JUDGEMENT Mungeshwar Sahoo, J. 1. Both these first appeals have been filed against the judgment dated 23.6.1993 and the decree following thereupon signed on 15.7.1995 by Sri Narendra Mishra, the learned Sub-Judge, 1st, Patna in Title Suit No. 603 of 1992. Since both these first appeals arise out of the same judgment and decree, these are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The defendant No. 1 i.e. State of Haryana and defendant No. 2 i.e. the Director of Lottery, have filed First Appeal No. 594 of 1993. The defendant No. 3 Dena Bank has filed other First Appeal No. 662 of 1993. 3. The plaintiff-respondent i.e. M/s Deep Mayank and Associates filed the aforesaid Title Suit No. 603 of 1992 for a declaration that the agreement dated 29.6.1992 entered into between the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 is illegal, void, arbitrary and not enforceable in law and the bank guarantee dated 28.7.1992 furnished by defendant No. 3 in favour of defendant No. 1 is void and not enforceable in law. The plaintiffs futher prayed that the defendant No. 3 Dena Bank be directed to forthwith release the margin money and collateral securities to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also prayed for declaration that the plaintiffs did not commit any default and are not liable for damages and the defendants are not entitled to encash the bank guarantee G.T./100/92 dated 28.7.1992 given in favour of defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs further prayed to restrain the defendants by an order of injunction from encashing the aforesaid bank guarantee and also prayed for cost of the suit. 4. The plaintiffs prayed the aforesaid reliefs on the facts which may be stated in brief that, the plaintiff No. 1 M/s Deep Mayank and Associates is a registered partnership firm and the plaintiffs are engaged in the business of marketing of lottery tickets in different States and have acquired sufficient experience in the said trade. They have their registered office at Calcutta, a branch office at New Delhi and the principal office at Patna. The defendant No. 1 i.e. State of Haryana was doing lottery business and invited tenders for appointing stockist of lottery tickets of Rs. 2/- for the entire country. The plaintiffs tender was accepted and were made main stockist and an agreement was executed between the parties on 29.6.1992. 5. The defendant No. 1 i.e. State of Haryana was doing lottery business and invited tenders for appointing stockist of lottery tickets of Rs. 2/- for the entire country. The plaintiffs tender was accepted and were made main stockist and an agreement was executed between the parties on 29.6.1992. 5. The plaintiffs further case is that because of the agreement the plaintiffs became the sole stockist for a period of one year from 1st July, 1992. The plaintiffs in good faith signed the agreement. At least 10 days time was needed to organize effecting sales in the country but the plaintiffs were not given any time. The plaintiffs were required to pay the royalty money of Rs. 1,97,280/- per draw and the draw was to be held everyday. The further case is that the defendants had to pay a sum of Rs. 81,00,000/- to the price winners out of the tickets sold by them prior to 1.7.1992 but the entire liability was put on to the plaintiffs just after the agreement. The defendants promised to adjust the amount but still 10% of that amount has not been adjusted. 6. The further case of the plaintiffs is that the plaintiffs had to give bank guarantee for Rs. 3,71,00,000/- in favour of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and on the request of Patna office of the plaintiffs, the defendant No. 3 Dena Bank offered bank guarantee No. G.T./100/92 dated 23.6.1992. It was stipulated in the bank guarantee that on default by the said main stockist the bank shall on demand pay the said sum to the Government of Haryana as per the agreement. According to the agreement, the plaintiffs were required to pay to the price winning tickets provided that it was claimed within 30 days from the date of draw which the plaintiffs complied. The further case is that recently the defendant No. 1 issued public notice to the effect that all such claims would be paid by them directly. The defendants action is mala fide and the defendants started violating the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not guilty of any default. The plaintiffs were the only stockist of tickets valued at Rs. 2/- but with mala fide intention the defendants in the bake of ticket printed that the plaintiffs were stockist of lottery ticket of value of Rs. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not guilty of any default. The plaintiffs were the only stockist of tickets valued at Rs. 2/- but with mala fide intention the defendants in the bake of ticket printed that the plaintiffs were stockist of lottery ticket of value of Rs. 5/- and 10/- and because of that the plaintiffs market became confused and the selling of tickets decreased. 7. The further case is that according to the agreement, the draw was to be conducted at Chandigarh or at such other place as may be decided by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in consultation with the plaintiffs but the plaintiffs were never consulted. The result of the draw had to be published in newspapers, which are popular with the public but it was not published in spite of plaintiffs letters. The defendants were required to deposit 0.81 lakh daily as printing costs of tickets and other miscellaneous charges without there being explanation as to why they were required to deposit the same. The numbers of the price winning tickets were leaked out on 18.7.1992, 19.7.1992 and 20.7.1992. Prior to draw the plaintiffs informed the authorities but the defendants took no steps. As a result of which the plaintiffs were put to huge loss. The plaintiffs became helpless. On 21st July, 1992, the plaintiffs informed the defendants that they could not continue with the work. However, the plaintiffs continued to work till 14.9.1992 on the impression that the things will improve, but the defendants did not take any step and, therefore, the default was committed by the defendants in not complying the terms of the agreement as such they are not entitled to enforce the bank guarantee. Subsequently, the defendants advertised in the newspaper that they would be directly selling the tickets of Rs. 2/- and started the business themselves. 