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2010 DIGILAW 1744 (MAD)

National Insurance Co. Ltd. , Trichy v. Saraswathi & Others

2010-04-13

S.MANIKUMAR

body2010
Judgment : Per S. MANIKUMAR, J. In an accident, which occurred on 6. 2003, husband of the first respondent, working as a Night Watchman in Agricultural Development Office, died. Wife, married daughters, sons, claimed compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/-. The appellant-Insurance Company, with the leave of the Court, resisted the claim, contending inter alia that the driver of the vehicle, insured with them, was not responsible for the accident and therefore, they are not liable to pay compensation. Without prejudice to the above, they also disputed the quantum of compensation, claimed under various heads. The Tribunal, on evaluation of pleadings and evidence, found that the driver of the vehicle insured with them, was responsible for the accident and by determining the monthly76 income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- and applying ‘8’ multiplier, computed the dependency compensation at Rs. 3,32,800/-. That apart, the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 5,000/- for funeral Expenses. Altogether, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 3,37,800/- as compensation with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum. Questioning the quantum of compensation, the Insurance Company has preferred this appeal. 2. Mr. Vadivel, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company submitted that the Tribunal, having determined the age of the deceased, a Night Watchman in Agricultural Department, as 58 years, ought not to have applied ‘8’ multiplier for computing the dependency compensation. He further submitted that the Tribunal has failed to consider that respondents 2 to 5/claimanats were already married and that they are not dependents. He also submitted that though the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 5,500/-, the respondents/claimants have produced Exhibit P-4, Salary Certificate, dated 111. 2006, to the effect that the deceased earned only Rs. 5,452/- at the time of accident and therefore, the Tribunal has failed to consider the inconsistency. According to him, the Salary Certificate has not been proved in the manner known to law. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 3. Wife, first respondent; married daughters, respondents 2, 4 and 5; and sons, respondents 3, 6 and 7, have claimed compensation. Admittedly, all of them are majors. According to them, the deceased was a Night Watchman in the office of Agricultural Development, Uthirameurur and earned Rs. 5,500/- per month. 3. Wife, first respondent; married daughters, respondents 2, 4 and 5; and sons, respondents 3, 6 and 7, have claimed compensation. Admittedly, all of them are majors. According to them, the deceased was a Night Watchman in the office of Agricultural Development, Uthirameurur and earned Rs. 5,500/- per month. Apart from denying the manner of accident, at Paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, the appellant-Insurance Company has denied the age, income, occupation of the deceased and further denied that the respondents/claimants are not Legal representatives of the deceased and put them to strict proof. At Paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit, the appellant-Insurance Company has prayed that they may be permitted to raise all the defences that are available to the insured as per Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, in case the insured remained ex parte. Reading of the counter affidavit in entirety, dies not disclose that the entitlement of the respondents/claimants, to claim compensation, has been disputed. Whereas, for the first time before this Court, the appellant-Insurance Company has questioned the entitlement of the respondents to prefer a claim petition. 4. As per Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Section 165, may be made by all or any of the Legal Representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. The contention that they are not the dependents of the deceased, raised for the first time before this Court, cannot be countenanced in law, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhabhai and Another (1987) ACJ 561. Earlier, the Gujarat High Court held that all the Legal heirs and Legal Representatives of the deceased would maintain a claim petition under Section 110-A (now under Section 166(1)) and accordingly, awarded compensation to the nephews of the deceased. Considering the divergence of opinion expressed by various High Courts, as regards the maintainability of the claim under Section 110-A (now under Section 166(1)), by persons other than wife, husband, parents and child, of a person, who died on account of the Motor Vehicles Accident, the Supreme Court in Paragraph 10, held as follows: “10. Considering the divergence of opinion expressed by various High Courts, as regards the maintainability of the claim under Section 110-A (now under Section 166(1)), by persons other than wife, husband, parents and child, of a person, who died on account of the Motor Vehicles Accident, the Supreme Court in Paragraph 10, held as follows: “10. Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorized by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression “legal representative” has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines “legal representative” as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorizes all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and clause (c) of that sub-section authorizes any agent duly authorized by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in Section 110-A of the Act.” Interpreting Section 110-A (now amended as Section 166(1), vis-à-vis, a corresponding provision in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Apex Court further held that, “These provisions are not merely procedural provisions,. