Judgment Sanjay Yadav, J. ( 1. ) The issue which crops up for determination in this appeal, under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is whether the child, aged 17 years can be held guilty of negligence and be non suited in a claim for compensation in lieu of injuries which he has sustained in an accident caused in due course of operation of a motor vehicle. ( 2. ) The facts briefly are that on 14.10.2000 respondent no.1 riding his motor cycle bearing registration No.MP-12-5875 caused an accident to the appellant/ child of seven years. Consequent whereof, the child sustained compound fracture tibia febula ( R). ( 3. ) The claim petition was filed for compensation in lieu of the injuries sustained by the appellant. The claims tribunal after taking into consideration that offending motor cycle was insured and that the same was driven rashly and negligently by respondent no.1 came to hold that the appellant/claimant shall not be entitled for any compensation as it was he who was negligent in detaining himself on public road. ( 4. ) Since the factum of accident is not in dispute and also the offending vehicle was duly insured with the Insurance Company/ respondent no.2 the only issue which calls attention is whether the tribunal was justified in holding that it was the appellant, child aged seven years standing by the side of the road would be solely held responsible for the accident. ( 5. ) The concept of contributory negligence cannot be made applicable to a child is what has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and others V. Abdul Rahman and others: AIR 1997 MP 248 , wherein the Division Bench after taking into consideration the catena of judgments regarding concept of contributory negligence relating to a child was pleased to observe: "10. Back home,there are catena of authorities which deal with the concept of contributory negligence in relation to a child. In the case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. Ku. Lalita.l983 Acc CJ 253 : (AIR 1982 Delhi 558) Court held thus (at p. 561 of AIR) :"Infants must, it seems, be treated as a category apart. In many cases infants have been held not guilty of contributory negligence where adults, would on similar facts, have been deemed to be contributory negligence. Lalita.l983 Acc CJ 253 : (AIR 1982 Delhi 558) Court held thus (at p. 561 of AIR) :"Infants must, it seems, be treated as a category apart. In many cases infants have been held not guilty of contributory negligence where adults, would on similar facts, have been deemed to be contributory negligence. The test is what degree of care for his own safety can an infant of the particular age reasonably be expected to take? The age of the child is a circumstance which must be considered in deciding whether it has been guilty of contributory negligence. In the case of a child of tender age, conduct on the part of such child contributing to an accident may not preclude it from recovering in full in circumstances in which similar conduct would preclude a grown up person from doing so. What is negligence in a grown up person is not necessarily negligence in a child." The High court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of K. L. Pasrija v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., 1986 Acc CJ 252 held, that a child cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence. In the case of Muthuswamy v. S.A.R. Annamalai. 1990 Acc CJ 974 :(AIR 1990 Madras 201 ) while discussing with regard to contributory negligence on the part of a child, aged about six the Court laid down as under (at p.205 of AIR) :- "It follows from the above decisions and the principles elucidated in them that at the age of 6, a child cannot be reasonably expected to take precaution for his own safety. The child would have little knowledge of the hazards of road traffic. At that age, the child would act more by instinct than by reason. The question whether a child is of sufficient age and intelligence to a child to realise and appreciate the risks he runs, so as to be capable of being guilty of contributory negligence is a question of fact in each case". At that age, the child would act more by instinct than by reason. The question whether a child is of sufficient age and intelligence to a child to realise and appreciate the risks he runs, so as to be capable of being guilty of contributory negligence is a question of fact in each case". In this contest we may refer to the observations made by M. B. Lal, J in the case of Gothelal Chourasia v. Gajjanansingh, 1988 Acc CJ 1120 (Madh Pra) which read thus :- "In this regard it will suffice to say that a duty casts upon the driver of a motor vehicle while driving the vehicle on a highway that he must drive the vehicle with reasonable care strictly observing the traffic regulations and rules of the road. He is also expected to keep a good look-out on all the directions of the road, on sides and on stretch of road in front of him. As such in all possible manner he has to take care of the pedestrian and his duty becomes higher when the pedestrians are children of tender age, because the behaviour of children is uncertain on the approach of a motor vehicle". In this regard we may also refer to the decisions rendered in the cases of Ramkumari Sharma v. Ramkishan, 1985 Acc CJ 493 (Raj); Amritsar Transport Co. (P) Ltd. v. Swaran Kumar, 1969 Acc CJ 82 (Punj and Hry); Motor Insurance Co. Ltd. v. A. N. Pattammal, 1972 Acc CJ 380 (Madras); Mohanlal v. Ku Babi, 1967 Acc CJ 123 (Punjab) and Sunil Kumar v. Roshanlal, 1973 Acc CJ 41 : (AIR 1973 Delhi 141) wherein it has been held that a child of tender age cannot be treated at par with an adult and the standard to be affixed has to be different and the concept of contributory negligence would have no applicability. 11. From the aforesaid discussion relating to contributory negligence on the part of a child of tender age there is no doubt that the concept of contributory negligence cannot be made applicable to a child. A child functions according to his own reasoning and his intelligence. Logicality and rationality are not expected from a child as a child of tender age has no continuous thinking process and is governed by his impulse, instinct and innocence. A child functions according to his own reasoning and his intelligence. Logicality and rationality are not expected from a child as a child of tender age has no continuous thinking process and is governed by his impulse, instinct and innocence. Can one ever conceive that a child, if would have been aware of the peril, would ever commit an act which is dangerous or hazardous for him? The answer has to be a categorical No, because a childs action is childlike and really innocent. Possibly for that reason, it has been said :- "The Maker of the Stars and Sea, become a Child earth for me? A child remains a child in spite of all training and directions and if anything sparkles it is the glory of his innocence which makes him indifferent to the risks which an adult apprehends and pays attention. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we conclude and hold that Riyaz, the child of four, was not liable for contributory negligence." ( 6. ) In view of above, it can be said with certitude that appellant child aged seven years was not liable for contributory negligence, the trial Court therefore grossly erred in non suiting him on the ground, that he contributed towards accident. ( 7. ) Now coming to the quantum of compensation admittedly no doctor has been examined who could have said with certainty the percentage of disability incurred by the appellant in the said accident. However, there are documents on record to suggest that the appellant was hospitalized for sometime and underwent medical treatment. ( 8. ) Therefore keeping in view the entire facts on record the ends of justice would meet, if a compensation in lum sum is quantified to Rs.35,000/-.The appellant shall also be entitled for interest @ 6 % on the enhanced from the date of appeal. The compensation would be paid by the respondent jointly and severally. The amount of said compensation shall be deposited in fix deposit for a period of five years with a nationalized Bank. The appeal is allowed to the extent above. However, no costs. Appeal allowed.