8. The further case of the plaintiffs is that the plaintiffs requested the bank from Patna office (Dena Bank for Patna) to furnish the bank guarantee. The defendants delivered a letter at Patna branch of the defendant No. 3 invoking bank guarantee on 3.12.1992 and, therefore, no part of cause of action relating to this bank guarantee arose at Chandigarh or any. other place. Thus, the Patna Civil Court has jurisdiction in this matter. The defendants delivered a letter at Patna branch of the defendant No. 3 invoking bank guarantee on 3.12.1992 and, therefore, no part of cause of action relating to this bank guarantee arose at Chandigarh or any. other place. Thus, the Patna Civil Court has jurisdiction in this matter. The plaintiffs learnt that the defendants are trying to encash the bank guarantee illegally and arbitrarily as per public notice issued by the State Government of Haryana. The said public notice was issued unauthorisedly with consulting the main stockist and for payment of the price winners were sought to be made by encashing the bank guarantee. 9. The further case of the plaintiff is that various terms and conditions of the agreement are arbitrary and impossible to perform and are beyond the imagination. The defendants with mala fide intention incorporated clause 5 of the agreement. Likewise clause 16 of the agreement is absolutely one sided which gives option to the plaintiffs to terminate the agreement by giving 4 months royalty, whereas the defendants can terminate without any liability. The agreement is void ab initio and no clause of the same can be acted upon. On these grounds the plaintiffs prayed for the aforesaid relief. 10. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on being noticed appeared and filed a contesting written statement mainly contending that the Court has got no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. According to them, the agreement in question dated 29.6.1992 was executed by the plaintiffs firm at Chandigarh. The payment regarding the lottery tickets were also to be made at Chandigarh. The breach of terms and conditions of the agreement has also been committed by the plaintiffs at Chandigarh and, therefore, no part of cause of action arose at Patna. There is also a clause in the agreement that the jurisdiction lies at Chandigarh and not at Patna. In the bank guarantee also it is specifically mentioned in clause (c) that in case of any dispute the jurisdiction will be at Chandigarh. The contract came into the existence at Chandigarh hence, Courts at Patna have no jurisdiction to try or entertain the suit. In dispute or difficulties or clarification of any clause of the contract was to be referred to the Secretary to the Government of Haryana, Finance Department as arbitrator as provided in the agreement and his decision will be final. The contract came into the existence at Chandigarh hence, Courts at Patna have no jurisdiction to try or entertain the suit. In dispute or difficulties or clarification of any clause of the contract was to be referred to the Secretary to the Government of Haryana, Finance Department as arbitrator as provided in the agreement and his decision will be final. The plaintiffs instead of availing the said remedy wrongly filed the suit. 11. The further defence is that the plaintiffs have not approached the Court with clean hand. They themselves have violated the terms and conditions of the contract and stopped the sale of lottery from 15.9.1992 without serving any notice. The plaintiffs also committed various other breaches as such they are not entitled to discretionary relief of injunction. The notice inviting tenders was published on 12.3.1992, which contains the detailed terms and conditions and the plaintiffs tender was accepted and, thereafter the terms and conditions were reduced into agreement between the parties on 29.6.1992 for one year starting from 1st July, 1992. The plaintiffs entered into the said contract with conscious mind and without any misconception after going through the terms and conditions and after fully understanding the contents thereof. The plaintiffs were required to furnish irrevocable bank guarantee from a nationalized bank in favour of defendant No. 2 for a sum of Rs. 3,71,00,000/-. The plaintiff executed the agreement and in terms of the same furnished bank guarantee dated 27.6.1992 with certain modification, it was given on 28.7.1992 which was delivered by the defendant No. 3 Dena Bank at Chandigarh to the defendant No. 2. According to the terms of the bank guarantee, in case of default by the stockist, the bank shall on demand pay the said sum to the defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs abruptly left business from 15.9.1992 and refused to honour the price winning tickets presented in the office by the general public and thereafter with a view to provide relief to the price winners the State Government of Haryana published notice in the newspaper informing the price winners to submit the price winning tickets in the lottery Department of Haryana Government. The plaintiffs violated the