Judgment : (S.A. Bobde, J) : 1. Heard Mr. K. V. Thomas, Adv. for the appellant, Mr.P.N.Shende, Adv. for respondent nos. 1 and 2 and Mr.N.S.Khubalkar, Assistant Government Pleader for respondent no.3. 2. This is an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, dt. 5.2.2010 by which the Writ Petition filed by respondents (herein)/employees was allowed with the finding that the reason for rejection of approval to their appointments is incorrect and with a further direction to the Education Officer to re-consider the entire issue of approval in favour of the respondents No.1 and 2 and so also respondent no.8. The respondents No.1 and 2 were employed as Shikshan Sewaks in the school run by the appellant/management. Since the approval was rejected and the respondents were prevented from signing the muster roll, they approached the Grievance Committee which directed the appellants to undertake a fresh selection process. The decision of the Grievance Committee was challenged before the learned Single Judge by way of present Writ Petition. 3. The learned Single Judge found that the reason given for refusal of approval i.e. one Rambhau Mahajan, Secretary of the appellant/Management, was not invited to the meetings of the School Committee is not justified and according to the learned Single Judge, the Grievance Committee ought not have accepted this reason for upholding approval. The learned Single Judge has also found that the selection of respondents No.1 and 2 was in pursuance of public advertisement whereupon said respondents underwent regular selection process and were appointed after their selection. The learned Single Judge has also found that even the Grievance Committee has not found the selection process to be invalid and has further observed that the defect regarding absence of said Rambhau Mahajan cannot be the basis for undoing the entire selection process. 4. Mr.Thomas, learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have seen that the respondents no.1 and 2 have not worked for a period of two years. We do not find any material to support this contention. The Grievance Committee has also not given a finding that the respondents no.1 and 2 have not worked for a period of two years. Having regard to the dates of their appointment and the dates on which their services were terminated, it cannot be said that said respondents have not worked for a period of two years. The Grievance Committee has also not given a finding that the respondents no.1 and 2 have not worked for a period of two years. Having regard to the dates of their appointment and the dates on which their services were terminated, it cannot be said that said respondents have not worked for a period of two years. Thus, since their appointments have been found to be in clear vacancy after due selection, we see no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned Single Judge. 5. It is also contended on behalf of the management that rejection of the approval and termination of services was justified since there was a defect in constitution of the Committee. We are not inclined to entertain this submission from the management which itself is responsible for the alleged defect in constitution of the Selection Committee. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind the settled position in law that if the management finds that there is a defect in the appointment of an employee by reason of some defect in the procedure of constitution of Committee which is not attributable to the employee, it is open for them to revoke the appointment order and not to resort to termination of services of such an employee. Termination of services may be resorted to where there is any misrepresentation by the employee in the matter of selection or in his conduct. We are constrained to make these observations because it is often found that the managements issue appointment orders to employees/teachers or Shikshan Sewaks and then seek to justify the termination of services of such employees on the ground that there was defect in the process of appointments and in a sense, seek to take advantage of their own wrong. In these circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the order impugned. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.