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was “new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new” the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies.” While confirming the decision of Gujarat High Court in Megjibhai Khimji’s case, the Supreme Court at Paragraph 12, further held that, “We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realization of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110¬F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for w3hose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers’ children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents.” .5. While deciding the dependency, the relevant factor to be proved by the beneficiaries is that by the death of a person on account of the accident, they have lost a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage and it is for the Court to evaluate the pecuniary loss, on the basis of evidence tendered by them. In this context, it would be useful to extract the judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in New India Assurance Co. In this context, it would be useful to extract the judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd., v. Kayicha Umma ILR 1987 (1) Ker 388, .“The beneficiaries have to prove that by the death of a person they lost a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage. What is reasonable is a question of fact which varies from case to case and has to be determined with reference to the evidence on record. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the Court has to make an estimate of the pecuniary loss suffered by the members of the family of the deceased. The Court has to evaluate the pecuniary loss resulting from death on the basis of a proper appreciation of the relevant circumstances and hard realities.” 6. In the case on hand, when the Legal representatives of the deceased have come forward with the plea that they have lost a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage, in the absence of any objection or contrary evidence, let in by the appellant-Transport Corporation that the claimants are not dependents of the deceased, this Court is not inclined to accept the objection raised for the first time before this Court. 7. On the quantum of compensation, the respondents have produced Exhibit P4, Salary Certificate of the deceased, dated 111. 2006, to prove that he earned Rs. 5,247/-(Basic Pay-Rs. 3,520 + Dearness Allowance – Rs. 1,727) at the time of accident. However, the said amount has been rounded-off to Rs. 5,200/-. The contention of the appellant that the Tribunal ought not to have applied ‘8’ multiplier cannot be countenanced for the reason that time and again, the Supreme Court, in catena of decisions has held that the multiplier method provided in Second Schedule to Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, can be taken as a guidance for the purpose of computing dependency compensation. In that context, perusal of the second Schedule, it is clear that for the age group of persons above 55 years and not exceeding 60 years, the multiplier is ‘8’. At the time of accident, the first respondent was aged 54 years and the multiplier applicable to persons of age group between 51 yeas and 55 years, is ‘11’. In that context, perusal of the second Schedule, it is clear that for the age group of persons above 55 years and not exceeding 60 years, the multiplier is ‘8’. At the time of accident, the first respondent was aged 54 years and the multiplier applicable to persons of age group between 51 yeas and 55 years, is ‘11’. Having regard to the longevity of an Indian Citizen and following the decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered view that ‘8’ multiplier applied for computing the dependency compensation, cannot be said to be manifestly illegal and therefore, the dependency compensation arrived at by the Tribunal, cannot be found fault with. .8. Perusal of the judgment further shows that apart from dependency compensation, the Tribunal has awarded only funeral expenses. There is no award in respect of loss of Consortium to the first respondent-Wife. The loss of love and affection, guidance to the daughters and sons, though married and living separately, cannot be precisely measured in terms of money. The Tribunal ought to have considered the above aspect and awarded a reasonable compensation for the same. But no award has been made. The Tribunal has failed to note that the respondents would have incurred some expenses for transportation of the corpse from hospital to their residence. The deceased was a Night Watchman in Agricultural Department. Normally, a Watchman even after retirement from government Office, would get some chances of employment, even after his retirement in the same capacity. The above aspect also could have been considered by the Tribunal, at the time of estimation of loss of income to the family. Considering the totality of the case and the failure of the Tribunal to award reasonable compensation towards love and affection, consortium and transportation, this Court is of the considered view that the award of Rs. 3,37,800/- cannot be said to be excessive of bonanza. 9. In the result, the civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.