clause Nos. 11 and 12 of the agreement and committed breach of the terms. The printing of tickets was the exclusive job of the defendants and the plaintiffs were to pay Rs. The plaintiffs violated the clause Nos. 11 and 12 of the agreement and committed breach of the terms. The printing of tickets was the exclusive job of the defendants and the plaintiffs were to pay Rs. 2,700/- per lakh tickets as printing charges according to the terms of the agreement. The defendants denied to have printed that the plaintiffs were stockist of tickets of Rs. 5/- and 10/- also. The draws of the lottery scheme were to be conducted at Chandigarh or at any such place as may be decided. The plaintiffs were liable to pay the royalty, printing charges, result publication charges and miscellaneous expenses as mentioned in the agreement itself. The draw was being conducted before the general public in presence of three Judges of high repute and also in presence of senior officers of the State Government as such there was no leakage of the price winning number of tickets. The plaintiffs wrote various letters Informing the defendants about their financial crisis and did not pay the outstanding amount which clearly establishes the breach of the terms and conditions on the part of the plaintiffs. Since 15.9.1992, the plaintiffs neither paid the royalty nor other charges as such committed breach of the terms and conditions of the agreement so the plaintiffs are liable to pay to the State of Haryana a sum of Rs. 5,70,13,920/-. The cheques issued by the plaintiffs for some amount were dishonoured by the bank and, therefore, the defendants are entitled to enforce the bank guarantee. The defendants suffered huge loss and goodwill on account of decrease in the sale of the lottery tickets. 12. An additional written statement was filed denying the leakage of price winning tickets and also it was stated that the plaintiffs executed the agreement after reading the terms and conditions of the agreement with conscious mind. On these grounds the defendants submitted that the plaintiffs suit is liable to be dismissed. 13. The defendant No. 3 Dena Bank did not file any written statement and did not contest the suit. 14. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Court below framed 7 issues, which are as follows: (i) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (ii) Have the plaintiff got valid cause of action for the suit? (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation and principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? 14. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Court below framed 7 issues, which are as follows: (i) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (ii) Have the plaintiff got valid cause of action for the suit? (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation and principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? (iv) Has this Court got jurisdiction to try this suit? (v) is the agreement dated 29.6.1992 in between the plaintiffs and the defendants, illegal, void, arbitrary and not enforceable in law? (vi) Are the defendants entitled to encash the bank guarantee No. G.T./110/92 dated 28.7.1992 and are the plaintiffs liable to pay the damages to the defendants? (vii) Are the plaintiffs entitled to the relief/reliefs if any? 15. After trial while deciding issue Nos. 4 and 5, the lower Court below came to the conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction to try the suit and the agreement dated 29.6.1992 Ext.-G is illegal, void and not enforceable in law and while deciding issue Nos. 1, 2 and 6 at paragraph 7, the lower Court below found that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are not entitled to encash the bank guarantee No. G.T./100/92 dated 28.7.1992 which is also void and then decreed the plaintiffs suit. 16. It appears that earlier both these appeals were heard by this Court and by terms of the judgment dated 3.2.1995, three issues were framed and the matter was remanded to the trial Court under Order XLI Rule 25 C.P.C. for trying those issues giving liberties to the parties to leave additional evidence. The three issues are as follows: (i) Did the defendants-appellants practice fraud upon the plaintiffs-respondents by not inserting the terms and conditions determined and finalized between the Director of Lottery, Haryana State and the plaintiff at Patna? (ii) Did the defendants-appellants insert the terms and conditions in the deed of contract contrary to the terms and conditions of tender on which the plaintiffs were appointed stockist? (iii) Was the performance of contract made impossible by leaking out the first price winning ticket on behalf of the defendants-appellants subsequent to the contract? 17. Against the said judgment the State of Haryana filed Civil Appeal No.10301 of 1995 before the Honble Supreme Court of India. (iii) Was the performance of contract made impossible by leaking out the first price winning ticket on behalf of the defendants-appellants subsequent to the contract? 17. Against the said judgment the State of Haryana filed Civil Appeal No.10301 of 1995 before the Honble Supreme Court of India. The Honble Supreme Court by terms of order dated 6.11.1995 directed the trial Court to decide the issues framed by this Court in the order of remand within three months and the Honble Supreme Court observed that it is only desirable that the High Court should immediately take of the matter for the disposal of the appeals after the findings are sent back by the trial Court. From perusal of the order of the Honble Supreme Court, it appears that the matter of jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the State of Bihar was also raised. Regarding this question of jurisdiction of the Court the Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: "It is not necessary for us to make any observation on such rival contention of the parties since the appeal pending before the Patna High Court and the issues including the issues regarding the maintainability of the suit will be gone into in disposing of the appeals". 