JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri A.M. Tripathi, Sri Virender Nath Verma on behalf of the respondents. 2. By means of present special appeal, the order dated 23.3.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1251(SS) of 2009 (Nagesh Singh v. State of U.P. and others) is under challenge. 3. Factual matrix in brief of the present case are that in the State of Uttar Pradesh in order to provide Basic Education, a project/scheme has been initiated known as ‘Serv Shiksha Abhiyan’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘scheme’) which is to be implemented in all the districts of Uttar Pradesh. In order to implement the Scheme, one of the decision taken by the State Government is to appoint a person on the post of District Co-ordinator (construction). 4. Accordingly, for the District Sultanpur an advertisement was issued by the Director(opposite party No. 2) to appoint a person on the contract basis on the post of District Coordinator(construction) in order to look after the construction work to be carried out for the implementation the Scheme, the said appointment is to be made through District Level Committee consisting of the following members: 1. District Magistrate 2. District Basic Education Officer, member secretary 3. District Social Welfare Officer 4. Executive Engineer PWD, member 5. In response to the said advertisement, the petitioner and other candidates submitted their candidature and thereafter the petitioner was selected and an order dated 13.2.2007 was issued appointing him on the post of District Coordinator(Construction), Sultanpur on ad-hoc basis for a fixed term of one year and the petitioner joined his duties accepting the term of his appointment order, thereafter the said contract of appointment was extended time and again and the last extension was given with effect from 13.2.2008 for a period of one year. 6. 6. While the petitioner was working and discharging his duties, an inspection was done in respect to the construction work in Primary School and High School which were constructed in Block Jaisinghpur, District Sultanpur, as per the submission made on behalf of the appellant, the place where the work was performed falls under the legislative Constituency of one Sri O.P. Singh, M.L.A. who submitted a report dated 6.7.2009 against him in respect to some alleged defect and irregularities in the construction of the aforesaid schools and taking into consideration the same, the services of the petitioner were terminated by order dated 26.8.2009. 7. Aggrieved by the said order of termination, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the writ petition No. 5538 of 2009 (Nagesh Singh v. State of U.P. and others) on 4.9.2009, disposed off with the following directions : “The contention of petitioner is that the term of petitioner has been renewed but on the basis of complaint, the order impugned has been passed. Further submission has been made that in view of letter dated 8th December, 2008, Director of Education (Basic) has power to pass appropriate orders terminating the term of petitioner but Basic Shiksha Adhikari has passed an order, therefore, the order impugned is bad. After consideration of submission made by petitioner, I am of view that admittedly, appointment of petitioner is on contract basis for a period of one year subject to renewal. The appointment of petitioner has not been made under any relevant Rules. Therefore, if order terminating the contract has been passed that cannot be said to be illegal. In view of aforesaid fact, I am not inclined to interfere. The writ petition is dismissed, however, without imposing any cost. However, dismissal of the present writ petition will not come in the way of petitioner to approach respondent No. 2 regarding his grievances, which have been stated in the present writ petition.” 8. Order dated 4.9.2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 5538 was challenged by way of Special Appeal No. 667 of 2009 by the appellant and on 6.10.2009, an interim order has been passed in his favour. Order dated 4.9.2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 5538 was challenged by way of Special Appeal No. 667 of 2009 by the appellant and on 6.10.2009, an interim order has been passed in his favour. Operative portion of the same is as under : “In view of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant that the order terminating the term of the contract appointment has been passed by an authority, who is not competent to pass the impugned order as per Office Memorandum dated 8.12.2008, and also the fact that the renewal of the term of the contract appointment of the appellant was done after considering the entire record, extending the term of the appellant from 14.2.2009 to 13.2.2010 coupled with the argument that the impugned order has been passed without affording any opportunity to the appellant, though it terminates the already extended term of contract appointment, we, stay the operation and implementation of the impugned under dated 4.9.2009 under challenge in the instant special appeal, passed by the learned Single Judge and also the order of termination dated 26.8.2009, till further orders of the Court or till completion of the period of contract appointment i.e. 13.2.2010, whichever is earlier. However, it will be open for the respondents to move application for vacation of stay order alongwith the counter-affidavit.” 