RAVINDRA SINGH v. COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT, MARWAR INTERMEDIATE COLLEGE, NASIRABAD THROUGH MANAGER
2010-05-25
DEVENDRA PRATAP SINGH, JAYASHREE TIWARI
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Umesh Narain Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Pramod Kumar Rai for the appellant and Sri Rahul Sripat for the respondent. 2. This contempt appeal under Section 19(1) (a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been filed challenging an order and judgment dated 18th August 2008 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Contempt Petition No. 1817 of 2008 holding the appellant guilty of civil contempt and sentencing him to seven days of civil imprisonment and penalty of Rs. 2000/-. 3. Marwar Inter College, Nasirabad Buxipur in Gorakhpur is a duly recognised and aided institution wherein the salary of the teachers and non teaching staff is paid by the State Government under the U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (herein-after referred to as the ‘Act’). 4. On the recommendation of the appellant, the Committee of Management was superseded and an authorised controller was appointed vide order dated 25th of February 2008 under the Act which was subjected to challenge by the respondents in Writ Petition No. 15117 of 2008. On dismissal of the writ petition by a learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 19th March 2008, the respondents preferred an intra Court Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008. The said appeal was allowed after hearing the parties vide order and judgment dated 8.4.2008 and the said order was quashed. A further direction was issued restraining the respondents in the writ petition, including the appellant herein, not to interfere in the functioning of the respondent committee of management. Instead of complying with the said judgment, the appellant herein passed an order dated 2nd of May 2008 ordering single operation of the accounts of the institution under the Act. This led to the filing of the aforesaid contempt petition and after hearing the parties, charges were framed against the three officials, including the appellant herein, on 15th of July 2008. After considering the reply to the charges, the present impugned judgment was passed, sentencing the appellant and discharging the other officials. 5.
This led to the filing of the aforesaid contempt petition and after hearing the parties, charges were framed against the three officials, including the appellant herein, on 15th of July 2008. After considering the reply to the charges, the present impugned judgment was passed, sentencing the appellant and discharging the other officials. 5. It is firstly urged that the order of 2nd of May 2008 directing single operation of accounts was passed bona fidely to ensure payment of salary to the employees of the institution for the months of March and April 2008, thus, it cannot be said that there was any wilful disobedience or defiance of the appellate judgment. It is also urged that since the order appointing authorised controller was passed by the Joint Director of Education, he bona fidely waited for his directions before compliance of the judgment. 6. To appreciate the aforesaid argument, it would be necessary to examine the background of the circumstances under which this contempt petition was filed. 7. A duly elected Committee of Management has various powers with regard to service conditions of the teachers and employees of the institution and one of the most substantial powers is with regard to the payment of salary. One of the employees of the institution was claiming promotion which had not been granted by the Management and thus on this ground the Management was superseded and an Authorised Controller was appointed under Section 6 of the Act by the order dated 25th February 2008. This order was set aside by the Division Bench with the finding that : “when we peruse the Sections 3 to 5, what is seen is that it is essentially with respect to not paying the salary of the employees. In the present case, the grievance was that somebody was not being promoted. Surely that was not a matter on which, the officers of the Government could have rushed to appoint an Authorised Controller.” When the order was tried to be supported under Section 6, the Division Bench held : “a grievance, that somebody ought to have been promoted and since he is not promoted, he is suffering from financial loss, are not to be brought under Sections 3 to 6.......” 8. Thus, it is apparent that initially the appointment of the Authorised Controller on the recommendation of the appellant was itself per se illegal.