18. Pursuant to the remand order, the trial Court by terms of the order dated 18.2.1997 passed by Sri Subesha Nand Jha, Sub-Judge, 1st, Patna recorded the findings on all the three issues deciding all these issues in favour of the plaintiffs. 19. Against the said finding of the lower Court below the appellants in First Appeal No. 594 of 1993 i.e. State of Haryana have filed an objection under Order XLI Rule 26 C.P.C. on 9th July,1997. 20. Mr. Chatterji, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants in First Appeal No. 594 of 1993 i.e. State of Haryana assailed the impugned judgment and decree on two counts. Firstly, that the Civil Court in Bihar i.e. at Patna has no jurisdiction to try the suit because of the fact that the execution of the agreement dated 29th June, 1992 was done at Chandigarh. The lotteries were being drawn at Chandigarh. The bank guarantee was payable at Chandigarh. Firstly, that the Civil Court in Bihar i.e. at Patna has no jurisdiction to try the suit because of the fact that the execution of the agreement dated 29th June, 1992 was done at Chandigarh. The lotteries were being drawn at Chandigarh. The bank guarantee was payable at Chandigarh. The terms of agreement stipulates clearly that the Civil Court at Chandigarh will have the jurisdiction only to decide the dispute between the parties concerned and also clause (c) of the bank guarantee mentions that in the event of any dispute, the only Civil Court at Chandigarh shall have the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. In such view of the matter, no cause of action arose at Patna. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiffs with mala fide intention making false allegations and statements in plaint filed the suit at Patna and, therefore, in the written statement the defendants raised the question of jurisdiction of the Court. The defendants also filed an application under Order XIV Rule 2 to decide the question of jurisdiction but since the Court below proceeded to decide the suit itself on merit, the defendants consented for the disposal of the suit and in the suit itself the jurisdiction matter was an issue. The learned counsel further submitted that while deciding the said issue of jurisdiction, the learned Court below has not at all considered the legal position and in only one line stated that this Court had got jurisdiction without their being any basis. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Court below did not even care to mention in the impugned judgment as to how cause of action or part of cause of action arose at Patna. According to the learned counsel Civil Court at Chandigarh has only the exclusive jurisdiction to try the suit because no part of cause of action arose at Patna and the plaintiffs filing the suit at Patna is, therefore, not bona fide. According to the learned counsel by mere statement made by the plaintiffs in the plaint to the effect that cause of action arose at Patna jurisdiction will not be conferred on Civil Court at Patna. The cause of action is bundle of facts from which it can be gathered about the jurisdiction of the Court. 21. According to the learned counsel by mere statement made by the plaintiffs in the plaint to the effect that cause of action arose at Patna jurisdiction will not be conferred on Civil Court at Patna. The cause of action is bundle of facts from which it can be gathered about the jurisdiction of the Court. 21. So far the merit of the case is concerned, Sri Chatterji submitted that the lower Court below has wrongly held that the agreement is void and illegal on the ground that the terms which were agreed upon between the parties were not inserted in the agreement dated 29.6.1992 and the terms which were not agreed upon have been inserted in the said agreement. Learned counsel further submitted that according to Section 92 of the Evidence Act, the oral evidence is inadmissible to prove the terms and conditions of the agreement particularly, when it was reduced to writing which was produced in the Court which has been marked as Ext.-G. The learned counsel further submitted that there was no specific pleading of fraud as required under Order VI Rule 4 C.P.C. and further that the plaintiffs have not proved the fraud beyond all reasonable doubts as it is well settled principles of law that fraud must be established beyond all reasonable doubts just like criminal case. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiffs entered into the agreement with open eyes and carried on his business up to 14.9.1992 and because of financial crises they could not perform the contract and so with mala fide intention filed the suit at Patna making false allegations. Since the default was on part of the plaintiffs for non-performing the terms and conditions and because of the fact that the defendants incurred heavy loss because of the abrupt stopping of the business by the plaintiffs, the defendants were entitled to have bank guarantee encashed. On these grounds, the learned counsel Mr. Chatterji submitted that the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be set aside and the plaintiffs suit is liable to be dismissed. 22. On the other hand, Sri Sukumar Sinha, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents in both the appeals submitted that the plaintiffs in the plaint have given specific instances regarding cause of action which arose at Patna. 