9. Thereafter, the contractual appointment of the petitioner on the post in question had come to an end on 13.2.2010. Further, the Zila Education Project Committee had taken a decision not to renew the contractual appointment of the petitioner for the year 2010-11, accordingly an order was passed by the District Basic Education Officer, Sultanpur on 16.2.2010 terminating the contractual appointment of the petitioner. The same was challenged by means of Writ Petition No. 1251(SS) of 2010 (Nagesh Singh v. State of U.P. and others), dismissed by order dated 23.3.2010 with the following directions : “Two points have been put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The same was challenged by means of Writ Petition No. 1251(SS) of 2010 (Nagesh Singh v. State of U.P. and others), dismissed by order dated 23.3.2010 with the following directions : “Two points have been put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner. First is that the order passed by the opposite parties is without jurisdiction and it ought to have been passed by the Director but it is clarified that a Circular was issued wherein it has been clarified that the power of termination and appointment is vested with the District Project Committee and in the present case the District Project Committee has taken into consideration the entire working of the petitioner of the preceding year and passed the impugned order, therefore, the question of jurisdiction as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner fails. The next argument is that the renewal of the petitioner has been refused only on account of bias prevailing with the MLA who wrote a letter against him. The question of bias at the behest of the MLA could have got some force but the decision was taken by the BSA at earlier point of time. Now the decision has been taken by the District Project Committee and there is no allegation of bias against the members of the District Project Committee. The District Project Committee is supposed to undertake all exercise and consider the entire working of the petitioner in the preceding year. The petitioner’s working in the preceding year has been taken into consideration and the District Project Committee has found that the work of the petitioner is unsatisfactory. Once the working of the petitioner has been found to be unsatisfactory while reviewing the entire working of the petitioner, there was no question for renewal of the contractual appointment of the petitioner. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner in regard to bias also fails. In this view of the matter, the petition is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed.” 10. Aggrieved by the said order dated 23.3.2010, the instant Special Appeal has been filed by appellant. 11. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner in regard to bias also fails. In this view of the matter, the petition is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed.” 10. Aggrieved by the said order dated 23.3.2010, the instant Special Appeal has been filed by appellant. 11. Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the order dated 23.3.2010 submits that the action on the part of the respondent No. 4 thereby not renewing the contractual appointment of the appellant for the period of 2010-11 and passing the order date 16.2.2010 is per se illegal as there was no material or reason before the Committee on whose recommendation the impugned order was passed, so the same is liable to be set aside 12. He further submits that the order in question has been passed only due to the political pressure exerted by sitting B.S.P. MLA and report submitted by him who was personally prejudiced and annoyed against the petitioner as he had submitted an adverse report against his relative. Except the said report there was no other material against the petitioner which was taken into consideration while passing the impugned order, so the said order passed under the garb of political influence is arbitrary in nature, thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and in contravention to the principles of natural justice, liable to be quashed. In support of his argument Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the case of Rashmi Awasthi and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(8) ADJ 607 (DB) : 2009(5) ESC 3262 (All)(DB). 13. In rebuttal, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the appointment of the petitioner on the post of District Coordinator (Construction), Sultanpur was a contractual appointment which came to an end on 13.2.2010 and was not renewed for the next year i.e. 2010-11 by the competent authority. As such, the petitioner who was appointed on the contract basis has got no right or locus to file the present writ petition to get this contractual appointment renewed, so the present writ petition filed by him lacks merit and liable to be dismissed. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 15. As such, the petitioner who was appointed on the contract basis has got no right or locus to file the present writ petition to get this contractual appointment renewed, so the present writ petition filed by him lacks merit and liable to be dismissed. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 15. Admittedly, in the present case, the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of District Coordinator(Construction) by order dated 13.2.2007 for a fixed term which was renewed subsequently thereafter and last term/tenure of the appellant was up till 13.2.2010. 