Thus, it is apparent that initially the appointment of the Authorised Controller on the recommendation of the appellant was itself per se illegal. As already noticed one of the essential functions of the Management is payment of salary to the teachers and employees under Section 3. In case of failure by the Management to pay the salary, this essential function could be taken over by the District Inspector of Schools and the salary could be paid under his signature in view of sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. No doubt the order appointing the Authorised Controller was passed by the Joint Director, but that order was specifically quashed by the Division Bench and the respondents, including the appellant, were restrained from interferring in the functioning of the Committee of Management. However, the appellant instead of forthwith allowing the Committee of Management to function as such by ensuring that the charge was handed over back to it, he merely sought guidelines from the Joint Director for compliance of the writ judgment. Once an order has been quashed by this Court, it was expected of the appellant to proceed as if the order of the Joint Director did not exist and he should have restored the position of the date prior to the appointment of the Authorised Controller. However, on the one hand he alleges seeking guidelines for compliance of the writ judgment from the Joint Director, but without waiting for it he rushes to pass the order on 2nd of May 2008 taking over the function of payment of salary from the Committee of Management by ordering single operation of accounts. Had he laid off and awaited the communication of the sought guideline, it could have had a semblance of bona fides, but the passing of the order presented a fait accomplii, not only to the petitioner but also to the Joint Director, because even if the orders of Authorised Controller were to be withdrawn, result would have been the same. This was not only blatant disobedience but defiance is writ large in this action of the appellant. It is nothing else but over-reaching the orders of the Division Bench of this Court.
This was not only blatant disobedience but defiance is writ large in this action of the appellant. It is nothing else but over-reaching the orders of the Division Bench of this Court. This defiance is tried to be justified on the ground that the salary for the months of March and April 2008 had not been disbursed and he was under pressure from some leaders of the Union of Teachers under which he passed the order of single operation. Such a senior officer of the Education Department cannot be heard to say that he was under pressure to act in defiance of the writ judgment. There is no evidence to show any sort of pressure on him forcing him to pass the order of single operation except a mere application moved by a Union leader. He is justifying the passing of the order for non payment of salary of March and April 2008 on the one hand and on the other he says that he had sought the guidance of the Joint Director. Both the stands are absolutely contrary to each other. 9. Under Section 3(1) of the Act payment of salary to teachers and employees of an institution have to be made before the expiry of 20th day of the next month. Thus, under law the payment of salary of teachers and employees of the institution for the month of March became due on 20th of April 2008 and for the month of April, it became due to be paid on or before 20th of May 2008. Admittedly the charge was not handed over to the Committee of Management, by the authorised controller, therefore, firstly, it was not the responsibility of the Management to pay the salary and secondly, the salary of April did not even become due on the date when the order of single operation was passed. This fact itself clinches the issue of blatant defiance of the writ judgment, as if to teach the Management a lesson for having the audacity to approach the Courts of law.
This fact itself clinches the issue of blatant defiance of the writ judgment, as if to teach the Management a lesson for having the audacity to approach the Courts of law. The Apex Court in E.T.Sunup v. C.A.N.S.S.Employees Association and another, 2004 (8) SCC 683 was confronted with a similar attitude of the Government official, while upholding sentence order of the High Court it commented “it has become a tendency with the Government officers to somehow or the other circumvent the orders of Court and try to take recourse to one justification or other. This shows complete lack of grace in accepting the orders of the Court. This tendency of undermining the Court’s order cannot be countemanced. This Court time and again has emphasises that in a democracy the role of the Court cannot be subservient to administrative fiat. The executive and legislature have to work within the constitutional framework and the judiciary has been given the role of watchdog to keep the legislature and executive within check”. 10. However, the present facts are even worse. In the present case, instead of waiting for the “guidelines” of the Joint Director, the contemnor has taken a defiant stand in passing the order of 2.5.2008 and only after receiving the contempt notice of this Court, he has passed the order in compliance to create a defense and an alibi. It is not the first time that he has done so, he has repeated in other cases too. 11. He was asked to disclose the details of contempt cases against him and he gave a list out of which the Court summoned the files of two cases viz : Contempt Petition No. 2776 of 2009 (Ankesh Kumar Kushwaha v. Ravindra Singh) and Contempt Application No. 3928 of 2009 (Committee of Management, Kisan Adarsh Intermediate College v. Satish Chandra Srivastava and another). In Ankesh Kumar Kushwaha’s case, there was an order of this Court dated 15.5.2007 to consider the compassionate appointment of the petitioner within a month, however, the appellant herein did not consider it and it remained pending whereafter the aforesaid contempt petition was filed and only after receipt of notice in contempt, he considered the claim for compassionate appointment and rejected it on 5.9.2009.