22. On the other hand, Sri Sukumar Sinha, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents in both the appeals submitted that the plaintiffs in the plaint have given specific instances regarding cause of action which arose at Patna. The learned counsel further submitted that the bank guarantee was provided by the defendant No. 3 i.e. Dena Bank of. Patna prior to entering into the agreement. This bank guarantee was condition precedent for entering into the agreement which was furnished by the plaintiffs and, therefore, Civil Court at Patna has the jurisdiction to decide the suit. The learned counsel further submitted that all the discussions between the parties regarding the terms and conditions were finalized at Patna, therefore, this Civil Court has got the jurisdiction and the learned Court below rightly held so. The learned counsel further submitted that although application under Order XIV Rule 2 C.P.C. was filed before the Court below but the defendants did not press the said application and with the consent of the parties the suit itself was disposed of and now, therefore, in the appeal the defendants-appellants cannot be allowed to raise the said question again in view of Section 21 C.P.C. The learned counsel further submitted that moreover, according to Section 21 sub-section (1) the said question of jurisdiction cannot be allowed unless there has been a consequence failure of justice. 23. So far the merit is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that bar of Section 92 of the Evidence Act regarding inadmissibility of oral evidence in this case is not applicable because the plaintiffs are not challenging the terms and conditions of the agreement but according to the plaintiffs agreed terms and conditions were not written in the agreement and the terms and conditions which were not agreed between the parties have been mentioned in the agreement and moreover, some of the terms and conditions are beneficial and unilateral in favour of the State Government. The learned counsel further submitted that the defendants made the business impossible by not performing the terms and conditions of the agreement and, therefore, the defendants were at fault so plaintiffs are not liable for damages and the bank guarantee cannot be encashed by the State Government of Haryana. The learned counsel further submitted that the defendants made the business impossible by not performing the terms and conditions of the agreement and, therefore, the defendants were at fault so plaintiffs are not liable for damages and the bank guarantee cannot be encashed by the State Government of Haryana. According to the learned counsel the agreement is void because it is a wagery contract as such it is void under Section 30 of the Contract Act. The learned counsel further submitted that after trial the learned Court below on appreciation of evidence has decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and there is no illegality in the impugned judgment and decree as such no interference is called for in this appeal. 24. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that the first appeal filed by Dena Bank is not at all maintainable because Dena Bank has nothing to say in the matter and moreover, Dena Bank had not contested by filing written statement and no evidence was also adduced. The learned counsel for Dena Bank-appellant in first appeal 662 of 1993 submitted that the Bank will obey the judgment of the first appeal No. 594 of 1993. This appeal has been filed only to safeguard the interest of bank and for nothing else. 25. Both the learned counsel relied upon various decisions on the question of jurisdiction of the Court and also regarding merits of the case of the parties. The said decisions shall be considered while deciding the said issues. 26. In view of the above rival contentions of the parties the following points arises for consideration in this appeal: (i) Whether the Civil Court at Patna has the jurisdiction to try the suit as framed and filed by the plaintiffs claiming the reliefs as mentioned above? (ii) Whether the agreement dated 29.6.1992 between the parties is void, illegal, arbitrary and not enforceable in law and as such the defendants are entitled to encash the bank guarantee or not? FINDINGS 27 So far point (i) is concerned, according to the defendants the Civil Court at Patna has got no jurisdiction to try the suit because of the fact that the agreement in question was executed at Chandigarh and clause 25 contains that for the settlement of any dispute therein or relating thereto only the Court at Chandigarh will have the jurisdiction. Further case is that the bank guarantee is payable at Chandigarh and no cause of action arose at Patna. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that only because averments have been made in the plaint to the effect that discussion between the parties took place at Patna although it is denied by the defendants no cause of action will be conferred on the Court at Patna. On the contrary, according to the plaintiffs part of cause of action arose at Patna and in the plaint at paragraphs 5, 16 and 25 it has specifically been pleaded that only Patna Court had the jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the bank guarantee is given by Dena Bank, Patna and it was to be enforced at Patna and, therefore, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction. Now, let us considered the legal position. For better appreciation, it will not be out of place to quote here Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. "20.Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises." 28. In view of the aforesaid provisions the suit was to be filed according to clause (a) and (b) at the place of residence of the defendants and carry on business and according to clause (c) where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. In view of the aforesaid provisions the suit was to be filed according to clause (a) and (b) at the place of residence of the defendants and carry on business and according to clause (c) where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The dispute in this case between the parties is according to the plaintiffs Patna Civil Court has got exclusive jurisdiction and whereas according to the defendants-appellants, Patna Civil Court has no jurisdiction because no cause of action arose here. 29. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, it is mentioned that Dena Bank of Patna offered bank guarantee G.T./100/92 dated 28.7.1992. At paragraph 16 of the plaint, it is mentioned that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 delivered a letter at Patna branch of defendant No. 3 invoking the bank guarantee on 3.12.1992 and, therefore, no part of the cause of action relating to this bank guarantee accrued at Chandigarh or at any other place and thus, the Patna Court has jurisdiction in this matter. At paragraph-25, it is mentioned that because the Bank guarantee is invoked by the defendants on 3.12.1992, the Civil Court at Patna has got the jurisdiction. On these allegations, the suit has been filed before the Civil Court at Patna. 30. In paragraph 5 of the written statement the statement of plaintiffs made in paragraph 5 has been replied, whereas it is stated that the bank guarantee was handed over on 28.7.1992 at Chandigarh against the receipts according to the terms and conditions of the agreement. Likewise at paragraph 15 reply of paragraph 16 of plaint has been made wherein it is stated that the Civil Court at Patna has no jurisdiction because no cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs at Patna. The agreement was executed at Chandigarh. The payment was to be made by the plaintiffs at Chandigarh and the breach was committed by the plaintiffs at Chandigarh and in the agreement it was agreed between the parties that Court at Chandigarh will have jurisdiction and besides that in the bank guarantee also the jurisdiction of Chandigarh Court was agreed between the parties. In paragraph 25 of the written statement the paragraph 25 of the plaint has been replied and stated that no cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs to file the present suit against the defendants at Patna. 31. In paragraph 25 of the written statement the paragraph 25 of the plaint has been replied and stated that no cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs to file the present suit against the defendants at Patna. 31. In view of the facts as pleaded by the parties, there is no dispute that the agreement in question dated 29.6.1992 was executed by the parties at Chandigarh. Clause 25 of the said agreement contains the terms and conditions that in case of any dispute the Court at Chandigarh will have the jurisdiction only. This agreement has been proved and marked as Ext.-G. From perusal of the bank guarantee also it appears that in clause (c) it is specifically mentioned that the Chandigarh Court only has the jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the parties. So far the furnishing of bank guarantee is concerned admittedly Dena Bank is of Patna. 32. In the case of Hakam Singh vs. M/s Gammon (India) Ltd. reported in AIR 1971 SC 740 , the Honble Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Court under the Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award is accordingly, governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. By clause 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay in any event the respondents have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the Court of Bombay. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction of Court which it does not possess under the Code. In that case, it appears that the appellants before the Honble Supreme Court had agreed to do certain construction work for the respondents on the terms and conditions of the written tender. According to clauses 12 and 13 it was stipulated that only the Bombay Court has the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The dispute arose between the parties and an application was filed before the Sub-Judge, Varanasi for an order under Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. According to clauses 12 and 13 it was stipulated that only the Bombay Court has the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The dispute arose between the parties and an application was filed before the Sub-Judge, Varanasi for an order under Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. The Honble Supreme Court at paragraph 6 has held as follows: "Since an application for filing an award in respect of a dispute arising out of the terms of the agreement could be filed in the Courts in the City of Bombay, both because of the terms of CI. 13 of the agreement and because the respondents had their Head Office where they carry on business at Bombay, the agreement between the parties that the Courts in Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to try the proceeding relating to arbitration was binding between them." 33. In the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Another vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem reported in AIR 1989 SC 1239 , the Honble Supreme Court relying upon various decisions including the above referred decision i.e. 1971 SC 740 has held at paragraph 21 as follows: "From the foregoing decisions it can be reasonably deduced that where such an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts are to avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like alone, only, exclusive, and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim expressiounius est exclusio alterius expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed." 34. In the present case at our hand, the parties to contract conferred exclusive jurisdiction to try suit on Court at Chandigarh. Clause 25 of the contract clearly stipulates this condition. It has therefore to be properly construed." 