16. So, it is not disputed as per the terms of appointment/engagement the appellant was entitled to work on the post of District Coordinator(Construction) in the District Sultanpur only up till 13.2.2010 and thereafter by the efflux of time, the same came to an end. 17. Now, in the light of the above said facts, the question which is to examine in the instant case whether the appellant can claim as a matter of right to continue on the post in question despite the aforesaid condition of appointment order and when admittedly letter of appointment had also lost it’s efficacy due to efflux of time suo mota after expiry of term and whether the appellant in such circumstances can be directed to continue even beyond the said period to work and discharge his duties to be question answer in the present case. 18. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove the reply to the said question would be in negative. As the appointment of the appellant being for a fixed term, he has no right to continue beyond the period of indicated in his appointment letter which is a time bound for a fix period. Extension of appointment by judicial order is not permissible under law as a fixed term appointment would come to an end automatically by efflux of time. In case, the contention of the appellant is accepted, it would be amount to rewriting the appointment letter allowing the appellant to continue without their being letter of appointment issued by the competent authority for a period after the term of his term/tenure of engagement is over. 19. In case, the contention of the appellant is accepted, it would be amount to rewriting the appointment letter allowing the appellant to continue without their being letter of appointment issued by the competent authority for a period after the term of his term/tenure of engagement is over. 19. In the case Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava(Smt.), 1992(4) SCC 33 ., the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under : “The appointment, which is made for a fixed tenure comes to an end on the expiry of the period of appointment provided in the letter of appointment and the incumbent need not be terminated as the termination of employment comes automatically by efflux of time. In this case, admittedly, the appointment of the petitioner is for fixed tenure and in case the contention of petitioner is accepted, it will amount to giving an appointment by this Court for the period subsequent there to substituting itself to the position of appointing authority. This is neither permissible in law nor should be done. When a procedure is prescribed to do a thing in a particular manner, it should not be done otherwise.” 20. Further a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi and others, JT 2006 (4) SC 420, in Para 34 of the judgment has observed as under : “If it is contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued.” 21. In the case of L.I.C. v. Sri Rajiv Kumar Srivastava, 1994 (12) LCD 76, this Court has held placing reliance on the case of Director Institute of Management Development,U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava, 1992 (5) SLR 86, where the appointment is purely ad-hoc appointment and is contractual and by efflux of time, the appointment comes to an end. The person holding such post has no right to continue on the said post. 22. The person holding such post has no right to continue on the said post. 22. In the case of Alok Kumar Singh(Dr.) and 15 others v. State of U.P. and others [2002) 2 UPLBEC1373], it is held as under : “In view of the averments made in the counter-affidavit of the State Government it is evident that the petitioners are working only on contact basis without any regular selection through the Commission, and they cannot be equated with regularly selected teachers. Hence, they have no right to the post. Their appointment was under the Government Order dated 7.4.1998 to deliver lecturers for a very short span of time and they cannot claim regularization. Their duties and function are arise different from the regularly selected teachers. These appointments were made only due to the shortage of regularly selected candidates so that the teaching work may not suffer. However, the appointees cannot claim any right to continue. Only these who have been regularly selected by the Commission have a right to continue.” 23. So far as the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the contractual appointment of the appellant was not renewed only due to report submitted by the sitting MLA and the same cannot be a basis of not extending the contractual appointment of the appellant cannot be accepted. As in the case of Uma Devi (Supra), the Apex Court in Para 36 of the judgment has observed as under : It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such causal or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or causally, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast, country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept the casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term.” 24. For the foregoing reasons, there is neither any illegality nor infirmity in the order dated 23.3.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the present appeal filed by the appellant lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. ————