Similarly, in the case of Committee of Management, Adarsh Inter College, the Committee had filed a writ petition for passing orders on the election held by it under an observer given by the appellant himself, but despite an order in the writ petition, he did not consider it within the period mentioned therein but only after receipt of contempt notice, did he take any action. 12. Thus, it is evident that this is not the first instance where the appellant had violated the orders of the Court. Therefore, it would be traversty of justice and failure to uphold the rule of law in case of interference by this Court. In fact interference would amount to “slap-say-sorry and forget” which the Supreme Court in Jasikwal v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1374 has refused to follow in contempt jurisdiction in the following words : “we are sorry to say, we cannot subscribe to the “slap-say-sorry and forget”; school of thought in the administration of contempt jurisdiction”. 13. The learned Single Judge has considered the issue in detail and we find no infirmity whatsoever in the findings recorded by him. 14. It is further urged that once the judgment of the Division Bench had been complied with and a resultant order having been passed on 9th of July 2008, the Court was not justified in holding the appellant guilty of civil contempt. 15. This contention is also without any substance. While considering the first argument, the Court has found that there is a deliberate defiance of the writ order in passing the order on 2nd of May 2008. It is not that he is guilty of mere lethargy in taking consequential action in pursuance of the orders of this Court, but be succeeded in his deliberate attempt to overreach the orders of this Court. It was only after the receipt of the contempt notice that he took corrective measure and this is not the first instance where he has done this but earlier also in at least two cases, as noticed above, he has acted in a contemptuous manner in defiance of the orders of this Court.
It was only after the receipt of the contempt notice that he took corrective measure and this is not the first instance where he has done this but earlier also in at least two cases, as noticed above, he has acted in a contemptuous manner in defiance of the orders of this Court. In Vidhya Dhar Sharma v. G.B. Patnaik, 2001 (4) JT 405 , when confronted with the argument that the order has been complied, finding that the compliance was only after the receipt of the contempt notice, the Court went on to punish the incumbent after noting that : “It is only the pain and fear of being punished for contempt that seems to have persuaded them to take action and comply with the direction of this Court.” 16. Considering the entire facts, in the opinion of the Court, the learned Single Judge has taken a lenient view though, this Court was of the opinion that a more stringent sentence ought to have been awarded, however, we refrain from doing so. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. 17. Lastly, it is urged that the appellant had submitted an unqualified apology which, in the circumstances of the case, should have been accepted. 18. So far as the apology is concerned, it has rightly been held by the learned Single Judge that it was a mere paper apology. It is apparent from the record that notices were issued on 22nd of May 2008 and the matter was fixed for 15th of July 2008 and it is only after receipt of the notices in contempt of this Court that an order was passed on 9th of July 2008 withdrawing the order of single operation. An apology should be an act of real contrition and repentence, but here it lacks both. The Apex Court in (Dr.) K.L.Sahar v. Harishankar, AIR 1995 SC 2320 , has held that there is no rule that the Court is bound to accept even an unconditional apology. It has further gone on to hold in K.A. Mohammad v. Parasanand, AIR 1976 SC 454, that the right to punish is not lost by acceptance of apology. The learned Single Judge has rightly not accepted the apology on these facts. 19. No other point has been urged. 20.
It has further gone on to hold in K.A. Mohammad v. Parasanand, AIR 1976 SC 454, that the right to punish is not lost by acceptance of apology. The learned Single Judge has rightly not accepted the apology on these facts. 19. No other point has been urged. 20. In view of the aforesaid, there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly rejected. 21. The appellant shall surrender before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur on or before 21st June 2010 to serve out the sentence. ————