34. In the present case at our hand, the parties to contract conferred exclusive jurisdiction to try suit on Court at Chandigarh. Clause 25 of the contract clearly stipulates this condition. Likewise clause (c) of the bank guarantee also clearly stipulates that the Court at Chandigarh will have the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. In such circumstances, where the parties have entered into forum selection agreement, alleged hardship or inconvenience of either party is not sufficient ground to allow either party to file suit in breach of terms of agreement. The terms agreed between the parties regarding forum to file suit is binding on the parties. It is well settled principles of law that antecedent transaction in respect of which a contract is made will not furnish a cause of action for a suit on the contract. In this case, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that prior to entering into agreement there was discussion between the parties at Patna regarding the terms and conditions. In my opinion, this antecedent transaction will not furnish a cause of action. A Court will have jurisdiction over a matter if the cause of action arises within the local limits of jurisdiction. The expression "cause of action" means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiffs to prove if it is traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. In other words, the cause of action means the whole bundle of facts which it is necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in order to entitle him to succeed in the suit. 35. In a recent decision reported in (1994)4 SCC 710 , Aligarh Muslim University and Another vs. Vinay Engineering. Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Another, the Honble Supreme Court at paragraphs-2 and 3 has held as follows: "2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable. 3. In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and direct that the proceedings initiated in the High Court of Calcutta shall be returned to the respondent for presentation in proper court. The hearing cost is quantified at Rs. 10,000/- which Respondent 1 Vinay Engineering will pay, in any case before the application is presented to the Aligarh Court." 36. In another decision reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 , Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and Others, the Honble Supreme Court has held that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The Honble Supreme Court found that the advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to E.I.L. at New Delhi, that those would be scrutinized at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. It appears that in that case, writ was filed before the Honble Calcutta High Court and considering the above facts the Honble Supreme Court held that since NICCO had not invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court bona fide, this is a fit case for granting exemplary costs to ensure that such abuse of the Courts jurisdiction does not take place in future and imposed Rs. 50,000/- cost. 37. 50,000/- cost. 37. In the present case at our hand, even if the whole pleadings of the plaint are taken to be correct with regard to cause of action then also in my opinion, no part of cause of action arose at Patna. Furnishing of bank guarantee by Dena Bank of Patna will not confer jurisdiction on the Civil Court at Patna. The agreement Ext.-G dated 29.6.1992 has been challenged by the plaintiffs on the ground that it is void, illegal and arbitrary and the consequential relief has been sought regarding bank guarantee, therefore, the main relief is with respect to the agreement dated 29.6.1992 Ext.-G. If it is held void then the bank guarantee will not be enforceable and if it is held that it is legal and valid then the bank guarantee is liable to be invoked by the appellants. Moreover, the bank guarantee is also required to be paid at Chandigarh and not at Patna. Furnishing of bank guarantee is only consequential to the main agreement. The appellants required the plaintiffs to furnish bank guarantee. The plaintiffs might have furnished bank guarantee of any other bank from another city but that does not mean that Civil Court of that city would have acquired territorial jurisdiction to decide the dispute with respect to voidability of the contract between the parties. 38. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that according to Section 21 C.P.C. the appellants cannot be permitted to raise this question here because in the Courts below after filing application under Order XIV Rule 2 the defendants did not press the same and consented for final disposal of the suit. So far this question is concerned also, I find no force because if Patna Court has no jurisdiction then by agreement between the parties jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the Courts at Patna. Where a Court has no jurisdiction over a litigation its judgments and orders however, precisely certain or technically correct, are mere nullities and can be declared as void at any time by a Court where it is presented and in case of initial lack of jurisdiction no amount of consent or waiver on the part of the parties can create jurisdiction where there is none. 39. Moreover, this Section 21 C.P.C. applies where the defendants did not raise the question of want of jurisdiction at the very initial stage. 