2005, Pujan Thakur (the husband of the plaintiff) felt that a cloud was cast on the said registered sale deed dated 7.6.2005, he instituted Title Suit No. 91 of 2005 for declaration of his right, title and interest which is still pending. They also denied the relationship of land-lord and tenant. 4. In view of the alleged sale deed dated 26.7.2005, Pujan Thakur (the husband of the plaintiff) felt that a cloud was cast on the said registered sale deed dated 7.6.2005, he instituted Title Suit No. 91 of 2005 for declaration of his right, title and interest which is still pending. They also denied the relationship of land-lord and tenant. 4. The learned trial court framed the following issues for consideration: (I) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable? (II) Whether the plaintiff valued cause of action? (III) Whether the plaintiff has paid sufficient court-fees? (IV) Whether the suit barred by law of limitation, acquiescence, waiver and estoppels? (V) Is there relationship of landlord and tenant amongst the plaintiff and defendants and defendant is defaulter and whether any arrear of rent is dues? (VI) Whether the plaintiff bona fide requirement of the suit premises and plaintiff entitled to the relief of eviction? (VII) Whether the decree for partial eviction satisfy the personal necessity of the plaintiff? (VIII) Is the suit bad for non-joinder of parties or mis-joinder of parties? (IX) To what relief or reliefs, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to? 5. The parties led oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. On a consideration of the materials on record, the learned trial court recorded the following findings of facts: (i) The parties are agnates and at one point of time constituted a joint family. (ii) Smt. Rajeshwari Devi had executed the sale deed dated 4.1.1989 in favour of Shankar Prasad. (iii) On account of legal necessity, Shankar Prasad alienated the property in favour of the plaintiff by registered sale deed dated 7.6.2005. (iv) There has been landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants. (v) The defendants had last paid rent up to January 2006, whereafter they defaulted in payment of rent and are defaulters. (vi) The plaintiff had been able to prove her need for the suit property on account of personal requirements. (vii) The plaintiffs son (P.W. 5) is unemployed and wants to start a small business of gold-smith and, therefore, needs the suit property to earn his livelihood. (viii) Tenanted premise covers an area of 10 x 6 and, therefore, partial eviction cannot serve the purpose of the plaintiff. On these findings, the suit has been decreed and the defendants have been directed to vacate the suit property. (viii) Tenanted premise covers an area of 10 x 6 and, therefore, partial eviction cannot serve the purpose of the plaintiff. On these findings, the suit has been decreed and the defendants have been directed to vacate the suit property. 6 While assailing the validity of the impugned judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner (defendant no. 1) submits that it was the exclusive property of Rajeshwari Devi, the petitioners grandmother, and she was indeed the sole and the real owner. Therefore, the learned trial court had erred in holding that it was a joint family property, and has further erred in holding that the sale deed dated 4.1.1989 was validly executed. In his submission, once these two findings, which are errors of record, are set aside, the remaining findings automatically go. He also submits that Title Suit No. 91 of 2005 at the instance of Pujan Thakur, the plaintiffs husband, is still pending which deals with the same property. He relies on the judgment of this Court in Atma Ram Khemka and Others V/s. Punjab National Bank and Others, reported in 2008(2) P.L.J.R. 449 . 7. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 1 herein (the plaintiff) has supported the impugned judgment. He relies on the provisions of Section 14(8) of the Act in an effort to satisfy us that the scope of interference is very narrow. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandrika Prasad (D) thr. LRs. and Another V/s. Umesh Kumar Verma and Others, reported in 2002 (1) P.L.J.R. 144(S.C.) paragraphs 6 to 8. He also submits that the scope of the present suit and Title Suit No. 91 of 2005, are very different and the result of one will not affect the other. 8. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff (opposite party no. 1) has rightly relied upon the provisions of Section 14(8) of the Act. It is relevant to state that the suit for eviction under the provisions of the Act can be instituted on various grounds. For example, default in payment of rent, expiry of the period of lease, deterioration in the material condition of the property, personal necessity of the landlord etc. It is relevant to state that the suit for eviction under the provisions of the Act can be instituted on various grounds. For example, default in payment of rent, expiry of the period of lease, deterioration in the material condition of the property, personal necessity of the landlord etc. In view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, eviction suit on the ground of personal requirement in good faith or on the ground of expiry of the period of lease has to be disposed of as per the special procedure laid down in Section 14 of the Act, also known in common parlance a summary procedure. The judgment thereunder cannot be challenged in appeal or second appeal, and a civil revision application alone is competent. The scope of civil revision within the meaning of Section 14(8) of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court in Chandrika Prasad (D) Thr. Lrs. V/s. Umesh Kumar Verma (supra), paragraphs 6 to 8 of which are reproduced hereinbelow: "6. Section 14 is a special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bona fide requirement. This summary procedure for recovery of possession of any premises is available on the ground specified in Clause(c) or Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. We are concerned in the case in hand with Clause (c) which is a ground for passing decree for eviction where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit building is held by the landlord. Sub-section (8) of Section 14 is quoted below: "14(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this section: Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit." "7. In a revision petition filed under proviso to above sub-section (8) of Section 14 of the Act, the High Court has to satisfy itself as to whether the order of eviction passed under Section 14 of the Act was in accordance with law. The scope of the revisional jurisdiction depends on the language of the Statute. Though revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate jurisdiction, it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal." "8. An identical provision contains in proviso to Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 came up for consideration of this Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta V/s. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 . The Court held that an exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under this proviso is "for the purpose of satisfying if an order made by the Controller is according to law". The Court further held that the revisional jurisdiction exercisable under the said proviso is not so limited as is under Section 115, CPC nor so wide as that of an Appellate Court and the High Court cannot enter into appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts. The Court further held that the High Court however, is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of "whether it is according to law" and for that limited purpose may enter into reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available." 8.1. The Supreme Court has observed that the scope of revisional jurisdiction depends on the language of the Statute. Though revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate jurisdiction, it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. Relying on its earlier judgment in Shiv Sarup Gupta V/s. Dr. The Supreme Court has observed that the scope of revisional jurisdiction depends on the language of the Statute. Though revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate jurisdiction, it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. Relying on its earlier judgment in Shiv Sarup Gupta V/s. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, the Supreme Court further observed that revisional jurisdiction exercisable under Section 14(8) is not so limited as is in Section 115 CPC, nor so wide as that of an appellate court, and the High Court cannot enter into appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts. The High Court must examine whether or not the impugned judgment is in accordance with law, and may reappreciate the evidence for this limited purpose. In some of the other judgments of the Supreme Court, it has been held that this is the only forum for the parties to ventilate their grievances. Therefore, the High Court should not take a very strict view of it and should not solely confine itself to points of law. We shall, therefore, consider the instant revision application from that angle. 9. The parties are undoubtedly agnates and are very closely related. Rajeshwari Devi is the mother-in-law of the plaintiff, and the grandmother of defendant no. 1. Defendant No. 2 is the wife of elder son of Rajeshwari Devi. A perusal of the materials on record creates an impression in our minds that the property was part of joint family properties at the hands of Kali Thakur. He pre-deceased his wife, Rajeshwari Devi (defendant no. 3). The properly in question seems to have been given to Shambhu Thakur (defendant no. 2 and elder son of Rajeshwari Devi) in partition. Rajeshwari Devi alienated the property in question by a registered sale deed on 4.1.1989, in favour of Shankar Prasad. He (Shankar Prasad) inducted the defendants as tenants in a portion of the suit property in question covering an area of 10 x 6. Out of legal necessity, Shankar Prasad alienated the suit property in favour of the plaintiff by a registered sale deed dated 7.6.2005. The defendant continued to pay rent to the plaintiff (opposite party no.1 herein) till January 2006. Therefore, the learned trial court has held that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. Out of legal necessity, Shankar Prasad alienated the suit property in favour of the plaintiff by a registered sale deed dated 7.6.2005. The defendant continued to pay rent to the plaintiff (opposite party no.1 herein) till January 2006. Therefore, the learned trial court has held that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. We entirely agree with this finding. 10. Section 2(f) of the Act defines landlord as follows: "2. Definitions.In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (f) "landlord" includes the person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant." In other words, a person who is entitled to receive rent can also institute a suit for eviction. In that view of the matter, the present suit is maintainable and, therefore, its disposal does not depend on the plaintiffs title. 11 It is for this reason that we are unable to accede to the submissions advanced on behalf of defendant no. 1 (the petitioner) that the learned trial court has recorded erroneous findings of facts with respect to the nature and character, as well as the right, title and interest, with respect to the property in question. In view of the position that the defendants had paid rent to the landlord, the plaintiff-opposite party no. 1, till January 2006, relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. Therefore, the question of plaintiffs title is not of much relevance in the present case. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the first part of the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, the learned trial court recorded erroneous findings of facts with respect to title. It is for the same reason that pendency of Title Suit No. 91 of 2005 becomes wholly irrelevant for the purpose of disposal of the present suit. It is mainly based on the definition of landlord occurring in said Section 2(f) of the Act. It is for the same reason that pendency of Title Suit No. 91 of 2005 becomes wholly irrelevant for the purpose of disposal of the present suit. It is mainly based on the definition of landlord occurring in said Section 2(f) of the Act. Furthermore, for the limited purpose of disposal of the suit and the instant application, we are satisfied that the plaintiff has the right, title and interest of the suit property by virtue of the sale deeds dated 4.1.1989, read with the sale deed dated 7.6.2005. 12. The learned trial court has examined the question of the plaintiffs requirement and has come to clear findings of facts that her son (P.W. 5) is unemployed and intends to start the business of gold-smith in the room in question. We entirely agree with the finding recorded by the learned trial court that the plaintiffs requirement of personal necessity is entirely bona fide. We also agree with the finding recorded by the learned trial court that the suit premises, being a small room covering an area of 10 x 6, is too small to be divided between two persons. Therefore, there is no question of partial eviction. 13. In the result, we entirely agree with the impugned judgment and is accordingly upheld. This civil revision application is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. 14. After the judgment was complete, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that the defendants may be given six months time to vacate the premises, whereafter they will vacate it without the necessity of execution proceedings. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has no objection to the same. In that view of the matter, let the defendants vacate the suit premises on or before 31.1.2011, without the necessity of execution proceeding. There shall be stay of further proceedings in Execution Case No. 4 of 2008, pending before the learned Munsif-I, Madhubani till 31.1.2011. It is made clear that failure to carry out this order will treated to be violation of the order of this Court.