39. Moreover, this Section 21 C.P.C. applies where the defendants did not raise the question of want of jurisdiction at the very initial stage. In the instant case, the defendants raised the said question and issue was framed. Since the Court proceeded to decide the suit itself the application under Order XIV Rule 2 was not pressed and the said issue was decided by the Court below with other issues. It may be mentioned here that this suit was filed in 1992 and judgment was delivered in 1993 just within span of one year. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the defendants waived the point of jurisdiction. The Honble Supreme Court also, as referred to above, observed that the issue is still to be decided by the appellant Court. In my opinion, therefore, this issue still persist and it should be entertained by this appellate Court otherwise the very object of Section 20 of the Code would be frustrated and the plaintiff would receive encouragement to circumvent the section by instituting his suit in the Court of his choice in contravention of the said section. The learned counsel submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the appellants. So far this submission also in my opinion, on this ground alone the judgment and decree passed by a Court who has got no initial jurisdiction to try the suit cannot be held to be the final decision between the parties and is binding on them. Moreover, on this ground the plaintiffs-respondents cannot be allowed to circumvent the provision as contained in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 40. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that by filing written statement the defendants-appellants submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of Court and, therefore, now they are stopped to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court because they took a chance in the trial and now are giving a surprise. So far this submission is concerned also in my opinion, only because written statement has been filed taking other defence on merit, it cannot be said that the defendants- appellants submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and are therefore, deprived of their right to agitate the said question, 41. In the present case, the parties have agreed with regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of a Court and clearly stipulated to submit to the jurisdiction of particular Court i.e. at Chandigarh. In the present case, the parties have agreed with regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of a Court and clearly stipulated to submit to the jurisdiction of particular Court i.e. at Chandigarh. Since the contract was executed and signed by the parties at Chandigarh, the lotteries were being drawn at Chandigarh, the royalty was also being paid at Chandigarh, the breach of terms of the agreement was also committed at Chandigarh, the bank guarantee was also payable at Chandigarh, it cannot be said that Chandigarh Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit particularly, when the parties agreed in clause 25 of the agreement and clause (c) of the bank guarantee conferring jurisdiction exclusively on Civil Court at Chandigarh. 42. In view of my above discussion, I find much force on the submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant State of Haryana and accordingly, I hold that no cause of action or part of cause of action arose at Patna and, therefore, Civil Court at Patna has got no jurisdiction to try the suit. It appears that the plaintiffs filed the suit knowing full well the contents of the agreement containing the conditions of conferring jurisdiction of Civil Court at Chandigarh and also the condition of Clause (c) of the bank guarantee, intentionally filed the suit at Patna making averments to the effect that only Patna Court has the jurisdiction Only because it is pleaded in the plaint, the Patna Civil Court will not acquire any jurisdiction nor jurisdiction shall be created at Patna Court. 43. So far the other first appeal No.662 of 1993 is concerned, no separate discussion is necessary because the defendant No. 3 appellant Dena Bank had not filed written statement and moreover, the bank is not contesting. According to Section 126 of the Contract Act, Dena Bank is a surety and the plaintiffs are principal debtor and the State of Haryana is creditor. It is well settled principles that debtor is required to chase the creditor and the bank guarantee was payable at Chandigarh. Bank guarantee is payable on demand, as such bank is liable to pay as and when demand was made by beneficiary and the bank is not concerned with inter se dispute between the parties. 44. It is well settled principles that debtor is required to chase the creditor and the bank guarantee was payable at Chandigarh. Bank guarantee is payable on demand, as such bank is liable to pay as and when demand was made by beneficiary and the bank is not concerned with inter se dispute between the parties. 44. In the present case, I have already found that the Patna Civil Court has got no jurisdiction to try the suit and, therefore, I am not proceeding to decide the second point which was formulated above. 45. In view of my above finding, both the first appeals are allowed. In the result, the impugned judgment and decree and the subsequent finding recorded by the learned trial Court after remand by this Court, are set aside and it is held that the Civil Court at Patna/Bihar have got no jurisdiction to decide the disputes between the parties. Accordingly, the office is directed to send back the records of the Court below so that the learned Court below shall return the plaint and the other documents of the concerned parties as provided under Order VII Rule 10 for proper presentation of the plaint before appropriate forum.